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In recent years, there has been considerable linguistic interest in ‘non-canonical questions’
(Dayal 2016). These constructions express some quantity of interrogative meaning, as
well as some additional bias, or some additional request beyond pure information seeking.
This category includes four constructions with ‘negation’, which look superficially similar
but have received varying analyses in the literature: matrix biased questions; tag
questions; polar rhetorical questions, and interrogative exclamatives. In this thesis, I
address the question of how these constructions are related, and argue that the
relationships between these four ‘non-canonical questions’ are closer than the existing
literature suggests, building on and extending work from Sudo (2013) and Domaneschi et
al. (2017) who establish a framework for using speakers’ epistemic beliefs and the biases
provided by the evidential context to account for matrix biased questions. In order to
develop this overarching argument, I focus primarily on two constructions that have
received little attention in the literature: –int in Glasgow Scots and –n in the Shetland
dialect of Scots. I adapt an acceptability judgment style methodology for dialect syntax
research to incorporate recent work on non-canonical questions in experimental
pragmatics in order to establish the distribution of these particles across constructions
and belief/bias contexts. As part of this, I also qualitatively investigate how speakers of
different ages in communities with different relationships to linguistic change interact
with this common methodology for investigating linguistic variation, positing what I term
‘perceptual hyperdialectalism’ for the patterns of behaviour we see in an obsolescing
variety. From the results of the Scots research, I show that –int is acceptable in a subset
of the ‘non-canonical questions’, with –n available in the full set for older speakers but
seemingly undergoing loss in one context and moving towards the distribution of Glasgow
–int for younger speakers. This suggests that we should indeed treat the non-canonical
question constructions as more closely related than the literature suggests. I then provide
an analysis for the –int and –n constructions, arguing that they are check moves by
establishing the pragmatic similarities between the constructions that permit the
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particles and then developing a semantic analysis for them within Ginzburg’s (2012)
interactional semantics for dialogue. The final part of this analysis is to position the
particles syntactically. I do so by employing a conversational domain in the syntax above
CP, and by arguing for movement to this domain I build on existing literature that shows
that discourse particles exhibit syntactic behaviour and should be analysed as such.
My analysis of the Scots data has three main contributions: firstly, a full
description and analysis of the previously understudied Scots particles; secondly, an
analysis for standard English tag questions that clearly shows how they differ from the
Scots constructions and is also able to deal with problematic data from the literature
more accurately than other proposals; thirdly, new evidence that there needs to be more
fine-grained distinctions made, based on beliefs and biases, between the types of
conversational move that are made in e.g. tag questions and invariant particles, often
grouped together as ‘confirmationals’ or ‘checks’.
As well as the Scots data, I also address the relationship between the four non-
canonical questions through two sets of constructions in standard English. Firstly, I present
the results of an experiment which shows that although both matrix biased questions and
tag questions are permitted in neutral and negative evidential contexts, speakers prefer
biased questions in negative contexts, and tag questions in neutral ones. I show that this
follows from the analysis I presented for the syntax and semantics of tag questions in
standard English, and suggest that the results point towards a scalar model of beliefs and
biases as the best way to understand the licensing of interrogative constructions.
Finally, I look at polar rhetorical questions and rhetorical wh-questions. In the
literature, these constructions receive the same analysis throughout. However, the Scots
data indicates that the bias that is, or can be, expressed in polar rhetorical questions is
not the same as the bias that is expressed in rhetorical wh-questions. I argue that polar
rhetorical questions should receive the same analysis as matrix biased questions, following
Romero’s (2015) falsum/verum approach to the construction, and show that this cannot
hold for wh-questions. I then extend Kotek’s (2016) semantics for wh-questions to also
include rhetorical wh-questions, showing how this can account for a number of properties
that these constructions have (e.g. polarity flipped vs. non-flipped instances, NPI licensing,
lack of pair-list readings and ‘generic’ interpretations).
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Lay Summary
The primary purpose of asking an interrogative is to find out information. However,
sometimes questions do more than just seek information – for example, they might express
that the speaker has some sort of belief as to what the answer to the question should
be. Rhetorical yes-no questions (‘Didn’t I tell you it would be great?!’) are an obvious
example; others include biased questions (‘Didn’t she come too?’), tag questions (‘They
arrived, didn’t they?’) and interrogative exclamatives (‘Isn’t it a lovely day!’). This group
of ‘non-canonical questions’ (Dayal 2016) look similar on the surface, but have been given
varying analyses in the literature that suggests they are unrelated, or at best in two distinct
subgroups. However, I believe that the relationships between these constructions are closer
than has previously been suggested – this question of how the different constructions are
related is the central question of my thesis.
In order to investigate this question, I focus on data from two Scots varieties:
Glasgow Scots and the Shetland dialect of Scots. Each of these varieties has a particle
that seems to appear in some interrogative constructions: –int in Glasgow Scots (e.g.
‘She can come, kint she?’) and –n in Shetland dialect (e.g. ‘She can come, can’n she?’). I
use acceptability judgment tasks to establish the distribution of these particles across
contexts, and show that Glasgow –int is only available in 3 of the 4 non-canonical
questions named above, while Shetland dialect –n is only available in the 4 constructions
for older speakers, and 3 of the 4 for younger speakers.
Based on the results of this data collection process, I develop a pragmatic and
semantic analysis for the meaning of the Scots particles that focuses on the relationship
between the speaker and the other conversation participants, and what information is
assumed to be shared between them. I also propose a syntactic analysis for constructions
that include the particles, building on recent work on incorporating conversation
participants’ perspectives and goals into syntax. Throughout, I show how the analysis for
the Scots particles must be distinct from the analysis required for the constructions in
standard English. The English analysis I present brings together the four non-canonical
vi
constructions under one umbrella.
In the final two chapters of the thesis, I test the relationships between the four
constructions using standard English data. Firstly, I present the results of an experiment
which shows that speakers have strong intuitions about when a biased question should be
used and when a tag question should be used, despite the fact that both are technically
available in the same contexts. Secondly, I investigate the relationship between rhetorical
yes-no questions and rhetorical wh-questions (‘Who wouldn’t want to go to the party?!’).
I show that the analysis I put forward for non-canonical questions (including rhetorical
yes-no questions) cannot apply to the wh-question cases. I thus provide an alternative
analysis for the wh-question cases that can account for a number of properties that they
exhibit, some of which have previously not been discussed in the literature.
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Questions are generally understood to be information-seeking constructions, where the
speaker asks for their addressee to provide them with some information.
Cross-linguistically, question constructions can be signalled in various ways: in English,
ordinary polar questions like (1) are characterised by both syntactic properties
(subject-auxiliary inversion) and intonational properties (rising intonation).
(1) Can Emily come to the ↗party?
The notion of a question therefore appears, superficially, straightforward – a
speaker does not know something, and asks an addressee to provide the required
information through use of a construction that differs in its surface form from a
declarative proposition. Semantically, questions are taken to denote sets of propositions
(Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977), and in answering the question, the addressee selects
which proposition from the set holds in the world. For a question like (1), the addressee
would simply select between two propositions: Emily can come to the party (p) or Emily
cannot come to the party (¬p).
However, there is a growing literature on a group of constructions that I will term
‘non-canonical questions’, following Dayal (2017). These questions may behave differently
from standard interrogatives in terms of their syntax, and appear to express different
conversational goals. These constructions may also have complex relationships with
negation, and express meanings that contradict the surface polarity of the clause. At the
semantic/pragmatic level, non-canonical interrogative constructions thus pose questions
as to what sort of information is required to license interrogatives, and whether/how this
information is built into in the construction itself. At a syntactic level, non-canonical
questions raise the question of how much discourse is encoded in syntax, and how that
1
should be modelled. This thesis will engage with these major syntax/pragmatics interface
questions through detailed empirical investigation of two particles in two Scots2 varieties:
–int in Glasgow Scots, and –n in the Scots spoken in the Shetland Islands. Debate
surrounds the nomenclature used for this variety (see e.g. Tait (2007)). In this thesis, I
will refer to it as ‘Shetland dialect’.












(Shetland, Robertson and Graham 1952:10)
As can be seen from these examples, –int and –n seem to be used in places where
standard English would use negation in a non-canonical question. It is therefore non-
canonical question constructions with negation that I focus on in this thesis: negative
polar questions (or ‘biased questions’) (4), tag questions (5), rhetorical questions (6) and
interrogative exclamatives (7).
(4) Didn’t CJ go there yesterday too? biased question
(5) Lebo went there yesterday, didn’t she? tag question
(6) Didn’t I tell you it would be easy?! rhetorical question
(7) Isn’t it wonderful! exclamative
Theoretically, these constructions are interesting because all are non-canonical
questions that express some sort of bias towards a proposition p despite including
markers of negation. There is intuitively a clear link between these constructions;
however, the literature has considered them as two separate groups, with a relationship
between biased questions and tag questions, and a separate relationship between
rhetorical questions and interrogative exclamatives. There is thus a further question to be
addressed in this thesis about the overarching relationship between all four constructions.
I will now give a brief overview of recent accounts of the four constructions in the
literature as well as the role of intonation in questions, setting out the background for the
positions that I will take in this thesis. This will be followed by a short roadmap of the
thesis.
2‘Scots’ can be a loaded term, due to differing opinions on whether it should be classed as a language,
a dialect, a collection of dialects etc. Here, I use ‘Scots’ to refer to the varieties of English spoken across
Scotland.
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1.1 Non-canonical questions in the literature
1.1.1 Biased questions
The fact that negative polar questions (‘biased questions’) like (4) express bias was first
observed by Ladd (1981). While these may superficially look like negative questions, biased
questions indicate that the speaker has some existing belief of the positive proposition. The
fact that the negation isn’t ‘real’ can be seen syntactically. One would expect negation to
license negative polarity items (NPIs), such as either (Baker 1970, Horn 1989), but Ladd
observed that it was possible for questions with ‘outer’ negation (e.g. ‘high’ negation, or
reduced –n’t negation which attaches to the auxiliary and also inverts above the subject)
to not ‘anti-license’ (Giannakidou 1997) positive polarity items such as too, which are
generally repelled by negation. This is shown in (4), above. It is possible to have ‘true
negative questions’, which do license NPIs, such as (8) – Ladd referred to these as ‘inner’
negation questions3.
(8) Can Emily not come to the party either?
However, while ‘inner’ negation polar questions are used in cases where the speaker
is truly seeking information about the negative proposition underlying the question, ‘outer’
negation polar questions express a bias towards the proposition of the opposite polarity i.e.
to p. In asking a question like (4), the speaker is somehow making clear to the addressee
that they are biased toward the answer of the question being p.
A number of analyses have been proposed to account for this bias, both in terms
of establishing its pragmatic distribution and in terms of the actual semantics of the
question. In this thesis, I will follow the position of Sudo (2013), Domaneschi et al.
(2017) and Gaertner and Gyuris (2017) in arguing from the pragmatic point of view that
both the speaker’s epistemic belief and the evidential context surrounding the interaction
are important in licensing biased questions4.
Following Sudo (2013), I use the term ‘epistemic belief’ here to signal the extant
belief of the speaker when entering into the interaction where a non-canonical question
will be used. I use ‘epistemic belief’ as I set aside the potential influence of prior deontic,
3Ladd is primarily concerned with the idea that high –n’t negation can be both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’,
leading to ‘Ladd’s ambiguity’. However, more recent experimental work from Sailor (2013) in US English
and Domaneschi et al. (2017) in UK English has shown that Ladd’s ambiguity does not actually hold for
most speakers. I thus set that aside.
4There is an alternative perspective presented in the literature by e.g. Northrup (2014), Trinh (2014)
and Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) in which question bias can be accounted for purely through evidentiality.
Where relevant in this thesis, I will argue against this perspective, positing that the interaction between the
belief and the biases is crucial to understanding when and why speakers produce non-canonical questions.
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bouletic or teleological biases held by the speaker, though I acknowledge that they may
have their own effects; I will touch on these in chapter 5.
The ‘epistemic belief’ is some content that is part of the speaker’s set of beliefs
which is not currently active in the Common Ground (CG), but which the speaker believes
should be active in CG, whether through addition or reactivation. The epistemic belief
may be objective (such as ‘Hibs won the Scottish Cup in 2016 ’) or it may be subjective
(such as ‘this cake is delicious’) – either way, the person holding the belief of p is willing
to take responsibility for it (Krifka 2014, Woods 2016)5 and as such to be a source for it
(Gunlogson 2003). People may, of course, have epistemic beliefs that they do not wish to
make active in CG. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the ‘epistemic belief’ is the
speaker’s particular existing belief of p that they wish to discuss with the addressee.
While beliefs have been reasonably well-defined in the literature, there have been
few attempts to define what ‘evidence’ is in non-canonical questions, even from the purely
evidential accounts (though, see section 4.2.2 for discussion of Northrup’s (2014) evidential
base).
Here, I assume that evidence is something that conversation participants have
immediate and unproblematic access to, and which is public – i.e., it is manifest to all
discourse participants (Sperber and Wilson 1995). Sudo (2013) also takes this position.
However, I believe there needs to be some further consideration to this definition. In
principle, the evidence should be objective; however, given that the prior epistemic states
of conversation participants inevitably vary, there will always be some degree of
subjectivity to the strength of the evidence, even in examples which are fundamentally
objective. Take example (9).
(9) S believes that A bought a car recently. A mutual friend tells S that he saw A
going into to a car showroom at the weekend. S says:
Didn’t she just get a new car?
Here, S believes p - ‘A bought a car recently’. This belief is objective. S is then
confronted by some evidence: A was seen going into a car showroom at the weekend. This
evidence is also objective. However, it is easy to imagine how the backgrounds of S and A
can vary, and can subsequently affect the interpretation of the evidence produced by the
friend.
5Rather than stating the speaker believes p to be true, I follow Krifka (2014) and Woods (2016) in
stating that the speaker is at least willing to take responsibility for p in the discourse. This allows for
uncertainty, lying, bullshitting etc. However, for simplicity and for consistency with other relevant work,
I will refer to this as a ‘belief’.
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In a situation where both S and A are extremely wealthy businesswomen, the belief
that A already owns a car does not necessarily preclude S from believing that A is shopping
for a new car – she may well be buying a second. The fact that S believes A bought the
car recently means that the evidence may be considered slight negative counterevidence to
this prior belief – although the idea of A owning two cars is very much possible, why would
she be shopping for another quite so soon? However, this evidence would not eliminate the
possibility of S’s belief being true. The biased question is a possible response here, though
there may be other preferred responses, such as a tag question like She just got a new car,
didn’t she?.
On the other hand, in a situation where both conversation participants are less
than extremely wealthy, A’s going to a car showroom would be strong negative evidence
challenging S’s belief that ‘A bought a car recently’. Why would she be looking at a second
car, especially so soon after she had bought a first? Intuitively, the chances of producing
the given biased question are higher in this version of the world, where S’s prior epistemic
state leads them to judge the (identical) evidence as more negative than they would if they
operated in a world where money was no object (see chapter 5 for more on the choice of
biased questions and tag questions given evidential contexts).
While this is an extreme example of how discourse participants’ interpretations of
contextual evidence can vary, the basic principles are more broadly applicable: individual
speakers’ interpretations of contextual evidence will vary based on their background,
culture and the assumptions about the world that they bring to the conversation. So,
although evidence is in principle objective in question production, it can never truly be
devolved from speaker perspective and interpretation.
Returning to the existing literature, looking at data from English and Japanese,
Sudo (2013) posits a feature-based system, where different questions are licensed in different
contexts based on the combination of beliefs and evidential biases. Evidential context can
be either [+] or [–], [positive] or [negative]; for example, an evidential context in favour of
p would be [+positive], while an evidential context with no evidence for or against p would
be [–positive, –negative]. Beliefs are positive (p), negative (¬p), or it is possible that a
speaker can have no specific belief [Ø].
Sudo makes claims about the distribution of interrogative forms in English and
Japanese; Domaneschi et al. (2017) subsequently make use of a similar feature-based system
in their experimental work investigating when speakers in English and German choose to
produce different forms of matrix questions. Their work corroborated the claims of Sudo
5
(2013) about the distribution of biased questions in English. Their results are summarised




p PPQ / really?! PPQ really?! PPQ
neutral ONPQ PPQ
¬p ONPQ6 INPQ
Table 1.1: Relationship between epistemic and evidential biases established in Domaneschi
et al. (2017) for choice of matrix question produced in English and German.
Table 1.1 borrows terminology from Ladd (1981), who describes true negative
questions as ‘inner negation’ polar questions (INPQs), such as (8), repeated here.
(10) Can Emily not come to the party either?
The other terminology that Domaneschi et al. take from Ladd (1981) is the idea of
‘outer negation’ polar questions (ONPQs). These correspond to matrix biased questions
and have ‘high’ negation (e.g. in English, –n’t rather than not), such as (4). Domaneschi et
al. then add positive polar questions (PPQs), which are polar questions with no negative
markers (such as (1)), and really?! positive polar questions (really?! PPQs), which are
positive polar questions preceded by really?!, expressing surprise. Blank squares were not
tested as Domaneschi et al. argue that questions would not be used in these contexts (see
chapter 7 for more discussion).
As summarised in Table 1.1, Domaneschi et al.’s production experiment showed
that speakers had significant preferences as to which form of matrix question should be
produced depending on the particular combination of prior belief and current evidential
context that the participants had been given. Most relevant for the thesis at this point is
the distribution of ONPQs, which are used when speakers already have a bias towards the
answer of the question (p), and there is either challenging counterevidence or simply no
evidence in favour of p. I will refer to these as ‘(matrix) biased questions’ throughout this
thesis.
While these ideas of beliefs and biases explain the distribution of the forms of
interrogatives, the question of how biased questions express the idea that speaker believes
p has led to some debate. Here, I will give a brief summary of the three main positions
in the literature: a pragmatic analysis based on utility values (van Rooij and Šafářová
6Domaneschi et al. (2017) find that there is variation in the intonation used in ONPQs in this cell and
suggest that there may be an INPQ variant here; however, they leave the details for future research.
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2003), a semantic analysis centered on negation of the speech act (Krifka 2015) and the
¬verum (Romero and Han 2004) and falsum approaches (Repp 2009, Romero 2015).
In this thesis I generally support the falsum analysis, which developed from the original
¬verum analysis: here, I explain briefly why I reject the two alternative analyses, and
give a brief summary of Romero and Han (2004) and Romero (2015) – for more detailed
discussion, see chapter 4.
van Rooij and Šafářová (2003) argue for a pragmatic account for question bias in
which all polar interrogatives have the same denotation. Whether a positive polar question
(Does she like dogs? ), a negative polar question (Does she not like dogs? ) or an alternative
question (Does she like dogs or cats? ) is used depends on the pragmatic purposes of the
question, and which question would have the highest utility value given the context and
the speaker’s expectations. In particular, ‘the speaker prefers to ask that type of polar
question for which the utility of the positive answer is higher or equal to that of its negative
counterpart ’ (van Rooij and Šafářová 2003:301). Positive polar questions, then, are used
where the speaker’s goal is to have p added to CG, as the positive answer (‘yes, p’) is more
useful in achieving the goal. The authors argue that alternative questions are used when
the speaker has no bias towards p or ¬p7. For the purposes of this thesis, most interesting
is their claim about negative polar questions: they argue that Ladd’s (1981) distinction
between ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ negation should be forgotten and that both are cases where the
negative proposition ¬p is either more informative, or the speaker believes that ¬p should
hold (i.e. it is their goal). While van Rooij and Šafářová (2003) present a neat analysis, it
does not account for the results in Domaneschi et al. (2017), where different positions of
negation had different licensing contexts, nor the fact that true negative questions license
NPIs while biased questions do not.
Krifka (2015) argues that the negation found in biased questions is a particular
speech act operator, situated in a high NegP. This operator embeds a ForceP that hosts
assertion force, and is scoped over by a second ForceP which hosts request force.
It is this request operator that licenses the interrogative word order; speech act level
NegP is not accessible without the inclusion of this request operator. The high negation
subsequently acts to ‘denegate’ the lower assertion force, asking the addressee if it is not
this assertion (i.e. is it some other assertion) that should be added to CG.
(11) S believes that there is a vegetarian restaurant nearby, but hasn’t seen it, and
7No bias in terms of their epistemic belief as to which should hold – this does not mean that a speaker is
necessarily neutral in in terms of their desire as to which proposition holds (van Rooij and Šafářová 2003).
See Beltrama et al. (2018) for recent discussion of alternative questions and their licensing conditions.
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wants to ask A whether their belief is correct.
[ForceP request [NegP isin’t [ForceP assertion [TP there ti a vegetarian restaurant
here]]]]
Krifka claims that this accounts for negation being syntactically high in biased
questions, which is common cross-linguistically: Romero and Han (2004) give evidence from
e.g. Bulgarian, Korean, German, Greek and Spanish. However, biased question negation is
not necessarily distinctly high. For example, in Japanese, the position of negation is fixed
regardless of whether the question has a biased or true negative meaning (Sudo 2013:12).
The two meanings can only be forced by inclusion of PPIs for the biased question reading
















‘Is no-one else coming?’ (Japanese, Sudo 2013:14-15)
Perhaps in languages like Japanese, it could be argued that there is LF raising
of negation to scope over the assertion operator – however, syntactically, this does not
then justify having a particular high negation position in the syntax. Furthermore, Romero
and Han (2004:614) state that although there are differences in preposed vs non-preposed
negation, it is not the case that this negation is correlated with a specific position; while
they believe it to be in C for e.g. English and Bulgarian, they cite work that argues
that in Spanish and Greek, the negation is lower than C (Suñer 1994, Alexiadou and
Anagnostopolou 1998). There does not, therefore, seem to be reason to argue for a specific
syntactic ‘high negation’ position based on the cross-linguistic evidence.
Instead, in thesis I support the analysis that biased question negation is not-at-issue
content (Romero (2015), building on Romero and Han (2004)). Romero and Han (2004)
argue that the negation in a biased question scopes over a verum operator (Höhle 1992).
verum is a conversational epistemic operator which, in Höhle’s original conception, is a
particular kind of focus accent that does not focus the part of the proposition it sits on,
but rather emphasises that the proposition as a whole is true (see Lohnstein (2016) and












‘Karl has fed the dog’ (Lohnstein 2016:290)
In a biased question, Romero and Han (2004) argue that the verum operator is
scoped over by the negative marker at LF; this construction is then scoped over by the Q
marker.
(15) Isn’t Jane coming too?
LF: [CP Q not [ verum [IP Jane is coming too]]]
The speaker is thus asking whether they are correct in assuming that p is true and
should definitely be added to the Common Ground.
Following criticisms of the ¬verum analysis from Romero (2006) and AnderBois
(2011) (see chapter 4), Repp (2009) and Romero (2015) posit instead that the negation is
not true negation, but a falsum marker. falsum is, in effect, the opposite end of a scale
from verum and signals that the speaker does not believe p is true.
(16) Jfalsum pK = zero degrees of strength for adding p to the Common Ground
(Repp 2009:199)
In a biased question, then, the question operator scopes over falsum as well as
the proposition, and asks whether it is the case that there are zero degrees of strength for
adding p to CG.
(17) Isn’t Jane coming too?
LF: [CP Q [ falsum [IP Jane is coming too]]]
I will discuss the falsum analysis for biased questions in more detail in chapter 4.
In summary, biased questions have been shown to be interesting because they
express bias towards an underlying proposition p, and thus have an unexpected
relationship to polarity, as well as being licensed by a complex interaction between
speaker beliefs and the evidential context. I move on to consider tag questions, often
assumed to be closely related to biased questions.
1.1.2 Tag questions
Canonical tag questions8 like (5), repeated below, are the second type of non-canonical
question construction which will be considered in this thesis.
8Following Sailor (2011), I refer to tag questions where the tag agrees with the anchor e.g. in terms of
the auxiliary verb and the pronoun agreeing with the subject of the anchor as ‘(canonical) tag questions’.
Most often, canonical tag questions are of the opposite polarity to their anchor (Tottie and Hoffman
2006); however, same polarity canonical tags are possible. I contrast the term canonical tag question with
‘invariant tag particles’: a category which includes various tag particles like right, huh and eh.
9
(18) Lebo went there yesterday, didn’t she?
It is often claimed that tag questions are complex syntactic constructions, with the
entire speech act expressed by the combination of the assertion in the ‘anchor’ proposition
of the tag and the question in the tag. Syntactically, both Culicover (1992) and den
Dikken (1995) posit movement analyses for tag questions, in which the anchor is raised
above the tag. However, Sailor (2011) formalises the notion that the two clauses are in
fact separate (suggested informally by e.g. van Rooij and Šafářová (2003), Reese and Asher
(2006)). Under Sailor’s account, the anchor of the tag is a regular assertion, while the tag
is a biased question which has undergone VP-ellipsis due to the egivenness condition
(Merchant 2001), which states that information can be elided if it is already given in the
context.
The idea that tag questions express bias has been long noted in the literature
(Sadock 1974, Millar and Brown 1979, Ladd 1981, Reese and Asher 2006, Malamud and
Stephenson 2014), with the tag taken to do something like ‘hedge’, ‘check’ or ‘reconfirm’
(Ladd 1981) the proposition presented in the anchor of the tag. It is assumed that the
speaker has a bias towards that proposition being true and so the tag, of the opposite
polarity, relates to that bias.
In terms of how that bias is expressed in tag questions, in his syntactic analysis,
Sailor (2011) posits that these tags are specifically VP-elided biased questions. Matching
this, a number of accounts have added tag questions into their analysis of matrix biased
questions. van Rooij and Šafářová (2003) mention tag questions as part of their utility
value analysis; Krifka (2015) also accounts for tag questions in the same ‘denegation of the
assertion’ analysis he poses for biased questions, and both Sailor (2011) and Malamud and
Stephenson (2014) do not formalise a ¬verum analysis for tag questions but suggest this
would be the correct direction to go in. I will take it for granted throughout this thesis
that tag questions are VP-elided biased questions, and thus that they also have a falsum
analysis9.
As well as the syntactic and semantic structure of the canonical tag question
construction, the discourse purpose of tag questions has also be discussed in the
literature (Reese and Asher 2006, Malamud and Stephenson 2014). It is this aspect of tag
questions that I will focus on in this thesis. These works do not discuss the meaning of
the individual parts of tag questions, but rather the overall impact of the constructions
9Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) are an exception to this general rule that canonical tag questions are
linked to biased questions in the literature; they posit a complex speech act analysis for tag questions but
do not discuss matrix biased questions. I will discuss their analysis in detail in chapter 4.
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on the discourse. Reese and Asher (2006) argue that reverse polarity tag questions
produce ‘Acknowledgment’ and ‘Confirmation’ moves. Malamud and Stephenson (2014)
discuss the impact of reverse polarity tag questions with rising intonation (as well as
same polarity tag questions and rising declaratives) on a Table model of discourse
(Farkas and Bruce 2010), invoking the idea that a speaker projects potential discourse
commitments on behalf of themselves or the addressee. I discuss these analyses in detail
in detail in chapter 4.
So, though tag questions may have additional purpose beyond information-seeking
and expressing of bias, it is still assumed in the literature that they are closely related
to biased questions – if not completely the same construction. I now turn to look at the
positions the literature has taken on rhetorical questions and interrogative exclamatives –
positions quite separate from biased questions and tag questions.
1.1.3 Rhetorical questions
Rhetorical questions like (6), repeated here, look on the surface to be regular interrogatives.
(19) Didn’t I tell you it would be easy?!
However, their purpose is assumed not to be information-seeking. Sadock (1974)
claims that rhetorical questions semantically have the force of an assertion of the opposite
polarity to their form. So, a rhetorical question like (6) would have the force of a positive
assertion, indicating that the speaker had told the addressee that ‘it would be easy’. Han
(2002) presents a semantic analysis to account for this ‘assertive force’.
However, more recently, there has been a shift away from this speech act analysis
of rhetorical questions towards a more pragmatic analysis which retains their status as
interrogatives semantically, as well as syntactically. Beginning with Rohde (2006) and
followed by Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) and Biezma and Rawlins (2017), it has been
shown that different types of interrogative constructions can serve as rhetorical questions
(e.g. 20), and do not necessarily have to indicate opposite polarity assertions (e.g. 21).
(20) Are you doing a PhD or vacationing in Konstanz?! (Biezma and Rawlins 2017:303)
(21) It’s understandable that Luca adores Mina. After all, who helped him when he was
in trouble?
(=‘Mina helped Luca when he was in trouble’)
(Caponigro and Sprouse 2007:124)
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Although these examples are clearly not semantically equivalent to an assertion of
the opposite polarity, the notion of ‘asserting’ has remained prevalent. Ginzburg (2012)
argues that rhetorical questions are used to ‘restate’ something which is known to all
conversation participants; similarly Biezma and Rawlins (2017) argue that rhetorical
questions are non-inquisitive interrogatives in which the meaning is forced into CG via
presupposition, and thus do not have to be answered, giving them an assertive flavour
although they are still questions.
Rhetorical questions are thus assumed to strongly express a bias towards a
particular proposition – however, perhaps because they are considered to be almost
‘beyond’ bias (as a statement or assertion), they have not generally been discussed in the
same terms as matrix biased questions or tag questions. Biezma and Rawlins (2017) do
claim that these interrogatives that express attitudes are from the ‘same family’, but do
not claim that the bias arises in the same way. Their account of rhetorical questions
assumes that the information is already in CG for all conversation participants, or forced
through presupposition based on evidential context, rather than through any particular
semantic mechanism such as verum or falsum.
Importantly also, accounts of rhetorical questions have attempted to group all
rhetorical questions into the same analysis. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 6;
I now move on to discuss interrogative exclamatives in the literature.
1.1.4 Interrogative exclamatives
Most discussion of exclamatives has focused on wh-exclamatives e.g. How amazing that
talk was!, with polar interrogative type exclamatives (such as (7), repeated below) taken
to be a side note, perhaps incorporated into the category of rhetorical questions (Zanuttini
and Portner 2003, Delfitto and Fiorin 2014).
(22) Isn’t it wonderful!
The analyses that have been put forward for exclamatives have been varied: there
have been those where the semantics of exclamatives come from a question which has had
its domain widened to include an unexpected answer (e.g. Zanuttini and Portner 2003),
and those where there is a specific degree mechanism responsible for the meaning (e.g.
Rett 2011). Other analyses combine the two aspects: for example, Castroviejo Miró (2008),
Wood (2014) and Taniguchi (2017) all combine question semantics with some form of degree
modifier (e.g. pos, see discussion in Kennedy and McNally (2005)) or exclamative force
modifier (e.g. Taniguchi’s excl). Despite the mixed opinions on how the degree/scalarity
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interpretation should arise, all but Rett (2011) have treated exclamatives as underlyingly
interrogative constructions with question semantics which have some additional semantic
mechanism to provide the exclamative interpretation.
Exclamatives will not be discussed in as much depth as the other three constructions,
but will be referred to throughout chapter 4 where necessary.
1.1.5 The role of intonation
In the previous four subsections, I focused on the fact that the four non-canonical
questions investigated in this thesis have the same syntax as regular interrogatives in
English. However, as noted in the first paragraph, there is also a regular intonation
contour associated with English polar interrogatives – rising intonation. It is therefore
worth noting that the prosodic qualities of the four non-canonical questions presented
here have been reported to vary from this. Most substantially, work has been carried out
into the intonation contours of rhetorical questions (Quirk et al. 1985, Banuazizi and
Creswell 1999, Bartels 1999, Dehé 2017). Dehé (2017) shows that a complex interaction
of contours, accent placement, duration and voice quality appear to signal rhetorical
questions in English, contrasting with the signals for information-seeking questions.
Intonation has also played an important role in discussion of the properties of tag
questions. Ladd (1981) claims that there are ‘nuclear’ tag questions, those where the tag
has a separate nucleus to its anchor, and ‘post-nuclear’ tag questions, where the tag is
incorporated into the same intonation contour as its anchor. He furthermore claims that
post-nuclear tags rise while nuclear tags fall; Reese and Asher (2006) argue that while
post-nuclear tags always rise, nuclear tags can either rise or fall. Furthermore, Dehé and
Braun (2013) present a corpus study showing that falling intonation is the most common
type in reverse polarity tag questions. Tag questions, therefore, do not always have the
rising contour predicted of regular interrogatives.
Intonation contours are less frequently discussed for biased questions or interrogative
exclamatives. Domaneschi et al. (2017) find that there may be some variation in intonation
patterns for biased questions in situations where the speaker is being challenged by some
counterevidence – however, they do not investigate this in any more detail. Interrogative
exclamatives do not have regular rising intonation, and are generally posited to have falling
intonation (Clark and Lindsey 1990, Taniguchi 2017)10.
10There may well be other properties involved in the prosodic marking of interrogative exclamatives –
further work along the lines of Dehé’s (2017) in-depth work on the intonation of rhetorical questions would
be beneficial.
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Regarding the meaning of the various prosodic patterns found in these non-canonical
questions, there have been three main ways of dealing with this in the literature. Firstly,
there have been accounts in which the intonation has been incorporated into the overall
meaning of the construction – for example, Reese and Asher (2006), who consider the
varying intonation patterns of tag questions in order to make claims about their meanings
as whole units. Secondly, the idea that rising intonation adds some sort of ‘questioning’
speech act to a construction has been a popular theory (Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg
1990, Truckenbrodt 2015, Farkas and Roelofsen 2017), primarily based on evidence from
rising declaratives, which appear to take on an interrogative meaning purely due to the
addition of rising intonation. Finally, Gunlogson (2008) argues that rising intonation has
a more pragmatic meaning, that of contingency, defined as follows:
‘A discourse move µ by an agent α is contingent on a discourse condition δ if:
(a) δ does not obtain at the time of µ; and
(b) It is inferrable from the discourse context that the update effected by µ
is to be retained only if δ obtains after the discourse move immediately
succeeding µ.’
(Gunlogson 2008:129)
So, in a rising declarative, the acceptance of p (the proposition in the declarative)
to CG will only happen if the addressee is able to be an ‘independent source’ for the
proposition – and thus to take responsibility for it. Gunlogson (2008) argues this accounts
for the distribution of rising declaratives, which are used when the speaker has some weak
evidence to suggest that p is true, but is aware that the addressee is in a position of
authority with regards to the topic, such as (23).
(23) Robin is sitting in a windowless computer room when another person enters. The
newcomer is wearing a wet raincoat and boots. Robin says to the newcomer:
It’s raining?
It is this meaning of contingency I will apply to the rising intonation on
non-canonical questions in this thesis. Throughout, I will make arguments in favour of
this point, particularly over the speech act analysis.
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1.2 Questions at hand and roadmap
As previously mentioned, this thesis will investigate a number of questions at the
syntax/pragmatics interface by carrying out a detailed investigation into the particles
–int in Glasgow Scots and –n in Shetland dialect.












(Shetland, Robertson and Graham 1952:10)
In order to address the overarching questions about the role of evidence and belief
in discourse, and about discourse in syntax, it will firstly be crucial to establish the
distribution of –int and –n, only briefly mentioned in the literature so far. In chapter 2, I
introduce the two varieties in more detail before giving a brief overview of the literature
on the complexities of negation in Scots, and of questions in Scots. I then develop an
extension to the ‘interview method’ for dialect syntax (Cornips and Poletto 2005,
Barbiers and Bennis 2007, Thoms 2014) that I use as the methodology for gathering data
on the two particles. As part of this, I discuss how best to interpret acceptability
judgment data in non-standard varieties, and posit an extension of hyperdialectalism
(Labov 1972b, Trudgill 1986, Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 1995, 2006, Britain and Fox
2009) to the perceptual domain in Shetland, improving our ability to interpret
acceptability judgment data, and shedding further light on linguistic change in Shetland.
In chapter 3 I present quantitative and qualitative results from the data collection
process in order to establish the distribution of –int and –n, taking the information from
chapter 2 into account. I show that –int and –n are each restricted to a set of
non-canonical question constructions: –int in tag questions with some contextual
preferences; polar exclamatives, and rhetorical questions, and –n in the same
constructions, with evidence of some acceptability in matrix biased questions but with
ongoing loss.
Having established the distribution of the particles, in chapter 4 I turn to an analysis
of the particles, addressing pragmatic, semantic and syntactic questions about the encoding
of beliefs and evidence in discourse. Firstly, I establish the specifics of the pragmatic
conditions that link the three contexts that can license the –int and –n particles, arguing
that there is an important role for the relationship between the speaker and addressee. I
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thus build links between all four non-canonical questions with negation in standard English
discussed above, but show where the Scots particles could develop separate functions.
I then provide a semantic and syntactic analysis for the particles, arguing that despite
their surface appearance – very much like negation markers – they are not negation, nor
are they markers of specific biased question negation such as falsum (Romero 2015).
Instead, I argue that these particles have been reanalysed as check markers, extending
the interactional semantic framework of Ginzburg (2012). Syntactically, having argued
that these particles are a sort of discourse marker, I address the question of discourse in
the syntax. I build on the work of e.g. Speas and Tenny (2003), Haegeman and Hill (2013)
and Wiltschko and Heim (2016) who posit various neo-performative syntactic projections
above CP. Specifically, I argue –n and –int trigger head movement to this discourse domain,
providing further evidence that discourse particles should be treated as part of the syntax.
Throughout chapter 4, I make comparisons with relevant analyses for standard
English constructions to show both where the Scots data diverges, and how standard
English can also be accounted for in this framework. In chapters 5 and 6, I move on to
consider standard English more closely, as the Scots data makes links between all four non-
canonical questions constructions discussed at the beginning, and raises questions about
assumptions that have been made in the literature.
Firstly, recent literature has shown cross-linguistically that speakers choose to use
different forms of matrix interrogatives depending on their epistemic beliefs and the
evidential context surrounding the interaction. Furthermore, it has also been shown
cross-linguistically that speakers use different forms of tag questions depending on their
epistemic beliefs and the evidential context surrounding the interaction. Matrix biased
questions and tag questions are argued to be available in the same contexts in English, as
detailed in sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 – however there has not, to date, been any
experimental work to establish whether the contexts which permit both types of
construction exhibit a preference as to which construction should be used. Given the
within-construction variation seen, and the ongoing change evidence in the Shetland
data, we might expect there to be preference by evidential context.
In chapter 5 I present a forced-choice task in order to test this question in both
English and German. I show that the English results fall out from the analysis for canonical
English tag questions that I set out in chapter 4, and is preferable to the analyses of
Northrup (2014) or Malamud and Stephenson (2014). Based on a comparison of the
results between English and German, I briefly hypothesize based on the results that cross-
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linguistically, beliefs and biases operate in a scalar fashion with regard to strength of
belief11, and consider a special role for beliefs beyond the epistemic (e.g. bouletic or deontic
beliefs).
In chapter 6, I move away from biased questions and tag questions to focus on
rhetorical questions. Shetland dialect –n and Glasgow Scots –int are available in polar
rhetorical questions, but not in rhetorical wh-questions. While both are clearly
non-canonical questions of sorts, this causes problems for standard analyses of rhetorical
questions, which treat polar and wh- rhetorical questions as being amenable to the same
analysis. In chapter 6 I therefore turn to address the relationship between polar and wh-
rhetorical questions and how these meanings are encoded semantically and syntactically.
I firstly argue that polar rhetorical questions can be understood in the same sort of belief
and bias model as biased questions, and in effect ‘fill in the blanks’ in the table presented
by Domaneschi et al. (2017) (Table 1.1). I show that rhetoricalness in wh-questions
cannot be expressed in the same way. This solidifies the relationship between the
non-canonical question constructions posited above, and speaks to the broader question
of how bias in interrogatives is expressed.
I then present evidence that there are at least two types of rhetorical wh-question,
one in which there is a known value for the wh-word in CG, and one which is a more
‘traditional’ rhetorical question that I argue has a ‘generic’ element to its interpretation. I
build on Kotek’s (2016) semantics for wh-questions in order to account for these two types
of rhetorical wh-question.
Chapter 7 draws together discussion from chapters 3-6 and concludes.
Overall, then, throughout this thesis I develop ways to grammatically encode
features of discourse in both syntax and semantics, based on detailed empirical work of
two understudied varieties, as well as investigation into standard English. I also present
arguments for developing a cohesive theory of polar interrogatives, built on a
combination of speaker beliefs, evidential contexts, and speaker perception of addressee
beliefs, extending recent work from Sudo (2013), Domaneschi et al. (2017) and Gaertner
and Gyuris (2017).
There are some notable aspects of the topics at hand that I do not cover in this
thesis. Firstly, one of the most striking properties of interrogatives in Scots is that there
is no specific form for biased questions. Both biased questions and true negative questions
11A similar idea regarding strength or credence of belief is put forward by Farkas and Roelofsen (2017);
however, Farkas and Roelofsen model their entire system of question bias on the strength of epistemic
belief alone. The results of my research support a model of question production that incorporates both
epistemic belief and evidential bias, such as Sudo (2013) and Gaertner and Gyuris (2017).
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are formed with low negation, as opposed to standard English, where there is a distinction
between high –n’t negation (biased questions) and verb-subject-not constructions (true
negative questions) (see section 2.3.2). I do not consider in any detail why Scots diverged
from English in this way – in part because there is not enough historical data available
in Scots. I also do not discuss in any great detail why standard reduced negation –na in
Scots does not appear to be able to raise in questions while –n’t can in standard English.
See Weir (2007) and Thoms et al. (2013) for some theoretical discussion on this topic.
Finally, I do not make any significant arguments as to what the negation in non-
canonical questions is, outside of the Scots context. For the most part, I follow Romero
(2015) in arguing that negation in biased questions is not regular semantic negation, but
falsum, as discussed above.
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Chapter 2
Scots Data and Methodology
2.1 Introduction
The primary data used to address the major questions presented at the beginning of this
thesis comes from non-canonical questions with ‘negation’ in two varieties of Scots: Glasgow
Scots and the Shetland dialect of Scots. In this chapter, I will firstly (in section 2.3) give
a brief overview of the two communities in question. The non-canonical questions at hand
have been shown to have complex relationships to negation; negation in Scots is in general
a complex phenomenon, and so I will then outline what we know about negation in Scots,
focusing on negation in interrogatives and particularly on Glasgow Scots and Shetland
dialect – as well as touching on declaratives, imperatives and variation in negation across
other areas of Scotland and the UK.
In section 2.4 I move on to introduce the methodology I use by firstly giving an
outline of how traditional grammaticality judgment tasks have been adapted and refined
in previous studies in order to investigate dialect syntax. I then outline a handful of
relevant experiments in laboratory pragmatics that have investigated both the pragmatic
and prosodic conditions required for insight into non-canonical questions. In section 2.4.2
I detail how I combined these two types of methodology, incorporating insights from
experimental pragmatics into the ‘interview method’ for dialect syntax in order to
investigate non-canonical question constructions in these varieties.
Finally in section 2.5, I consider the sociolinguistic contexts in which the judgments
were given, and how these issues of linguistic change and identity influence how speakers
carry out acceptability judgment tasks. This will appropriately arm us to interpret the
quantitative results presented in chapter 3.
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Figure 2.1: Map of Scotland highlighting the locations of the Shetland Islands and of the
Greater Glasgow area. ©NordNordWest / Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY-SA-3.0
2.2 Glasgow and Shetland
The data for this thesis comes from two very different communities in Scotland. Situated
on the central west coast, the Greater Glasgow area has an approximate population of
1.2 million (Census 2011) and is the largest urban area in Scotland. By comparison, the
Shetland Islands are the most northerly region of Scotland, 200 miles north of Aberdeen,
with a population of just 23,000 (Shetland in Statistics 2013:9).
Two rather distinct varieties of Scots are spoken in these areas. For details of
features of Glasgow Scots, see e.g. Macafee (1983, 1994), Stuart-Smith (1999), Macaulay
(2006), Stuart-Smith et al. (2006, 2007), Thoms et al. (2013), Childs (2017). For features
of Shetland dialect, see e.g. Robertson and Graham (1952), Melchers (1997), Pavlenko
(1997), van Leyden (2004), Sundkvist (2007), Smith and Durham (2011, 2012), Durham
(2013), Jamieson (2015). While each variety has a wide range of distinctive linguistic
features, relevant for this research are two small particles: –int in Glasgow Scots, and –n
in Shetland dialect.
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‘Tammy, isn’t that Jeannie of Maanwil’s daughter who has got married this week?’
(Shetland, Tait 1973:13)
Before we consider these negative-looking particles in detail, it is first necessary
to establish the general patterns of negation seen across Scots (and other non-standard
English) varieties and thus to situate these particles in their wider context.
2.3 Negation in Scots
2.3.1 Declaratives and imperatives
Negative declaratives and negative concord
Sentential negation in standard English can be expressed in two different ways: either with
a full negative marker, not, as in (28), or with a contracted negative marker, –n’t, as in (29).
The auxiliary may or may not be contracted in cases like (28) (Brown and Millar 1980,
Tagliamonte and Smith 2002, Yaeger-Dror et al. 2002, Varela Pérez 2013). Prevalence of
auxiliary contraction is associated with speech style, stance and dialect – however, it is not
relevant for the later discussion of interrogatives and so I will not discuss it any further
here.
(28) Andre will not like it.
(29) Hema won’t like it.
There is some debate in the literature as to whether the reduced negation form –n’t
in the present day is a clitic or an affix (Zwicky and Pullum 1983, Thoms et al. 2013). I take
no position in this debate, and will refer to the –n’t particle as ‘reduced’ or ‘contracted’
negation throughout.
There is phonological variation across varieties of English with respect to the
negative markers: for example, in Yorkshire, loss of [n] following a vowel (30) is
commonly attested; while glottalising or omitting the final [t] is common across English
varieties (Anderwald 2002).
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(30) They sell electrical goods but they [do:t] repair them.
(Yorkshire, Steele and Whisker 2007)
The forms of negation markers in Scots varieties clearly diverge from standard
English. General descriptive accounts of Scots often claim that no [no] is the standalone
negation particle corresponding to standard English not (Brown and Millar 1980,
Anderwald 2002). Indeed, no as the independent negative marker appears to be available
in all Scots-speaking areas except the north east (e.g. Aberdeenshire), where the
standalone negator is nae [neI] (McClure 2002, Macafee 2011). In both of the varieties
investigated in this thesis, Glasgow Scots (Thoms et al. 2013) and Shetland dialect
(Robertson and Graham 1952), the standalone negative marker is no [no].













‘He’ll not know that you’re here.’ (Shetland, Graham 1993:58)
This no is not constituent negation (see Thoms et al. (2013) for arguments relating
to its ability to be syntactically very high, its potential for variation in scope-taking with
because adjuncts, and NPI licensing properties), and can co-occur with constituent negation
(also realised as no in both Glasgow Scots and Shetland dialect).
(33) He should NO no go. (Scots, Thoms et al. 2013)
While no as a standalone negative marker is the most common variant across Scots
varieties and is the same in both of the varieties investigated in this thesis, the reduced
negative form varies more substantially. –nae [ne] is probably the most well-known, as the
variant used in east central and south east coast Scots (Brown and Millar 1980) as well as
in central west coast varieties (Macaulay 1991, Aitken, cf. Macafee 2011:2). In the north
east and northern isles, –na [n@] is the common reduced form negation, though there are
localised instances of [nu] found in Shetland too (Stadler et al. 2016). I will represent the
standard reduced negative marker in Glasgow Scots, therefore, as –nae, and the reduced
negative marker in Shetland dialect as –na. This appears to be a purely phonological
difference, and does not have any bearing on any syntactic or semantic properties of the
marker12.
12Until approximately the late 20th century, V-to-I movement in Shetland dialect meant that –na could
attach to main verbs, with examples such as kenna (‘know not’), sawna (‘saw not’) and caresna (‘cares
not’) attested in dialect literature printed in The New Shetlander magazine. V-to-I has been all but lost
from the dialect (Jonas 2002, Jamieson 2015) and does not require any further discussion here.
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‘I don’t know how it began, really.’ (Shetland, Cumming 2010:1)
The final point worth noting about negative declaratives in Scots is the potential for
negative concord, in which multiple negative markers in a sentence yield a single semantic
negation. While standard English generally does not exhibit negative concord, concord is
considered to be somewhat of a ‘vernacular universal’ (Trudgill 1999, Hope 2000, Chambers
2004) across non-standard varieties of English, in various forms (Smith 2001, Howe 2005,
Blanchette 2015). Smith (2001) describes six different kinds of negative concord, varying
in frequency of availability (with levels of use depending on various sociolinguistic factors
(Cheshire et al. 1993, Beal and Corrigan 2005, Smith and Holmes-Elliott 2014)). The most
common is ‘object negative concord’ (Blanchette 2015), in which a negative indeterminate
object (e.g. nothing) follows a negated verb (e.g. 36).
(36) I don’t know nothing about that.
= I don’t know anything about that
(Appalachian English, Blanchette 2015:15)
The other common form is ‘subject negative concord’ (Blanchette 2015), in which
a negative indeterminate object (e.g. nobody) precedes a negated verb (e.g. 37).
(37) Nobody don’t know where it’s at.
= Nobody knows where it’s at
(African American English, Labov 1972a:786)
In some varieties, it is possible for negative concord to extend to either a verb or
indeterminate in a subordinate clause (Baugh 1983, Smith 2001, Howe 2005). There are
also negative inversion structures, in which subject-auxiliary inversion of a negated verb
takes place over a negative subject for emphatic purposes. These constructions are attested
in African American English, Appalachian English and Alabama English (Labov 1972b,
Feagin 1979, Smith 2001, White-Sustaita 2010).
Scots varieties are reported to exhibit the potential for negative concord (Macaulay
1991, Cheshire et al. 1993, Smith 2001, Anderwald 2002, 2005, Macafee 2011, Smith and
Holmes-Elliott 2014, Thoms et al. 2017). As only object negative concord has been attested
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in UK varieties13, it is only object negative concord I will discuss.
The most detailed work on negative concord in a dialect of Scots has been carried
out in Buckie, in the north east. Smith (2001) finds approximately 60% negative concord
while Smith and Holmes-Elliott (2014) report a total of 42.6% negative concord.
(38) We was na wanting nothing fancy.
(Buckie, Smith and Holmes-Elliott 2014)
Compared to Buckie, production rates for Glasgow are extremely low: Childs only
finds 8% production rates in her corpus of Glasgow Scots (Childs 2017). The Scots Syntax
Atlas project (Gary Thoms, p.c.) also finds little acceptability of object negative concord
(using the example ‘I cannae see nothing’) in Glasgow Scots. The comparative acceptability
rates for the same construction in north east mainland Scotland (around Buckie) are much
higher. Notably, the atlas also finds that acceptability rates for the same negative concord
construction in Shetland dialect are comparable to the north east. However, for a further
variant of negative concord, ‘I didna see it nowhere’, Shetland dialect appears to diverge
from the north east regarding the acceptability: nowhere is not acceptable as a negative
indeterminate in concord in Shetland dialect, while it is in Buckie. Thoms et al. (2017)
argue that negative concord can be restricted to specific indeterminates: we can thus
conclude that while no indeterminates permit negative concord in Glasgow Scots, concord
is restricted to nothing in Shetland dialect and more freely available with e.g. nowhere in
Buckie.
The potential for negative concord is thus variable between the locations
investigated in this research. In Glasgow Scots, negative concord is not widely
acceptable14; in Shetland dialect, it is acceptable in object negative concord with nothing,
but seemingly not as broadly acceptable as in varieties in north east Scotland. The
limited availability of negative concord in both varieties will be relevant later in the
thesis in discussion particular instances of non-canonical questions.
Negative imperatives
Negative imperatives in present-day standard English are generally formed with don’t at
the beginning of the clause (39). Subjects are optional, but must immediately follow this
13Thoms et al. (2017) point out that Buckie and north east varieties permit extension of negative concord
to an indeterminate in a subordinate clause as long as it is a neg-raising predicate such as think. This is
still object negative concord, without locality restrictions.
14Though Thoms et al. (2017) do discuss the possibility for negative concord in Glasgow with ‘semi-
negatives’ (Zeijlstra 2004:39) like hardly and ‘squatitives’ (Horn 2001) like fuck all.
24
negated do (40). Imperatives in standard English can also be produced with do and an
unreduced form of negation, not (41). In that case, subjects are not permitted in any
position.
(39) Don’t touch that dial!
(40) Don’t you forget! (Potsdam 2007:253)
(41) Do not (*you) desert me! (Rupp 2007:19)
In general, negative imperatives in Scots varieties operate very similarly to their
standard English counterparts. East coast, north eastern and insular dialects of Scots use
their relevant dinnae (east/central) or dunna (north/insular) form to produce an
imperative. Subjects behave as they do in standard English imperatives (42). However,
independent negative marker no cannot appear in negative imperatives (43).
(42) Dinnae (you) smoke in here! (Fife, Weir 2012:1)
(43) *Dae no smoke in here! (Fife, Weir 2012:9)
While the examples given here are from Fife, the same system applies in Shetland
dialect, with the relevant phonological differences (dunna, rather than dinnae). Glasgow
Scots has an accidental gap where the variety would be expected to have dinnae (Thoms
et al. 2013) – although dinnae should be the negative form of do, and would be e.g.
phonologically and morphologically licit, the variety simply does not have it. This ‘dinnae
gap’ means that regardless of the construction type, where other varieties have dinnae,
Glasgow Scots speakers fill this gap via circumlocution, or use the standard English don’t
in its place15 – however, this is not particular to imperatives and should not be taken to
be a meaningful syntactic distinction between Glasgow Scots and other varieties of Scots.
Syntactically, it appears that whatever analysis one wishes to give standard English
imperatives, whether that is a subject-auxiliary inversion analysis (Potsdam 1998, Thoms
et al. 2013) or an analysis in which there is a specific high imperative projection such as a
JussiveP (Zanuttini 2008, Weir 2012), the analysis will extend to Scots varieties.
In both negative declaratives and negative imperatives, then, the systems of
negation in Scots appear to be very similar to standard English in terms of their syntax
and semantics, with some phonological variation. While there are some small variations
in the systems which require further explanation (e.g. negative concord, or the
15An alternative negative imperative strategy in Glasgow Scots is to use the exhortative particle gonnae
with a lower negation, no (Weir 2012, Sailor and Thoms 2018), such as gonnae no dae that.
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ungrammaticality of do no in Scots imperatives), as a whole, there is little variation to
worry about here. The story is rather different for interrogatives.
2.3.2 Interrogatives with negation
In standard English, there are two way to form a matrix negative interrogative, as was
detailed in chapter 1.
(44) Can Emily not come to the party?
(45) Can’t Emily come to the party?
As explained in chapter 1, each of these forms has been shown to be preferred in
specific pragmatic contexts based on whether the speaker has a prior belief about the truth
of the proposition p, and the nature of the evidential context surrounding the interaction
(Domaneschi et al. 2017). There appears to be some dialectal variation to this distinction.
Tagliamonte and Smith (2002) find that –n’t is categorical (e.g. (45)) in Tiverton and
Henfield, in the south of England – presumably, therefore, exhibiting Ladd’s ambiguity16.
In their northern English locations (York and Maryport), speakers had a mix of low and
high negation questions. Tagliamonte and Smith do not discuss how these question forms
line up with speaker beliefs and evidential biases in context, but it is notable that both
are available.
However, from Newcastle (Beal 1993:199) and further north across Scotland (and
Ulster) (Brown and Millar 1980, Aitken 1984, Tagliamonte and Smith 2002), only questions
like (44) are available in information-seeking questions. While in English varieties, –n’t
negation can invert over the subject in a question, it is not possible for –nae or –na to
invert in Scots varieties (Millar and Brown 1979, Brown and Millar 1980, Thoms et al.
2013).
(46) Is he no coming?
(47) *Isnae he coming? (Millar and Brown 1979:29)
This means that both true negative questions and matrix biased questions are
expressed in the same way across Scots varieties, with a seemingly ‘low’ negation marker
16However, the participants in Domaneschi et al. (2017) are also in the south of England, London to
be precise. There may be an age-based aspect to the variation, in this case; equally, it may be that the
students in Domaneschi et al. (2017) spoke varieties of English from outside of the south of England. The
fact that there may be greater instances of Ladd’s ambiguity in the south of England is worth investigating,
but will not impact on the results of this thesis and so I will not discuss this any further.
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no, and the only noticeable syntactic distinction in the availability of NPI or PPI
licensing.
(48) Is he no coming either? true negative question
(49) Is he no coming too? biased question
The fact that biased questions in Scots varieties are not clearly distinct from true
negative questions syntactically is a further challenge to the idea that cross-linguistically,
‘high’ negation can be clearly distinguished from ‘low’ negation due to its position in the
syntactic structure (Romero and Han 2004, Krifka 2015, Domaneschi et al. 2017).
Inverted –na(e) is also unavailable in tag questions. Tag questions on positive
anchors in standard English are most commonly –n’t constructions (50), with verb-subject-
not tag questions never produced in the data in Tagliamonte and Smith (2002) and not
discussed by Tottie and Hoffman (2006) in their corpus study. Verb-subject-not tags are
perhaps considered to be acceptable but ‘somewhat stilted’ in standard English, and there
are rare attestations (e.g. (51)) (Bender 2001:73).
(50) You’ve seen California, haven’t you? (US English, Tottie and Hoffman 2006:292
(51) Bob left today, did he not? (US English, Bender 2001:74)
However, in Scots varieties, again –na(e) cannot invert (53). This means that verb-
subject-no tags are in fact the norm in Scots (52), not the stilted forms found in standard
English (though see further discussion in section 2.3.2, below).
(52) She’s his sister, is she no?
(53) *She’s his sister, isnae she? (Edinburgh, Brown and Millar 1980:118)
The inability to invert reduced negation markers above the subject appears to be
the state of affairs across Scots dialects in all interrogative constructions – though Brown
and Millar (1980) claim that ‘some rural dialects’ can invert the –na(e) form. Robertson
and Graham (1952) give an example of this inversion in Shetland dialect (54), and it is
found in dialect literature in the 20th century. However, as a speaker of the dialect in the
present day, I would find this unacceptable17.
17It may possibly still be available for some older speakers of the dialect; however, I do not investigate












‘Couldn’t you have managed to get over?’
(Robertson and Graham 1952:10)
Dieth’s unpublished notes on the grammar of the Buchan dialect (from the late
nineteenth century), cited in McClure (2002) also give an example of this inversion –
however, there are no examples of this inversion in Jennifer Smith’s (p.c.) recent corpus
of the Buckie dialect, a neighbouring region of north east Scotland. I thus set this aside.
However, although questions with negation in Scots are generally formed by the
verb-subject-no construction, as I will refer to it, it appears that certain varieties of Scots
have innovated particles that are used in interrogative constructions that use negation in
standard English – namely, the four non-canonical question constructions that I highlighted
in the introduction. I will give a very brief summary of particles found outside of the two
locations of prime interest for this thesis, before giving a more in-depth overview of what
the literature tells us about Glasgow Scots –int and Shetland dialect –n.
–n’t, e and e no
As we saw above, –na(e) is unable to invert in interrogative constructions in Scots varieties,
while in standard English –n’t inverts frequently, depending on the type of construction
(e.g. more often in tag questions) and the relationship to epistemic beliefs and evidential
biases in matrix questions (Domaneschi et al. 2017). Despite not being the standard
negation marker, –n’t also has a role in Scots varieties (Millar and Brown 1979) in non-
canonical questions (Tagliamonte and Smith 2002).
(55) Dainty, isn’t she? Isn’t she dainty? Dainty, look at her. Look at the feet all
crossed and all, eh? (Buckie, Tagliamonte and Smith 2002:265)
Tagliamonte and Smith (2002) find that –n’t is the negative marker used in
‘rhetorical questions’ that do not necessitate an answer across the three Scots varieties
they investigate (Buckie, Cumnock and Cullybackey, an Ulster Scots variety) – both
matrix and tag. Millar and Brown (1979) and Brown and Millar (1980) also attest
interrogative –n’t in Edinburgh in tag questions and ‘confirmational’ matrix questions.
Although –n’t is not the declarative or imperative negative form, then, it is a form which
can be used in certain non-canonical questions in Scots.
Interestingly, while reverse polarity tag questions are by far the most common in
standard English, –n’t is also reported to be available in tag questions on negative anchors
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in Scots – at least in Edinburgh (Millar and Brown 1979). However, –n’t must be combined
with a lower negative marker, no. These tags are semantically equivalent to positive tags,
according to Millar and Brown (1979:33).
(56) Your name’s no Willie, isn’t it no?
= Your name’s not Willie, is it?
(57) He wouldnae do it, wouldn’t he no?
= He wouldn’t do it, would he?
(Edinburgh, Millar and Brown 1979:30)
The availability of these tags across other Scots varieties is not discussed in the
literature; however, they are noted to be available in Newcastle and Tyneside (58), in
‘confirmation’ contexts only (Beal 1993:201).
(58) She can’t come, can’t she not? (Tyneside, McDonald and Beal 1987:1987)
Recall that Beal (1993) also found that –n’t was not used in information-seeking
questions in Newcastle, just as across Scots varieties. This ability for –n’t to combine with
a lower negative marker and be ‘cancelled out’ appears to be exclusively a property of
these northern English and Scots varieties which do not have –n’t in information-seeking
questions, but can in ‘confirmational’ or ‘rhetorical’ contexts.
On the east coast, in Fife and Edinburgh, tags can be formed with the invariant
particles e and e no. However, there is some disagreement in the literature about how these
tags interact with the polarity of the main clauses. Millar and Brown (1979:32) claim that
the tags are polarity matching, with e on positive statements and e no on negative ones.
Thoms et al. (2013) claim the opposite, stating e is available on negative anchor clauses
while e no is attached to affirmative clauses. The informants cited in Miller (1990) do not
distinguish between e and e no in tag contexts; he therefore reports that both can be used
on either positive or negative anchors and gives evidence of both (e.g. (59)-(62)).
(59) that cannae be right, eh?
(60) no it was chemistry they kept giving us all the silly formulas eh?
(61) the dog’s no really angry, eh no?
(62) you’re taking me to the pictures, eh no?
(all Edinburgh, Miller 1990:5)
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It is also worth noting that e can be fronted to form a matrix interrogative (63); e
no is claimed not to be able to by Millar and Brown (1979), but in fact, this is attested in
the Dictionary of the Scots Language (64).
(63) E you’ve got a new bike? (Edinburgh, Millar and Brown 1979:32)
(64) Eh no I’m a good boy mummy?
(Edinburgh, http://www.dsl.ac.uk/entry/snd/sndns1370)
The east coast e and e no particles, therefore, seem to be another way that Scots
speakers have innovated alternative strategies to express some sort of bias in interrogative
constructions. Further work on their pragmatic distribution and their semantic
contribution would certainly be valuable; however, I set these aside here and focus on the
two particles that I will be investigating in this thesis: Glasgow Scots –int and Shetland
dialect –n.
Glasgow Scots –int
In Glasgow Scots, the literature reports a particular form of negation used in certain non-
canonical questions: –int [InP]. Brown and Millar (1980) briefly mention –int as being
used in confirmational tags in Glasgow, while Macafee (2011) argues that it is a recent
innovation in the variety. Thoms et al. (2013) provide the most detailed discussion of –int
to date, with numerous examples.
Firstly, they explain that –int combines with the onset of the relevant auxiliary verb
to give the particle forms shown in Table 2.1.
We must consider whether –int is simply a phonological reduction from –n’t, since,
as explained above, phonological reduction processes of negative auxiliaries in English
dialects are very common. At their most extreme, such processes lead to forms like those
found in the Black Country (65-66), where the negative marker (whether that is –n’t or
–na (Clark and Asprey 2013)) is lost entirely and vowel mutation marks the negation (65).
The mutation may then be lost, as in (66).
(65) Why didn’t [deI] you bring me back no shrimps? (Clark and Asprey 2013)
(66) I can’t [kA:] think of any others. (Asprey 2007:138)
A similar reduction example is found in the north east of Scotland (Smith 2000,
McClure 2002) and Fife (Weir 2007) in which dinna ‘don’t’ can be reduced to [da:].
30
Root Negative Particle Standard
can [kIn] cannae [ka.ne] kint [kInP] can’t [kanP]
could [kud] couldnae [kud.ne] kint [kInP] couldn’t [ku.d@nP]
should [Sud] shouldnae [Sud.ne] shint [SInP] shouldn’t [Su.d@nP]
will [wIl] willnae [w2l.ne] wint [wInP] won’t [wonP]
would [wId] widnae [wId.ne] wint [wInP] wouldn’t [wu.d@nP]
do [du] don’t [donP] dint [dInP] don’t [dOnP]
does [d2z] doesnae [d2z.ne] dint [dInP] doesn’t [d2.z@nP]
did [dId] didnae [dId.ne] dint [dInP] didn’t [dId@nP]
have [he] havnae [h2v.ne] hint [hInP] haven’t [ha.v@nP]
has [hez] hasnae [h2z.ne] hint [hInP] hasn’t [ha.z@nP]
had [hEd] hadnae [h2d.ne] hint [hInP] hadn’t [ha.d@nP]
am [2m] amnae [2m.ne] int [InP] ?amn’t [a.m@nP]
is [Iz] isnae [Iz.ne] int [InP] isn’t [I.z@nP]
are [2r] arnae [2r.ne] int [InP] aren’t [a.r@nP]
was [wIz] wasnae [w2z.ne] wint [wInP] wasn’t [wa.z@nP]
were [wIr] wernae [w2r.ne] wint [wInP] weren’t [wE.r@nP]











‘don’t know what this is’ (Aberdeenshire, McClure 2002:75)
While the Black Country and Aberdeenshire examples are particularly extreme,
there are other relevant phonological reduction processes taking place with regard to
negative auxiliary verbs. In the north of England, for example, Petyt (1985) and later
Steele and Whisker (2007), discuss reduction processes in Yorkshire, where in negative
auxiliary verbs, both loss of n following a vowel and loss of a consonant before –n’t are
commonly attested. The second process gives rise to forms very similar to the Glasgow
forms, such as [dInP] and [wUnP].
(68) We didn’t [dInt] have any accidents with the big buses. (Steele and Whisker 2007)
(69) I wouldn’t [wUnP] like to be her. (Petyt 1985:182)
(70) Couldn’t [kUnP] you do it? (Petyt 1985:182)
There are some differences between the Glasgow Scots situation as presented in
the literature and the reduction process seen in the Black Country and Yorkshire. First,
reductions in Glasgow are claimed to be systematic with respect to the combination of
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the onset and the –int [InP] marker, rather than the loss of of a consonant before –n’t :
note, for example, both can and could share the same form [kInP]. The outcome is
nevertheless the same, or extremely similar, in some contexts (e.g. [dInP] in place of
didn’t). Most importantly, the phonological reduction evidenced in Yorkshire and the
Black Country is a general process, which takes place across constructions – declaratives,
matrix interrogatives, tags etc. In contrast, Thoms et al. (2013) make claims about the
distribution of Glasgow Scots –int which suggests that it is not a regular reduction
process.
Thoms et al. (2013) claim that –int is only available in tag questions (with positive











‘They were leaving, weren’t they?’ (Glasgow, Thoms et al. 2013:18)
(72) Hint she just got an amazing wee voice! (Glasgow, Thoms et al. 2013:19)
This suggests that –int is not the result of a general reduction process but has
become specialised for a specific purpose – perhaps from a phonological reduction of the
non-canonical –n’t described above. This sort of specialisation is common. For example,
while int is a common reduction of isn’t or ain’t in English varieties, in Multicultural
London English the reduction of ain’t it to int it was the first step towards the development
of innit.
ain’t it [eInt It] → int it [Int It] → innit [In It] (Andersen 2001:106)
Andersen (2001) gives an example from the Corpus of London Teenage Language
where innit is found in a wh-question.
(73) Well why innit there? (Andersen 2001:106)
This shows that the development of innit does come from a general process: however,
it has now grammaticalised as an invariant tag for younger speakers – no longer following
the canonical tag question paradigm, as seen in (74) – and has taken on a variety of
discourse roles distinct from the original role of the tag question (such as in (75), where
innit is used to express agreement with the implicature of the wh-question) (Krug 1998,
Andersen 2001, Pichler 2017).
(74) Josie: She loves her chocolate, innit?
Truno: Yeah! (Andersen 2001:97)
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(75) Dawn: What are you saying that for?!
Grace: Innit. (Andersen 2001:146)
The claim made by Thoms et al. (2013) regarding the distribution of –int does raise
a number of questions, however. Firstly, as we saw in chapter 1, tag questions are used
in a range of contexts based on speaker’s epistemic belief and evidential bias. How does
–int ’s distribution line up with these parameters? Secondly, the distribution across ‘tag
questions’ and ‘exclamatives’ causes some issues for the set-up in the literature where tag
questions are a subset of biased questions, exclamatives are a subset of polar rhetorical
questions, and there is no overlap between tags and exclamatives. What exactly is –int,
then, and what would this tell us about the relationship between the non-canonical question
constructions?
Finally, there is no discussion in the literature about whether or not constructions
with –int and a lower no marker are available, like the –n’t and no constructions we saw
in examples (56-57). This is important to establish and will feed into the analysis for –int.
Shetland dialect –n
While there has been some discussion in the literature of Glasgow Scots –int, there has been
almost no mention of Shetland dialect –n, with the exception of Robertson and Graham
(1952:10), who state that ‘the [negative] interrogative is formed by suffixing –n or –na [to
the auxiliary]’. The authors give two examples of this –n marker (76-77); other examples

























































‘Haven’t I told you so many stories?! So now I don’t have any left to tell.’
(Shetland, Jamieson 1962:25)
18The second negative marker in this example is interesting; I will discuss it further below.
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A similar form of –en or –nin seems to be found in late 19th and early 20th
century Aberdeenshire, with Wight (1922) including examples such as wullen where
standard English would use ‘won’t’, wuden ‘wouldn’t’ and diven19 ‘don’t’; examples with















‘Don’t you see the ships sailing on it?’
(Aberdeenshire, Grant and Main Dixon 1921:116)
However, there is no more recent evidence of any of these –en or –nin constructions
in any north east mainland dialects, unlike Shetland dialect –n, which is attested in dialect
writing at least in the late 20th century and in conversation by speakers in the present day
(e.g. (80)).
(80) You have a standing ticket, do’n you? (attested, 9th June 2018)
The –n particle in Shetland dialect can be phonologically represented as [@n], and
can be attached to any auxiliary verb and inverted in order to form an interrogative. There
are no phonological changes to the root of the auxiliary when –n is suffixed, suggesting
that it is not simply a reduction of an extant negative marker. However, the particle is
only distinguishable from a reduced form of standard English –n’t or the local negative
marker –na in a limited number of phonological contexts. The full distribution of –n and
how it combines with different auxiliaries is presented in Table 2.2.
There are three cases where there are clear differences between –n and either
standard variety – can’n, do’n and will’n. In all three of these cases, the fact that there
has been no phonological alteration from the root clearly distinguishes them from the
standard Scots and English forms.
All of the other cases are clearly distinguished from the standard Scots negative
marker through syllabification; however, the only thing that separates them from the
standard English is a lack of [t] or [P]. There are a number of cases where there is a vowel
19Divn’t is a negative, generally non-past form of do, localized to the north east of England (Rowe 2007,
Pichler 2009, Beal et al. 2012) and the north east of Scotland (Rowe 2007), where it is now limited to tag
questions (Jennifer Smith, cf. Rowe 2007). Divn’t is restricted to present tense 1st and 2nd person contexts
only.
20The have forms are perhaps less common due to the be-perfect in Shetland dialect (Pavlenko 1997,
Smith and Durham 2012). As can be seen in example (78), Shetland dialect speakers traditionally employ
be where standard English would use have to form perfectives. However, older and middle-aged speakers in
the present day vary between be and have forms (Smith and Durham 2011), and the be-perfect appears to
be in decline among younger speakers, with evidence of hyperdialectal (see section 2.5 for a full discussion of
hyperdialectalism) behaviour, with certain speakers having extremely high usage rates, and others barely
using it (Smith and Durham 2012).
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Root Negative Particle Standard
can [kIn] canna [ka.n@] can’n [kI.n@n] can’t [kanP]
could [kud] couldna [kud.n@] could’n [ku.d@n] couldn’t [ku.d@nP]
should [Sud] shouldna [Sud.n@] should’n [Su.d@n] shouldn’t [Su.d@nP]
will [wIl] winna [wI.n@] will’n [wI.l@n] won’t [wonP]
would [wId] widna [wId.n@] wid’n [wI.d@n] wouldn’t [wu.d@nP]
do [du] dunna [d2.n@] do’n [du.@n] don’t [dOnP]
does [d2z] doesna [d2z.n@] does’n [d2.z@n] doesn’t [d2.z@nP]
did [dId] didna [dId.n@] did’n [dI.d@n] didn’t [dI.d@nP]
have [hIv] havna [hIv.n@] hav’n20 [hI.v@n] haven’t [ha.v@nP]
has [hIz] hasna [hIz.n@] has’n [hI.z@n] hasn’t [ha.z@nP]
had [hEd] hadna [hId.n@] had’n [hI.d@n] hadn’t [ha.d@nP]
am [Im] amna [Im.n@] am’n [I.m@n] ?amn’t [a.m@nP]
is [Iz] isna [Iz.n@] is’n [I.z@n] isn’t [I.z@nP]
are [Ir] irna [Ir.n@] ir’n [I.r@n] aren’t [a.r@nP]
was [wIz] wisna [wIz.n@] wis’n [wI.z@n] wasn’t [wa.z@nP]
were [wIr] wirna [wIr.n@] wir’n [wI.r@n] weren’t [wE.r@nP]
Table 2.2: Auxiliary verbs and negation forms in Shetland dialect.
change between the local form and the standard form that would be used when ‘knappin’
(‘speaking properly’) (wid’n, ir’n, wis’n and wir’n, as well as am’n, where the standard
form would be amn’t, though the acceptability of amn’t is extremely variable across English
varieties (Quirk et al. 1985, Hudson 2000, Anderwald 2002)). However, vowels are often
less tense in fast speech (Port 1976, Miller 1981, Fourakis 1991) and so this cannot be
taken to be a firm distinction.
Finally in the paradigm, there are a number of cases where the lack of final [t] or
[P] are the only differences between the –n particle and the standard English –n’t (could’n,
should’n, did’n, does’n, is’n). However, final [t] or [P] is frequently dropped from negative
auxiliary verbs in speech across English varieties (Anderwald 2002:68). For example, ‘nasal
flapping’ of [t] or [P] takes place when [t] occurs between [n] and a vowel (Labov 1989),
leading to realisation of [t] as [̃R], a nasalised flap. In these contexts, it becomes impossible
to distinguish the –n variant from –n’t. I will investigate both clearly distinct cases of –n
and cases of –n which could potentially be confounded with the standard due to flapping
in this thesis. For more details, see section 2.4.
Regarding the syntactic distribution of –n, there is no information in the literature
beyond the mention of ‘interrogatives’ made by Robertson and Graham (1952). However, as
we saw in the introduction, ‘interrogatives with negation’ come in many different shades.
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It is difficult to tell from Robertson and Graham’s examples, and the examples in the
literature exactly how these constructions should be classified: (76) could likely be some
form of exclamative, but without context it could also be a biased question in the face
of some challenging evidence. (77) and earlier example (27) are likely biased questions
while (78) seems to be a rhetorical question. At first glance, it seems –n has a somewhat
wider distribution than Glasgow Scots –int, but without full investigation that can only
be speculation. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence of –n in a true negative question,
but this also needs to be tested. Finally, the possibility of having –n combine with a
lower negative marker no in the tag on a negative anchor is not attested in the literature:
from my own judgment and discussion with dialect speakers, a construction like (81) is
acceptable. However, this will also be tested more broadly.
(81) She canna come, can’n she no?
Finally, to give some additional attention to the example in (77) in which there is
both the –n marker and an unreduced negative marker no lower in the clause of a matrix
interrogative. Further examples are attested by speakers in the present day, both in matrix
biased questions (82) and as tag questions on positive anchors (83).
(82) Do’n they no have a bakery in Walls?
(attested 4th July 2017)
(83) It must be three year since I left there, is’n it no? (attested 23rd January 2016)
The meaning of these questions is the same as a biased question with a single
negative marker in a standard English. As we saw above, negative concord is not especially
prevalent in Shetland dialect, and it seems surprising that this particularly unusual instance
of negative concord would be present. Furthermore, other varieties which have the –n’t
and no combination as tags on negative anchors (e.g. Edinburgh (Millar and Brown 1979))
are claimed not to have the construction available on positive anchors.
(84) *She likes him, doesn’t she no? (Edinburgh, Millar and Brown 1979:30)
Shetland dialect –n is therefore understudied in the literature; even in literature
on Shetland dialect, it has barely been mentioned. From attestations and examples in
the literature, it seems as though –n is limited to non-canonical questions; however, is it
the case that it is available in all of the speaker belief and evidential bias contexts that
license non-canonical questions with negative markers in standard English? Its distribution
36
needs to be established. In establishing its distribution, it will be useful to compare with
Glasgow Scots –int, which, from the literature, appears to have a more limited set of
available contexts. Comparing the two constructions will help to address the broader
questions presented at the beginning of this thesis.
2.3.3 Summary
Although negation in Scots appears to pattern relatively similarly to standard English in
terms of sentential negation in declaratives and to a large extent with negation in
imperatives, there are substantial differences in how negation operates in interrogatives,
with reduced negation marker –na(e) unable to undergo subject-auxiliary inversion, even
in non-canonical question contexts. While the standard structure for both true negative
questions and non-canonical questions with negation is therefore verb-subject-no, it
appears that across Scots varieties, particles have been innovated to express certain
non-canonical interrogative meanings. The literature identifies at least four different
strategies: –n’t across north east and east central Scots, e/e no in Edinburgh and Fife,
–int in Glasgow and –n in Shetland, perhaps more historically also in the north east
mainland. The properties of each appear to be slightly different. In this thesis, I focus on
Glasgow Scots –int and Shetland dialect –n.
In the introduction, I presented the questions I wish to address in this thesis,
including about the information that licenses non-canonical questions, how this
information is encoded in the constructions, and the overall relationship between
non-canonical questions with negation markers. Both Glasgow Scots –int and Shetland
dialect –n share the qualities of being restricted to some number of non-canonical
question constructions that, in standard English, use reduced negative marker –n’t.
However, unlike standard English, it does not appear from the literature that –int and –n
can be general negative markers (unlike –n’t, which, while attested only in non-canonical
questions in Scots, clearly also has a role as a general negative marker in standard
English). This gives us a perfect opportunity to investigate the exact pragmatic contexts
required for these non-canonical question constructions, as well as to look at what is
encoded in the constructions, and how this is represented syntactically.
The first task is to establish the distribution of the particles in more detail. In
the next section, I lay out the methodology that I will use, giving some background on
traditional (dialect) syntactic judgment methods before discussing more recent laboratory




Gathering syntactic judgment data
Since at least Chomsky (1966), the classic data collection method for syntactic data has
been acceptability judgments, presented in the literature as such:
(85) *Whom do you know the date when Mary invited?
(86) ?Which man do you wonder when to meet?
(87) Which man did Bill go to Rome to visit?
(Haegeman 1995, cf. Bard, Robertson and Sorace 1996)
Chomsky’s first attempts at developing an introspective methodology aimed to
determine grammaticality, and posited a binary grammatical/ungrammatical distinction,
with ungrammaticality marked by an * (85). However, over the years, additional
distinctions such as the ? seen in (86) have been included and the idea of a
grammatical/ungrammatical distinction has been brought up for question. The
methodology has thus been subject to considerable criticism over the years (Quirk and
Greenbaum 1970, Labov 1972c, Newmeyer 1983, Nagata 1988, Rizzi 1990, Bard et al.
1996), and the idea of a gradient acceptability has become more common. While
researchers remain interested in tapping into true grammaticality and the possibility of a
Universal Grammar which may be binary, the reality of what speakers accept certainly
isn’t binary. Establishing acceptability is thus generally carried out through rating tasks
such as Likert scales or magnitude estimation tests (Bard et al. 1996, Schütze 1996,
Sprouse 2007, Bader and Häussler 2010, Sprouse et al. 2013, Schütze and Sprouse 2014,
Sprouse and Almeida 2017, Langsford et al. 2018).
The use of judgments in syntactic data collection has meant that for standard
varieties, especially standard English, a huge amount of data has become available and
allowed morphosyntactic research in the generative tradition to flourish. It was not until
much later that the grammar of non-standard dialects began to be taken seriously, and
the same sort of grammaticality judgments tasks began to be used with speakers of non-
standard varieties (Rizzi 1982, 1986, Poletto 1993, Zanuttini 1994, Henry 1995).
Of course, it was not that non-standard varieties had been entirely ignored until
that point. Traditional dialectology methods (e.g. the Survey of English Dialects (1962))
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involved direct elicitation with speakers in order to gather primarily lexical as well as small
quantities of morphological/phonological data from non-standard varieties. While those
elicitation tasks are undoubtedly valuable and allow for large scale data collection (which
if necessary can be carried out without the presence of a trained researcher, thus saving
time), within the methodologies of these traditional dialectological surveys, there are a
number of problems that arise. Firstly, speakers are often not good at judging their own
usage patterns – for example, social norms such as pressure towards a standard may heavily
affect speakers’ self-reporting (Labov 2001:199); furthermore, speakers style shift, and the
formality of a elicitation situation, especially with a stranger, leads to a reduction in usage
of the vernacular – the exact type of speech that we are trying to elicit (Labov 2001). All
of this leads to the overall problem of trying to gather data from non-standard varieties:
the Observer’s Paradox.
The Observer’s Paradox suggests that by virtue of being present, the researcher is
likely to affect the speech behaviour of their participants. The most common issue of the
Observer’s Paradox is that it is possible that as an academic, and potentially an outsider
to the community, the researcher’s presence will create a situation where speakers modify
their behaviour or deny use of non-standard variants in order to seem more ‘proper’ (Henry
1995, Labov 2001, Adger and Trousdale 2007). On the other hand, the Observer’s Paradox
may also lead to participants accepting features they would not produce, or altering their
speech so as to seem more ‘local’ – particularly in a situation where a speaker is proud of
their community and their identity, and use their general knowledge of a variant within
the community to misestimate their own usage (Henry 1995:14). Both create equally
challenging difficulties for the researcher, and need to be taken into account when designing
an experiment.
Developed primarily by Labov (1966, 1972b), sociolinguistic interviews were
designed to tackle the Observer’s Paradox. By collecting corpora of naturalistic speech
data from community members by situating oneself in the community at hand and
recording conversations at length with speakers on topics relevant to the local
community, researchers can gather data which closely represents the vernacular of the
speakers. This methodology could then be extended by including multiple members of
the same community (e.g. a family) in a single interview, allowing the speakers to
converse with each other and thus allowing the researcher, potentially an outsider, to step
even further back from the interview (Gumperz 1964, Labov 1972c).
Sociolinguistic interviews remain the ‘gold standard’ for data collection in non-
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standard varieties (Tagliamonte 2012:106). Like the traditional dialectology work that
they aimed to improve upon, sociolinguistic interviews have proven extremely useful for
gathering phonetic, phonological, lexical and morphological data – but syntactic data has
remained understudied until more recently.
The most important and obvious reason for this is that a single syntactic
construction is unlikely to be produced to any great frequency within a sociolinguistic
interview context. There may be multiple ways to express the same sentiment; the nature
of the discussion may not require a particular construction, or it may simply be an
infrequent construction in the grammar overall (Labov 2001, Cornips and Poletto 2005,
Buchstaller and Corrigan 2011). Syntactic constructions are also by their very nature
larger than an individual lexical item or phoneme, and thus require a much more
substantial quantity of interview time to gather a non-trivial number of tokens that can
be analysed. Furthermore, complex interactions between different syntactic (or additional
pragmatic) factors are even less likely to emerge in an hour-long interview context. It is
thus necessary when carrying out work on dialect syntax to find ways to combine the
breadth of data collection that traditional introspective methods of syntactic
acceptability judgments can give us with the best practice from sociolinguistics in order
to ensure that we access speakers’ vernaculars as best as possible.
In recent years, a number of large scale dialect syntax projects have attempted to
do just this, while also gathering descriptive and theoretical data across varieties.
Projects on Scandinavian varieties (ScanDiaSyn,
http://www.tekstlab.uio.no/nota/scandiasyn/), Welsh (the Syntactic Atlas of the
Welsh Dialects, http://www.ling.cam.ac.uk/david/sawd/), Dutch (SAND,
http://www.meertens.nl/sand/), American English (the Yale Grammatical Diversity
Project, http://microsyntax.sites.yale.edu) and Scots (SCOSYA,
http://scotssyntaxatlas.ac.uk) have all worked to establish methodologies and
gather data on syntactic variation in the dialects of these languages. Below, I will detail
the ‘interview method’, established by the SAND project (Cornips and Poletto 2005,
Barbiers and Bennis 2007) and used and refined in various other dialect syntax research
(Thoms 2014, Jamieson 2015) that I adapted for use in this research.
The interview method
In the ‘interview method’, a written questionnaire is constructed which includes examples
of all the relevant phenomena that the researchers wish to investigate. Each example is
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Figure 2.2: Likert scale given to participants in the Scots Syntax Atlas project.
embedded in a short context, so as to make the example as naturalistic as possible, such
as (88), where the example that was being tested follows the short context and ‘you say’.
(88) We’re out for a walk. You point at somebody wearing a silly hat and you say: ‘Sees
du yun?’
(Jamieson 2015:39)
The researcher subsequently organises interviews with pairs of participants, who, in
the style of Labov’s extended interview, know each other well – friends, family members
etc. This paired interview structure attempts to reduce the Observer’s Paradox as far as
possible by having participants work with someone they know well, and with whom they
would use their vernacular variety. Each interview consists of two sessions: in the first
session, the interviewer reads out the questionnaire contexts and examples to one of the
participants, who rates each example on a Likert scale from 1-5. In the second session,
the first participant reads out another randomised form of the questionnaire to the second
participant, who then carries out the same rating process. For example, the Scots Syntax
Atlas project presented participants with a scale where 1 corresponded to something that
was associated with the labels ‘I would never say that; you would never hear that here;
it’s very unnatural; it’s bad’. On the other hand, 5 was associated with the labels ‘I would
definitely say it; you would hear that a lot here; it’s very natural; it’s fine’ (see scale in
Figure 2.2).
Broadly, Likert scale judgments of this sort have been shown to be valid and reliable
indicators of acceptability in syntax (Sprouse et al. 2013, Sprouse and Almeida 2017,
Langsford et al. 2018). With regard to dialect syntax specifically, during a pilot experiment
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for SCOSYA carried out in Buckie Scots, Thoms (2014) established the judgments given
by speakers in an interview method task matched with levels one would expect based
on previous sociolinguistic interview data collected in the area on a particularly frequent
morphosyntactic variable (negative concord).
As well as the rating process itself, in the interview method participants are
encouraged to discuss the reasoning behind their judgments with the interviewer, or with
each other, and to give as much extra information as they like. All of their discussion is
recorded to give additional qualitative data to the research and in particular to try to
avoid one of the problems of introspective acceptability judgment research – participants
may be judging any part of the stimuli or its context, not just the part that is relevant
for the research at hand. Allowing participants to openly discuss their reasoning and
incorporating this into the research gives a more rounded picture of the phenomena
investigated.
The ‘interview method’ has proven successful for both broad, large-scale data
collection and investigating change in specific features, tackling some of the major issues
in dialect syntax data collection by making the situation as informal as possible; having
participants work in pairs with a friend or family member who is from the same
community; ensuring the examples and contexts are as naturalistic as possible and
effectively conducting a set of very small, structured conversations with the participants.
However, while the method has proved extremely useful for judgments on constructions
with purely syntactic variation, recall from chapter 1 and section 2.3 that there are a
number of additional pragmatic and possibly intonational factors that could influence the
acceptability of the –int and –n particles. These therefore need to be factored into the
methodology.
For example, in order to reduce the influence of the standard language as far as
possible, examples in Jamieson (2015) and the SCOSYA project were written in an
orthography matching, as closely as possible, the local dialect. However, Jamieson
(2015:40) states that some of their participants ‘indicated apprehension regarding their
ability to "read in Shetland dialect"’; although participants were able to successfully
complete the task, their lack of familiarity with reading dialect out loud meant that
sometimes they stuttered, or read the examples with an unnatural intonation if they did
not correctly predict what the end of the sentence was going to be. While this is not a
problem for examples that focus on syntactic phenomena like word order or the
acceptability of a specific lexical item, it becomes a serious concern when intonation may
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affect the interpretation of the example.
I thus turn to give an overview of the methodologies used in recent experimental
works which have investigated the types of non-canonical questions that feature in this
research. Following this, I will explain how I incorporated features of this experimental
pragmatics research into the ‘interview method’ as described above in order to keep the
effects of the Observer’s Paradox low, while being able to test the full range of phenomena
required to understand the distribution of –int and –n.
Incorporating laboratory pragmatics methods
As with most syntactic and semantic phenomena, and as detailed above, research on
non-canonical questions for many years relied on introspective judgments (Ladd 1981,
Büring and Gunlogson 2000, van Rooij and Šafářová 2003, Romero and Han 2004, Sudo
2013). However, in more recent years, the development of more sophisticated
experimental pragmatics methodologies have lead to quantitative data collection on
various sections of the topic in a number of languages (Wochner et al. 2015, Seeliger and
Repp 2016, Dehé 2017, Domaneschi et al. 2017).
The results of Domaneschi et al. (2017) concerning the evidential and epistemic
biases that license interrogatives were summarised in chapter 1. In order to establish the
distribution that they found, the researchers presented participants with a short context
which established the epistemic belief they were to hold. This information was presented
written on a screen (with a small relevant cartoon, e.g. a picture of a train). In this
example, the participant is given a belief that there is a train which leaves before 07:00.
(89) Tomorrow you need to go from Nottingham to Sheffield very early. Your brother
goes there quite frequently and you remember he told you that he usually takes a
train in the morning, before 07:00. (bel = p)
On the next screen, the evidence surrounding their ‘interaction’ was presented in
the same way. In this example, the operator presents counterevidence that there is a train
before 07:00.
(90) You go to the station to the ticket office and you ask for a train ticket for the next
morning. The operator answers you: the only train available is at 11:00. (ev = ¬p)
Participants were then asked to choose the question they would be most likely to
use from a list, such as the list given here (Domaneschi et al. 2017:13).
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• Is there a train in the early morning?
• Really?! Is there a train in the early morning?
• Is there no train in the early morning?
• Isn’t there a train in the early morning?
• Other ways of asking if there is a train in the early morning
Participants were then asked to produce the question they had chosen into a
microphone so as intonational information could also be recorded.
In a different experiment, Wochner et al. (2015) investigated the prosody of
German rhetorical questions, and how speakers distinguish potentially ambiguous
rhetorical interrogative structures from genuine questions. In their study, participants
were paired in a soundproof booth, and seated in front of a computer screen. One
participant was assigned the addressee role, and another the speaker role. Each
participant was presented with a context including the relevant epistemic and evidential
biases, which they read silently to themselves.
(91) Die Oma des Sprechers erkundigt sich, ob dieser Lust habe mit ihr und den anderen
Enkelkindern eine Runde Domino zu spielen. Jeder weiß jedoch, dass Domino total
veraltet ist.
‘The speakers’ grand mother is asking her grand child whether he wants to play
dominos with her and the other grand children. However, everybody knows that
dominos is totally out of date.’
The ‘speaker’ would then read out the target utterance, a question.
(92) Wer spielt denn Domino?
Who plays dominos?
The ‘addressee’ would produce what they deemed to be the most appropriate
response, thereby establishing whether they had interpreted it as a rhetorical question or
an information seeking question. All dialogue was recorded and analysed to establish the
intonational cues that German speakers use when producing rhetorical questions and
information-seeking questions – also relevant for the purposes of this research is that,
based on these cues in combination with the context, the ‘addressees’ in Wochner et al.’s
study were able to determine whether the question was rhetorical or not.
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Seeliger and Repp (2016) investigated different interpretations of question intonation
in Swedish by asking participants to produce a sentence such as the example in (93) which
can either function as a rejecting declarative, or a rejection question, based on its intonation
contours. Participants were presented with the epistemic and evidential bias contexts on
screen, and then given the sentence to produce.
(93) Inte målar Anna Maja?
But Anna is not painting Maja!
Surely Anna is not painting Maja?
Recent experimental pragmatics work, then, has relied on reading aloud written
stimuli to establish how participants understand non-canonical questions. However, as
mentioned above, production of written stimuli is a problematic methodology for use in
data collection with non-standard varieties. These are spoken varieties, and speakers are
not used to reading the material. The formality of this task would also reintroduce some
of the style shifting that methodologies like the interview method aim to avoid.
However, the L2 acquisition literature contains experimental methods which ask
participants to demonstrate understanding of intonation variation. Cruz-Ferriera (1989)
presents an experiment that she developed to test Portuguese L2 speakers of English and
their understanding of its intonation patterns. In this experiment, participants are
informed that the focus of the study is the intonation patterns. They then listen to
pre-recorded sentences. Each sentence is played three times, after which participants are
asked to choose one of three possible meanings for the given sentences. The possible
meanings are given to the speakers in written form in their native language. The
sentences Cruz-Ferriera included in the study varied, but included rhetorical questions
like (94) and tag questions like (95) (note that the ‘meanings’ would have been presented
to the Portuguese learners in Portuguese). ‘ signals prosodic stress.
(94) ndidn’t John en‘joy it
a) the speaker is remarking on how great John’s enjoyment was
b) the speaker is asking if John enjoyed it
c) the speaker is saying that John did not enjoy it
(95) nyou’ve been here before / ‘haven’t you
a) I’m sure I’ve seen you here before
b) you may have been here before, but I’m not sure about it
c) I’m disappointed that you’ve been here before
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The study was primarily designed to be used as an evaluation instrument for
teachers, and participants’ abilities in the test thus varied depending on their abilities in
their L2.
Based on Cruz-Ferriera’s work, Jiang (2005) also presented a study in which non-
native speakers of English, this time of Mandarin and Cantonese, were asked to listen to
two examples of the same English sentences with varying intonation, and determine based
on their intonation what the meaning of each sentence was. An example is given in (96).
(96) nare you sure you’ve brought it with you
a) the speaker is asking a question and is not sure of the answer, which could be
either ‘yes’ or ‘no’
b) the speaker is asking a question and expects the answer ‘no’
Jiang found that her native English speaking control group were able to complete
the task with an 89% success rate for perception (picking up on whether the two
examples had differing intonation) and an 87% success rate for comprehension (choosing
the correct meaning for each example)21. While her control group was small, with only
135 judgments given, the high success rates indicate that native participants were able to
distinguish between different intonation patterns at a reliable rate, and to correctly
identify the intended meanings.
The evidence from Cruz-Ferriera (1989) and Jiang (2005) seems to suggest that
in listening tasks, participants can distinguish between intonation patterns and ascribe
the correct meaning to them. So, although production tasks are most common in testing
non-canonical questions, it seems as though perception tasks also have a role.
Using the evidence from experimental pragmatics and L2 acquisition, then, I will
now set out how I adapted the ‘interview method’ to test the acceptability of –int in
Glasgow Scots and –n in Shetland dialect across constructions, including non-canonical
question constructions.
2.4.2 The method used in this research
The methodology used in this research was designed to specifically incorporate the relaxed,
‘local’ nature of the interview method with some of the techniques from recent experimental
pragmatics work. At its core, it was still an acceptability judgment task on a 1-5 Likert
scale. In this section, I will justify the steps that I took when designing the materials for
this study, before explaining how the experimental sessions were run.
21Rates for non-native speakers varied from 70-87% success in perception and 42-61% in comprehension.
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Firstly, example sentences were designed to test the acceptability of –n and –int in
the following contexts, as well as to test examples of standard negative forms in each
context: so, verb-subject-no constructions for interrogatives and reduced –na(e) negation
for declaratives, imperatives and subject wh-questions22. All stimuli can be seen in
Appendix A.
i) Negative declaratives
e.g. I can’n/kint come.
e.g. I havena(e) checked yet.
ii) Negative imperatives
e.g. Do’n/Dint eat any!
e.g. Dunna/don’t23 be late!
iii) True negative polar questions (with NPI either)
e.g. Wid’n/wint you go either?
e.g. Can you no see either?
iv) True negative wh-questions (subject and object)
e.g. Who can’n/kint come?
e.g. What can’n/kint you eat?
e.g. Who doesna(e) eat meat?
e.g. What did you no like about it?
v) Rhetorical wh-questions (subject and object)
e.g. Who wid’n/wint want to go?!
e.g. Where am’n/hint I been?!
e.g. Who hasna(e) done that?!
e.g. What would he no do?!
vi) Matrix biased questions
22Throughout, I transcribe the example contexts and sentences in standard English, except where the
local variants relevant to the research are included – so, –n or –int. This is not indicative of how the
participants heard the examples, with pronunciations and lexical items varying depending on the location.
However, for ease of exposition and due to the lack of a standardised orthography for Scots, I will use
standard English transcription.
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e.g. Is’n/hint she been there before?
e.g. Can you no pick her up?
vii) Tag questions with positive anchors
e.g. You liked that pizza place, did’n/dint you?
e.g. You asked for lemonade, did you no?
viii) Tag questions with negative anchors
e.g. You canna(e) park there, can’n/kint you no?
e.g. You widna(e) want that, would you?
ix) Interrogative exclamatives
e.g. Wis’n/Wint that a terrible winter!
e.g. Did she no look beautiful!
x) Polar rhetorical questions
e.g. Wid’n/Wint she just love it?!
e.g. Did I no say you would do well?!
I also tested examples with both the –n or –int particles and a lower negative
marker no in the matrix biased question, tag question on positive anchor, interrogative
exclamative and polar rhetorical question contexts.
e.g. Can’n/kint you no come?
On the matrix biased questions, rhetorical questions and tag questions, I also varied
the intonation. As was detailed in chapter 1.1.5, intonation has been argued to play
an important role in the semantics of tag questions, with different intonation contours
argued to give either a questioning or confirming meaning (Ladd 1981, Reese and Asher
2006). Examples were presented with either rising or falling intonation in order to test the
potential effects of either contour on the acceptability of the construction.
As in the interview method, each example was embedded in a short context.
Adapting this part of the methodology was reasonably straightforward: in the contexts, I
was able to include information about the epistemic belief that the participant holds at
23Recall Glasgow Scots’ ‘dinnae gap’, which means the standard construction in negative imperatives is
don’t.
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that point in the conversation, as well as to introduce the evidential bias that frames the
examples in the core non-canonical interrogative contexts. So, while in the interview
method, the content of the context is not especially important and simply serves to
create a more natural ‘dialogue’ between the interviewer and the participant, the context
here was more like the contexts presented in Domaneschi et al. (2017) (shown in (89-90)),
where important and relevant pragmatic information for the participants was included.
These contexts therefore tried to incorporate aspects of everyday life for participants, as
in the interview method, while also targeting specific pragmatic contexts.
Each context was different, except in the case of the tag questions and biased
questions, where each positive anchor tag shared a context with the matrix question that
otherwise had the same criteria for more direct comparison of acceptability. For example,
a positive anchor tag with neutral evidential bias and rising intonation would share a
context with a matrix biased question with neutral evidential bias and rising intonation.
In the experimental pragmatics work, the contexts are kept the same – however, one of
the reasons for using contexts in the interview method is to ensure the natural,
conversational nature of the data collection and to keep formality low. I opted therefore
to vary the contexts to keep participants engaged and the situation informal. Due to the
subtle pragmatic differences in evidential biases created by the contexts, it was especially
important that participants continued to pay attention to the contextual information
throughout the task.
(97) At some point in the past, our friend Sarah told us she had been to Edinburgh
Castle (bel = p). You are trying to work out whether it is worth going to visit. You
ask me for advice, and I say ‘you should ask Sarah’ (ev = Ø). You say:
Oh yeah, she’s been before, is’n/hint she?
(98) You say that you are making our friend Robert fish and chips for dinner (bel = p).
I say ‘but Robert’s a vegetarian’ (ev = ¬p). You say:
Does’n/Dint he eat fish?
Each relevant context contained four examples: each set of four examples used the
auxiliary verbs can, do, have24 and would. These four verbs were selected to cover both
modal verbs (can and would) and auxiliaries (do and have).
The only context where this set of verbs varied was the exclamatives, where be, have
and do were used. The factive requirements in an exclamative construction (Zanuttini and
24Examples in Shetland used the be-perfect in place of have.
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declarative imperative negative question wh-question rhetorical wh-question exclamative polar rhetorical question
subject object subject object rise fall
–int / –n 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
standard 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
–int / –n + no – – – – – – – 4 4 4
matrix biased question positive anchor tag question negative anchor tag question
neutral evidence negative evidence neutral evidence negative evidence neutral evidence negative evidence
rise fall rise fall rise fall rise fall rise fall rise fall
–int / –n 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
standard 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
–int / –n + no 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Table 2.3: Contexts and numbers of examples per context in the Glasgow Scots and
Shetland dialect data collection process.
Portner 2003) exclude the use of modal verbs in these constructions. The fourth example
in the exclamative context was a past tense be example with was (therefore, wis’n or wint).
Varying all the factors, there were 236 relevant examples for participants to judge,
distributed as in Table 2.3.
As well as the 236 relevant examples, 164 filler examples were included. These
were designed to include other negation phenomena (e.g. negative concord, negation in
pseudocoordination and subject positioning in negative imperatives), other interrogative
constructions (e.g. positive polar questions and declarative questions), invariant tag
particle right, and some purposefully ungrammatical examples in which, for example, the
word order of a question was mixed up. Fillers were designed to give a broad variety of
grammatical (e.g. 99), dialectal (e.g. 100) and ungrammatical (e.g. 101) judgments in
order to ensure that participants continued to use the full scale throughout the
experiment, and thus to give participants ‘anchor’ points (Nagata 1992, Cowart 1994).
Fillers were also accompanied by short contexts which were similar to those given for the
actual experimental materials, for example (99-101).
(99) One of our friends is always going on holiday, never to the same place. She’s just
back from somewhere again, but you’re not sure where, so you say to me:
Where did she go this time?
(100) We are discussing Andy Murray’s latest final. We were watching it together, but I
had to go out. I ask you what happened and you say:
He never won in the end.
(101) I want to try out the new restaurant down the road. I ask you if it’s good, but you
say:
I no am been yet.
Although the ‘gold standard’ in experimental linguistics is to give double the
50
number of fillers to example sentences, there is also a pay-off in terms of attention span
and making an already long task even longer (Quirk and Svartvik 1966, Carden 1976,
Schütze 1996, Cowart 1997). Previous interviews in e.g. the Scots Syntax Atlas project
and Jamieson (2015) took up to an hour, with participants rating 200 examples. The
surrounding contexts in this research are longer than those previous ones, and arguably
require greater levels of concentration due to the various epistemic and evidential biases
involved. Therefore, I did not wish to make it longer than necessary. However, as well as
the fillers, there was also considerable variation in the types of constructions in the
examples themselves: from declaratives and imperatives to wh-questions and tag
questions, so there was already some variation built into the experiment.
One of the important parts of the interview method is that the examples are
delivered spoken by another member of the community who is known to the participant
(at least, in the second half of the interview). However, as highlighted above,
non-standard speakers are not always confident in reading their dialect; this may cause
problems in terms of intonation production if asking the participant to read from
prepared dialect materials. There is also a potential fatigue issue in asking participants
to read 400 example contexts. I therefore wished to incorporate the sort of recordings
used in the intonation perception experiments described in section 2.4.1 to the task, in a
way which was appropriate for the interview method.
Therefore, in each community, I had a speaker of the local dialect record each
individual trial sentence. The speaker who recorded the Glasgow Scots examples was a
33-year-old man who matched the criteria required of the participants in Glasgow (see
2.4.2 for details). The speaker who recorded the Shetland examples was a 21-year-old man
who matched the criteria required of the participants in Shetland. The choice of speaker
to carry out the recordings may have had an effect on the results (e.g. a young speaker
rather than an older speaker); however, both speakers were young men, and so any effect
should be consistent across both communities. By recording the examples, I was able to
control the intonation used, and ensure that every participant heard the same example,
while still using a local voice in each location.
With the experimental materials designed to incorporate the additional pragmatic
contexts and intonation requirements, the final step was to bring the experimental materials
together in an appropriate format for testing with participants.
The 400 examples were split into two groups of 200 in order to run two sessions
with each participant, to manage the length of time a participant had to concentrate. As
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stated above, for each relevant context, there were four examples; two of each example
were included in each session. Can and do were always paired together, and would and
have/be were always paired together in order to have a the modal/auxiliary split. Pairs
were taken alternately from the list of examples: for example, in session one, a positive
anchor tag question with a neutral evidential bias and rising intonation would include can
and do examples; positive anchor tag questions with neutral evidential bias and falling
intonation would include would and have/be to ensure that examples were distributed
across the experiment as much as possible. Session two would subsequently contain would
and have/be from the rising intonation group, and can and do from the falling intonation
group. All participants rated all examples over the course of the two sessions.
Each group of 200 was randomised per participant, so as to avoid ordering effects
(Greenbaum 1973, Schütze 1996, Cowart 1997).
Using PsychoPy2 (Pierce 2007), I built a programme from which to play these
sample sentences for participants. How this worked will be described below.
The session
In order to collect the data required for this study, I followed the interview method in
meeting with participants in their home community. This means that, rather than
carrying out the research in an experimental pragmatics style laboratory setting,
participants are interviewed in a location in which they would normally use their dialect,
as is also important in traditional sociolinguistic interviews (Labov 1972b). Participants
were given the opportunity to choose the location of their interview to allow them to
choose where they would be most comfortable: they were told only that it needed to be
a) quiet and b) uninterrupted for 2-3 hours. I met the majority of participants in their
own homes. Four Glaswegian participants chose to meet in a local library, two Shetland
participants chose to meet in a local community centre, and I met with one Glaswegian
participant at her place of work.
The design of instructions for judgment tasks can be important for getting the most
reliable results from participants (Schütze 1996, although see Cowart 1997 who argues that
the specific details of the instructions don’t affect participants’ behaviour). It is important
to ensure that participants are judging the correct materials – for the purposes of this,
and other dialect syntax, research, this can mean at least making sure that participants
know that the research aims to tap into their vernacular, and that the ‘correctness’ of
examples does not mean trying to think about the standard. However, it is also important
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that participants are not made explicitly aware of what the research is about, in order to
avoid biasing participants to give what they believe to be the ‘correct’ or desired answers.
Therefore, participants in this research were told that they would be taking part in research
for my PhD in Linguistics, in which I was researching some aspects of Scots dialects. Before
the task began, participants read an information sheet, and were given the opportunity
to discuss this sheet with the interviewer (myself) and ask any additional questions. The
participant subsequently signed a data gathering and speech recording consent form and
completed a basic information sheet before the first session began. After the sessions
were finished, participants were given a debrief sheet which explained more about the
research, and provided contact details in case they had any follow-up questions, or wished
to withdraw from the study at any point. All forms are available in Appendix A.
In following these steps before beginning the task itself, ethics procedures were
followed in line with the British Association for Applied Linguistics guidelines. The
process was approved by the University of Edinburgh Linguistics & English Language
Ethics Committee, who also specifically approved the consent forms, information sheets,
debrief sheet and data management plan.
Participants were set up with a laptop beside them; the screen appeared blank.
The laptop unfortunately made the setting less relaxed and more experimental, but by
maintaining the relaxed location, not using any more ‘intrusive’ equipment such as
headphones or lapel microphones and structuring the rest of the task in a conversational
style, I believe the positive qualities of the interview method were retained as far as was
possible while also allowing for the standardised examples to be played for each
participant.
In each session, for each example, I read out the short preceding context to the
participant. All contexts ended with ‘you say:’, after which participants pressed the space
bar on the laptop to hear the example sentence. Given that both Cruz-Ferriera (1989) and
Jiang (2005) allowed participants to listen to stimuli multiple times, participants in this
research were also allowed to repeat the sentence they had just heard by pressing the left
arrow. Participants could listen to an example as many times as they liked, but once they
pressed space to move on to the next example, they were unable to go back. Participants
could also request that I repeat the preceding context that I had read out to them.
After they had heard the example, participants were then asked to rate the example
on a scale from 1 to 5. The exact numbers used on a Likert scale often vary (usually 1-5 or
1-7) – although e.g. Greenbaum and Quirk (1970) advise again a midpoint that speakers
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Figure 2.3: The opening three screens of the PsychoPy programme that participants used
to listen to the examples. These were shown full screen. When a participant pressed space
bar to hear an example, a number briefly flashed on the screen before returning to blank.
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Figure 2.4: Representation of the scale that participants were given.
may treat as ‘not sure’, rather than a certain rating, best practice is generally to include
a range of numbers which permits for a midpoint (Schütze 1996). However, whether these
numbers should be labelled is up for debate. Cowart (p.c. to Schütze 1996:186) suggests
only labelling the end points of the scale so as to avoid uneven use of the scale, though on
the other hand, the SCOSYA project labelled all points of their scale (as seen in Figure
2.2) – making it clear as to what was intended by each point. In this research, I opted only
to label the endpoints of the scale in order to give participants flexibility in the remainder
of the scale, which could be discussed with me as the interviewer. To this end, a rating of
1 was described as ‘unusual; sounds weird; no one says that’, whereas 5 was described as
‘totally natural; I say that; people around me say that’. These labels attempted to access
both the participant’s judgment of their own usage and of the rest of their community; this
conflation is problematic (as will be discussed in detail in 2.5) but participants generally
have opinions on both counts, and so explicitly acknowledging this can be useful. The
scale was presented to participants as part of their information sheet (see Figure 2.4).
When using ordinal scale judgments, it is often recommended to have a trial period
first, in order to allow participants to become familiar with the examples and the rating
process (Bard et al. 1996, Schütze 1996, Cowart 1997), though Likert scales are generally
taken to be fairly intuitive (Langsford et al. 2018). These examples should be like the
examples in the actual study (Keller 2000) and ideally showcase the full range of potential
judgments so as participants become aware that they are able to use the full scale, and are
not ‘surprised’ by any stimuli.
In this research, then, participants were given three trial examples before they began
the main body of the first session. As well as giving them a chance to become familiar with
the rating process (described below), this warm-up period also gave them a chance to test
out the PsychoPy programme and to become familiar with how to play the examples. The
trial examples used were filler examples from the second session, and varied in acceptability:
one example of a negative imperative was presumed to be perfectly acceptable; one example
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with tag particle right was presumed to be of mid-range acceptability due to its falling
intonation, and one involved an ungrammatical word order and was thus presumed to be
unacceptable. This range of acceptability allowed me as the interviewer to discuss the use
of the scale with participants and encourage them to make full use of the possible range.
As in the standard interview method, participants gave their ratings by telling me;
I subsequently noted the ratings next to each example. Participants were encouraged to
discuss the reasons behind their judgments, and this discussion was recorded using a Zoom
microphone sitting between myself and the participant.
The two sessions for each participant were run back to back. Once the participant
had rated all of the examples in the first session there was a short break, during which I
would set up the second session on the laptop. There was no trial set at the beginning of
the second session, and participants were free to begin the second session whenever they
felt ready. Sessions varied in length depending on the participant: generally, each session
took between 45 minutes and 1 hour. The second session was usually faster, and sessions
with younger speakers were generally faster overall.
Participants were given a £15 Amazon voucher as a thank you for their participation.
The participants
Age Gender Location Age Gender Location
GY01 29 M Southside GO01 73 F Gorbals
GY02 22 F Strathaven GO02 56 F Castlemilk
GY03 23 F Paisley GO03 58 M Castlemilk
GY04 28 F East Kilbride GO04 67 F Govan
GY05 22 F Coatbridge GO05 65 F Bridge of Weir
GY06 29 F East Kilbride GO06 55 F Ruchill
GY07 20 F Strathaven GO07 61 M Castlemilk
GY08 30 F East Kilbride GO08 55 M Castlemilk
GY09 29 M Pollock GO09 64 M Castlemilk
GY10 27 M Kennishead GO10 82 F Blackhill
Table 2.4: Glasgow participants’ age, gender & area of (Greater) Glasgow where they grew
up
Participants were recruited through the friend-of-a-friend approach (Milroy 1980):
either through existing contacts or posts shared on Facebook. In Glasgow, I only
personally knew one participant; others were friends or family of acquaintances,
colleagues or other participants. On the other hand, due to the insular nature of a
community like Shetland and my being a part of the in-group, I knew a number of the
Shetland participants personally; furthermore all but one of those I did not know
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Age Gender Location Age Gender Location
SY01 21 F Gulberwick SO01 78 F Whalsay
SY02 26 F Lerwick SO02 66 F Lerwick
SY03 21 F Cunningsburgh SO03 72 F Hillswick
SY04 28 F Whiteness SO04 60 F Lerwick
SY05 18 F Whalsay SO05 69 F Bressay
SY06 19 M Quarff SO06 60 F Lerwick
SY07 20 F Sandwick SO07 68 M Sumburgh
SY08 20 F Ollaberry SO08 65 F Whalsay
SY09 30 M Cunningsburgh SO09 64 M Bressay
SY10 18 M Whalsay SO10 70 M Northmavine
Table 2.5: Shetland participants’ age, gender & area of Shetland where they grew up
personally already knew of me through family or friends. This means that my status as
the interviewer was different in both locations. In dialect syntax terms, the ideal would
be to have someone from each community carry out each series of interviews. However,
the importance of being from the community is heightened in Shetland – Smith and
Durham (2012) show how young speakers who use Shetland dialect dramatically drop
their rates of use of variants like the be-perfect and lexical item ken when interviewed by
a non-local speaker as opposed to someone from Shetland. The idea of speaking
‘properly’ to someone who is not a Shetlander is such a pervasive part of life as a dialect
speaker there is even a dialect word for it: ‘knappin’ (Melchers 1985, Karam 2017).
Given this, it was most important that the Shetland interviewer was local. In Glasgow,
effects of my non-local status were hopefully mediated to some extent by the fact that I
was Scottish, and the fact that the actual sentences the speakers were judging were
recorded by a Glasgow Scots speaker, as described above. Of course, there may still have
been some wariness that participants did not vocalize and this should be kept in mind.
In both Glasgow and Shetland, 10 participants aged 18-30 and 10 participants age
55+ were recruited. This gave a total of 20 participants per community, and 40 participants
overall (as shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5). These groupings permit comparison between the
two communities as wholes, but also to view any apparent time changes that are ongoing
in the community – particularly in Shetland, where there is rapid dialect levelling taking
place in younger generations (Smith and Durham 2011, Sundkvist 2011, Smith and Durham
2012). 55 was chosen as the cut off point for the older age group as this was the point at
which Kevin Stadler (p.c.) found that speakers started behaving differently in Shetland
with regard to acceptability of verb raising in questions based on the data in Jamieson
(2015).
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Participants had to meet two criteria, with an additional third which was less
important, but also taken into consideration.
• Participants had to have been born and brought up in the community in question
(Glasgow or Shetland).
• Participants could not have spent any significant portion of time living outside of
their community.
• I asked where participants’ parents were from. This was not necessarily a deciding
factor: those whose parents had both also been born and raised in the community
were preferred, but a handful of exceptions were made where only one parent was
born and raised in the community, but the participant met the other criteria.
These criteria help to narrow down the participants to those with dense, multiplex
networks within the community (Milroy 1980). These are thus participants who are
embedded within community life and likely to be dialect users. Each of the three factors
is important in its own right: firstly, being born and brought up in the relevant
community gives speakers access to a peer group who are likely users of the variety.
Secondly, not spending any significant time living outside of the community reduces the
likelihood of contact with other varieties and the need to accommodate by being in a
minority. Finally, parents (or other guardians/early caregivers) are traditionally held to
be the most important inputs into a child’s language acquisition process, with children
acquiring their parents’ variation (Labov 2001). Having parents who are from the
community therefore puts speakers in a strong position to have acquired the local variety.
Given my insider status in the Shetland community, the three questions above were
generally enough to establish whether a potential participant was suitable for the research.
However, as I had less insider knowledge within the Glasgow community, I asked potential
participants from Glasgow in advance if they would use any of the following four phrases:
i) They books / Them books is old.
ii) Gonnae no forget!
iii) She would come, wint she?
iv) You’re looking for a pen and then you find it: Here it’s!
These four constructions have been highlighted in the literature (Thoms et al.
2013, Weir 2012) and by the ongoing SCOSYA project as being used in the Glasgow area.
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Speakers using these features, therefore, were likely to use the relevant –int feature. As
long as a participant self-reported usage of (iii) and at least one other of the features, as
well as meeting the relevant social criteria, they were accepted for the data collection
process.
2.4.3 Data analysis
Participants’ basic information forms and consent forms were stored securely, and all
recordings / data about the participants stored were anonymized, and referred to by a
participant ID number only, which incorporated the location and age group (e.g. GY05 =
participant 5 in the Glasgow 18-30 group, SO03 = participant 3 in the Shetland 55+
group).
The ratings given by participants were input into .csv files, stored by participant
ID number only.
Comments given by participants on individual examples (e.g. what they would use
instead, or people they associated use of the example with) were collated in a .csv file, and
were coded for the type of construction, the exact example, any alternative if given, as
well as the age group of the participant. In the Glasgow data, 898 comments were coded
in this way. In the Shetland data, 1150 comments were coded in this way.
Figure 2.5: Example section of the file of participant comments: participant number and
age were coded, alongside the general form of the construction (PNX = positive anchor
tag question, neutral evidential context; PNZ = positive anchor tag question, negative
evidential context; NNX = negative anchor tag question, neutral evidential context, WH
= wh-question; QNX = matrix biased question, neutral evidential context), the specific
example number, what the participant stated they prefered (if nothing, CMNT to signal
a general comment), prefers type (coded for e.g. INT or NO constructions), and finally
comment – if the participant had any explicit comments that did not relate to a specifically
preferred form.
Using the participants’ comments, judgments were excluded if:
i) A participant made it clear that they were not judging the correct example – e.g.
repeating wouldn’t instead of wint.
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ii) It was clear that the motivation behind the rating was not to do with the test item –
for example, one participant’s rating of a true negative question was excluded because
they did not want either to be at the end; however, when asked for clarification, they
said that the rest of the example was acceptable.
iii) A participant stated that the preceding context was bad, and this was not to do with
the kind of evidential bias expressed in the context.
Statistical analysis was carried out in the RStudio environment (RStudio Team
2015). Details of the exact analysis process will be provided in chapter 3.
During the analysis process, a pattern emerged in the way that participants in
different age groups in the two locations appeared to be using the Likert scale for judgments.
Before I discuss the results for the –n and –int particles that were the central focus of this
research, I will use the results from two sets of filler examples to unpick the judgment
patterns, and to provide a sociolinguistic interpretation of the patterns.
2.5 Sociolinguistic interpretation
As detailed in 2.4.1, the scalar grammaticality judgment methodology has been successfully
used to explore syntactic patterns for many years, improving on the classic grammatical /
ungrammatical (*) binary. The interview method has subsequently proven successful for
research in dialect syntax, with the ability to get at subtle points of variation between
dialects and the standard. However, there has been little discussion of linguistic change
and grammaticality judgments, despite the clear relationship between variation and change,
and role of ongoing change and standardisation/levelling in dialects. Diachronic change
is often investigated through corpora or apparent time interviews and/or elicitation tasks,
but for particular low frequency constructions, constructions where there are many possible
alternatives, or in less-studied dialects, these methods are not necessarily always feasible.
Acceptability judgments, therefore, can be employed to understand variation in a change
context, but care must be taken in the interpretation. This research, investigating two Scots
dialects with very different cultural environments, language attitudes and relationships to
variation and change, presents an opportunity to explore how speakers’ metalinguistic
awareness and their relationship to an ongoing change curve (Stadler 2016) affects the way
they interact with an acceptability judgment task.
In this section, I will use data from filler examples to show the general patterns
based on age that appear in each community. In section 2.5.2, I will discuss how this
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should be interpreted, focusing primarily on the Shetland participants who exemplify a
situation if not of dialect death, then certainly of rapid, intensive attrition (Smith and
Durham 2011, 2012, Sundkvist 2011). I will frame their behaviour in terms of perceptual
hyperdialectalism, and suggest that the need to assert a local identity is driving younger
speakers’ judgments. The discussion in this section will set the scene for the next chapter,
providing the information required to fully evaluate the results for the –int and –n particles,
as well as shedding light on the current linguistic situation in Shetland.
2.5.1 Making use of the scale
As described in the methodology section above, participants were asked to judge each
item in the research on a 5-point Likert scale. ‘1’ was described as something that was
‘unusual, sounds terrible, nobody round here would say that’, while ‘5’ was described as
being ‘perfectly normal, I would say it and I would hear it around me’. No particular
descriptors were attached to the middle of the scale. Participants were also invited to give
further comment on why they were giving particular scores, and to explain their use of the
scale. This was entirely optional, and some participants chose to do this more than others;
however, all participants made full use of the scale.
The ways in which participants made use of the scale varied – particularly by age
within the two locations. Here I will demonstrate the pattern with two sets of filler examples
– one designed to be grammatical and the other to be ungrammatical.
For grammatical examples, we will look at filler examples of positive polar questions,
in situations where the speaker was not given any prior belief, and the evidential context
was relatively neutral – in effect, a standard information-seeking question. Eight of these
examples were included as fillers, one of which can be seen in (102).
(102) We’re at the park. You decide to go and get an ice cream from the van. You say:
Do you want anything?
Standard positive polar questions in Scots are taken to be syntactically the same as
in English25. These examples are therefore predicted to be grammatical for all participants,
and indeed, that is what we find.
As can be clearly seen in Figure 2.6, where the mean ratings for the constructions
are plotted by age group (x-axis) for each location, scores for positive polar questions are
25Jamieson (2015) shows that there are remnants of verb raising in questions in Shetland; however,
do-supported questions were preferred by speakers in all age groups. No such evidence has been attested
for Glasgow since sees tu? (lit. ‘see you?’, ‘do you see?’) was a shibboleth of Paisley speech in the late
nineteenth century (Beal 1997:346).
61
Figure 2.6: Mean acceptability of positive polar questions in Glasgow and Shetland, by
age.
at ceiling for participants in both age groups in both locations. In Glasgow, the mean for
the older group is 4.913, while in the younger group it is 4.95 – the difference between
groups is not significant (t = -0.93402, df = 148.43, n.s.). In Shetland, the mean rating
for positive polar questions from older speakers was 4.938, while for younger speakers it
was 4.9. Again, the difference between groups is not significant (t = 0.58593, df = 128.08,
n.s.). There was no effect of gender in either location.
It seems that when examples are acceptable, speakers are generally not afraid to
give the highest rating. However, given the complex interactions of evidence and belief
involved in the non-canonical questions in this research, as well as the numerous possible
forms of question that are available in these situations (e.g. matrix biased questions, tag
questions, rising declaratives, invariant tags...), the examples investigated may not be as
clear cut in their acceptability as the standard information-seeking questions seen here. I
therefore take a combination of two factors to indicate acceptability:
62
1. a mean rating between 4 and 5; and
2. a median rating of 5
These criteria capture the ‘ceiling effect’ of Bader and Häussler (2010), in which
examples that are acceptable are rated at ceiling (e.g. the median rating of 5), but allowing
for some flexibility with regard to the potential for alternative variants in any given context,
varying interpretations of belief strength etc (e.g. the mean rating between 4 and 5).
Examples which fit only one of the criteria, or which fall just outside the boundaries, will
be discussed on a case by case basis.
The picture is more complicated for ungrammatical examples at the other end of
the scale. I will demonstrate this with examples of do no in negative imperatives. Recall
from section 2.3.1 that unlike English negative imperatives where both don’t and do not
are able to be used (Potsdam 1996, Rupp 2003), negative imperatives in Scots do not
permit both options. Only dunna or dinnae (depending on location26) is available; do no
is unacceptable (Weir 2012, Thoms et al. 2013).
(103) Dinnae smoke in here!
(104) *Dae no smoke in here! (Weir 2012:9)
As ungrammatical filler examples, each participant judged four examples of negative
imperatives which were constructed with do no in place of dunna or don’t, such as (105).
(105) I have just arrived at your house and I’m really hungry. There’s some fresh scones
sitting out, and I’m eyeing them up, but you say:
Do no touch them! They’re for later.
As expected from the literature, speakers in both areas in both age groups did not
rate these examples in the ‘grammatical’ range, as set out above. However, despite the
fact that speakers did not consider these constructions acceptable, there were significant
differences in the ratings between the age groups in both communities.
This can be seen in Figure 2.7, where again the mean ratings for the construction
are plotted by age group (x-axis) for each area. The first thing to note is that these mean
ratings are low. However, there are statistically significant differences with respect to how
low the constructions are rated.
26Recall too that Glasgow does not have either of these forms, and so uses don’t in negative imperatives
(Thoms et al. 2013).
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Younger speakers in Glasgow in particular judge these examples extremely low.
While older Glaswegian speakers have a mean rating of 2.775, it is still significantly
higher than that of the younger speakers, at 1.275 (t=7.1349, df=51.826, p > .001). In
Shetland, the mean for younger speakers (2.75) is fairly comparable with the Glaswegian
older speakers, but is significantly higher than that of the older Shetland speakers, who
gave a mean rating of 2.00 (t = -2.5448, df=76.255, p = .013). There was no effect of
gender in either community.
Figure 2.7: Mean acceptability of do no imperatives in Glasgow and Shetland, by age
So, while grammatical examples are effectively at ceiling – and are thus fairly easy
to interpret – it’s not so straightforward for unacceptable examples. Speakers seem to
respond differently based on their age group within the area. Why is this?
The obvious interpretation would be to say that these speakers reject these variants
to different extents – and to some degree, this is true. However, I believe there is more
to it than that, particularly in Shetland, where the importance of identity is heightened
(Giles and Billings 2004). In the next section I will interpret this in order to set up the
background for the non-canonical question analysis in chapter 3.
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2.5.2 Changing dialects, changing interpretations
In this section, I firstly provide a brief analysis for the behaviour of the Glasgow
participants. The Glasgow results add to the growing body of work on age and
sociolinguistic perception (Drager 2011, Carrera-Sabaté 2014, Lawrence 2017) where
younger speakers exhibit greater metalinguistic awareness of particular variants or more
nuanced sociolinguistic indexing, with older speakers ‘overcompensating’. I thus extend
this literature by demonstrating this pattern of behaviour in acceptability judgments.
Secondly, I consider the behaviour of the Shetland participants, tying it to
hyperdialectalism. Hyperdialectalism is defined as a form of hyperadaption (Labov 1972b),
where, in the face of an intensive period of language contact and thus a perceived threat
to their way of speech, speakers become ‘hyperlocal’. I argue that rather than reflecting
hyperdialectal usage (Trudgill 1986, Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 1995, Britain 2009,
Smith and Durham 2011), the younger speakers’ mid-range ratings are borne out of
‘linguistic insecurity’ (Labov 2006:318) and evidence what I term perceptual
hyperdialectalism.
This analysis offers insights into how we understand the sociolinguistic situation in
Shetland, following on from the work of e.g. Smith and Durham (2011, 2012), Durham
(2014) and Karam (2017). More broadly, it taps into the metalinguistic knowledge of
speakers at the end of a linguistic change.
Glasgow: a typical case of variation and change
There is a continuum of variation in Glaswegian speech, from the broadest ‘slang’ (as it is
often known to its speakers (Macafee 1983)) to Standard Scottish English. Broad Glasgow
Scots is a stigmatised variety, both by speakers in the near vicinity (Pollner 1987) and
more broadly across the UK (Coupland and Bishop 2007, Andersson and Trudgill 1990),
due to assumptions that it is a ‘working class’ variety and the negative value judgments
that come with this (see Skeggs (2010) for an overview). Despite this, there is evidence
that Glaswegians are extremely proud of their speech – even or perhaps especially in the
face of these negative perceptions about the variety in general (Braber and Butterfint 2008,
Braber 2009).
The form of broad Glasgow ‘slang’ that can express local solidarity is undergoing
change. Young speakers are intensifying features which are already taken to be major
signifiers of Glaswegian speech (e.g. t-glottaling (Stuart-Smith 1999)); incorporating
features from other varieties of English (e.g. l-vocalization (Stuart-Smith et al. 2006));
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innovating new lexical items (e.g. the pure intensifier (Macaulay 2006)), and getting rid
of others (Macafee 1994). Despite all of this change and innovation, and the fact young
speakers behave differently to older speakers, these features are still taken to signal
‘Glaswegian’ speech. For example, although l-vocalization is argued to have spread
through urban areas from the south-east of England, Glaswegian speakers perceive it as a
local Glaswegian feature, and employ it to strengthen their identity (Stuart-Smith et al.
2007).
The relationship between all of these variables is complex, with age, gender and
socio-economic class all coming into play. However, in terms of variation and change
patterns, for the purposes of this research, the linguistic situation in Glasgow can be
described as a relatively standard one: language changes, but does not disrupt speakers’
sense of community, or the role that language plays in that community.
In this research, younger speakers from Glasgow were fairly categorical with their
judgments. Examples that were clearly acceptable were rated at ceiling level (i.e. 5). There
was more variation in the ratings given to less acceptable or unacceptable examples, but on
the whole, younger speakers were happy to give ratings of 1 or 2. When potential variation
was explicitly discussed it was generally area that was given as the locus of variation – for
example, GY01 suggested that use of invariant tag right was a ‘pure east end’ feature.
As we saw, older speakers patterned with the younger speakers with constructions
that were clearly standard, and received ceiling judgments (i.e. 5) (see Figure 2.6).
However, with ungrammatical examples, older speakers did not (in general) behave like
the younger speakers in giving strongly negative judgments (i.e. at the level of 1 or 2).
Although there is a clear distinction between their ‘acceptable’ ratings (5) and lesser or
unacceptable ratings (less than 5), there is an unwillingness to say that ‘no-one’ says this.
Instead, there is more hedging, and settling on numbers in the mid-range: 3s and 4s. It
seems that participants were less willing to categorically state that any particular feature
was not a feature of some sort of Glaswegian speech. Explicit comments show that the
idea that ‘I wouldn’t say that, but other people might’ was pervasive among older
participants.
(106) We are arranging a party and there are a few things we still need to get. I said I
would get the glasses, but I seem to keep putting it off. You say:
Kint you no get the glasses?
(107) You are talking about a new pub in town that only opened last weekend. You are
about to tell me what it is like, but before you do, you just check and say:
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GO10: kint kint– no you know I hear people saying that
but maybe not me ehh four I think for that one
You havnae been yet, hint you?
GO03: I would say it’s four the only thing I would
change is the end bit [...] that’s just my
interpretation of how I would say it right
E: yeah yeah no absolutely
GO03: but it may well be ninety percent of the
population in Glasgow would say it similar to
that and I’m– I’m no trying to talk posh it’s just
me personally how I would say things
Participant GO03 was particularly insistent about the idea of other people using
the features in question after the interview, strongly associating –int with young people
and even labelling it as ‘a bit neddy’27.
Innovation in language is often viewed in a negative light: Labov (2001:220), for
example, finds a ‘strong pattern of negative evaluation of change in progress’ in
Philadelphia, and older speakers’ in this research did sometimes label these ‘young’
features as ‘working class’28, despite the fact that all speakers in this research were
selected to come from mainly working class areas, seen in Table 2.4. GO03 did this above,
while participant GO10 referred to a tag with ‘kint you’ as ‘scruffy’, despite happily
accepting other instances of –int tags. However, despite the pejorative associations that
‘working class’ can classically bring, how negative this association of ‘broad’ features with
working class speakers is in Glasgow is debatable due to the solidarity that broad
Glaswegian speech tends to trigger. In fact, it appears that older speakers were more
permissive of these features they claim not to use than we might expect – suggesting that
some form of ‘Glaswegian solidarity’ may be at play, as seen in Braber (2009).
The pattern seen in the grammaticality judgments in Glasgow Scots fits with and
builds on current literature on metalinguistic awareness and social perceptions. Carrera-
Sabaté (2014), for example, found that young women were more aware of an ongoing vowel
change in the Lleidatá dialect of Catalan than older speakers were. Lawrence (2017) argued
that younger speakers had greater metalinguistic awareness of the social indexing of vowel
27‘Neds’ are a subgroup of (young) working class people in Scotland, often considered ‘the Scottish
version’ of e.g. English ‘chavs’ or American ‘white trash’ (Pockele 2013).
28This may have been exacerbated by the fact the recordings for the research were produced by a younger
Glaswegian man who spent some time growing up in Castlemilk, an area described as ‘rough as fuck’ by
the speaker himself.
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variants in York English than older speakers did, while Drager (2011) showed that older
speakers tended to be affected more by the perceived age of the speaker in a task looking at
an ongoing vowel shift in New Zealand English, in effect overcompensating and attributing
more of the trap variant, the final result of the vowel shift, to younger looking speakers.
The literature thus suggests that younger speakers have greater metalinguistic
awareness of ongoing changes, and are able to more accurately apply them to
non-age-based social cues. In the acceptability judgment results presented here, it
appears that something similar is happening with the older speakers in Glasgow. While
younger speakers have more nuanced judgments on e.g. specific pragmatic contexts (see,
for example, section 3.3.3), older speakers accept the possibility of a variant – even when
it’s ungrammatical, as seen above.
So why did the Shetland participants pattern so differently?
Shetland: perceptual hyperdialectalism
As we saw above, the umbrella of Glasgow Scots incorporates considerable ongoing
change, with young people strengthening or adding certain features, and losing other,
more traditional ones. How, then, does it differ from Shetland, a variety where change
has also been well documented (Melchers 1985, van Leyden 2004, Melchers and Sundkvist
2010, Sundkvist 2011, Smith and Durham 2011, 2012, Jamieson 2015, Karam 2017)? In
this section, I will take the position that the difference is one of attitude and ‘linguistic
insecurity’ (Labov 2006:318), leading to something which I will term ‘perceptual
hyperdialectalism’.
In situations of hyperdialectalism, speakers become ‘hyperlocal’ (Labov 1972b).
This may be exhibited in a number of ways: for example, speakers may extend the
potential contexts for use of a feature, losing e.g. pragmatic distinctions, or adopt what
was traditionally a minority variant so as it becomes categorical in a limited number of
cases, despite general loss. In effect, they make themselves ‘more’ local in specific
contexts, while losing the environmental distinctions that may have once restrained
production (Trudgill 1986, Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 1995, Britain 2009). There is also
the potential for statistical hyperdialectalism (Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 2006:275),
where speakers do not extend contextual uses but simply increase the usage of a
particularly salient feature.
Hyperdialectal speech is recorded in young speakers’ production data in Shetland by
Smith and Durham (2011). Demonstrative distal yon is a particularly clear case, though
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other syntactic and phonological features also showed similar patterns. Yon participates in
a distal deictic system in Shetland dialect alongside this and that. There are disagreements
in the literature about exactly which distal contexts permit use of yon (see Robertson and
Graham (1952), Melchers (1997) for different possible combinations) – however, regardless
of which semantic or pragmatic environments it is posited to be used in, it is understood
to be a marginal form, limited contextually.
There were generally low rates of yon across the three age groups that Smith and
Durham investigated, but surprisingly, there was more usage in the younger group than
the middle or older groups. Looking at this between speakers, however, only four of the
eight younger speakers used any yon at all. Furthermore, two in particular were extremely
prolific users, with around 36% yon usage - compared to < 20% with the older and middle
groups – thus bumping up the overall younger speakers’ mean usage rates.
Syntactically, the younger speakers follow the same patterns of use with regard to
whether yon is a determiner or pronoun – with more use as a determiner – as the older
and middle speakers, but with larger percentages of overall use. Smith and Durham do not
investigate the semantic or pragmatic contexts where speakers produce yon – so it may be
the case that there is contextual extension. Nevertheless, it seems clear that some speakers
are employing yon in a hyperdialectal way Smith and Durham’s data, whether it is purely
statistical or involves some structural extension.
Given this evidence, Smith and Durham (2011) conclude that Shetland dialect may
be obsolescing, at least in Lerwick, with other recent articles reaching similar conclusions
(van Leyden 2004, Melchers and Sundkvist 2010, Sundkvist 2011, Durham 2014) – though
Karam (2017) is slightly more optimistic.
Outside of academia, reports of dialect death in the community itself have been
ongoing for considerably longer – perhaps centuries29. Local literary magazine The New
Shetlander in 1962 – following the introduction of television to the isles, but prior to the
population increases caused by the development of the oil industry in the 1970s – printed
an editorial stating that ‘for over a hundred years, there’s been talk of the death of the
dialect’, going on to challenge those claims by stating ‘while there’s a Shetlander alive to
showe a neep [‘chew a turnip’] it should continue’.
29These century-old reports of ‘dialect death’ may be conflated with the death of Norn, the West Norse
language spoken in Shetland until some time after Shetland was given from Norway to Scotland as a dowry
in 1469 (Barnes 1998). Karam (2017), for example, discusses how, in 1949, John Graham was only able to
identify 107 of the 300 words collected by Jakob Jakobsen in his work in Shetland the 1890s; furthermore,
a Shetlander in their early twenties in the late 1970s only identified 65 words. However, Jakobsen (1928)
set out to document remnants of Norn in the isles in the late nineteenth century. Though it is debated
exactly when Norn died out, even the most generous estimates (Wiggen 2002, Rendboe 1984) suggest
that the last pockets of Norn were lost in the mid-nineteenth century; more conservatively, the estimate is
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The attitude expressed in this editorial, that although a variety may change and may
lose features that it once had, it is not dying out, mirrors the position set out for Glasgow
speakers above. The attitudes expressed by the young speakers in Svenstrup (2016) also
demonstrate this. Svenstrup looks at the metalinguistic awareness of young (age 14-17)
German speakers living in bidialectal areas where both regional variety Schwäbisch and the
German standard Hochdeutsch are spoken. During interviews, the young speakers came
to an agreement that, although there is a ‘real’, authentic Schwäbisch, they themselves
speak what they refer to as neuschwäbisch ‘new-schwäbisch’. This is further described as
a jugendsprache, or ‘youth language’ (Svenstrup 2016:150).
Crucially, although these young speakers distance themselves from the variety
spoken by the older members of their community – either denying that they speak it
altogether, or claiming to speak only ‘snippets’ or in particular situations – the speakers
still believe that what they themselves speak is a kind of Schwäbisch. They may have
enregistered (Agha 2003) a new term for it, but their local identity and ties to their
community are, I would argue, strengthened by this enregisterment – giving their variety
its own in-group label, which is distinct and yet retains a connection to the speech of the
older members of their community. In this way, the younger speakers are able to assert
the many facets of their identities clearly – young, cool, urban speakers, who nevertheless
speak a regional dialect.
In present-day Shetland dialect, this same enregisterment has not taken place among
younger speakers, despite the fact that Wolfram and Schilling-Estes (1995:698) argue that
‘nonmainstream dialects... play a large role in the shaping of cultural identity’. Children
of Shetland heritage have a generally positive attitude towards the dialect and consider it
to be ‘an important facet of their identity’ (Durham 2014:303), something they are proud
of. Despite these positive attitudes, Durham (2014, 2017) shows that younger Shetland
speakers’ self-reported usage estimates lean more strongly towards English than dialect
when compared to the children in Melchers’ (1985) 1983 corpus, even in informal, local
contexts such as speaking to a friend who is also from Shetland. Stadler et al. (2016) and
Stadler (2016) show that both younger and older speakers in Shetland a) identified the
direction of a morphosyntactic change and b) placed themselves in relation to that change
that Norn was lost by the mid-eighteenth century (Knooihuizen 2005, Barnes 2010). Using knowledge of
remnant ‘Norn’ (vocabulary) to measure use of a more modern day ‘Shetland dialect’ does not, therefore,
seem like a particularly useful exercise – however, this attitude persists at least to some extent, labelled
‘Nornomania’ by Melchers (2012) following Smith (1996). It may well be that this ongoing conflation of
the loss of Norn with the loss of the Norn-influenced Scots dialect that resulted from the contact between
the two varieties has intensified the discussion of dialect death and meant that it has been ongoing for such
a long period.
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curve, with younger speakers consistently positioning themselves ahead of the curve to a
greater extent than older speakers.
Within the community, speakers of all ages playing a part in the identification of
(local) people who don’t speak the dialect. Older people bemoan the fact that ‘young
people don’t speak dialect any more’ – this in itself is unsurprising, given the tendency for
negative perceptions of language change, but what is then interesting is that the younger
speakers themselves often express the attitude that young people don’t speak dialect too.
Smith and Durham (2011:217), for example, quote one of the young speakers in their
research who states that other than one of her best friends, her other friends ‘don’t have
the accent at all’. In this research, in the discussion that followed our interview, I asked
participant SY02 and her sister if they had any further suggestions for people I could
interview. Previously SY02 had suggested that her boyfriend might take part; however, in
that situation, the two of them decided that he didn’t really speak dialect, and that if he
were to complete the judgment tasks, he wouldn’t be able to judge them properly – despite
his Shetland lineage. Unlike the Schwäbisch speakers, these speakers do not consider the
people they pick out to be speaking a different form of the same dialect – in their eyes,
they are simply not speaking the dialect at all.
Furthermore, some younger speakers I approached to participate in this research
(and previous research I have carried out in Shetland) expressed concern that they did not
really speak dialect themselves, despite being Shetlanders who were born and brought up
in the isles (with at least one, but usually two Shetland parents) and who had not spent
any significant time living anywhere else. This did not happen with any older participants
I approached, despite the fact that the older participants, with an average age of 67.2, were
born in the mid-late 1940s and early-mid 1950s and were thus the targets of the criticism
about the death of the dialect highlighted in The New Shetlander in the early 60s.
It seems, therefore, that an important difference between the current young
generation of Shetland dialect speakers’ experiences of ‘dialect death’ and those who have
come before is that the current generation exhibit high levels of ‘linguistic insecurity’
(Labov 2006). Traditionally, linguistic insecurity has been defined as occurring when
speakers feel ‘that the variety they use is somehow inferior, ugly or bad’ (Meyerhoff
2006:292). However, Preston (2013) argues that it can be seen in terms of an individual
speaker’s relationship to their regional standard, specifically ‘when one feels that they are
not able to perform the linguistic job at hand’ (Preston 2013:324). Sometimes, speakers
see their entire region as ‘incorrect’, and judge themselves because of that; however,
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speakers may believe that their own area is ‘correct’, but that feel they themselves are
lacking (e.g. the Michigan speakers in Preston (2013)). It is clear here to see parallels
with the ‘semi-speakers’ identified by Dorian (1977, 1994) in her work on dialect death in
East Sutherland Gaelic. ‘Semi-speakers’ were younger members of the community whose
Gaelic was considered ‘imperfect’, though they could still make themselves understood.
Older and/or more fluent members of the community would recognise these people as
‘semi-speakers’, and openly make judgments that they didn’t speak the Gaelic ‘right’. In
turn, the semi-speakers were aware of their status in the community, aware of their
linguistic errors, and embarrassed about their lack of language (Dorian 1994).
I argue a similar thing is happening with at least some younger speakers in Shetland
– those who consider the dialect to be a part of their identity, but who are concerned about
their abilities regarding the dialect, and/or who are picked out as being in some way lacking
in dialect ability.
For speakers of all ages, there is a strong desire to distance oneself from people who
are not members of the community in-group, known locally as soothmoothers, a slightly
derogatory term (Karam 2017) – especially in the face of the threat to cultural identity
that comes with the obsolesence of a dialect (Wolfram and Schilling-Estes 1995:699). A
key way of doing this is through making use of the local linguistic resources. Following
Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985:181):
The individual creates for himself the patterns of his linguistic behaviour so
as to resemble those of the group or groups with which from time to time he
wishes to be identified, or so as to be unlike those from whom he wishes to be
distinguished.
Aware that they do not produce certain variants, younger participants turn to
what they ‘know’, or think that they know, about the linguistic features of their
community – distinguishing their own usage (majority 5 ratings) with what they perceive
to be possible, or overheard (majority 4 ratings). Participants back this up by making
explicit their connections to the community, legitimizing their right to be making
judgments. Participants would claim a variant was part of someone else’s dialect: this
‘someone else’ was always someone who could be considered to have a more ‘legitimate’
claim to the dialect than the participant themselves believed they did. Most often this
meant older speakers who were family members (e.g. grandparents), but participants also
referred to people from areas perceived to be more rural and thus more ‘broad’. Though
in the task participants are not employing the resources in conversation, they are doing
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as much as they can to preserve their in-group status through ‘knowledge’ – the issue is
that this knowledge is not necessarily accurate.
To take an extreme example, participants were given three examples as ‘trial’
examples, including one ungrammatical sentence (108) to show them the wide range of
acceptability that would be presented to them during the tasks, and to allow them to get
into the hang of using the 1-5 scale.
Participant SY05 was one of the youngest participants at age 18, but was also from
Whalsay, a particularly distinctive and reputedly ‘broad’ dialect area of Shetland (Cohen
1978, Melchers 1985, Durham 2017).
(108) I want to try out this new restaurant down the road. I ask you if it’s any good, but
you say:
I no am been yet.
SY05: mmm no so much maybe like a three
E: three so yeah so like
SY05: like I’ve heard it but I widna say it myself
Despite the fact that the example shown in (108) is entirely ungrammatical in terms
of its word order, both in standard English and in Shetland dialect, SY05 states that this
is something she has ‘heard’. However, she clearly goes on to distance herself from it – ‘I
widna say it myself’30.
Although the example in (108) is an extreme one, the principles that seemed to be
underpinning how SY05 scored this ungrammatical trial example were a continued theme
throughout the younger speakers’ rating processes.
(109) We are organising a birthday party. You have spoken to all of our friends to see if
they can come, and everyone was able to come. When I ask you who is able to
come to the party, you say:
Who can’n come?!
By stating that (older) members of her own family would use a variant, SY07
implicitly defends her position as an in-group member. Furthermore, in mentioning a
specific area (North Roe, the northmost point of mainland Shetland) where a particular
feature could be used, SY07 is marking out her perceived understanding of the dialect.
30As the interviewer, in the face of any uncertainty about completing the task, I took the opportunity
provided in the trial examples to ensure that speakers were making full use of the scale, and to understand
that some things were going to be unacceptable – so in this case I pointed out to SY05 that this example
(and potentially others that would follow) were not ‘meant’ to be correct, and could be scored low.
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SY07: I widna use ‘can’n’, I’d say ‘wha canna come?’
E: mmm so what would you give it
SY07: I’ll give it a four
E: do you think some folk might say it
SY07: yeah cos well my auntie she’s– they stay up
in North Roe and she’s really broad so she
definitely says it and I’ve heard it from her
and like folk around there
The results of the acceptability judgments do not seem to reflect hyperdialectal
usage patterns, despite the fact that these are attested in the variety (Smith and Durham
2011) – young speakers are aware of their own broad usage patterns, and have the ability
to analyse their own deployment of linguistic resources in order to make judgments about
what they say. However, the results appear to exemplify the principles of hyperdialectalism
(Trudgill 1986, Britain 2009) but within the space of perceptual dialectology. I surmise
that while the younger speakers are aware that traditionally, the –n particle can be used
in more contexts than they themselves would produce it in, they aren’t accurately able
to pinpoint what those contexts are. They therefore extend the possibility of a variant to
new contexts and lose the original environments for use.
Dorian (1977) discusses the ‘unreliability’ of semi-speakers’ elicitations – indeed, if
we were collecting a corpus of data from these speakers, it does not seem that it would give
a full picture of what the –n particle can, or at least could, do. However, it does not seem
to me that the young Shetlanders’ judgments are unreliable. Interpreting their judgments,
however, requires in-depth knowledge of the linguistic situation in the community, and of
the fragility of identity tied up in the politics of the local dialect. Without this knowledge,
and without the additional qualitative discussion that comes with the interview method,
it would be easy to arrive at the conclusion that younger speakers said things that older
speakers did not – however, that is not the case. The results of this research, and the
suggestion of perceptual hyperdialectalism, highlight the importance of qualitative research
to back up the quantitative judgments so often given in syntactic research. This is especially
pressing in contexts of rapid, intensive language change.
A final note: why don’t the older Shetland speakers behave more like the older
Glasgow speakers, given the general tendency for older speakers to be more permissive of
ungrammatical examples in their judgments? Firstly, they do to some extent – compare
the judgments given by the younger Glasgow speakers, who give the clearly low judgments
in Glasgow, to those given by the older Shetland speakers. Although they are both stricter
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than the other age groups in their own varieties, the younger Glasgow speakers are harsher
still than the older Shetland speakers. The older speakers in Shetland, too, are more likely
to give occasional 5 outliers to an otherwise unacceptable variant than the younger speakers
are – as is the case in Glasgow.
However, the older speakers in Shetland are also aware of the ongoing language
change and potential obsolescence of the variety. They also want to assert their identities
as Shetlanders, to mark themselves out as being part of ‘the in-group’ and to accurately
represent the dialect, which they perceive to be dying. This sort of pride in the variety is
also found in work on obsolescing Ocracoke and Smith Island varieties (Wolfram and
Schilling-Estes 1995, Schilling-Estes 1998, Schilling 2017). The major difference between
the older Shetland group and the younger Shetland group is that the older speakers’
perceptions are more accurate, and less likely to be based on an approximation of what
they think other, ‘more legitimate’ speakers are saying.
2.6 Conclusions
This section has demonstrated that there are many difficulties and variety-specific
nuances that need to be taken into account when interpreting the results of a Likert scale
acceptability judgment task in dialect syntax – especially in the case of language change,
or, more specifically, potential dialect death. I suggested that the situation exemplified
by the Glasgow judgments builds on existing sociolinguistic literature in which younger
speakers are better at social indexing tasks than older speakers. I also explored the
situation in Shetland, and posited that the behaviour of the young speakers was the
result of something I termed ‘perceptual hyperdialectalism’. Younger speakers are more
permissive because they are attempting to assert their identity as in-group members, but
they do not have full command of the contextual environments that permit a feature.
Armed with this analysis, we can now move on to examine the data gathered from
acceptability judgments on non-canonical questions, looking at the –n variable in Shetland





In order to address the overarching questions of this thesis, about the licensing of questions
and the relationship between syntax and discourse, it is essential to have a full picture of
the distribution of the Scots particles we are interested in. The existing claims from the
literature were discussed in chapter 2 alongside the full morphological and phonological
paradigms for each particle, with –int reported in tag questions and exclamatives only
(Thoms et al. 2013) and –n claimed to be available in ‘interrogatives’ (Robertson and
Graham 1952). Examples from chapter 2 are repeated here.
(110) Hint she just got an amazing wee voice!
(111) They wur leavin, wint they? (Glasgow)
(112) You have a standing ticket, do’n you? (Shetland)
Recall that there are examples of Shetland dialect –n which are very clearly different
from either standard Scots –na negation or standard English –n’t negation: can’n, will’n
and do’n. I will discuss examples with these three auxiliaries (‘clear cases of –n’) separately
from the others, which I will refer to as ‘potentially confounded’ (primarily with standard
English –n’t : see chapter 2 for details of the phonology of –n).
In the previous chapter I laid out the methodology and sociolinguistic interpretation
that I employ in this research. In this section I present the results of that interview
method research. Due to the different ways that different groups of participants in each
area interacted with the methodology, I will mostly discuss the results for each area and
its particle separately.
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I will firstly present the results for the particles in truly negative constructions:
declaratives, imperatives and true negative questions (both polar and wh-). The results
will show that neither the Shetland –n particle (either in the clear or confounded contexts)
or Glaswegian –int are acceptable in these contexts.
I will then move on to look at the particles in non-canonical interrogatives:
matrix biased questions (in both negative and neutral evidential contexts); polar
rhetorical questions; exclamatives; tag questions on positive anchors (in both negative
and neutral evidential contexts), and tag questions on negative anchors (in both negative
and neutral evidential contexts). The results here are more interesting and vary by
context and location. They will be discussed in-depth below.
In each section, descriptive statistics are presented first in order to give an
overview of how participants in each location judged the examples. Following the
descriptive analysis, I used the ordinal package (Christensen 2018) in RStudio (RStudio
Team 2015) to fit cumulative link mixed models (CLMM). CLMM is an extension of
logistic regression designed to deal with ordered data with more than two response
categories. As such, it is ideal for dealing with Likert-style judgment data, such as the
data in this research, without risking the issues associated with using regular linear
mixed models on non-normally distributed data. For each context, I ran models with
random intercepts for participant and example number, with the relevant fixed effects.
Given that there were four verbs and each verb generally corresponded to one example
per construction type per context, and that there were already random intercepts for
individual examples included, the models would not converge when a fixed effect for verb
type was added. I thus do not discuss specific verbs as part of the model data, beyond
the clear/confounded –n cases in Shetland dialect.
I use paired t-tests for direct comparisons, where relevant, with the Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons when required.
The interview method allows participants to state explicit preferences in a
particular context. This information is noted by the interviewer throughout, and can also
provide additional information to support the quantitative data. Throughout, where
relevant, I will present raw numbers of participants’ explicit comments in favour of
particular constructions, which may indicate an overall tendency for speakers to use a
particular construction. However, as it was optional for participants to give any explicit
comments beyond a simple rating, the numbers are often quite small, and so can only be
taken as additional supporting evidence, rather than permitting any conclusions to be
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drawn purely on the qualitative data.
No effect of gender were found in any case in either location. For that reason, gender
was removed from the statistical models and will not be discussed.
No effect of intonation was found on the acceptability of the non-canonical questions
where it was tested. Intonation was thus also removed from the statistical models. I will
discuss this lack of effect in chapter 4.
3.2 Distribution in canonical clause types
3.2.1 Negative declaratives
In negative declaratives, participants judged examples with the local variant (–n in
Shetland and –int in Glasgow), as well as examples with the (local) standard
phonological variant of negation. As discussed in chapter 2, in Shetland, this is –na [n@],
while in Glasgow it is –nae [ne].
Shetland
Examples (113) and (114) exemplify the negative declarative constructions that Shetland
participants judged.
(113) I widna [wId.n@] think so.
(114) I wid’n [wI.d@n] get any of them.
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, participants in both age groups rated –na in negative
declaratives consistently highly, while –n received more varied ratings. –na received a
rating of 5 in 87.5% (N=35) of examples for older speakers and 92.5% (N=37) of examples
for younger speakers. Results are more mixed with the local variant. With the clearly
local variant, 90% of examples (N=18) were rated 1 or 2 by the 18-30 group, while 85%
(N=17) were by older speakers. With the potentially confounded variant, 60% (N=12) of
examples were rated 1 or 2 by the 55+ group. Only 25% (N=5) were rated 1 or 2 by the
18-30 group, but they also gave no 5 ratings. The 18-30 group had a median rating of 3
(N=9) for the potentially confounded construction.
There is a clear difference in the ratings given to the specific variant –n and to the
standard –na construction, with acceptance of –na and a lack of acceptance for the –n
variant.
78
Figure 3.1: Proportions of judgments for –n and standard –na in negative declaratives,
in Shetland, by age. The –n variants are divided into two groups; clearly local variants
like can’n on the left, and those that could be conflated with the standard in the middle.
Judgments run from 1-5 on the y axis.
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It is interesting to note that with regards to the clear cases of –n, younger speakers
appear to pattern with the older speakers and actually make use of the 1 and 2 ratings to
a greater extent than is expected when they dislike a variant. While older speakers give
relatively similar ratings to the specific local variant as they do the potentially confounded
variants in this case, with a majority of 1 and 2 ratings, younger speakers – while clearly
not accepting the variant, with no 5 ratings – give considerably more mid-range ratings,
particularly 3s and 4s, with a median of 3 as opposed to the median of 1 in the clear –n
case. This may be to do with the potential confound, and the possibility of interpretation
as a ‘speech error’ in these contexts, as demonstrated by SO05 in the conversation below31.
(115) I say that I am thinking about getting an iPhone, and I ask you which one I should
get. You say:
I wid’n get any of them.




E: yeah I wid’n get any of them
SO05: that’s just the way he’s speaking, it’s a negative
he’s saying ‘I widna get any of them’
E: ok
SO05: so I I I mean some folk maybe doesna say things
right wh– what he means is ehh– ‘wid’n’ you widna
say ‘wid’n’ but it’s a negative for all that
Running a cumulative link mixed model (CLMM) with random intercepts for
participant and example showed that there was an effect of the construction type
(whether –na or –n), as expected from the descriptive data. There were no effects of age;
local vs potentially confounded verbs, or any interactions between these variables. The
mean ratings for each construction type are thus plotted in Figure 3.2. A paired t-test
further confirms that –na was significantly preferred to –n in negative declaratives (t(79)
= 19.998, p < .001).
Glasgow
Examples (116) and (117) exemplify the negative declarative constructions that Glasgow
participants judged.
31SO05 gave the example in the declarative a 3, after comparing it with an instance of ‘wid’n’ in a
rhetorical question which happened to directly follow the declarative.
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Figure 3.2: Mean ratings for –na and –n in negative declaratives in Shetland.
Figure 3.3: Cumulative link mixed model results for negative declaratives in Shetland.
There is a significant effect of construction type, but no other effects or interactions.
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Figure 3.4: Proportions of judgments for –int and standard –nae in negative declaratives,
in Glasgow, by age.
(116) I widnae [wId.ne] think so.
(117) I wint [wInt] get any of them.
Participants in both age groups clearly rated –nae in declaratives highly, as can
be seen in Figure 3.4. 87.5% (N=35) of examples were rated 5 by 55+ participants; as
were 80% (N=32) of examples by 18-30 participants. On the other hand, 42.5% (N=17)
of examples with –int were rated 1 or 2 by the 55+ group, with only 10% (N=4) rated 5;
75% (N=30) were rated 1-2 by the 18-30 group.
As was the case in the Shetland data, it is clear that the standard local form (here,
–nae) is acceptable across the board in negative declaratives, with high percentages of
5 ratings and no 1 or 2 ratings in either age group. Furthermore, –int is clearly fairly
unacceptable, with three quarters of examples rated by the 18-30 group receiving ratings
of 1 or 2. Although older speakers gave a broader range of ratings to –int, this fits with
their overall pattern; the percentage of 5 ratings is still small.
Running a CLMM with random intercepts for participant and example showed that
there was an effect of the construction type (whether –nae or –int), as expected from the
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Figure 3.5: Mean ratings for –nae and –int in negative declaratives in Glasgow.
descriptive data. There were no effects of age or interaction between age and construction.
The mean ratings for each construction type are thus plotted in Figure 3.5. A paired t-
test further confirms that –nae was significantly preferred to –int in negative declaratives
(t(78) = 14.7, p < .001).
3.2.2 Negative imperatives
In negative imperatives, participants judged examples with the local variant (–n in
Shetland and –int in Glasgow), as well as examples with the (local) standard
phonological variant of imperative negation. As discussed in chapter 2, in Shetland, this
is dunna [d2n@], while in Glasgow it is don’t [donP].
Shetland
Examples (118) and (119) exemplify the negative imperative constructions that Shetland
participants judged. Note that the form for negative imperatives with –n would be do’n,
and thus it is not a confounded variant.
(118) Dunna [d2.n@] be late!
(119) Do’n [du.@n] bother, she’s not sure if she can come yet.
As can be seen in Figure 3.7, participants in both age groups rated –na in negative
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative link mixed model results for negative declaratives in Glasgow.
There is a significant effect of construction type, but no other effects or interactions.
Figure 3.7: Proportions of judgments for –n and standard –na in negative imperatives, in
Shetland, by age.
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Figure 3.8: Mean ratings for –na and –n in negative imperatives in Shetland.
imperatives consistently highly, while –n received consistently low scores – no participant
gave an –n imperative a 5, with 85% (N=34) of examples receiving a 1 or 2 rating from
the 55+ group, and 62.5% (N=25) doing so from the 18-30 group. 87.5% (N=35) of
standard –na examples received a 5 from older speakers, and 92.5% (N=37) did from
younger speakers.
Clearly, then, the standard dunna variant is perfectly acceptable for speakers, with
high percentages of 5 ratings for both age groups giving both a high mean and a median
of 5. On the other hand, there are no 5 ratings for do’n imperatives in either age group,
and in fact generally low ratings for those examples (especially, as expected, in the 55+
group).
Running a CLMM with random intercepts for participant and example showed there
was an effect of the construction type (whether –na or –n), as expected from the descriptive
data. There were no effects of age or any interaction between age and construction type.
Local vs potentially confounded verbs could not be tested in imperatives, as only do’n,
an obviously local example, was tested. The mean ratings for each construction type are
plotted in Figure 3.8. A paired t-test further confirms that –na was significantly preferred
to –n in negative imperatives: t(79) = 27.614, p < .001.
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Figure 3.9: Cumulative link mixed model results for negative imperatives in Shetland.
There is a significant effect of the construction type, but no other effects or interactions.
Glasgow
Examples (120) and (121) exemplify the negative imperative constructions that Glasgow
participants judged.
(120) Don’t [donP] be late!
(121) Dint [dInt] bother, she’s not sure if she can come yet.
As can be seen in Figure 3.10, don’t imperatives scored highly in both age groups,
with 95% (N=38) of examples rated 5 by 55+ and 18-30 participants. On the other hand,
dint imperatives were rated 5 only 10% (N=4) of the time in both age groups, with the
median rating in the 55+ group 4 (25%, N=10) and 1 in the 18-30 group (47.5%, N=19).
Clearly, the variant which is the standard for negative imperatives in Glasgow,
don’t, is acceptable for participants. Dint, on the other hand, does not fare so well, with
particularly low ratings from younger speakers, and very mixed ratings from older speakers.
There were very few 5 ratings at all for the dint imperatives, suggesting that this is not
an acceptable variant for speakers of any age.
Running a CLMM with random intercepts for participant and example showed that
there was an effect of the construction type (whether don’t or –int), as expected from
the descriptive data. There were no effects of age or any interaction between age and
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Figure 3.10: Proportions of judgments for –int and standard don’t in negative imperatives,
in Glasgow, by age.
Figure 3.11: Mean ratings for don’t and –int in negative imperatives in Glasgow.
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Figure 3.12: Cumulative link mixed model results for negative imperatives in Glasgow.
There is a significant effect of the construction type, but no other effects or interactions.
construction type. The mean ratings for each construction type are thus plotted in Figure
3.11. A paired t-test further confirms that don’t was significantly preferred to –int in
negative imperatives: t(78) = 16.133, p < .001.
3.2.3 True negative questions
With the true negative polar questions, participants judged examples with a verb-subject-
no (VSno) construction, the standard in both varieties, and examples with the local variant,
whether that was –n or –int. Either was included in all the examples in order to ensure the
questions were interpreted as truly negative questions, as one of the key differences between
true negative questions and biased questions is negative questions’ ability to license NPIs
(Ladd 1981).
Shetland
Examples (122) and (123) exemplify the negative question constructions that participants
judged.
(122) Are you no bought any either? / Is du no bought any either?
(123) Ir’n [I. r@n] you been either? / Is’n [I. z@n] du been either?32
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Figure 3.13: Proportions of judgments for –n (clear and potentially confounded) and VSno
in truly negative questions in Shetland, by age.
As can be seen in Figure 3.13, participants in both age groups rated VSno in negative
questions consistently highly – receiving 85% (N=34) 5 ratings from the 55+ group and
90% (N=36) from the 18-30 group, and no 1 or 2 ratings from either age group.
The –n variants receive considerably lower ratings. In the 55+ group, 60% (N=12)
of the clearly local variants were rated 1 or 2, while 45% (N=9) of the same examples rated
by the 18-30s were given 1 or 2 ratings, with only 1 example given a 5. Medians were 1
for the 55+ group and 3 for the 18-30 group.
In the potentially confounded situation, 50% (N=10) of examples were rated 1 or
2 by the 55+ group, with 20% (N=4) receiving 5 ratings. In the 18-30 group, only 20%
received a 1 or 2 rating, but again only 1 example received a 5. Again, medians were 1 for
the 55+ group and 3 for the 18-30 group.
Clearly, VSno constructions are acceptable as truly negative questions for the
32While younger speakers judged examples with second person pronoun you, older speakers were given
examples with dialect variant du, a traditionally informal/singular second person pronoun (Melchers 1985)
which takes –s agreement. On the other hand, like standard English, formal/plural you has –Ø marking. As
with many features of Shetland dialect, du is obsolescing in the present day (Melchers 1985, Thomson 2014),
and thus the decision was taken not to use it in examples that younger speakers judged. In examples with
second person pronouns, therefore, older speakers and young speakers judged slightly different examples
in order to make the examples as natural as possible for the speakers involved.
89
Figure 3.14: Mean ratings for VSno and –n in truly negative questions in Shetland.
Shetland participants of all ages. For the –n variant, the construction does not appear to
be acceptable. This is most clear with the examples where the variant is clearly the local
variant, but is also apparent with the confounded cases – though there is arguably a little
less certainty about this, given 1) the lack of 1 ratings from the 18-30 group, as seen in
Figure 3.13, and 2) the small number of 5 ratings from the older group. Perhaps notably,
2 of those 4 5 ratings came from one participant, as opposed to one particular example
being favoured.
Running a CLMM with random intercepts for participant and example showed that
there was an effect of the construction type (whether –n or VSno), as expected from the
descriptive data. There were no effects of age, local vs potentially confounded verbs, or any
interaction between the three fixed effects. The mean ratings for each construction type are
thus plotted in Figure 3.14. A paired t-test further confirms that VSno was significantly
preferred to –n in true negative question: t(79) = 15.288, p < .001.
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Figure 3.15: Cumulative link mixed model results for true negative questions in Shetland.
There is a significant effect of the construction type, but no other effects or interactions.
Glasgow
Examples (124) and (125) exemplify the negative question constructions that participants
judged.
(124) Have you no bought any either?
(125) Hint [hInt] you been either?
As can be seen in Figure 3.16, VSno in negative questions was rated highly by both
groups with 64.1% (N=31) 5 ratings from the 55+ group and 82.5% (N=33) from the 18-30
group. 31.6% (N=12) of –int examples received 5 ratings from the 55+ group, with 36.8%
(N=14) receiving 1 or 2 ratings. In the 18-30 group, 57.5% (N=23) received 1 or 2 ratings.
Truly negative VSno questions appear to be acceptable for both age groups,
although this is clearer with the 18-30 group, where there are no 1 or 2 ratings. There is
less certainty about –int in these truly negative questions in the 55+ group, with a fairly
even split between 5 and 1 and 2 ratings, and a median of 5. However, the 55+
participants’ mean rating remains firmly outside the ‘acceptable’ zone, at 3.29 (as can be
seen in Figure 3.17).
Running a CLMM with random intercepts for participant and example (Figure 3.18)
showed that there was an effect of the construction type (whether –int or VSno). There
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Figure 3.16: Proportions of judgments for –int and VSno in truly negative questions in
Glasgow, by age.
was also an overall effect of age, and an interaction between age and construction type –
all of which comes out from the descriptive data. The mean ratings for each construction
type are thus plotted in Figure 3.17 by age group.
However, despite the interaction between age and construction type, both young and
old age groups demonstrate the same pattern – significantly preferring VSno constructions
to –int constructions. Paired t-tests show this is true for the 18-30 group: t(39) = -10.951,
p < .001. It is also true for the 55+ group: t(35) = -3.5045, p = .0013.
3.2.4 True negative wh-questions
Participants judged both object and subject wh-questions; it was particularly important to
make this distinction as the two have different forms in Scots. Like polar questions, negative
object wh-questions are usually verb-subject-no constructions. However, although –na(e)
is claimed to be ‘unavailable in questions’ in Scots varieties (Brown and Millar 1980, Thoms
et al. 2013), subject wh-questions are usually formed with –na(e). As well as these standard
type examples, participants also judged examples with their local variant, whether that
was –n in Shetland or –int in Glasgow, in both subject and object wh-questions.
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Figure 3.17: Mean ratings for VSno and –int in truly negative questions in Glasgow, by
age.
Figure 3.18: Cumulative link mixed model results for true negative questions in Glasgow.
There are significant effects of the construction type and age group, and an interaction
between construction type and age group.
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Figure 3.19: Proportion of judgments for –n (clearly local and potentially confounded)
and for VSno in object wh-questions in Shetland, by age.
Shetland
Examples (126) and (127) exemplify the sorts of object wh-questions that participants
judged. Examples (128) and (129) show the kind of subject wh-questions that participants
judged.
Object wh-questions
(126) What did you no like about it?
(127) What bit do’n [du.@n] you understand?
Subject wh-questions
(128) What ones irna been watered already?
(129) Who is’n [I. z@n] got any yet?
As can be seen from Figures 3.19 and 3.20, the standard form of wh-questions,
whether VSno in object wh-questions or –na in subject wh-questions, was rated extremely
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Figure 3.20: Proportion of judgments for –n (clearly local and potentially confounded)
and for –na in subject wh-questions in Shetland, by age.
highly across both age groups — 76.25% (N=61) of standard examples received 5 ratings
in the 55+ group, and 83.75% (N=67) did so in the 18-30 group.
In object wh-questions, the clearly local form is not accepted by either age group,
with no 5 ratings at all and a median of 1 for the 55+ participants (60%, N=12) and 3 for
the 18-30 group (50%, N=10).
The potentially confounded form gets more mixed ratings, with 25% (N=5) 5 ratings
in the 55+ group, only 15% (N=3) 1 or 2 ratings, and a median of 4 (35%, N=7). In the
18-30 group, as can be seen in Figure 3.19, there is a clear median of 4 (65%, N=13) for
the confounded constructions with younger speakers, with very few 5 (N=3) ratings or 1
or 2 (N=2) ratings.
In subject wh-questions, neither the local form nor the potentially confounded form
received any 5 ratings from the 18-30 group, with 75% (N=15) of the clearly local form
receiving 1 or 2 ratings. With the potentially confounded variant, judgments ranged from 2
to 4, with a median of 3 (45%, N=9). With older speakers, again 75% (N=15) of the clearly
local examples received a 1 or 2 rating, and 50% (N=10) of the potentially confounded
variant did as well. There were 4 (20%) 5 ratings.
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Figure 3.21: Mean ratings for standard constructions (–na in subject or VSno in object)
and –n in negative subject and object wh-questions in Shetland.
The picture for wh-questions in Shetland is thus mixed. I hypothesise that with
the subject wh-questions, the results are more strongly negative with respect to the
acceptability or lack thereof of –n because there, –n examples are a clearer phonological
divergence from the –na standard (as in declaratives, where the word order is the same
but the phonology is different). With object wh-questions, if the negated auxiliary was to
invert, –na would be unacceptable and while VSno is the standard, in standard English
–n’t would be an acceptable option. This is closer to –n (in the potentially confounded
situation) and thus gets a higher level of acceptability than –n in the subject
wh-questions.
I ran a CLMM with random intercepts for participant and example (Figure 3.22), as
well as fixed effects for construction type (whether clearly local –n, potentially confounded
–n, or the standard construction (–na in subject wh-questions or VSno in object wh-
questions), subject vs object wh-question and age. The model showed that there was a
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Figure 3.22: Cumulative link mixed model results for negative wh-questions in Shetland.
There are main effects of construction type (both clearly local –n examples and potentially
confounded –n examples). There were no further effects or interactions.
main effect of the construction type (both clearly local and potentially confounded –n).
There were no other effects or interactions. The mean ratings for each construction type
are thus plotted in Figure 3.21, with ‘other’ signifying potentially confounded verbs.
Although in the descriptive statistics we saw differences in the behaviour of the two
age groups, and different tendencies in subject vs object wh-questions, the overall results
do not reflect the descriptive statistics. Nevertheless, it is the case that the acceptability
of the –n marker is higher in the potentially confounded contexts, and from the descriptive
statistics, it seems that object wh-questions have a greater tendency to be confounded.
Glasgow
Examples (130) and (131) exemplify the sorts of object wh-questions that participants in
Glasgow judged. Examples (132) and (133) show the kind of subject wh-questions that
participants judged.
Object wh-questions
(130) What did you no like about it?
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Figure 3.23: Proportion of judgments for –int and for VSno in object wh-questions in
Glasgow, by age.
(131) What bit dint [dInt] you understand?
Subject wh-questions
(132) What ones havnae been watered already?
(133) Who hint [hInt] got any yet?
As can be seen in Figure 3.23, VSno in object wh-questions was rated highly overall,
with 77.5% (N=31) 5 ratings from the 55+ group, and 83.8% (N=31) from the 18-30 group.
With –int, 30% (N=12) were rated 1 or 2 by the 55+ group, while 27.5% (N=11) were
rated 5 (also the median). 51.3% (N=20) were rated 1-2 by the 18-30 group, with a median
of 1.
In Figure 3.24, –nae in subject wh-questions is clearly rated highly, with 79.5%
(N=31) of examples rated a 5 by participants in both groups. 35% (N=14) of –int examples
are rated 1 or 2 by 55+ participants, with a median of 4 (32.5%, N=13). 60% (N=24) of
–int examples received a rating of 1 or 2 from the 18-30 participants, with a median of 1.
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Figure 3.24: Proportion of judgments for –int and for –nae in subject wh-questions in
Glasgow, by age.
Running a CLMM with random intercepts for participant and example (as seen
in Figure 3.26) shows that there was an effect of construction type (whether –int or the
standard construction), as clearly predicted from the descriptive data. There was also an
effect of age, and there was an interaction between construction type and age. There was
no effect of or interaction with subject vs object wh-question, despite the differences seen
above in the descriptive statistics. Means are thus plotted for construction type and age,
as seen in Figure 3.25.
Despite the interaction between age and construction type, both young and old age
groups demonstrate the same pattern – significantly preferring standard constructions to
–int constructions. Paired t-tests show this is true for the 18-30 group: t(74) = -13.977, p
<.001; and also for the 55+ group: t(78) = -7.8769, p < .001.
It seems therefore, that –int is not acceptable in wh-questions for participants in
Glasgow in either age group. To some extent, it seems as though older speakers in Glasgow
may have been showing similar behaviour to speakers in Shetland in object wh-questions,
where –nae would not be acceptable but –n’t (closer to –int) would be in standard English,
and thus the results were somewhat higher for –int in object than subject wh-questions.
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Figure 3.25: Mean ratings for standard constructions (–nae in subject or VSno in object)
and –int in negative wh-questions in Glasgow, by age.
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Figure 3.26: Cumulative link mixed model results for negative wh-questions in Glasgow.
There is an effect of construction type (whether –int or the standard (–nae in subject
wh-questions and VSno in object wh-questions). There is also an effect of age group, and
an interaction between age group and type of construction. There was no effect of subject
vs object wh-question.
However, this did not come out in the statistical analysis.
When object and subject are taken together, the mean for –int in wh-questions for
older speakers is 3.275, with a median of 4 (28.75%, N=23). Neither of these figures falls
in the ‘acceptable’ range. I therefore take it that this is not acceptable for speakers.
3.2.5 Summary
In both Shetland and Glasgow, as expected, the relevant standard constructions were rated
highly across age groups. Although there was some variation in the exact judgments, the
local variants –n and –int scored lower across all age groups. Following the criteria set out
in the previous section on what counts as ‘acceptable’ (a median rating of 5 and a mean
rating between 4 and 5), at no point did –int or –n achieve an ‘acceptable’ rating in any
canonical construction. I now move on to consider non-canonical constructions.
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Figure 3.27: Mean ratings for local variants (–int in Glasgow and –n in Shetland) versus
the standard construction (verb-subject-no in both varieties) in all four non-canonical
question questions: matrix biased questions (BQ), exclamatives (EXCL), polar rhetorical
questions (RQ) and tag questions with positive anchors (TQ).
3.3 Distribution in non-canonical questions
Before going into the detailed results, I will begin by giving an overall summary of the
distribution of –n and –int across all four non-canonical constructions.
Recall that in the Scots dialect literature there are two relevant claims. Firstly,
Robertson and Graham (1952) claim that –n is available in ‘interrogatives’ in Shetland
dialect. This has already been shown to be false for truly negative questions and negative
wh-questions – but is it is acceptable in the four non-canonical construction types?
Secondly, Thoms et al. (2013) claim that –int is only available in tag questions and
exclamatives in Glasgow – however, recall that in the literature, tag questions are related
to matrix biased questions and exclamatives are related to rhetorical questions, and there
is thus a subsequent question about how –int is judged in these constructions too.
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Looking at Figure 3.27, there are some interesting patterns which broadly
correspond to the claims made in the literature. Firstly, note that –n (in red) appears to
be in the ‘acceptable’ range in all four constructions in Shetland dialect, though slightly
less so in matrix biased questions than in any of the other three constructions. Secondly,
note that there are peaks for acceptability of –int (in blue) in exclamatives and tag
questions; however, also note that polar rhetorical questions with –int seem to be on the
cusp of acceptability when compared with the matrix biased questions with –int.
Standard VSno constructions (in orange and green) interestingly seem to be acceptable in
matrix biased questions, tag questions and polar rhetorical questions (at least in
Shetland), but not in exclamatives. At this first glance, the results appear promising and
corroborate the claims made in the literature so far. However, there is considerably more
analysis that can be done within each location and each question type to establish the
patterns of use and the patterns of change happening in each community – taking into
account factors like age, evidential context (where relevant) and verb type. I will firstly
discuss matrix biased questions, before turning to tag questions. Discussion on
exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions will follow.
3.3.1 Matrix biased questions
Matrix biased question examples were split into two groups: those in which the participant
was given a belief and then was presented with counterevidence which challenged that
belief (a negative evidential context), and then those in which the participant was given a
belief, but there was there nothing presented which would challenge this belief (a neutral
evidential context). I will discuss the raw judgments for each type of context separately.
Negative evidential contexts
Shetland
Examples (134) and (135) show the type of examples with negative evidential contexts
that participants judged.
(134) You ask me to help you change the oil in your car. I agree quite confidently, but
when I actually get under the bonnet, it becomes clear I really don’t know what
I’m doing. You say:
Are you no done this before? / Is du no done this before?
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Figure 3.28: Proportions of judgments for –n (clear and potentially confounded) and VSno
in biased questions in negative evidential contexts in Shetland, by age.
(135) The other week I told you I was going to go to this new restaurant down the road.
Now, you are thinking about going. You ask me if it is any good, but I say I don’t
know. You say:
Ir’n [I. r@n] you been? / Is’n [I. z@n] du been?
As can be seen in Figure 3.28, VSno constructions were rated highly in both age
groups, with 92.5% (N=74) of examples getting a 5 rating from the 18-30 group, and 85%
(N=68) of examples getting a 5 rating from the 55+ group.
For –n, in the cases where it is clearly the local variant, just 15% (N=3) of examples
were rated 5 by the 18-30 group, while 55% (N=11) were by the 55+ group. In the
potentially confounded examples, 61.66% (N=37) were rated 5 by the 18-30 group and
68.33% (N=41) were by the 55+ group.
There seems, therefore, to be a discrepancy between the ratings of the clearly local
form in the 18-30 group and the 55+ group, with greater acceptance in the 55+ group,
where over 50% of examples scored a 5.
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Figure 3.29: Proportions of judgments for –int and VSno in biased questions in negative
evidential contexts in Glasgow, by age.
Glasgow
Examples (136) and (137) show the type of examples with negative evidential contexts
that participants judged.
(136) You ask me to help you change the oil in your car. I agree quite confidently, but
when I actually get under the bonnet, it becomes clear I really don’t know what
I’m doing. You say:
Have you no done this before?
(137) The other week I told you I was going to go to this new restaurant down the road.
Now, you are thinking about going. You ask me if it is any good, but I say I don’t
know. You say:
Hint [hInt] you been?
As can be seen in Figure 3.29, VSno constructions are rated highly by participants
in both age groups, with 81.25% (N=65) 5 ratings in the 55+ group and 78.75% (N=63)
5 ratings in the 18-30 group. In the 18-30 group, 42.5% (N=34) of –int examples received
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Figure 3.30: Proportions of judgments for –n (clear and potentially confounded) and VSno
in biased questions in neutral evidential contexts in Shetland, by age.
a rating of 1 or 2. In the 55+ group, 24.4% (N=19) of –int examples received a 1 or 2
rating, with 33.3% (N=26) receiving a 5 rating.
Neutral evidential contexts
Shetland
(138) I really like films with Angelina Jolie in them. A friend of ours is telling us about
her most recent film they went to see the other day. You say to me:
Wid you/du no like that film?
(139) Our friend plays for a local hockey team. They are having a charity fundraiser, and
I tell you that she said we have to come and that it’s going to be absolutely
amazing. You say:
Wid’n [wI. d@n] she say that?
VSno constructions were rated highly in both age groups. 81.25% (N=65) of
examples were rated 5 by the 18-30 group, while 75% (N=60) were by the 55+ group. In
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the possibly confounded situation, 73.33% (N=44) of examples were rated 5 by the 18-30
group while 81.66% (N=49) of examples were rated 5 by the 55+ group.
There is some divergence in the ratings for the clearly local –n particle, however.
The numbers are considerably smaller than in the other two groups (only 2 examples per
participant), but 55% (N=11) of examples are rated 5 by the 55+ group, giving a median
of 5. In comparison, only 10% (N=2) are rated 5 by the 18-30 group, with a median of 4
(45%, N=9).
The differences can be seen clearly in Figure 3.30, where the ‘N local’ column looks
very different for the 18-30 group than the 55+ group. The results are fairly similar for
the other two columns, and between age groups.
Glasgow
(140) I really like films with Angelina Jolie in them. A friend of ours is telling us about
her most recent film they went to see the other day. You say to me:
Wid you no like that film?
(141) Our friend plays for a local hockey team. They are having a charity fundraiser, and
I tell you that she said we have to come and that it’s going to be absolutely
amazing. You say:
Wint [wInt] she say that?
In neutral contexts, as can be seen in Figure 3.31, once again VSno was rated highly
in both age groups – with 76.25% (N=61) 5 ratings in the 55+ group and 70% (N=56) 5
ratings in the 18-30 group. 26.9% (N=21) received a 1 or 2 rating in the 55+ group (median
= 5 (27.5%, N=22)), with 52.5% (N=42) giving a 1 or 2 rating in the 18-30 group.
3.3.2 Matrix biased questions – overall
Running a CLMM with random intercepts for participant and example in Shetland (as
seen in Figure 3.32) shows that there was an effect of construction type (whether VSno,
–n in a clearly local context or –n in a potentially confounded context). There was also
an interaction between the potentially confounded –n cases and the evidential context –
however, there were no further effect or interactions. Means are thus plotted for
construction type by evidential context, and given the clear differences in behaviour seen
in the descriptive statistics, by age. This can be seen in Figure 3.33.
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Figure 3.31: Proportions of judgments for –int and VSno in biased questions in neutral
evidential contexts in Glasgow, by age.
Figure 3.32: Cumulative link mixed model results for matrix biased questions in Shetland.
Note that there are effects of construction type: VSno, clearly local instances of –n and
potentially confounded instances of –n, as well as an interaction betwen those potentially
confounded instances and the evidential context they appear in. There were no further
effects or interactions.
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Figure 3.33: Mean ratings for standard VSno constructions and –n in matrix biased
questions in Shetland, by age and evidential context. Verbs where the –n examples were
clearly local are plotted in orange; verbs where –n could potentially be confounded with
–n’t are plotted in red.
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Looking here at the clearly local verbs with –n (‘N.local’), we see that the mean
ratings for the examples in the two age groups are very similar. However, the information
from the descriptive statistics indicates that these means were reached in very different
ways. For older speakers, the mid-range mean comes from over 50% of examples being
rated 5, and then a collection of 1-2 ratings bringing down the average. The examples
that are rated highly vs those that are not do not correspond to individual participants,
examples, age groups, areas: it appears to be an instance of random variation, as we might
expect to see at the end of a change (Smith and Durham 2011). On the other hand,
the 18-30 group’s mean comes from primarily mid-range ratings, with very few ratings at
either pole. Following the analysis of participants’ rating systems given in the previous
section, despite the fact that we see no statistical effects of age in the model, it seems that
participants are behaving very differently when it comes to the clearly local examples of
–n.
It is also worth looking at the potentially confounded –n examples. Here, there
is again no interaction with age, but there is an interesting interaction with evidential
context. As we will see in chapter 5, speakers generally prefer to produce biased questions
in negative evidential contexts over neutral ones – and this is the pattern we also see in the
Glasgow data, shown in Figure 3.36, where the graph trends towards higher ratings for all
biased questions in the negative context over the neutral context, for both acceptable and
unacceptable variants. However, in Shetland dialect’s potentially confounded examples,
there is a preference for the –n variant to be in neutral contexts rather than negative ones
(though despite being a significant interaction in the model, this is not supported by a
paired t-test: t(119) = -1.5274, n.s.). This is surprising, given the general tendency. The
general tendency can also be seen for the VSno data in Shetland, so it is not the case
that Shetland dialect speakers are behaving different with regard to general use of biased
questions. Furthermore, this suggests that it is not the case that Shetland dialect speakers
are judging –n like standard English –n’t, as this would be expected to be more highly
rated in negative contexts (see chapter 5).
This is interesting as it indicates similar behaviour to the pattern for –n’t found in
the north of Scotland (Tagliamonte and Smith 2002), where –n’t was found in ‘rhetorical
questions’ – given that rhetorical questions require a neutral-positive evidential context,
we would expect that a particle which is permitted in rhetorical questions like –n’t would
be better in evidential contexts which more closely resembled those that permit rhetorical
questions.
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Due to the nature of the potential confound of –n with –n’t, it is impossible to
know if participants were judging the –n particle in these contexts, or whether they were
judging a reduced –n’t. It may also be worth noting as we saw in chapter 2 that –n-like
particles were historically recorded in interrogatives in the north of mainland Scotland too.
Either way, it appears that in these neutral evidential contexts, Shetland participants are
behaving in general like other northern Scots speakers – either by retaining the –n particle,
by adopting the present-day use of –n’t found in the north of Scotland, or a mixture of
both. It may be that the mixture of both allows this to continue more strongly in contexts
where there is this confound, while in cases where there is not (e.g. can’n or do’n), loss
happens more rapidly.
Participants comments (shown in Figure 3.34) can also help shed some light on
the situation. For 18-30 participants, VSno constructions are explicitly preferred in both
negative and neutral contexts, though there are also a small number of requests for –n in
neutral contexts only (including one can’n). For older speakers, VSno is strongly
preferred in negative contexts in participants’ explicit comments, but interestingly in
neutral contexts, there are very few comments explicitly requesting VSno. There are also
a few requests for –n in the neutral context – very slightly more than for VSno. This
suggests that there has been a surge in preferred use of VSno in neutral evidential
contexts for younger speakers, and that –n in (at least neutral) biased question contexts
is acceptable for older speakers33. This corroborates the analysis of the CLMM output.
Moving on to the Glasgow data, running a CLMM with random intercepts for
participant and example in Glasgow (as seen in Figure 3.35) shows that there was a strong
effect of construction type (VSno or –int), but no further effects or interactions. This effect
is supported by the results of a paired t-test: t(315) = 17.618, p < .001. In order for easier
visual comparison with the Shetland data in Figure 3.33, means are still plotted for type
of construction by evidential context and age (Figure 3.36).
Looking at the two locations together, we can see that the standard VSno
construction is acceptable in both locations. However, it is clear that there is some sort
of variation in behaviour between the two groups: while the mean for –int in Glasgow is
clearly mid-range, the mean for confounded –n in Shetland is much higher: in the
acceptable range. For the the clearly local –n in Shetland, the mid-range ratings indicate
very different behaviour between the two age groups, with clear variability in
33This also perhaps suggests that because the 55+ group made fewer explicit comments regarding
preferences in the neutral evidential contexts, there were fewer things they disagreed with in this context.
This would suggest that they would also be happy with the -n + no constructions that participants also
judged: see section 3.4.
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Figure 3.34: Explicit comments given by participants in Shetland regarding what they
would prefer to use in a biased question by evidential context. Raw numbers of comments
made are displayed on the y-axis. Only forms which were mentioned more than once were
included. Note that as well as in reference to either VSno or –n examples, these explicit
comments also came from examples which had both –n and no.
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Figure 3.35: Cumulative link mixed model results for matrix biased questions in Glasgow.
Note that there is a strong effect of construction type (whether VSno or –int). There were
no further effects or interactions.
acceptability for speakers 55+, but perceptual hyperdialectal ratings from the 18-30
group.
In Glasgow, the mean ratings for –int are also mid-range. For younger speakers,
there is a clear low median (as seen above for both neutral and negative evidential
contexts); however, this is not the case for older speakers. There are a number of possible
explanations for this: it may be that older speakers are generally uncertain of younger
speakers’ behaviour, as was described in section 2.5. In other cases, it may be that there
was a confound between the example and a reduced –n’t. It may also be that –n’t was
available in biased questions for older speakers, but has undergone a reduction and
reanalysis to –int for younger speakers, and there is some residual acceptability.
Participants comments (as shown in Figure 3.37) may again shed some further light
on the question: note that no participant in either age group explicitly requests –int in a
matrix biased question. On the other hand, there are a number of preferences for VSno
constructions, and also some for –n’t. There is notable difference with the Shetland older
speakers’ comments here (seen in Figure 3.34), where VSno was not often offered as an
alternative in neutral contexts, ever so slightly less than –n. In Glasgow, –int is never
offered as an alternative, and speakers of all ages express explicit preferences for VSno in
113
Figure 3.36: Mean ratings for standard construction VSno and –int in matrix biased
questions in Glasgow, by age and evidential context.
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Figure 3.37: Explicit comments given by participants in Glasgow regarding what they
would prefer to use in a biased question by evidential context. Raw numbers of comments
made are displayed on the y-axis. Only forms which were mentioned more than once were
included. Note that as well as in reference to either VSno or –int examples, these explicit
comments also came from examples which had both –int and no.
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all biased question contexts.
Whatever the explanation, there is nevertheless a clear and statistically significant
difference in acceptability between VSno and –int constructions for both age groups in
Glasgow, with a mean rating well below the 4-5 range. It seems as though –int is not
acceptable in matrix biased questions: we will be able to see clear differences between the
acceptability of –int in e.g. tag questions as opposed to these matrix biased questions in
the next section.
3.3.3 Tag questions on positive anchors
Like the biased questions discussed above, tag questions on positive anchors were also
presented in two evidential contexts – those where the participant was given some
counterevidence to challenge the belief that had been established for them (a negative
evidential context) and those where there was no counterevidence to challenge their belief
(a neutral evidential context). Participants in both locations judged the standard
verb-subject-no tag and the local variant, whether that was –n in Shetland or –int in
Glasgow.
Tag questions on negative anchors will be discussed in section 3.3.11.
Neutral evidential contexts
Shetland
Examples (142) and (143) exemplify the constructions that participants in Shetland judged
for tag questions on positive anchors in neutral evidential contexts.
(142) A while ago, I told you I would be able to pick up your cousin from the airport.
Now, you tell me that she is arriving tomorrow and you say:
You can pick her up, can you no?
(143) You are pretty sure that you have seen that I have a driving license. We agree to
help one of our friends move house, and we’re going to rent a van to do it. You say
to me:
You can drive, can’n [kI.n@n] you?
As can be seen in Figure 3.38, speakers of all ages seem to accept tags with both
the –n and VSno forms. This is particularly true of the 55+ group, who give 90% (N=18)
of the clearly local examples a rating of 5, as well as 86.67% (N=52) of the potentially
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Figure 3.38: Proportions of judgments for –n (clearly local and potentially conflated) and
VSno as tag questions on positive anchors in neutral evidential contexts, in Shetland, by
age.
confounded examples. VSno performs well with the older speakers too, with 65% (N=52)
5 ratings – however, less well than the –n examples.
Young speakers rate the potentially confounded examples very highly (95% (N=57)
5 ratings) - but they also rate the clearly local variant highly, with 70% (N=14) 5 ratings
and no 1, 2 or 3 ratings at all. This is the same percentage of 5 ratings as for the VSno
construction (70% (N=56)).
We can look at the explicit comments regarding preferences that speakers made
to further explore their preferences. As can be seen in Figure 3.39, 55+ participants
consistently requested –n, and never VSno in the neutral contexts. On the other hand,
while the 18-30 group did request –n, they also frequently stated an explicit preference for
VSno. It is worth noting that of the 30 requests for –n in the younger group, nine were for
the clearly local example can’n, where there is no question that it is –n that is preferred.
It seems, therefore, as though older speakers have a preference for –n in neutral
evidential contexts, but also accept VSno. Younger speakers accept both constructions,
with perhaps a slight preference for –n, but this is less clear than it is for older speakers.
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Figure 3.39: Explicit comments given by participants in Shetland regarding what they
would prefer to use as a tag question on a positive anchor, by evidential context. Raw
numbers of comments made are displayed on the y-axis. Only forms which were mentioned
more than once were included. Note that as well as in reference to either VSno or –n
examples, these explicit comments also came from examples which had both –n and no.
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Figure 3.40: Proportions of judgments for –int and VSno as tag questions on positive
anchors in neutral evidential contexts in Glasgow.
Glasgow
Examples (144) and (145) exemplify the constructions that participants in Glasgow judged
for tag questions on positive anchors in neutral evidential contexts.
(144) A while ago, I told you I would be able to pick up your cousin from the airport.
Now, you tell me that she is arriving tomorrow and you say:
You can pick her up, can you no?
(145) You are pretty sure that you have seen that I have a driving license. We agree to
help one of our friends move house, and we’re going to rent a van to do it. You say
to me:
You can drive, kint [kInt] you?
In the 55+ group, both VSno and –int tags are rated fairly highly in neutral
contexts. 76.25% (N=61) of –int tags received a 5 rating, while 63.75% (N=51) of VSno
tags did. In the 18-30 group, only 40% (N=32) of VSno tags received a 5 rating, while
68.4% (N=54) of –int tags did.
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It seems, therefore, that –int tags are acceptable in neutral contexts for both age
groups, with no 1 ratings at all. VSno tags appear more acceptable to older speakers, with
a bit more uncertainty for the younger speakers. This is corroborated by younger speakers’
explicit preferences as shown in Figure 3.41 – in the neutral context, 18-30 speakers clearly
prefer to request –int, with no explicit requests at all for VSno in neutral contexts. Compare
this with the explicit preferences stated by older speakers in Figure 3.41 – though –int does
get more comments than any other, there is still a showing for VSno too.
As expected, then, in neutral evidential contexts Glaswegian participants seem to
be behaving similarly to the Shetland participants – with the age groups reversed. Younger
speakers have a clear preference for –int, but appear to also accept VSno to some extent.
Older speakers seem to accept both to some extent, with a slight preference for –int.
Negative evidential contexts
Shetland
Examples (146) and (147) exemplify the constructions that participants in Shetland judged
for tag questions on positive anchors in negative evidential contexts.
(146) We have organised a retirement party for someone at work. I was meant to buy a
gift, but at 6pm on the day of the party when you ask me where the present is, I
say “what present?”. You say:
You bought the present, did you no?
(147) Last week on Facebook you saw a post about me going to see the latest James
Bond film. However, when you ask me about a character from the film, I say “. . . I
don’t know?”. You say:
You saw the film last week, did’n [dI.d@n] you?
For participants in the 18-30 group, VSno tags in this context received 5 ratings in
76.25% (N=61) of examples, while 68.75% (N=55) did in the 55+ group. The potentially
confounded tags were rated highly in both age groups, with 85% (N=51) 5 ratings from
the 18-30 group and 78.33% (N=47) 5 ratings from the 55+ group.
The most interesting results, however, are perhaps from the clearly local variant,
where 60% (N=12) of examples are rated 5 by the 55+ group, but only 25% (N=5) are by
the 18-30 group. Recall in section 3.3.3, as seen in Figure 3.38, the 18-30 group seemed
to accept –n quite happily in neutral evidential contexts, but they seem less sure of clear
examples of –n as a tag in negative evidential contexts.
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Figure 3.41: Explicit comments given by participants in Glasgow regarding what they
would prefer to use as a tag question on a positive anchor, by evidential context. Raw
numbers of comments made are displayed on the y-axis. Only forms which were mentioned
more than once were included. Note that as well as in reference to either VSno or –int
examples, these explicit comments also came from examples which had both –int and no.
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Figure 3.42: Proportions of judgments for –n (clearly local and potentially confounded)
and VSno as tag questions on positive anchors in negative evidential contexts, in Shetland,
by age.
Looking at participants’ comments, this is highlighted further – 18-30 participants
stated a preference for VSno tags more often that –n tags in negative evidential contexts
(Figure 3.39), while 55+ participants did not request VSno tags at all in negative contexts.
It seems, therefore, like –n may be the preferred variant for older speakers in negative
evidential contexts, but with definite acceptability of VSno as well. For younger speakers,
there is less certainty about the acceptability of –n when it is clearly the local variant, but
clear acceptability of VSno.
Glasgow
Examples (148) and (149) exemplify the constructions that participants in Glasgow judged
for tag questions on positive anchors in negative evidential contexts.
(148) We have organised a retirement party for someone at work. I was meant to buy a
gift, but at 6pm on the day of the party when you ask me where the present is, I
say “what present?”. You say:
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Figure 3.43: Proportions of judgments for –int and VSno as tag questions on positive
anchors in negative evidential contexts, in Glasgow, by age.
You bought the present, did you no?
(149) Last week on Facebook you saw a post about me going to see the latest James
Bond film. However, when you ask me about a character from the film, I say “. . . I
don’t know?”. You say:
You saw the film last week, dint [dInt] you?
In negative evidential contexts, the 55+ group act very similarly to the neutral
context, with 75% (N=60) 5 ratings for –int tags and 60% (N=48) for VSno tags. In the
18-30 group, there is a reduction in 5 ratings for the –int tags (50%, N=39), and a slight
increase in 5 ratings for the VSno tags (46.25%, N=37).
Speakers’ comments (Figure 3.41) overall follow similar patterns to the neutral
context, too, with more explicit preferences for –int in both age groups, although to a
lesser extent than in the neutral context. It is also notable that younger speakers in
particular requested matrix biased questions, more than VSno tags.
It seems, therefore, that –int tags are acceptable in negative evidential contexts to
some extent for the 18-30 group, though perhaps less than in neutral evidential contexts.
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Figure 3.44: Cumulative link mixed model results for tag questions on positive anchors
in Shetland. There are main effects of construction type (whether –n in clearly local
contexts, –n in potentially confounded contexts, or VSno), and interactions between the
clearly local –n form and the evidential context, and the clearly local –n form and the age
of the participants. There were no further effects or interactions.
VSno tags are not strongly preferred, and looking at the comments, it may be because
speakers prefer matrix biased questions instead. Both –int and VSno seem to be acceptable
for the 55+ group in negative evidential contexts.
3.3.4 Tag questions on positive anchors – overall
Running a CLMM with fixed effects of construction type (–n in both confounded and
clearly local contexts, as well as VSno), evidential context and age, as well as random
intercepts for participant and example in Shetland (as seen in Figure 3.44) shows that there
was an effect of construction type (whether VSno, or –n, either clearly local or potentially
confounded with standard –n’t. There were also interactions between the clearly local –n
variant and evidence, and the clearly local –n variant and age. There were no further
effects or interactions. Means are plotted for type of construction by evidential context
and age, which can be seen in Figure 3.45.
Unlike with biased questions, we saw a more similar pattern in the raw judgment
data between older speakers and younger speakers: however, there is a difference in their
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Figure 3.45: Mean ratings for standard construction VSno and –n in tag questions on
positive anchors in Shetland, by age and evidential context. Clearly local examples (e.g.
can’n) are in orange, while examples which are potentially confounded with the standard
(e.g. did’n) are in red. Standard VSno means are plotted in blue.
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judgments of clearly local variants. For older speakers, it appears that clearly local variants
are as acceptable as the potentially confounded variants, while that is not quite the case
for younger speakers. However, this interaction between the local –n variants and the age
groups is not supported by a t-test: t(68.724) = 0.89776, n.s. – and clearly, there are
high levels of acceptability of the variant for speakers of all ages, with both a median of
5 and a mean in the 4-5 range for both age groups. However, for both age groups, in the
clearly local variant of –n there is a preference for neutral evidential contexts over negative
evidential contexts. This can be seen from the graph in Figure 3.45, and the interaction is
supported by a paired t-test: t(39) = 3.8462, p = .0004.
Moving on to the Glasgow data, running a CLMM with fixed effects of
construction type, evidential context and age, as well as random intercepts for
participant and example in Glasgow (as seen in Figure 3.46) shows that there was an
interaction between construction type, evidence and age, but no further effects or
interactions. Looking at the raw data in Figure 3.40 and Figure 3.43, it appears that
younger speakers preferred –int to VSno in neutral evidential contexts. This is supported
by a paired t-test (Bonferroni corrected, significance level = .0125): t(77) = -4.7753 p <
.001. There are no further significant comparisons in either evidential context for either
age group. Means are plotted for type of construction by evidential context and age,
which can be seen in Figure 3.47.
The difference in acceptability visible in the 18-30 group but not the 55+ group may
once again be due to a number of factors: primarily, –int as a recent innovation, and/or
older speakers’ tendency to be more permissive in their ratings.
We will consider tags on negative anchors in section 3.3.11 below.
3.3.5 Polar rhetorical questions
In both Shetland and Glasgow, participants judged rhetorical questions with verb-subject-
no as the standard. As rhetorical questions are not discussed in the literature for either
of these locations, the standard VSno construction for interrogative syntax was assumed.
However, it must be noted that Tagliamonte and Smith (2002) find –n’t is used for rhetorical
questions in three Scots varieties, and so this must be kept in mind as a possible standard
also.
Participants in each location also judged examples of their local particle: so –n in
Shetland and –int in Glasgow.
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Figure 3.46: Cumulative link mixed model results for tag questions on positive anchors in
Glasgow. There is an interaction between the construction type (whether –int or VSno),
evidential context and age. There were no further effects or interactions.
Shetland
Examples (150) and (151) show the types of polar rhetorical question construction that
participants in Shetland judged.
(150) I am just back from my holidays. I had a great time, and I’m very tanned. Later
that day, I say to you “I can’t wait to get away again”. You say:
Are you no just been on holiday?! It’s my turn.
(151) I have entered some photos in a photography competition. I tell you I could win in
one of the rounds, but I have lost all the rounds so far and I am looking pretty sad
about it, so you say:
Can’n [kI. n@n] you still win the last one?!
Ratings for VSno constructions were generally fairly high – 63.75% (N=51) 5 ratings
in the 55+ group and 48.75% (N=39) in the 18-30 group. –n constructions where the
example could be confounded with the standard scored very highly, with 86.66% (N=52)
5 ratings from the 18-30 group, and 85% (N=51) 5 ratings from the 55+ group, and no 1
or 2 ratings from either group.
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Figure 3.47: Mean ratings for standard construction VSno and –int in tag questions on
positive anchors in Glasgow, by age and evidential context.
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Figure 3.48: Proportions of judgments for –n (clearly local and potentially confounded)
and VSno in polar rhetorical questions in Shetland, by age.
The instances of –n where it is clearly the local variant seem to perform as well for
older speakers as they do in matrix biased questions – again, 55% (N=11) 5 ratings. The
18-30 group rated the clear –n examples 5 35% (N=7) of the time, with a median of 4
(45%, N=9).
It seems again like there is a difference in how older and younger speakers are rating
the clearly local construction in polar rhetorical questions. However, when it comes to the
potentially confounded examples, it performs well in both age groups. This may well be a
conflation of the local variant with the standard –n’t, which is attested in this construction
in the north of Scotland (Tagliamonte and Smith 2002).
Glasgow
Examples (152) and (153) show the types of polar rhetorical question construction that
participants in Glasgow judged.
(152) I am just back from my holidays. I had a great time, and I’m very tanned. Later
that day, I say to you “I can’t wait to get away again”. You say:
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Figure 3.49: Proportions of judgments for –int and VSno in polar rhetorical questions in
Glasgow, by age.
Have you no just been on holiday?! It’s my turn.
(153) I have entered some photos in a photography competition. I tell you I could win in
one of the rounds, but I have lost all the rounds so far and I am looking pretty sad
about it, so you say:
Kint [kInt] you still win the last one?!
As can be seen in Figure 3.49, overall, participants in the 18-30 group did not rate
polar rhetorical questions in general very highly, with 33.75% (N=27) of VSno constructions
receiving a 5 rating, and 35% (N=28) of –int constructions the same. In the 55+ group,
73.75% (N=59) of VSno examples were rated 5, while 60% (N=48) of –int examples were.
It is interesting to note that –int and VSno appear to fare as well as each other
within age groups, looking at Figure 3.49. The apparent difference is really between the
age groups, where polar rhetorical questions in general seem to cause a bit of uncertainty
among participants in the 18-30 group.
It is worth considering whether younger participants preferred –n’t, as we might
expect if they were behaving like Tagliamonte & Smith’s speakers. For this we can look at
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Figure 3.50: Explicit comments given by participants in Glasgow regarding what they
would prefer to use in a polar rhetorical question. Raw numbers of comments made are
displayed on the y-axis. Only forms which were mentioned more than once were included:
the interrogative forms VSno, –int and –n’t, and then a plain declarative, and a declarative
with a tag. Note that as well as in reference to either VSno or –int examples, these explicit
comments also came from examples which had both –int and no.
the explicit comments that speakers gave about their preferences in the rhetorical question
context.
As can be seen in Figure 3.50, 18-30 participants most often explicitly expressed
a preference for VSno constructions, and it is in fact the 55+ group who most often
expressed a preference for –n’t. Although the numbers are by nature small (recall that
it was entirely optional for participants to comment further on their judgments, or give
alternative constructions), there does not seem to be any reason to suggest that the 18-30
group strongly prefer a third type of construction – certainly no more than the 55+ group
did.
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Figure 3.51: Cumulative link mixed model results for polar rhetorical questions in Shetland.
There is an effect of the construction type for the clearly local –n examples, but no other
effects or interactions.
3.3.6 Polar rhetorical questions – overall
Running a CLMM with fixed effects of construction type (–n in both confounded and
clearly local contexts, as well as VSno) and age, as well as random intercepts for
participant and example in Shetland (as seen in Figure 3.51) shows that there was an
effect of construction type – specifically, of the clearly local –n particle. There were no
further effects or interactions. Means are plotted for type of construction by age group,
which can be seen in Figure 3.52.
The results from the CLMM are strengthened by t-tests (Bonferroni corrected,
significance level = .0167). Clearly local –n particles are dispreferred when compared
to potentially confounded –n examples: t(41.973) = -4.2851, p = .0001. However, there
was no significant difference between the clearly local –n examples and standard VSno
examples: t(56.449) = 0.97259, n.s..
Fitting with the descriptive statistics above (see Figure 3.48), it seems as though
both –n and VSno constructions are acceptable for speakers, but potentially confounded
–n examples are better than clearly local ones. In that way, participants may be operating
more like other speakers in the north of Scotland, using –n’t in rhetorical questions, or
retaining an –n variant in instances where there is also evidence of reduced –n’t. For
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Figure 3.52: Mean ratings for standard construction VSno and –n in polar rhetorical
questions in Shetland, by age.
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Figure 3.53: Cumulative link mixed model results for polar rhetorical questions in Glasgow.
There is an effect of age, but no further effects or interactions.
older speakers there was a median rating of 5 and a mean between 4 and 5 for clearly
local examples, but for younger speakers the median rating was 4 (despite also having a
mean between 4 and 5, and a high proportion of 5 ratings). Perhaps there is some move
towards loss of –n in polar rhetorical questions in Shetland dialect, and some instances of
perceptual hyperdialectalism: however, this was not shown in the statistical analysis, and
for both age groups clearly local examples were as acceptable as the standard construction.
Moving on to the Glasgow data, running a CLMM with fixed effects of construction
type (–int and VSno) and age, as well as random intercepts for participant and example
(as seen in Figure 3.53) shows that there was a main effect of age, but no further effects or
interactions. Means are plotted for type of construction by age group, which can be seen
in Figure 3.54.
The results from the CLMM corroborate the discussion surrounding the descriptive
statistics above. There is some level of acceptability for –int in these constructions – as
much as for the standard VSno construction, but younger speakers generally rate all polar
rhetorical questions lower than older speakers do. This is also clearly supported by a t-test:
t(290.13) = 6.4607, p < .001. As discussed above and shown in Figure 3.50, there does not
appear to be a third construction that younger speakers prefer. Their mid-range ratings
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Figure 3.54: Mean ratings for standard construction VSno and –int in polar rhetorical
questions in Glasgow, by age.
135
are thus somewhat surprising, and remain unexplained.
Looking across the two locations, there is seemingly some similarity, with both
VSno and the local particles (whether –int or –n) available. In Shetland, the –n particle
is to some extent preferred, and in Glasgow, younger speakers seem to disprefer rhetorical
questions on the whole, but there are no clear preferences for one variant over the other in
polar rhetorical questions in either location.
3.3.7 Rhetorical wh-questions
With polar rhetorical questions, we see that there is a difference in the acceptability of
the Shetland –n and Glasgow –int particles as compared to true negative questions,
where neither particle was acceptable. Above I presented the results for true negative
wh-questions; here, I will present the results for rhetorical wh-questions in order to
compare with both true negative wh-questions and with polar rhetorical questions for
each location.
Participants judged both object and subject rhetorical wh-questions. As with polar
rhetorical questions, wh-rhetorical questions are not specifically discussed in the literature.
I therefore assume that their ‘standards’ are that object wh-questions are verb-subject-no
constructions, and rhetorical subject wh-questions have –na(e).
As well as these standard type examples, participants also judged examples with
their local variant, –n in Shetland or –int in Glasgow, in both types of rhetorical wh-
question.
Shetland
Examples (154) and (155) exemplify the sorts of rhetorical object wh-questions that
participants judged. Examples (156) and (157) show the kind of rhetorical subject
wh-questions that participants judged.
Rhetorical object wh-questions
(154) I am telling you about a friend of mine who always takes on challenges when
drunk. I list a long list of silly things that he has done, and you say:
Jeez, what wid he no do?!
(155) We have a mutual friend who seems to be really good at everything. She runs,
plays in a band and bakes. As well as all this, I tell you that she recently won a
poetry competition. You say:
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Figure 3.55: Proportion of judgments for –n (clearly local and potentially confounded)
and for VSno in rhetorical object wh-questions in Shetland, by age.
Wow, what can’n [kI.n@n] she do?!?
Rhetorical subject wh-questions
(156) I am telling you about something embarrassing that I did earlier. To try and make
me feel better, you say:
Who hasna done that?!
(157) I want to ask you if you want to go on holiday with me. I am not sure if you want
to, but when I do ask you, you are very enthusiastic and you say:
Who wid’n [wI.d@n] want to go?!
As can be seen in Figure 3.55, VSno in rhetorical object wh-questions was rated
highly overall, with 80% (N=32) 5 ratings from the 55+ group and 90% (N=36) 5 ratings
from the 18-30 group. With –n in clearly local contexts, there are no 5 ratings from either
age group, with a median of 2 (50%, N=5) for the 55+ group and of 4 (40%, N=4) for the
18-30 group. Each participant only judged one example of a clearly local –n, but from this
small set of data it seems as though it is not available in this context.
137
Figure 3.56: Proportion of judgments for –n (clearly local and potentially confounded)
and for –na in rhetorical subject wh-questions in Shetland, by age.
The picture for the potentially confounded –n cases is more complicated. For the
55+ group, the median rating is in fact 5 (43%, N=13), with 30% (N=9) 1 or 2 ratings.
For the 18-30 group, it is 4 (50%, N=15), with 23.3% (N=7) 5 ratings and 10% (N=3) 1
or 2 ratings.
In rhetorical subject wh-questions, as can be seen in Figure 3.56, standard
constructions with –na were rated highly, with 70% (N=28) 5 ratings from the 55+ group
and 82.5% (N=33) 5 ratings from the 18-30 group. Clearly local cases of –n had a median
rating of 1 (50%, N=5) for the 55+ group and 30% (N=3) 2 and 3 ratings respectively
for the 18-30 group. Again, potentially confounded cases were a little more complicated.
For the 55+ group, the median rating was 1 (33.3%, N=10) but there were nevertheless
23.3% (N=7) 5 ratings. For the 18-30 group, it is clearer that the confounded variants
are also unacceptable, with only 1 (3.3%) 5 rating and a median of 3 (40%, N=12).
Just like true negative wh-questions, then, the picture from the descriptive statistics
is somewhat mixed. For clearly local –n particles, the results suggest that the particle is
unacceptable in rhetorical wh-questions in both object and subject cases. However, for
older speakers in particular, the confounded cases appear to cause some confusion. In
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subject rhetorical wh-questions, there is no clear rejection or acceptance for the confounded
cases; in object cases, there appears to be some limited acceptance. For younger speakers,
however, there is clear rejection of the confounded cases of –n in subject rhetorical wh-
questions; the picture is slightly more complicated in object wh-questions but the median
rating is still a clear 4 (see previous section on interpreting the scale).
Glasgow
Examples (158) and (159) exemplify the sorts of rhetorical object wh-questions that
participants judged. Examples (160) and (161) show the kind of rhetorical subject
wh-questions that participants judged.
Rhetorical object wh-questions
(158) I am telling you about a friend of mine who always takes on challenges when
drunk. I list a long list of silly things that he has done, and you say:
Jeez, what wid he no do?!
(159) We have a mutual friend who seems to be really good at everything. She runs,
plays in a band and bakes. As well as all this, I tell you that she recently won a
poetry competition. You say:
Wow, what kint [kInP] she do?!?
Rhetorical subject wh-questions
(160) I am telling you about something embarrassing that I did earlier. To try and make
me feel better, you say:
Who hasnae done that?!
(161) I want to ask you if you want to go on holiday with me. I am not sure if you want
to, but when I do ask you, you are very enthusiastic and you say:
Who wint [wInP] want to go?!
As can be seen in Figure 3.57, standard VSno constructions were rated highly in
rhetorical object wh-questions, with 76.9% (N=30) 5 ratings from the 55+ group and
72.5% (N=29) 5 ratings from the 18-30 group. There were no 1 or 2 ratings in either
group. For –int, the ratings are less clear cut. For the 55+ group, the median rating was 4
(38.5%, N=15) with 33.3% (N=13) 1 or 2 ratings. For the 18-30 group things are a little
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Figure 3.57: Proportion of judgments for –int and for VSno in rhetorical object wh-
questions in Glasgow, by age.
Figure 3.58: Proportion of judgments for –int and for –nae in rhetorical subject wh-
questions in Glasgow, by age.
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Figure 3.59: Cumulative link mixed model results for rhetorical wh-questions in Shetland.
There is an effect of construction type (–n, whether clearly local or potentially founded,
and the standard constructions), but no further effects or interactions.
clearer, with a median rating of 1 (27.5%, N=11) but 52.5% (N=21) ratings of either 1 or
2. Nevertheless, there were also 20% (N=8) ratings of 5.
For rhetorical subject wh-questions, again, the standard construction – in this case,
–nae – was acceptable for old speakers. 87.2% (N=34) of the 55+ group’s judgments were
for 5. For the 18-30 group, 57.5% (N=23) were rated 5, with no 1 or 2 ratings in either
age group. These results can be seen in Figure 3.58. Results for –int are more varied.
For the 55+ group, there is a median rating of 3 (27.5%, N=11), but 40% (N=16) 1 or
2 ratings, and only 12.5% (N=5) 5 ratings, suggesting this is not particularly acceptable.
For the 18-30 group, the median rating is 1 (35%, N=14) with a total of 64.5% (N=25) 1
or 2 ratings and only 5% (N=2) 5 ratings.
3.3.8 Rhetorical wh-questions – overall
Running a CLMM with fixed effects of construction type (–n or standard), age and type of
wh-questions (subject or object) as well as random intercepts for participant and example
with the Shetland data (as seen in Figure 3.59) shows that there was a main effect of
construction type (standard vs confounded –n vs clearly local –n), but no further effects
or interactions.
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Figure 3.60: Mean ratings for standard constructions (either VSno or –na) and –n, whether
clearly local or potentially confounded with the standard, in rhetorical wh-questions in
Shetland, by age.
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These model results are supported by paired t-test comparisons (Bonferroni
corrected, significance level = .0167). The standard constructions are preferred to
potentially confounded –n examples: t(164.64) = 10.207, p < .001, while potentially
confounded –n examples are preferred to the the clearly local –n examples: t(77.898) =
4.9, p < .001.
These results are shown in the descriptive statistics, but some of the more fine-
grained descriptive distinctions do not show up in the statistical model. Though the median
ratings varied for potentially confounded –n in subject and object rhetorical wh-questions,
particularly for older speakers, it is only the overall construction type that significantly
affects participants’ judgments.
For clearly local –n, the mean rating was 2.23 – definitely in the unacceptable
range – and for standard constructions it was 4.713, clearly in the acceptable range. For
potentially confounded constructions, the mean rating was 3.317. Certainly, this is not in
the ‘acceptable’ region, but it is mid-range.
There are, I believe, two possible explanations for these results, looking at the
descriptive statistics. Firstly, it is possible that –n, for older speakers, is somewhat
acceptable in rhetorical wh-questions – after all, they do have a median rating of 5 for
these contexts. However, it is notable that this is not the case for younger speakers; it is
also worth noting that for clearly local –n examples, –n is not acceptable in rhetorical
wh-questions. This second possibility is that older speakers were particularly confounded,
especially in the object wh cases. This second possibility is supported by the clearly local
–n results, the behaviour of the younger speakers, and the results of the true negative
wh-questions as presented above, as well as the results for polar rhetorical questions,
presented in Figure 3.52.
Moving on to the Glasgow data, running a CLMM with fixed effects for construction
type (–int or standard constructions (VSno or –nae), age and wh-question type (subject
or object) shows a main effect of construction type, and no other effects or interactions
(see Figure 3.61).
These results are supported by a paired t-test, with standard constructions
significantly preferred to –int : t(157) = 17.277, p < .001.
3.3.9 Exclamatives
As highlighted in Zanuttini and Portner (2003), exclamatives have a number of key
properties, including a) the availability of scalar implicature and b) factivity. Due to the
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Figure 3.61: Cumulative link mixed model results for rhetorical wh-questions in Glasgow.
There is an effect of construction type (–int or the standard constructions VSno/–nae),
but no further effects or interactions.
requirement of factivity, modal verbs were excluded from the exclamative examples in
order to have as concrete examples as possible. Therefore, the examples were constructed
with do, is, was and, in Glasgow only, have (in Shetland, as explained in chapter 2, the
have-perfect examples were given with the be-perfect).
Shetland
Examples (162) and (163) show the types of exclamative construction that participants in
Shetland judged.
(162) You are boasting that you can make a really hot chilli. You serve me some, and I
try it. My eyes start watering because of the spiciness. You say:
Is it no hot!
(163) I am talking about a winter a few years ago when the weather was really bad, and
we were both snowed in. You say:
Wis’n [wI.z@n] that a terrible winter!
As can be seen in Figure 3.63, –n is the most highly rated construction in
exclamatives in both age groups, with 87.5% (N=35) of examples receiving a 5 rating in
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Figure 3.62: Mean ratings for standard constructions (either VSno or –nae) and –int in
rhetorical wh-questions in Glasgow, by age.
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Figure 3.63: Proportions of judgments for –n and VSno in exclamatives in Shetland, by
age.
the 55+ group, and 90% (N=36) receiving a 5 in the 18-30 group. VSno constructions
received fairly varied ratings, with 50% (N=40) receiving a 5 in the 55+ group but only
27.5% (N=11) doing so in the 18-30 group. The median rating for verb-subject-no in the
18-30 group was 3 (30% (N=12)).
Due to the lack of modal verbs in the examples, all of the examples of –n
exclamatives are ones which could be conflated with the standard –n’t. However, these
examples are clearly acceptable for speakers of both age groups in the dialect. VSno
exclamatives seem to be somewhat acceptable for older speakers, but not so for younger
speakers.
Glasgow
Examples (164) and (165) show the types of exclamative construction that participants in
Glasgow judged.
(164) You are boasting that you can make a really hot chilli. You serve me some, and I
try it. My eyes start watering because of the spiciness. You say:
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Figure 3.64: Proportions of judgments for –int and VSno in exclamatives in Glasgow, by
age.
Is it no hot!
(165) I am talking about a winter a few years ago when the weather was really bad, and
we were both snowed in. You say:
Wint [wInt] that a terrible winter!
As can be seen in Figure 3.64, –int received higher ratings than VSno in exclamatives
in both age groups. 87.5% (N=35) of –int examples were rated 5 by 55+ speakers, while
57.5% (N=23) were rated 5 by 18-30 participants. 60% (N=24) of VSno examples were
rated 5 by 55+ participants; only 25% (N=10) were by 18-30 participants.
Certainly, it seems as though –int is available for speakers in both age groups in
exclamative constructions; VSno constructions seem to be ok to some extent for older
speakers (with no 1 ratings), but not so much with younger speakers, where 42.5% (N=17)
of examples were rated 1 or 2.
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Figure 3.65: Cumulative link mixed model results for exclamatives in Shetland. There is
an effect of construction type (–n or VSno), but no further effects or interactions.
3.3.10 Exclamatives – overall
Running a CLMM with fixed effects of construction type (–n and VSno) and age, as well as
random intercepts for participant and example in Shetland (as seen in Figure 3.65) shows
that there was a main effect of construction type, but no further effects or interactions.
Means are plotted for type of construction by age group, which can be seen in Figure 3.66.
In Shetland, there was an overall preference for –n in exclamatives as opposed to
VSno constructions. This can be seen in the descriptive statistics presented above, but
also quite clearly in Figure 3.66. This distinction is supported by a paired t-test: t(79) =
-8.8392, p < .001. It also seems as though VSno constructions are perhaps not acceptable
in exclamatives: certainly, their acceptability is considerably lower than in the other three
constructions.
As noted above, all of the examples of exclamatives were potentially confounded
with –n’t in Shetland. The high rating of –n may therefore either be attributed to
acceptability of –n, or to a reduced –n’t, or both.
Running a CLMM with fixed effects of construction type (–int and VSno) and age,
as well as random intercepts for participant and example in Glasgow (as seen in Figure
3.67) shows that there was a main effect of age, but no further effects or interactions.
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Figure 3.66: Mean ratings for standard construction VSno and –n in exclamatives in
Shetland, by age.
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Figure 3.67: Cumulative link mixed model results for exclamatives in Glasgow. There is
an effect of age, but no further effects or interactions.
Means are plotted for type of construction by age group, which can be seen in Figure 3.68.
As with the polar rhetorical questions, above, it appears that younger participants
on the whole rated exclamatives lower than older participants did. Surprisingly, however,
there is no effect of construction type in the model, despite the fact that both the descriptive
statistics and means suggest that there would be.
Overall, therefore, it seems as though both –int in Glasgow and –n in Shetland are
acceptable in exclamatives. For both varieties, it seems (statistically in Shetland and as a
tendency in Glasgow) that standard VSno constructions are less acceptable in exclamatives
than in other non-canonical interrogative constructions.
3.3.11 Tag questions on negative anchors
Once again, with tag questions on negative anchors, there were two evidential contexts
in which the examples that participants judged can be grouped into: firstly, the context
with a belief and subsequent counterevidence challenging this belief (a negative evidential
context) and secondly, the context in which there was a belief with no counterevidence
(a neutral evidential context). Participants judged three constructions here: the standard
verb-subject (VS) construction; the local variant (–n in Shetland and –int in Glasgow),
and the local variant plus a lower negation marker (so –n + no in Shetland and –int + no
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In the Shetland examples there is still potential for the –n variant to be confounded
with the standard –n’t. However, because the –n + no variant is already clearly non-




Examples (166), (167) and (168) show the types of examples that participants in Shetland
judged for tag questions on negative anchors in neutral evidential contexts.
(166) We are discussing one of our friends who recently broke up with her partner. You
say:
She isna got a boyfriend now, is she?
(167) There is a concert on this weekend that we have spoken about going to. I haven’t
mentioned getting tickets yet, and you are about to order some. Before you do, you
want to check you do need to get one for me, so you say:
You irna got one, ir’n [I.r@n] you?
(168) For some months, there was a cat that would sit outside my door. You would
always say hi to it. However, you realise you haven’t see it for a while. You come in
and you say:
That cat isna been here for a while, is’n [I.z@n] it no?
As can be seen in Figure 3.69, VS tags on negative anchors are rated highly in both
age groups, with 81.25% (N=65) 5 ratings in the 55+ group and 82.5% (N=66) 5 ratings
in the 18-30 group. On the other hand, –n ratings were mixed. Participants in the 55+
group rated examples with –n 1 or 2 72.5% (N=58) of the time. Participants in the 18-30
group rated examples 1 or 2 27.5% (N=22) of the time, with a median rating of 4 (33.75%,
N=27).
–n + no examples received mixed ratings, with 30% (N=24) 5 ratings from
participants in the 55+ group, and 36.25% (N=29) 1 or 2 ratings. Only 16.25% (N=13)
of –n + no examples scored a 5 with participants in the 18-30 group, where the median
rating was again 4 (41.25%, N=33), and there were 21.25% (N=17) 1 or 2 ratings.
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Figure 3.69: Proportions of judgments for –n, –n + no and VS as tag questions on negative
anchors in neutral evidential contexts, in Shetland, by age.
It seems as though VS tags are the main acceptable tags for both age groups in this
context in Shetland – while –n tags are clearly not acceptable for either age group (with
evidence of perceptual hyperdialectalism in the 18-30 group), the ratings for –n + no tags
were much more mixed for older speakers, with a median rating of 5, but equally with
a high percentage of 1 and 2 ratings. Again, there appears to be evidence of perceptual
hyperdialectalism with younger speakers’ median rating of 4.
Glasgow
Examples (169), (170) and (171) show the types of examples that participants in Glasgow
judged for tag questions on negative anchors in neutral evidential contexts.
(169) We are discussing one of our friends who recently broke up with her partner. You
say:
She hasnae got a boyfriend now, has she?
(170) There is a concert on this weekend that we have spoken about going to. I haven’t
mentioned getting tickets yet, and you are about to order some. Before you do, you
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Figure 3.70: Proportions of judgments for –int, –int + no and VS as tag questions on
negative anchors in neutral evidential contexts, in Glasgow, by age.
want to check you do need to get one for me, so you say:
You havnae got one, hint [hInt] you?
(171) For some months, there was a cat that would sit outside my door. You would
always say hi to it. However, you realise you haven’t see it for a while. You come in
and you say:
That cat hasnae been here for a while, hint [hInt] it no?
In neutral contexts, standard VS tags on negative anchors are rated highly by both
age groups: 75% (N=60) 5 ratings from the 55+ group, and 67.5% (N=54) from the 18-30
group. –int by itself performs poorly in the 18-30 group (62.5% (N=50) 1-2 ratings), while
37.5% (N=30) of –int + no examples received a 5 rating (compare with 18.75% (N=15) 1
or 2 ratings).
In the 55+ group, –int performs better than it does in the 18-30 group, with 34.2%
(N=27) 5 ratings. –int + no, however, does even better, with 56.25% (N=45) 5 ratings
(compare with only 8.75% (N=7) 1 or 2 ratings).
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Clearly, VS tags are acceptable here. –int + no tags seem to be acceptable to the
55+ group, but it is less clear whether or not they are acceptable to the younger group.
–int is clearly unacceptable for the younger group, but it is less clear whether it is accepted
by the older group.
Negative evidential contexts
Shetland
Examples (172), (173) and (174) show the types of examples that participants in Shetland
judged for tag questions on negative anchors in negative evidential contexts.
(172) You told me a secret about one of our friends, and told me not to tell anyone. I
agreed. Next time you see her, however, she says that I mentioned it. So later on,
you say:
You didna tell her, did you?
(173) Our friend Ian has always preferred rugby to football. However, one day we are on
the street, and we see him in an Aberdeen shirt. You say:
Ian doesnae like football, does’n [d2.z@n] he?
(174) I have been trying to win a holiday by collecting the codes on the backs of crisp
packets. You thought this was ridiculous all along. When the closing date passes, I
tell you I am really disappointed not to win. You say:
You didna really think you’d win, did’n [dI.d@n] you no?
As can be seen in Figure 3.71, VS tags on negative anchors are rated highly in both
age groups, with 78.75% (N=63) 5 ratings in the 55+ group and 85% (N=68) 5 ratings
in the 18-30 group. On the other hand, –n ratings were mixed. Participants in the 55+
group rated examples with –n 1 or 2 63.75% (N=51) of the time. Participants in the 18-30
group rated examples with –n 1 or 2 27.5% (N=22) of the time, with a median rating of
4 (37.50%, N=30).
–n + no examples in negative contexts were rated much lower than the neutral
contexts by the 55+ group, with 57.5% (N=46) of examples given a 1 or 2 rating, and
only 8.75% (N=7) scoring a 5 rating. In the 18-30 group, the ratings between negative and
neutral contexts appear more similar, with 6.25% (N=5) of examples rated 5, and again,
a median of 4 (36.25%, N=29). 30% (N=24) of examples received a 1 or 2 rating from the
18-30 group.
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Figure 3.71: Proportions of judgments for –n, –n + no and VS as tag questions on negative
anchors in negative evidential contexts, in Shetland, by age.
It seems reasonably clear that only VS tags are acceptable in this context for
Shetland speakers in both age groups – neither –n or –n + no perform very well at all in
the negative evidential context for either age group.
Looking at participants’ comments, too, the standard VS tag is clearly preferable for
speakers (Figure 3.72). Although there were small numbers of comments for constructions
like ‘I thought he wasn’t coming’ in the 18-30 group, and for ‘Is he coming?!’ in the 55+
group (as well as a surprising handful of comments for VSno constructions), the clear
preference in all contexts for all groups is the standard VS construction. Notably, no
participant explicitly requested a –n + no construction. However, similar constructions
are attested in the dialect, as we saw in example (81).
Glasgow
Examples (175), (176) and (177) show the types of examples that participants in Glasgow
judged for tag questions on negative anchors in negative evidential contexts.
(175) You told me a secret about one of our friends, and told me not to tell anyone. I
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Figure 3.72: Explicit comments given by participants in Shetland regarding what they
would prefer to use as a tag question on a negative anchor, by evidential context. Raw
numbers of comments made are displayed on the y-axis. Only forms which were mentioned
more than once were included.
agreed. Next time you see her, however, she says that I mentioned it. So later on,
you say:
You didnae tell her, did you?
(176) Our friend Kev has always preferred rugby to football. However, one day we are on
the street, and we see him in an Aberdeen shirt. You say:
Kev doesnae like football, dint [dInt] he?
(177) I have been trying to win a holiday by collecting the codes on the backs of crisp
packets. You thought this was ridiculous all along. When the closing date passes, I
tell you I am really disappointed not to win. You say:
You didnae really think you’d win, dint [dInt] you no?
In negative evidential contexts, the standard VS tag again performs well on negative
anchors, with 88.75% (N=71) 5 ratings from 55+ participants, and 68.75% (N=55) from
157
Figure 3.73: Proportions of judgments for –int, –int + no and VS as tag questions on
negative anchors in negative evidential contexts, in Glasgow, by age.
the 18-30 group. 63.75% (N=51) of –int examples scored a 1 or 2 from the 18-30 group,
while only 25% (N=20) did in the 55+ group (with 30% (N=24) scoring a 5).
–int + no tags in negative evidential contexts were rated 1 or 2 in 45% (N=36)
cases by the 18-30 group, with a median of 3 (23.75%, N=19). In the 55+ group, 40%
(N=32) of examples were rated a 5, with 18.75% (N=15) rated 1 or 2.
Again, it is clear that VS tags are acceptable for participants in both age groups.
Both –int and –int + no are clearly unacceptable for the 18-30 group. In the 55+ group
it is less clear, though both are rated lower than the standard VS form, and with less than
50% 5 ratings.
Explicit comments on participants’ preferences of tags to attach to a negative anchor
are also interesting to investigate, as can be seen in Figure 3.74. The most comments in
each context for each age group are for the standard VS tags – however, the picture is
less clear than it was in the explicit comments given in Shetland in Figure 3.72. With the
18-30 group, there are a number of explicit preferences for –int + no, particularly in the
negative evidential context. For the 55+ group, the comments present a clearer preference
for VS, but there were still small numbers of comments in favour of –int + no, –n’t + no,
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Figure 3.74: Explicit comments given by participants in Glasgow regarding what they
would prefer to use as a tag question on a negative anchor, by evidential context. Raw
numbers of comments made are displayed on the y-axis. Only forms which were mentioned
more than once were included.
and again a surprising small number of preferences for VSno constructions.
3.3.12 Tag questions on negative anchors – overall
Running a CLMM with fixed effects of construction type (–n, –n + no and standard
VS), evidential context and age, as well as random intercepts for participant and example
in Shetland (as seen in Figure 3.75) shows there were main effects of construction type
(whether VSno, –n or –n + no). There were no further effects or interactions. Means are
plotted for type of construction by age group, which can be seen in Figure 3.76.
The results of the CLMM are supported by paired t-tests (Bonferroni corrected,
significance level = .0167). VS is preferred to –n: t(507.21) = 23.991, p < .001, and is
also preferred over –n + no: t(511.33) = 20.611, p < .001. –n + no is preferred to –n:
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Figure 3.75: Cumulative link mixed model results for tag questions on negative anchors
in Shetland. There is an effect of construction type (–n, –n + no or VS), but no further
effects or interactions.
t(637.88) = -2.9415, p = .003.
It seems, therefore, that although there is a tendency among the 55+ group for –n
+ no to be preferred in neutral evidential contexts, this is not statistically significant. –n
+ no is preferred, overall, to –n, but neither perform especially well when compared to VS
constructions.
Running a CLMM with fixed effects of construction type (–int, –int + no and
standard VS), evidential context and age, as well as random intercepts for participant and
example in Glasgow (as seen in Figure 3.77) shows there were main effects of construction
type (whether VSno, –int or –int + no). There was also a main effect of age, and an
interaction between –int + no and evidential context. There were no further effects or
interactions. Means are plotted for type of construction by age group, which can be seen
in Figure 3.78.
In general, older speakers rated the three constructions higher than younger speakers
did. However, we can also see that for participants in both age groups, there is more
acceptability of –int + no in neutral contexts than negative evidential contexts. This is
supported by a paired t-test: t(158) = -5.7426, p < .001. Furthermore, we see that VS is
preferred to both –int (t(526.46) = 18.352, p < .001)) and –int + no (t(538.99) = 10.654,
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Figure 3.76: Mean ratings for standard construction VS, –n, and –n + no as tags on
negative anchors in Shetland, by evidential context and age.
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Figure 3.77: Cumulative link mixed model results for tag questions on negative anchors in
Glasgow. There is an effect of construction type (–int, –int + no or VS), but no further
effects or interactions.
p < .001), while –int + no is preferred to –int (t(635.01) = -6.7555, p < .001) (Bonferroni
correction applied in all three cases, significance level = .0167). This mirrors the results
we saw in Shetland, although it is clearer.
Comparing the two locations, we can see that –int + no seems to be available in
at least neutral evidential contexts for speakers in Glasgow; there was a tendency towards
the same preference in Shetland with –n + no, but this did not come out in the statistical
model. This may be due to the younger speakers; I suggest that as Shetland dialect is
generally obsolescing, this feature is being lost.
In general, these –n + no and –int + no constructions were rated lower than VS and
didn’t break into the 4-5 mean range. Participants sometimes suggested that the situations
weren’t confirmational enough – these tags would only be preferred in a context leaning
towards the positive, rather than in a context where the evidential context was neutral:
for example, GY09, shown below.
(178) It’s really hard to find parking around your house; there are lots of double yellow
lines everywhere. Sometimes at weekends and public holidays, it is ok, but not
often. I have come round to yours and have parked outside the door. You say:
You cannae park there, kint you no?
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Figure 3.78: Mean ratings for standard construction VS, –int and –int + no as tags on
negative anchors in Glasgow, by evidential context and age.
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GY09: see like see that’s– that’s a perfectly valid
sentence but it would only be like– in that
context that you were saying it is, it’s quite
weird because I wouldn’t say to you ‘you cannae
park there kint you no’ if you weren’t sure like
E: yeah yeah
GY09: so I would say like ‘you cannae park there kint
you know’ is like if I was with somebody that I
thought would know
This may thus have also been a factor in participants’ ratings.
3.4 –n + no
Recall in chapter 2 I presented evidence from the literature and attested examples of
constructions in which Shetland dialect speakers used both –n and a lower negative marker
no in constructions where standard English would simply use a single negative marker.
(179) Can’n we no aa come in? (Shetland, Robertson and Graham 1952:10)
I also tested the acceptability of this ‘double negative’ construction with both
Shetland participants and with Glasgow participants in the form of –int + no, where the
construction has not been attested. I tested its acceptability in matrix biased questions
with varying evidential contexts, in tag questions on positive anchors with varying
evidential contexts, in polar rhetorical questions and in interrogative exclamatives (i.e.
the relevant non-canonical question constructions). Median ratings are presented in Table
3.1.
BQ – neut BQ – neg TQ – neut TQ – neg RQ Excl
Shet 18-30 5 5 4 4 5 1
Shet 55+ 5 5 5 4 5 4
Gla 18-30 1 1 3 1 1 1
Gla 55+ 4 4 4 4 5 4
Table 3.1: Median ratings for –n + no and –int + no in all non-canonical question contexts
by location and age.
Results for Glasgow are as expected, given that the construction is not attested: the
median rating for the –int + no construction by 18-30 speakers in five of the six discussed
contexts was 1. On the other hand, the median for 55+ speakers in five of the six discussed
contexts was 4. This lines up with speakers’ comments about how they were using the scale
discussed in section 2.5. Combined with low-mid mean ratings (2-3), it appears that this
construction isn’t really acceptable for Glaswegian participants.
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In Shetland, the picture is a little more confusing, and the median ratings are
more mixed. For both older and younger speakers, biased questions and polar rhetorical
questions with –n + no received median ratings of 5, and older speakers also gave positive
tag questions in neutral contexts a median rating of 5. However, for younger speakers
this tag question context had a median rating of 4; 4 was also the median rating for both
groups for positive tag questions with negative evidential contexts. Despite these high
medians, too, the mean ratings were generally high-mid range (around 3-4), as opposed to
the Glasgow low-mid range.
Importantly, the –n + no construction is never the preferred construction for
Shetland speakers and it is therefore more difficult to assess its acceptability accurately –
it is always dispreferred when compared to the most preferred construction in any
context. However, it seems as though it may be acceptable to some extent in biased
questions, rhetorical questions and tag questions, given its attestations and moderate
acceptability.
Given the somewhat inconclusive results regarding the acceptability of
constructions like (179), I will not discuss –n + no results in any detail in the rest of this
thesis. Intuitively, given the change we see in progress in Shetland dialect, with loss of
acceptability of –n in matrix biased questions for younger speakers, the presence of this
construction in the dialect may be related to the Jespersen Cycle (Jespersen 1917), with
the lower no strengthening whatever biased question negation is being expressed by the
–n marker historically. Evidence of specific pragmatic phenomena occurring regarding
incoming negative markers (see e.g. Schwenter (2005) on Brazilian Portuguese não V não
constructions and Espinal (1993) and Schwenter (2006) on no V pas constructions in
Catalan) and outgoing negative markers (e.g. non in Old French (Larrivée 2010) and en
in West Flemish (Breitbarth and Haegeman 2014)) has been attested cross-linguistically,
and this may be a stage in that sort of development. However, for reasons of space and
given the inconclusive results for the acceptability of this phenomenon as well as a lack of
historical evidence available for Scots varieties in general, I will set this aside.
3.5 Conclusions
In this section, I presented results from interview method tasks carried out with Shetland
dialect speakers and Glasgow Scots speakers in two age groups in order to establish the
distribution of the particles –n and –int in the respective varieties.
The results of the tasks show that –n and –int appear to be restricted to
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non-canonical questions, scoring poorly in declaratives, imperatives, true negative
questions and negative wh-questions. We saw that both –n and –int are available as tag
questions on positive anchors, with a preference for neutral evidential contexts over
negative ones. A similar pattern was replicated for –n + no and –int + no as tags on
negative anchors, where there was increased acceptability in neutral contexts for
participants in Glasgow, and a tendency for this to be the case with older speakers in
Shetland. We also saw that both –n and –int are acceptable in exclamatives, and in
polar rhetorical questions. Perhaps most interestingly, in matrix biased questions, we saw
that –int in Glasgow Scots was unacceptable, but that –n in Shetland dialect was
acceptable to some extent, with perceptual hyperdialectalism in younger speakers’
judgments leading to no significant difference in acceptability between older and younger
speakers. I take this as evidence of change in progress, with loss of –n from matrix biased
question contexts, while it is retained in tag questions and exclamatives.
Given the distribution that has been established in this chapter, in the next chapter,
I turn to the question of how we should analyse –int and –n. In doing so, I will address the
big questions posed at the beginning of the thesis: what information is taken into account
when licensing a question? How is this information encoded in the semantics? And how is





In chapter 3, I established the distribution of Shetland dialect –n and Glasgow Scots –
int. I presented the results of a data collection process which showed that these particles
are restricted to certain types of non-canonical questions (see Table 4.1) in each variety.
Examples of the particles –n and –int are shown in examples (180) and (181).
(180) You’ll be there, wint you?
(181) You’ll be there, will’n you?
Shetland –n Glasgow –int
18-30 55+ 18-30 55+
True Negative Q x x x x
Biased Q ?/x ?/X x x
Exclamative X X X X
Polar Rhetorical Q X X ?/X X
Tag Q (negative evidence) X X X X
Tag Q (neutral evidence) X X X X
Table 4.1: Availability of Shetland –n and Glasgow –int particles in various interrogative
constructions in each variety. For detailed results and discussion of acceptability, see
chapter 3.
In this chapter, I turn to analyse the –int and –n particles. Though on the surface
they look like negative markers, and appear where there are negative markers in standard
English, their distribution is extremely limited. I will first (section 4.2) look at the
pragmatics of the contexts that permit these markers, showing how they can be grouped
together and separated from biased questions, in order to more broadly assess what
information can contribute to the licensing of a non-canonical question. I will then
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(section 4.3) analyse –int and –n as check moves, using Ginzburg’s (2012) interactive
semantics for dialogue, and show how they are distinct from standard English,
particularly tag questions. Finally, in section 4.4, I present a syntactic analysis for the
particles, building on the pragmatic and semantic analyses I give, to support the idea of a
conversational domain above CP in the left periphery that includes discourse particles,
following Wiltschko and Heim (2016). Here, I motivate head movement to the discourse
domain, and add further weight to the argument that discourse particles should be part
of the syntax.
4.2 Pragmatics of –n and –int contexts
4.2.1 Introduction
The first step in analysing –int and –n is establishing the pragmatic contexts for their
use. In order to do so, I will focus on speakers’ epistemic beliefs and the evidential biases
surrounding the interaction, as outlined in chapter 1. The ‘belief’ and ‘bias’ terminology
comes from the literature on biased questions (Sudo 2013, Domaneschi et al. 2017,
Gaertner and Gyuris 2017), but I will extend it to discuss polar rhetorical questions and
exclamatives too, and show how the distribution of all four non-canonical question
constructions where we see some evidence of –n or –int (biased questions, tag questions,
interrogative exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions34) can be accounted for in this
framework, with clear similarities between the four constructions. I will also provide
further evidence to support this framework that takes account of both beliefs and bias as
opposed to a purely evidential account (Büring and Gunlogson 2000, Trinh 2014,
Northrup 2014, Farkas and Roelofsen 2017).
I will then present evidence from three types of scenarios (predicates of personal
taste; commitment revision; discourse closure) to show how tag questions, interrogative
exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions can be separated out from biased questions
based on their pragmatics. In this way, I will establish the relevant details of the pragmatic
contexts that permit –int in Glasgow and –n in Shetland dialect35.
Throughout this section, I will also discuss evidence from standard English. I do so
34I will discuss rhetorical questions in greater detail in chapter 6, where I will explore the relationship
between polar and wh- rhetorical questions. I will only discuss polar rhetorical questions in this section to
the extent that their relationship to the other non-canonical questions is made clear.
35Throughout this chapter, I will only discuss –n in Shetland dialect to the extent that it is available for
all speakers; therefore, in tag questions, interrogative exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions. There
was some evidence that –n was permitted in biased questions for older speakers in Shetland dialect (see
section 3.3.1); however, I will set this aside and focus on what I take to be the end product of a linguistic
change.
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in order to build a case for arguing that the contexts for –n and –int are a specific subset of
contexts for interrogative production where specialisation could take place. I do not argue
that the standard English constructions are also specialised in this way – rather, different
languages group together different parts of the belief and bias matrix36.
4.2.2 The importance of evidence and belief
As outlined in chapter 1, the literature discusses two main influences on question
production: the ‘epistemic belief’ of the speaker and the ‘evidential bias’ of the context
(Ladd 1981, Büring and Gunlogson 2000, Romero and Han 2004, Sudo 2013, Northrup
2014, Trinh 2014, Domaneschi et al. 2017, Farkas and Roelofsen 2017, Gaertner and
Gyuris 2017). In chapter 1 I set out the position that I support in this thesis – that both
epistemic belief and evidential bias are important – but here I will consider the
alternatives too. In particular, a number of recent accounts have taken the influence of
evidential context to be the sole relevant factor (Trinh 2014, Northrup 2014, Farkas and
Roelofsen 2017). In this section, I will focus my discussion on the model proposed by
Northrup (2014)37, which suggests that there are very particular contexts relating to the
evidence available at different time points in the discourse that license the use of different
question types; these contexts do not overlap and therefore there can be no overlap in the
purposes of questions. I will argue that Northrup’s key examples can be accounted for in
the belief and bias model, which does not require arguing that only one question type is
possible per context and thus better accounts for the data.
For Northrup (2014), question production is based on a discourse model in which
interrogative forms have very specific contexts for use based on the time of evidence, which
may be prior – some evidence that the speaker had access to prior to the speech time in
the discourse context – or current – some evidence that the speaker has access to at the
speech time. For example, prior evidence could involve having seen a poster for a talk
that day at work, when the speech time is at home in the evening. On the other hand,
current evidence, for example, could be seeing a poster for a talk and inquiring about it
to a colleague at that moment.
At all times, questions are assumed to involve a commitment to [p ∨ ¬p] (an
36See Gaertner and Gyuris (2017) for a possible representation of the belief and bias space, and how
different question types represent different parts of the matrix in different languages.
37For discussion of Farkas and Roelofsen’s (2017) model of tag question and rising interrogative
production, see section 4.3.5. Farkas and Roelofsen posit a compositional inquisitive semantics for these
constructions which involves the speaker’s interpretation of the strength of the current evidence, which
accounts for the data but does not, to my mind, make strong enough predictions. I will compare this to
my account in section 4.3.5.
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‘openness’ commitment) – but this may be prior (i.e. the speaker had no prior belief of p
or ¬p based on whatever evidence they had access to prior to the speech time) or current.
Furthermore, a speaker may also have commitments to p or ¬p based on the current
evidential context surrounding the interaction they are participating in, or it may be the
case that they had prior evidence suggesting either p or ¬p. Northrup’s account does not
permit any overlap in terms of forms used: his account therefore rules out the possibility
of biased questions and tag questions occurring in the same contexts (see Table 4.2).
prior current
default polar question — [p ∨ ¬p]
biased questions p [p ∨ ¬p] and ¬p
rising tag questions — [p ∨ ¬p] and p
falling tag questions [p ∨ ¬p] p
Table 4.2: Northrup’s (2014) formulation of the prior and current evidential contexts
required to produce matrix biased questions, rising tag questions and falling tag questions.
There are a number of positives to Northrup’s model – for example, that the current
belief of the speaker when using a falling tag question is p rather than the openness
commitment that the speaker believes an answer to the question. However, it is not clear
how Northrup’s key argument (see (182)) for phrasing the distinction in terms of current
and prior evidence rather than beliefs and contextual evidence really challenges the belief
and bias model.
(182) Happy hour approaches; Zabi and Kazuko need a drink. Zabi can’t easily recall
where the brewery is.
Z: Do you remember where the brewery is? Never mind; it’s on Swift, isn’t ↘it?
(Northrup 2014:208)
Northrup argues that the openness commitment to [p ∨ ¬p] is based on Zabi’s prior
evidence base (signalled by the polar question at the beginning of his turn), and that Zabi
also has a weak commitment to p due to his current evidential base. As there is no change
in contextual evidence, Northrup argues that the sudden ability to license the falling tag
question comes from the shift from a prior and current evidence base for [p ∨ ¬p] to a prior
base for [p ∨ ¬p] and a current base for p (i.e. the speaker remembered p). However, this
can be accounted for in a belief and evidence based model: Zabi asks the polar question
because he cannot remember where the brewery is, and there is no evidence to tell him that
Kazuko can or cannot remember where it is. Importantly, never mind serves as a repair
and informs Kazuko that any answer to the question she might propose ‘doesn’t matter’
or that Zabi ‘won’t care’ about any answer (Couper-Kuhlen 2004). In effect, the polar
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question is cancelled; Zabi can then start again, announcing his belief of p (‘the brewery
is on Swift’) in a neutral evidential context and using the falling nuclear tag question to
indicate that Kazuko’s opinion is still important and valued, but Zabi is confident in his
own belief.
Furthermore, Northrup argues that matrix biased questions are used in contexts
only where there is conflict between the speaker’s prior belief p, and the evidence presented
which thus gives a concurrent evidential base for [p ∨ ¬p] and ¬p. On the other hand,
falling nuclear tag questions are used when a speaker has a prior belief of [p ∨ ¬p], and
a current belief of p due to the contextual evidence. Rising tag questions are used when
speakers have a concurrent commitment to [p ∨ ¬p] and to p, with no prior evidential
context.
I believe Northrup is right to consider evidence when looking at non-canonical
questions: however, there are clear examples which contradict his categorisation of the
question types’ licensing. For example, situations where conflict between S’s belief and
the evidential context are not present, and a matrix biased question is clearly permitted,
such as when the addressee explicitly states that they cannot remember p.
(183) S and A are at a party. They spot someone arriving. S recalls that both they
and A had met this person the previous weekend. S believes he is called Ash.
A: There’s Rob’s friend. I can’t remember his name!
S: Wasn’t it Ash?
It was Ash, ↗wasn’t it?
#It was Ash, ↘wasn’t it?
In this situation, S’s epistemic belief is p – the person who has just arrived is
called Ash. This is a prior belief, and not one received currently. The evidential situation
surrounding the interaction is neither positive nor negative; merely entering the room
cannot be seen to be evidence for or against the fact that this person is named Ash.
According to Northrup’s theory, then, the matrix biased question should be ruled out.
However, in a situation like (183), where the addressee has specifically indicated that they
can’t remember p or ¬p, a matrix biased question is preferable to a falling tag question,
and a tag question with a rise is also permissible. Notably:
i) Two different constructions are permissible, arguing against the categorical nature of
Northrup’s model which only permits one type of question per context.
171
ii) Despite the fact that the current evidential base does not include explicit evidence
for ¬p, the matrix biased question is available.
iii) It is hard to see the distinction between prior evidential base and current evidential
base here; of course, p is a belief that has been established prior to the current
interaction, but it is still part of the current evidential base. Note that the speaker
could also reply to the addressee with a plain assertion: ‘It’s Ash.’ It is therefore
hard to see how an ‘openness’ commitment to [p ∨ ¬p] is required here.
This example contradicts Northrup’s (2014) claim that licensing of all matrix biased
questions must involve conflict between the addressee’s prior belief state and their current
evidential base. The situation in (183) provides no evidence to contradict S’s belief, and it
is very difficult to see how one could be construed, particularly given A’s explicit admission
that they have no evidence either way.
Instead of following an evidence-only approach to understanding the licensing of
these non-canonical questions, I propose following the work of e.g. Sudo (2013), Domaneschi
et al. (2017) and Gaertner and Gyuris (2017) who argue that it is the interaction between
epistemic beliefs and evidential biases that lead speakers to produce different forms of
questions. For details of how these authors envisage the relationship between the two, see
chapter 1. I repeat the table of interrogative production distribution from Domaneschi




p PPQ / really?! PPQ really?! PPQ
neutral ONPQ PPQ
¬p ONPQ INPQ
Table 4.3: Relationship between epistemic and evidential biases established in Domaneschi
et al. (2017) for choice of matrix question produced in English and German.
Note that while there were significant preferences for certain constructions, the
second most popular option per context varied in a way which suggests that there is more
of a possible overlap in question production than in the model Northrup (2014) proposed
(see Domaneschi et al. (2017) for full details). In particular, the cell where the speaker
had no existing belief but was faced with some evidence in favour of p had no significant
difference in preference between a standard PPQ and a really?! PPQ. This again works in
favour of the belief and bias model.
As well as speaker’s epistemic beliefs and the contextual evidential bias, however, I
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would also like to draw a further distinction between evidence that a speaker can surmise
from the context surrounding the interaction, and evidence that directly modifies the
position taken by the addressee. If a speaker has the belief p, and if the evidence
surrounding the interaction is neutral or leaning in support of p, given that the addressee
has access to the same evidence manifest in the context as the speaker, the speaker can
reasonably assume that the addressee also shares p, such as in (184)38.
(184) S thinks that Hibs won the Scottish Cup in 2016. S and A are about to watch a
programme about Scottish Cup winners. A montage of previous winners is played
at the beginning of the programme, in which a number of teams featured, including
Hibs. S says:
Hibs won in 2016, didn’t ↘they?
Hibs won in 2016, didn’t ↗they?
Didn’t Hibs win in 2016?
In (184), S has the belief p. The evidence is slightly positive – clearly, Hibs won the
cup at some point before they were featured in the montage – but is neutral with respect
to the detail e.g. in what year this happened. This evidence does not affect what S assumes
about A’s position; nor does it affect S’s position.
If something in the speaker’s evidential base external to their direct communicative
interaction with the addressee suggests that ¬p is true, this does not necessarily modify
how the speaker interprets the addressee’s belief, and it does not mean that the speaker
cannot take an egocentric perspective about p. If the speaker has previously taken the
position that the addressee must share p, counterevidence that does not directly come
from the addressee might at most lead the speaker to take a less egocentric approach and
consider the addressee to be neutral as to whether or not p holds. In this situation, it
is possible that the addressee previously had access to the counterevidence that has only
just become manifest to the speaker; however it may be the case that it is also new to the
addressee. Though they may very well still opt for a biased question, the speaker is asking
the addressee to choose between p and ¬p for addition to Common Ground (CG) from a
position where the addressee’s preference for one or the other option is unknown. This can
also be seen in an example with a negative evidential context, such as (185).
(185) S and A are attending a party at Leah’s house. They are running very late, and
expect everyone to be there already. S believes their friend, Rosie, is attending the
38In each context, I order the possible questions from most to least likely.
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party. However, on the way to the party, S and A walk past Rosie’s house and see
that her lights are on and her car is still outside the house. S says:
Rosie’s coming to the party, isn’t ↗she?
Isn’t Rosie coming to the party?
Rosie’s coming to the party, isn’t ↘she?
In (185), S’s belief of p is challenged by some contextual evidence: it looks like Rosie
is at home. It is still plausible that A may also share S’s belief of p, and thus may also
be being challenged to the same extent by the evidence. The falling tag question is still
possible, but dispreferred when compared to either a tag question with rising intonation,
or a biased question, due to the negative evidential context.
On the other hand, if the addressee specifically makes a statement that undercuts
the speaker’s belief of p, the speaker can no longer safely assume that the addressee
shares/shared a belief of p. At best, it could be that the speaker has misinterpreted the
information given by the addressee, or that the addressee has offered some evidence that
they consider to be compatible with p, while the speaker does not think the evidence is
compatible. The speaker could thus interpret the addressee’s belief as somewhat neutral.
At worst, it may in fact be that the addressee believes ¬p, and that this is what they are
telling the speaker by undercutting the speaker’s previous assumption. The speaker must
then clear up the conflict of beliefs. For example, take (186).
(186) S and A are organising a retirement party for their colleague, Oluseun. S believes
that A will have bought a present for Oluseun, based on the delegation of tasks
they previously carried out. However, on the way up the stairs to the party, S
mentions the present and A says ‘what present?’. S says:
You bought the present, didn’t ↗you?
Didn’t you buy the present?
# You bought the present, didn’t ↘you?
In (186), S has the belief p – ‘A is buying a present for Oluseun’. The discourse-
external evidence is neutral; however, S can no longer assume that A shares their belief of
p.
While it may at first seem like evidence that comes directly from the addressee is
simply stronger negative contextual evidence, below I will argue that the speaker’s
interpretation of the addressee’s belief can have independent effects on the choice of
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discourse move, separate to the discourse-external evidence. I do not believe that this
interpretation of addressee belief is semantically encoded in standard English, but argue
that it affects the pragmatic licensing of the various constructions in standard English
and the contingency required in the construction (Gunlogson 2008, see also section 4.3).
This specific set of conditions allowed the Scots –n and –int particles to specialise around
this particular point and to establish a meaning built on this idea of shared belief.
Having defined the parameters of ‘evidence’ and how dependent on the speaker and
their interpretation this is, in the next section I discuss the common factors that bring
together the constructions that permit –n and –int in their respective varieties, to suggest
how they have become or are becoming specialised.
4.2.3 –n and –int : common factors
For all of the constructions with interrogative syntax I will discuss here, the speaker
holds an epistemic belief of p. This distinguishes them from ‘true’ interrogatives, whether
negative or positive, where the speaker has no prior belief and thus the question is truly
information-seeking. This, however, does not allow us to distinguish the contexts in
which –n and –int continue to be available from biased questions, which do not permit
–int in Glasgow and appear to be losing –n in Shetland. In order to do so, we need to
look more closely at the evidential contexts, the role of addressee beliefs, and possible
follow-up moves, for all four constructions. I will focus on the distinction between biased
questions and tag questions, but I will refer to exclamatives and rhetorical questions
where necessary in order to demonstrate that the criteria I refer to are relevant for all the
–n and –int constructions.
Non-challenging evidence
The two evidential contexts that are discussed with regards to biased questions and tag
questions in the literature are neutral and negative evidential contexts. It is worth therefore
investigating whether either of these contexts is particularly more relevant than the other
for licensing –n and –int.
One of the results that comes out from the data presented in chapter 3 is that –n
and –int in tag questions are preferred in evidential contexts where there is no evidence
challenging the speaker’s belief of p over contexts where there is counterevidence (see
section 3.3.3).
Interestingly, too, although –n appears to be being lost from biased questions in
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Shetland dialect, we see that in contexts where –n is potentially confounded with the
standard English –n’t (e.g. did’n), these –n constructions are significantly preferred in
neutral evidential contexts over ones with negative counterevidence. This suggests that
again, neutral/non-challenging evidential contexts are preferred for –n. However, of course,
we also seem to see ongoing loss of –n from biased questions (and a lack of availability
for –int in biased questions at all in Glasgow Scots), suggesting that there is a stronger
preference for tag questions in neutral evidential contexts than biased questions given that
the particles can seemingly specialise to prefer neutral evidential contexts but only be
retained in tag questions39.
Although not discussed in terms of beliefs and biases in the literature, it is also
possible to frame exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions in terms of their evidential
contexts too. Exclamatives are taken to be factive and thus there cannot be any challenge
to this factivity in the immediate environment in which they are produced. Polar rhetorical
questions are perhaps more complex (see chapter 6) but fundamentally are assumed to be
in CG in a way such that ‘reasserting’ them (Ginzburg 2012) is taken to be ‘obvious’ to
the addressee – it is not the case that it is a question that requires resolving due to some
challenging evidence. Therefore, we can conclude that the constructions that permit –n
and –int are available in contexts where there is no contextual evidence challenging the
speaker’s belief of p.
Despite the fact that the three constructions which permit –n and –int in both
Shetland and Glasgow are related to neutral or positive evidential contexts, this is once
again not enough to distinguish the constructions from biased questions, which are also
available in non-challenging evidential contexts (as we saw in examples like (183) and
(184)). I believe that looking at possibilities for attribution of the speaker’s belief to the
addressee is a key difference, which I will explore with regard to predicates of personal
taste in the next section.
Predicates of personal taste
Predicates of personal taste offer a good context in which to separate out the influence of
evidential context and the ability for the speaker to attribute the belief to the addressee. As
Malamud and Stephenson (2014:2) state, predicates of personal taste allow us to distinguish
speaker and addressee beliefs and discourse commitments: if S is talking to A, and states
that ‘L is attractive’, S typically means that they find L attractive, without passing any
39See chapter 5 for an experimental exploration of this prediction in standard English.
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judgment on whether other conversation participants find L attractive. S is taken to be
the judge for the predicate (Lasersohn 2005). Pearson (2013) notes that there is a speaker-
hearer shift when a predicate of personal taste is used in a (positive polar) question: ‘Is this
cocktail nice?’ opens the floor for the addressee to take on the role as the judge without
offering any judgment on the speaker’s behalf. This idea is also expressed by Tenny’s
(2006) ‘interrogative flip’, where the seat of knowledge flips from speaker to addressee in
a question context.
Malamud and Stephenson (2014) discuss the role of predicates of personal taste
with regard to reverse polarity tags with rising intonation, same-polarity tags, and rising
declaratives in three specific contexts, which they refer to as ‘blushing/innuendo’,
‘seeking agreement’ and ‘unsure of move’. Malamud and Stephenson’s insight into
‘seeking agreement’ situations are relevant here – they suggest that by virtue of being
licensed in a context like (187), reverse polarity tags involve the speaker and the
addressee individually acting as judges, and committing to p.
(187) A and B are discussing various traits of their mutual acquaintances. B says ‘I
think Bill, more than anything else, is just a really nice guy’. A replies:
(But) he’s attractive too, isn’t ↗he? (Malamud and Stephenson 2014:3)
Malamud and Stephenson argue that a construction like (187) involves a projected
commitment to p from the speaker (e.g. they will only commit based on A’s response),
plus a projected addition to the CG (e.g. A’s response will support the addition of p to
CG). I will discuss their semantic analysis in section 4.3.5. For the moment, we can extend
Malamud and Stephenson’s discussion of predicates of personal taste and examine how
nuclear tags with falling intonation behave as compared to matrix biased questions (as
well as exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions). Consider examples (188) and (189)
– the contexts are identical except for the fact that in (189), A makes a move to rent the
movie that they do not in (188).
(188) S believes that horror films are too scary for 12-year olds to watch. S and A are
going to be babysitting A’s cousin, Mariya, who is 12. Mariya asks them to rent a
particular film because her friends watched it and liked it. It is a horror film. At
the video shop, S and A see the film on a shelf. S says to A:
It’s too scary for her, isn’t ↘it?
?It’s too scary for her, isn’t ↗it?
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# Isn’t it too scary for her?
(189) S believes that horror films are too scary for 12-year olds to watch. S and A are
going to be babysitting A’s cousin, Mariya, who is 12. Mariya asks them to rent a
particular film because her friends watched it and liked it. It is a horror film. At
the video shop, A picks up the film Maryia asked for. S says to A:
Isn’t it too scary for her?
It’s too scary for her, isn’t ↗it?
#It’s too scary for her, isn’t ↘it?
In both examples (188) and (189), S holds the belief p – ‘horror films are too scary
for a 12-year old’. 12-year-old Mariya wants to watch a horror film. There is some negative
evidence challenging S’s belief about the film’s suitability – Mariya’s friends have reportedly
watched and enjoyed this film. Despite this consistent evidence, though, it is the opinion
of the addressee that matters for the production of the falling tag question.
In (188), S is able to make the assumption that A shares their belief because they
have not been explicitly told otherwise. In this context, the falling nuclear tag question is
the preferred option; the rising tag question would be marked but not unacceptable, while
the matrix biased question is strange in this context.
In (189), S’s belief about the (subjective) truth of p has not changed; neither has the
discourse-external evidence that this film is a horror film and therefore too scary for Mariya.
What has changed is S’s ability to attribute this belief state to A: when A picks up the
movie, they indicate that they are considering renting it. The falling nuclear tag question is
thus ruled out, and the matrix biased question or rising tag becomes the preferred option.
It seems, therefore, that matrix biased question and rising tags can be used when there
is uncertainty regarding A’s beliefs, while a falling tag question cannot. This contrasts
with examples like (184) and (185) where although there is neutral and negative evidence
respectively, and intuitively there are preferred constructions in each context, none of the
options are bad. That does not appear to be the case in these examples that lack the
potential for addressee attribution.
Further examples show the same pattern.
(190) S and A’s friend Christian has made a cake. Christian is usually a good baker. S,
A and another friend, Paula, each take a slice. S takes a bite, and thinks the cake is
delicious. Paula has also taken a bite, and looks very happy. A has also taken a
bite, but has not indicated their feelings about the cake. S says to A:
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It’s good, isn’t ↘it?
?It’s good, isn’t ↗it?
#Isn’t it good?40
S believes that the cake is delicious, and the external evidence (Paula’s agreement)
backs this up. By producing a falling tag question, S is making a statement about their
own belief (in the anchor), but is making an assumption about the addressee’s belief too.
Now, consider context (191).
(191) S and A’s friend Christian has made a cake. Christian is usually a good baker. S,
A and another friend, Paula, each take a slice. S takes a bite, and thinks the cake is
delicious. Paula has also taken a bite, and looks very happy. A has also taken a
bite, but screws up their face. S says to A:
Isn’t it good?
It’s good, isn’t ↗it?
#The cake is delicious, isn’t ↘it?
In context (191), S’s belief about the (subjective) truth of p (the cake is delicious)
has not changed; neither has the evidence supporting this belief. What has changed is
that they no longer feel justified in also attributing p to the addressee. In cases where the
speaker is no longer able to attribute to the addressee, tag questions with falling intonation
are dispreferred; instead, rising intonation tags or matrix biased questions are preferred.
This ability to attribute is also important for the production of interrogative
exclamatives with –n’t. As discussed above, the speaker must be willing to take
responsibility for p, and the discourse-external evidence must also support p –
furthermore, the speaker must be able to attribute p to the addressee. When there is no
possible way that the addressee can believe p due to a lack of manifest evidence, an –n’t
exclamative should not be possible. For example, consider context (192).
(192) S is on the phone to A, and is telling A about their new cat. S just picked up the
cat that day. S says:
#Isn’t it cute!
The exclamative in (192) is infelicitous because S cannot possibly know that A
shares their belief of p (‘the cat is cute’) if A does not have access to the evidence (i.e. the
40With exclamative intonation, this would be ok.
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ability to look at the cat, and to see that it is cute) – no matter how strongly positive the
evidence is. Compare with (193):
(193) S is on holiday. They are on the phone to A, and are telling A about the town they
are staying in. S knows A stayed in the same town on holiday last year. S says:
Isn’t it beautiful!
Although A does not have direct access to the same current evidence that is
currently manifest to S (indeed, things may have changed in the town, S and A may have
stayed in different areas of the town etc), S assumes A will be willing to also take
responsibility for p in CG, given that they have access to some relevant evidence. It is
thus felicitous for S to produce the exclamative.
Note that this directly contradicts Taniguchi’s (2017) argument that exclamatives
are purely about speaker commitment, with no input from the addressee. While I believe
Taniguchi is correct for positive inversion exclamatives (boy, is that spicy! ), the evidence
from examples (192) and (193) suggests that standard English negative inversion
exclamatives are centered around the speaker/addressee relationship. This can also be
seen with the contrasting acceptability of in my humble opinion, a parenthetical that
implies the speaker is not willing to change their opinion (Beyssade and Marandin 2006a)
– e.g. that they are happy to take responsibility for p by themself. In my humble opinion
is acceptable preceding positive inversion exclamatives, but not negative inversion
exclamatives, presenting further evidence that while positive inversion exclamatives may
involve speaker-only commitment, negative inversion exclamatives require some
connection with the addressee.
(194) In my humble opinion, boy, was it delicious!
(195) #In my humble opinion, wasn’t it delicious!
With regards to polar rhetorical questions, see chapter 6, where I discuss them in
more detail. I believe that the line between polar rhetorical questions and exclamatives is
a difficult one to draw: however, it seems that scalarity plays an important role. Zanuttini
and Portner (2003), for example, argue that scalarity is the other important factor in
establishing what exclamatives are, alongside factivity. There is no such requirement on
rhetorical questions – I thus follow the literature in stating that polar rhetorical questions
and exclamatives are in effect the same construction (Zanuttini and Portner 2003, Delfitto
and Fiorin 2014); however, I suggest that when the relevant predicate is scalar, it is an
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exclamative. When it is not scalar, the move is a rhetorical question. Predicates of personal
taste are gradable (Kennedy and McNally 2005, Kennedy 2007) and are thus not available
to be in polar rhetorical questions – they therefore cannot be discussed at this point.
In summary, there appear to be differences in the availability of non-canonical
question constructions depending on whether the speaker believes they can also attribute
a belief of p to the addressee, separate to the non-challenging nature of the evidential
context. The evidence from predicates of personal taste presented here separates
exclamatives and falling nuclear tag questions from rising tag questions and biased
questions, which are dispreferred in these situations.
However, although it is the case that the constructions which permit –n and –int
appear to be addressee-directed in that they require the possible attribution of the speaker’s
belief to the addressee in order to be produced, it is not the case that the acceptance of p
to CG is dependent on the addressee’s acceptance or confirmation. I will now discuss what
I label commitment revision in order to investigate the relationship between the beliefs of
the speaker and the addressee.
Commitment revision
I use the term commitment revision to refer to a situation where an addressee expresses
an explicit inability to take responsibility for p; in other words, a case where the addressee
indicates that they can only be a dependent source for the proposition, and do not have
their own independent reason to commit to p (Gunlogson 2003). These situations can
be clearly seen where the speaker utters some sort of question or tag, and the addressee
responds with ‘I don’t know’. When an addressee responds to a speaker’s question or tag
with ‘I don’t know’, they explicitly state that they are unable to take any responsibility
for p at this point. In all three constructions where –n and –int are available, if the
addressee responds with ‘I don’t know’, the speaker can in effect revise their commitment
to a straightforward assertion of p. This suggests that these constructions do not have to
have full question semantics or to take ¬p into account (although they might).
Firstly, canonical tags with falling intonation. If the speaker produces a canonical
tag with falling intonation, and the addressee responds with ‘I don’t know’, it is perfectly
valid for the speaker to then revise their commitment and take full responsibility for p’s
addition to CG. This is true regardless of evidential context (although falling tags are more
common in neutral contexts (Ladd 1981)), suggesting that when a speaker produces this
construction, they do not need the addressee to provide any sort of answer in order for the
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proposition to be added to CG and downdated from the Table/QUD stack.
(196) S: He can come, can’t ↘he?
A: I don’t know.
S: Well, he can.
Examples of this can be seen in the British National Corpus (197), where following
an assertion with a tag question, an addressee indicates they do not know the answer, and
the speaker re-states the assertion without the tag, thus taking full responsibility for p41.
(197) Paul: Wendy’s just got Sky, hasn’t she?
Shelia: Eh?
Paul: Wendy’s got Sky in today. I went round. I got the lecture.
Moving on to consider canonical tags with rising intonation, the same commitment
revision possibilities are not available – indicating that in these cases, the speaker is not
able to be an independent source for the commitment and requires some active
confirmation from the addressee. Of course, canonical tags with rising intonation are
preferred in situations where there is some evidence challenging the speaker’s existing
belief – it thus makes sense that the move would require more active participation from
the addressee. The commitment revision possibilities for the two types of canonical tags
could therefore perhaps be seen to be a function of the evidential contexts they are
available in, rather than the semantic meaning of the construction.
(198) S: He can come, can’t ↗he?
A: I don’t know.
S: #Well, he can.
I thought he could.
On the other hand, matrix biased questions suggest that commitment revision is not
simply a function of the evidential context. Regardless of whether the evidential context is
neutral or negative, if an addressee responds to the speaker’s biased question with ‘I don’t
know’, it is not possible for the speaker to revise their levels of commitment and take full
responsibility for the proposition in CG as an independent source. In a negative evidential
41Although I do not have access to the intonation of this example, Dehé and Braun (2013) find in their
corpus study of the International Corpus of English that 84.8% (N=196) of the negative tags on positive
anchors have falling intonation; it is therefore most likely that this is a falling tag. The context, as well,
does not give any negative counterevidence challenging Paul’s belief that ‘Wendy’s just got Sky’ and thus
we would expect this to be a falling tag (Ladd 1981).
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context, such as (199), the speaker’s position has clearly been challenged and they can no
longer take responsibility for the proposition. At most, they could claim that they thought
p was correct, based on their previous epistemic state, but they cannot be an independent
source.
(199) S thinks their friend Denyse will be coming to the party tonight. However, S then
notices on Facebook that Denyse has clicked attending on a different event that
is taking place at the same time.
S: Isn’t she coming?
A: I don’t know.
S: #Well, she is.
#I think she is.
I thought she was.
In a neutral evidential context, one might assume that when there is no information
challenging the speaker’s belief, in the event that the addressee could not take on an
independent commitment (as in (200)), the speaker could revise their commitment and
take full responsibility for the proposition in CG. However, it is clear that that is not the
case. While it would be possible for the speaker to say that they currently think Darryl
bought a ticket, it would not be felicitous for them to entirely revise to no longer require
an independent commitment from the addressee.
(200) S has got some spare tickets to a concert. S thinks their friend Darryl already
has a ticket but wants to check this information with A in case Darryl is still
looking for one.
S: I thought about giving the ticket to Darryl, but didn’t he get a ticket the
other day?
A: I don’t know.
S: # Well, he did.
I think he did.
I thought he did.
While this may be related to the idea of credence (or strength) in belief as put
forward by Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) – perhaps it is the case that in both of these
situations, the speaker’s credence of belief is not high enough to take sole responsibility,
and that biased questions are only available in a [low, moderate] credence context – note
that the impossibility of commitment revision also holds to some extent for examples where
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the addressee has strong credence of belief, such as the friend-of-a-friend’s name situation
presented in example (183) and repeated here, with an extended response.
(201) S and A are at a party. They spot someone arriving. S recalls that both they
and A had met this person the previous weekend. S believes he is called Ash.
A: There’s Rob’s friend! I can’t remember his name.
S: Wasn’t it Ash?
A: ?I (really) don’t know42.
S: ?Well, it was.
I think it was.
In example (201), the addressee has opened the interaction by stating that they are
not able to be an independent source. Despite having high credence in the proposition, the
speaker then uses a biased question; if commitment revision was based purely on credence
in the belief, we would expect that this would be a perfectly acceptable situation in which
a speaker could then revise their commitment. However, this is a marked option. The
Table/QUD has not been cleared; the speaker has to in effect retract the biased question
from the QUD and put forward a proposition instead. The speaker has given the addressee
the opportunity to make a commitment, which they have felt unable to take; it is thus
better for the speaker to hedge in their subsequent response43.
Unlike biased questions but like falling intonation tag questions, exclamatives and
polar rhetorical questions permit commitment revision.
(202) S: That cake! Wasn’t it good!
A: I don’t know.
S: Well, it was.
42Note that it is perhaps marked for A to respond to S in this situation with ‘I don’t know’. A put
the information on the Table/QUD that they could not remember the name of the friend, and S followed
up with the biased question, which seems to indicate that S cannot proceed unless the addressee is also
willing to be a source for the commitment. Given that when there is an active MaxQUD which has not yet
been downdated and which was initiated by A, some form of question elaboration (Asher and Lascarides
2003) or influence/dependence relation (Ginzburg 2012) should hold.
‘If Q-Elab(a,b) holds between an utterance a uttered by A, where g is a goal associated by convention
with utterances of the type a, and the question b uttered by B, then any answer to b must elaborate a
plan to achieve g.’ (Asher and Lascarides 2003)
Given this principle, the question posed by S should be aimed at achieving the goal g of the original
utterance. For A to then repeat their original position would suggest that S’s move did not move towards
a resolution of g, breaking the Q-Elab principle. However, if A really insists, perhaps with something like
really, it is possible for S to revise to something like I think it was, but marked to simply say it was, as
discussed above.
43It may also have lowered the speaker’s credence in their belief of p.
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(203) A was very confident that they would be able to win a prize in a photography
competition they entered. In particular, they believed their entry for the last
category was in with a very good chance. However, they have lost all of the
earlier categories and are behaving in a very dejected manner.
S: Cheer up! Can’t you still win the last one?
A: I don’t know.
S: Well, you can.
Well, I think you can.
As with the tag questions with falling intonation, if the addressee explicitly says
that they cannot commit to p, it is possible for the speaker to take full responsibility for
the proposition and present it again to the addressee, this time as an assertion for their
acceptance.
In summary, commitment revision is permitted following falling tag questions,
exclamatives and rhetorical questions. This possibility does not seem to be purely to do
with the strength of or credence of the speaker’s belief of p, as it is not possible in biased
questions even when there is no challenging evidence. The relation between the speaker
and addressee is therefore relevant to the licensing of these constructions, but if the
speaker’s assumption that the addressee is also able to take responsibility for the
proposition turns out to be incorrect, the discourse can still proceed.
Finally, I will discuss what I term ‘discourse closure’: what sort of follow-up moves
are permitted after the relevant constructions. In particular, I will focus on the possibility
of a following so.
Discourse closure
There has been considerable discussion about what is required to accept something into
CG. According to e.g. Farkas and Bruce (2010), Northrup (2014) and Malamud and
Stephenson (2014), addition to CG can come about in one of two ways. A proposition
can be added directly into CG by being overtly accepted by the discourse participants.
Alternatively, a proposition that is not objected to by a discourse participant is
automatically added into that participant’s discourse commitments. A proposition that is
then in the discourse commitments of all conversational participants is automatically in
the CG between those participants. On the other hand, Ginzburg (2012) is more cautious
and supports an approach where active acceptance is required (verbally or perhaps
gesturally), not just a lack of dissent. Looking at the ways the propositions from the
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three constructions that permit –n and –int can be accepted into CG can shed further
light on the differences between these constructions and biased questions, despite the
similarities between them.
Intuitively, tag questions with falling intonation do not require a response from the
addressee in the way that a true question or a tag question with rising intonation does. It
should be noted that ‘yeah’ or ‘mm’ responses to tag questions appear to be very common
in the British National Corpus, but there are a number of instances where the discussion
moves on without any explicit (verbal) acknowledgement. Generally, the discussion remains
on the same topic, but without explicit acknowledgment of the original assertion. In (204),
Jessie adds extra information to the characterisation in the assertion without explicitly
acknowledging it. In (205), the group laughs and then moves on without any explicit
acknowledgment of the assertion that ‘Kevin was right’. In (206), Evelyn uses two tags to
which Arthur does not explicitly respond. Eventually, Evelyn moves the conversation on
to birds using a polar question, which Arthur then responds to. In (207), Carole does not
explicitly acknowledge Pat’s assertion that Amy has had a long night.
(204) Harry: He was always very particular about his ives- knives, wasn’t he?
Jessie: And very clean.
Harry: Yeah.
(205) Karen: We need, we’ve only got one more.
Ruth: Yeah, well, Kevin was right then, wasn’t he?
[group laughs]
Paul: Got five left.
(206) Evelyn: Well I know what’s on there, it won’t be the same, its not, it won’t
be the same songs or items, will it?, they don’t repeat their repertoire,
their there not different items [pause] I mean if we did and it was
[pause] a repeat you could always wipe it out, put something on top,
couldn’t you? [pause] Have all the birds gone?
Arthur: They went a little while ago, apart from that they never came on this
end.
(207) Carole: Yes ooh dear excuse me [pause] early night tonight [pause] Amy
permitting.
Pat: Mm [pause] well she’s certainly got a [pause] had a long evening
innings, hasn’t she?
186
Carole: Well hopefully she’ll be in reasonable mood when she wakes up [laugh]
The speaker believes that the addressee already shares the belief p, and so the
addressee does not need to take any responsibility for p, or respond. It seems the addressee
can choose to acknowledge p overtly, as they would with an assertion, but there is no
‘conversational crisis’ if p is not directly acknowledged.
Adding so to a second following proposition highlights this distinction. So is used
to mark an inference between propositions (Blakemore 2002) and is used in ‘recipient-
orientated’ contexts (Bolden 2009) – possibly indicating a desire for the addressee to take
a turn in the conversation. Observing the acceptability of this additional so on a following
proposition, we can see differences with regard to the behaviour of nuclear tag questions,
confirmational particles and post-nuclear tag questions. I will also consider how so relates
to matrix biased questions, exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions.
Firstly, falling nuclear tag questions. Consider the examples in (208) and (209). In
both cases, the speaker uses a tag with falling intonation, indicating that they are willing
to take full responsibility for the proposition in CG, but simply wish to open the lines of
communication for the addressee if they wish to make a comment.
(208) It’s a beautiful day, isn’t ↘it? (?So) we should go to the beach!
(209) David drinks white wine, doesn’t ↘he? (?So) I’ll buy some for the party.
In both cases, the speaker is happy to take responsibility for the proposition, or
believes that it is already in CG between themself and the addressee. There is no
requirement for the addressee to provide confirmation, or in fact any response unless they
wish to explicitly reject p44. The speaker can simply move on to the second proposition,
e.g. ‘we should go to the beach’. Although this second proposition seems to be in some
way linked to the first, to add an inferential so link is unnecessary, and in fact marked. If
we consider the function of so to encourage turn-taking that incorporates the two related
propositions, there does not seem to be any need to hold over the first proposition when
moving on to the second when a falling nuclear tag is used. In situations like those in
(208) and (209), the discourse can proceed following the second proposition with the
addressee responding directly to the second proposition, with the first already confirmed
in CG.
44Of course, the addressee can respond e.g. with yes, yeah, mhm, a nod etc., as they could to an assertion
without a nuclear tag.
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Matrix biased questions do not request confirmation, but rather seek an answer (as
seen above in the commitment revision examples). Even in a neutral evidential context,
a following so proposition is marked (see example (210)). However, it seems that in fact,
without an explicit addressee response (an answer, a nod etc), any following proposition
is somewhat marked regardless of whether or not it has so.
(210) Doesn’t David drink white wine? ?So I’ll get some for the party.
This makes sense if we consider that the second proposition requires that the
proposition contained in the matrix biased question (‘David drinks white wine’) is true
and in CG. However, as it is semantically a question, p must be dealt with in the QUD
before the discourse can proceed.
It is also worth discussing the discourse continuation possibilities for exclamatives
and polar rhetorical questions. For both constructions, so is marked following the
construction; without so, they are felicitous.
(211) Isn’t it a lovely day! (?So) let’s go to the beach!
(212) Didn’t I tell you it would be fine?! (?So) let’s celebrate.
Interestingly, however, there are situations with rising nuclear tags where a so
linking to a following proposition does not seem to be marked – though note, that it is
not that so is obligatory here. It is simply not marked.
(213) It’s a beautiful day, isn’t ↗it? (So) we should go to the beach!
(214) David drinks white wine, doesn’t ↗he? (So) I’ll buy some for the party.
In examples (213) and (214), the tag expects more of a response from the addressee
than the falling tags in examples (208) and (209). They appear to be requesting explicit
confirmation of p from the addressee, rather than checking CG presence. If the addressee
has not provided any overt response to the first proposition, the speaker can add so to the
second proposition, indicating that something, namely the second proposition, is dependent
on the addressee’s confirmation of the first proposition and therefore a response is required.
Note that the addressee does not have to overtly confirm the first proposition –
by virtue of responding to the second proposition, they are able to confirm the first. In a
canonical falling nuclear tag question, speakers have accepted the first proposition by virtue
of not rejecting or challenging it, and so the second proposition is treated independently.
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4.2.4 Summary
We saw in chapter 3 that –n and –int had a limited distribution, restricted to tag
questions in non-challenging evidential contexts, interrogative exclamatives and polar
rhetorical questions, with apparent loss from matrix biased questions. In this section I
have discussed firstly how all four of these non-canonical question types can be
considered within the same framework of speaker beliefs and evidential biases, and how a
combination of the two factors is important for licensing the questions. I then presented
evidence from the pragmatic distribution of falling tag questions, interrogative
exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions in standard English, which showed that
despite some overlap in the licensing contexts of these three constructions with rising tag
questions and matrix biased questions, there are ways that they can be separated and
grouped together. Firstly, I discussed that in the tag questions, exclamatives and polar
rhetorical questions, it is the case that the speaker feels that they can attribute their
belief to the addressee; using predicates of personal taste I showed how this possibility for
addressee attribution is not just a case of strong discourse-external evidence, but can
operate separately and affect the possibility of licensing particular construction types.
Secondly, I discussed the ability of a speaker to revise their level of commitment to p and
take full responsibility for p in CG if the addressee was unable to commit. Finally, I
discussed discourse closure and the possibilities of follow-up moves for all constructions.
Having established the pragmatic distribution of the particles, the first step in answering
the question of what they are, I will move on to develop the semantics of –n and –int,
taking all of this as evidence in that discussion. Importantly, I do not argue that the
standard English constructions and the negative markers in them have specialised; they
are interrogative constructions that happen to have this pragmatic distribution.
4.3 A semantic analysis for –n and –int
4.3.1 Introduction
Taking the pragmatic evidence established in section 4.2 above, in this section I will propose
a semantic analysis for the –int and –n particles, firstly arguing that they are not instances
of biased question negation (Romero and Han 2004, Krifka 2015, Romero 2015). Instead, I
will develop an analysis of the particle as check moves, using the framework for dialogue
established in Ginzburg (2012). The term ‘check’ has been widely used in the literature – I
will define this more specifically for the Scots particles, before putting forward an analysis
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of standard English tag questions which draws on Reese and Asher (2006) and Gunlogson
(2008) and shows where the two constructions differ. I will round off this section with
a comparison of my tag question analysis to two recent accounts: Farkas and Roelofsen
(2017) and Malamud and Stephenson (2014), showing how the analysis presented here
accounts for the data better.
Although the check move can also be used in contexts where standard English
would use exclamatives or polar rhetorical questions, I will mostly set aside detailed
comparison with the semantics of these standard English constructions in this chapter.
For discussion of rhetorical questions, see chapter 6. I will refer to exclamatives where
necessary in this chapter.
4.3.2 ¬ a negative question
It is immediately apparent from their distribution that –int and –n cannot be standard
negation markers. From their distribution, we can see that speakers do not accept either
particle in truly negative questions, nor in negative assertions or imperatives – two other
contexts where negation is generally used. Instead, we can consider whether an analysis
of biased question specific ‘negation’ is appropriate. I argued against the analyses of van
Rooij and Šafářová (2003) and Krifka (2015) in chapter 1. The alternative is a ¬verum
or a falsum analysis, which I consider now.
Perhaps the most influential analysis of biased questions is that of Romero and Han
(2004). Romero and Han posit an analysis of biased questions with ‘high’ negation in which
the negation marker is indeed negation, but scopes high over a verum operator (Höhle
1992), also introduced by the negation. verum is a conversational epistemic operator
which indicates a high degree of belief in the proposition. While verum is not lexically
realised in biased questions, it can be realised in assertions through focus intonation, as in
(215), or epistemic adverb really, as in (216).
(215) S: Peter claims Kimiko went to the Himalayas.
A: She DID go to the Himalayas.
(216) Sandra really is clever.
Romero and Han (2004) define the verum operator as expressing that the speaker
is ‘certain that p should be added to the Common Ground’. The formal definition they give
is shown in (217), and states that for every world w’ in the set of worlds that is compatible
with x ’s knowledge in w (Epix(w)), then for every world w” in the set of worlds where x ’s
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conversational goals in w’ are fulfilled (Convx(w)), p is part of the Common Ground in
w”. They shorten this definition to FOR-SURE-CGx.
(217) JverumK =λ p<s, t>λw.∀w’ ∈ Epix(w)[∀w” ∈ Convx(w’ )[p ∈ CGw” ]]
(Romero and Han 2004:627)
In order to get the definition of biased questions, then, the negation raises and
scopes a) under the Q operator but b) above the verum operator.
(218) Isn’t Jane coming too?
LF: [CP Q not [ verum [IP Jane is coming too]]]
This then gives the Hamblin/Kartunnen question partition {FOR-SURE-CGx p,
¬FOR-SURE-CGx p }, asking whether the speaker is correct in assuming that p should be
added to CG or whether the addressee can provide any information that contradicts this
assumption.
Romero and Han’s (2004) analysis has been widely cited; however, Romero (2006)
and AnderBois (2011) point out various issues with the account. Firstly, what it would
mean to answer a question where what is being questioned is the negation of FOR-SURE-
CGx does not align with what it actually means to answer a biased question (Romero
2006). To answer ‘yes’ to a ¬verum question would mean that the addressee was sure that
p should be added to CG; however, a ‘no’ response would only indicate uncertainty about
adding p to CG. In actual fact, a ‘no’ response to a biased question indicates endorsement
of ¬p as well as uncertainty about adding p to CG – examples like (219) are discussed by
Kramer and Rawlins (2010) and Holmberg (2013). The ‘no’ answer that aligns with the
¬verum analysis of questions, then, is not strong enough.
(219) S: Isn’t she coming?
A: Yes. ‘she is coming’
No. ‘she is not coming’
Furthermore, AnderBois (2011) points out that the ¬verum analysis was designed
to account for Ladd’s (1981) ambiguity (see chapter 1 for discussion). However, Ladd’s
ambiguity has no independent motivation in biased questions (Sailor 2013), nor is the scope
ambiguity attested anywhere else e.g. in declaratives with verum such as those in (215)
and (216).
Taking these issues into account, Romero (2015) follows Repp (2009) and posits a
high negation analysis using falsum, defined as in (220), or FOR-SURE-NOT-IN-CG:
191
(220) JfalsumK =λ p<s, t>λw.∀w’ ∈ Epix(w)[∀w” ∈ Convx(w’ )[p /∈ CGw” ]]
(Romero 2015:507)
(221) Isn’t Jane coming too?
LF: [CP Q [falsum [IP Jane is coming too]]]
Rather than the negation scoping over a verum marker, the negation marker in itself
is a falsum marker, which Romero argues is not-at-issue content following Potts (2005).
There is therefore no scope ambiguity present, as there is no true negative operator. The Q
operator scopes over both the proposition at hand {¬p, ¬(¬p)} and the epistemic operator
FOR-SURE-NOT-IN-CG(p), ¬FOR-SURE-NOT-IN-CG(p)45. Romero (2015) argues that
this gives the correct answering possibilities, with ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses targeting the
at-issue content.
(222) S: Isn’t she coming?
A: Yes. ‘she is coming’, ¬(¬p)
No. ‘she is not coming’, ¬p
It is not actually clear from Romero’s analysis how the answering particles interact
with the not-at-issue content; presumably, ‘yes’ must select for ¬FOR-SURE-NOT-IN-
CG(p) while ‘no’ must select for FOR-SURE-NOT-IN-CG(p). In both cases, ‘yes’ therefore
selects for the negated cell from the partition – the positive proposition comes from the
cancellation of the double negation, as seen in (222).
Romero (2015) also uses her falsum analysis to account for negation in subjunctive
conditionals, and draws parallels with biased questions as well as denials.
(223) A: He found something.
B: Wrong! He DIDn’t find something.
[assert [falsum [he found something]]] (Szabolsci 2004)
45Though not-at-issue content is argued not to engage with any intensional operators, it is appropriate
to suggest that the Q operator can scope over not-at-issue content, as Romero (2015) does here. Potts
(2005:88) argues that instances of not-at-issue content are commitments made relative to one discourse
participant (the speaker) that are always ‘interpreted as though they were root-level assertions’ regardless
of how embedded they are. However, interrogative flip (Tenny 2006, Pearson 2013) means that when
combined with a Q operator, the addressee is now being asked to commit to the not-at-issue content too.
1. S: Did Lance Armstrong, an Arkansan, win the Tour de France in 2003?
A: Yes, but he’s not an Arkansan.
No. Lance Armstrong, a Texan, won the Tour de France in 2003.
2. S: Did that damn dog run away again?
A: No. Our dog ran away again.
The Q operator asks the addressee to commit to all parts of the underlying utterance, including the
not-at-issue content. Therefore, having Q scope over falsum is appropriate.
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(224) If there hadn’t been some oil in the tank, the furnace would have exploded.
[ If [falsum [there had been some oil in the tank ]]] (Romero 2015:511)
Having shown that –int and –n are not true negation, the question arises as to
whether a falsum analysis is suitable for the Scots –int and –n data, especially given that
tag questions are understood as VP-elided biased questions (van Rooij and Šafářová 2003,
Sailor 2011) and that Taniguchi (2017) argued for a ¬verum analysis for exclamatives,
making further links between these verum/falsum analyses and non-canonical questions.
However, I think the distribution of the Scots particles alone is enough to reject this
analysis. There is no evidence for –int in matrix biased questions in Glasgow Scots, and
there is evidence that –n is being lost from matrix biased questions in Shetland (see section
3.3.2). These markers are therefore not available in the biased question contexts that the
falsum analysis is designed to account for. It is also worth noting that these markers are
not available in subjunctive conditionals (225), or denial contexts (226) either. These are
the other contexts that are argued to contain falsum markers by Repp (2009) and Romero
(2015).
(225) *If there had’n been some oil in the tank, the furnace would have exploded.
(226) S: Ezra won the race.
A: *Ezra DINT win the race.
As well as this, I showed in the previous section that in the contexts that use –int
and –n the speaker is sure that p should be added to CG. It therefore seems unlikely that
there would be a need to negate that certainty in the construction, as the speaker does not
need nor want to suggest that could be a possibility.
In summary, to the extent that the falsum analysis put forward by Romero (2015)
may be the correct analysis for biased questions, it is not appropriate to analyse the Scots
data in this way. However, there is one part of the ¬verum analysis I would like to draw
on. Specifically, the formulation in which there is no question of {p, ¬p}: rather, the
‘question’ is all about the certainty of p.
Based on the pragmatic distribution seen in the previous section, while all of these
constructions are taken to be questions in standard English, I argue that there is no need
for the speaker to take ¬p into account in these contexts, and so Scots constructions with
–int and –n are not questions, but rather check moves (to be defined further in the next
section). This check purely selects for a proposition in the anchor or main clause, and
has more in common with confirmational particles like right or huh, and suggests that we
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should be looking more closely at these sorts of confirmation type constructions in trying
to develop an analysis for the Scots data. In the next section, I look to these sorts of
constructions rather than interrogatives in order to put forward a semantic analysis for
–int and –n.
4.3.3 ‘Check’ moves in the literature
I adopt the term check46move as I believe the speaker who produces an –int or –n marker
is checking that the addressee shares their belief of the relevant proposition p. However,
throughout the literature, there are varied definitions of what a ‘check’ move is (Carletta
et al. 1996, Ginzburg 2012), as well as varied definitions of ‘confirm/confirmationals’ (Reese
and Asher 2006, Wiltschko 2014), ‘acknowledgments’ (Asher and Lascarides 2003) and
‘align’ moves (Carletta et al. 1996). There are overlaps in what is considered to fall
into each of these categories – for example, Wiltschko and Heim’s ‘confirmationals’ are
considered by Ginzburg to be ‘check’ moves; furthermore, Carletta et al.’s (1996) ‘align’
moves are treated as ‘check’ moves by Ginzburg, but appear to show more in common
with Asher and Lascarides’ ‘acknowledgments’. I will overview these concepts below, with
the aim of formulating the semantics of the check move I have posited for the Scots data
presented in chapter 3. This will be considerably more specific than either the ‘check’
move as described by Carletta et al. (1996) or as defined by Ginzburg (2012), though I will
build on these concepts, and will account for the particular pragmatic distribution of –int
and –n we see in the Scots data. My analysis will also draw on Beyssade and Marandin
(2006a,b) and their extension of Ginzburg’s work, importantly arguing for the inclusion of
speaker interpretation of addressee belief in the semantic representation (see also Brennan
and Hanna 2009, Galati and Brennan 2010).
The first relevant mention of ‘check’ moves comes from Carletta et al. (1996) in their
map task corpus; there, the ‘check’ move is defined as a move that requests information
that the person doing the checking has some sort of belief about, but is uncertain about.
The authors go on to state that usually ‘the information to be confirmed is something
which the checker’s conversation partner has tried to convey explicitly or something which
the checker believes was meant to be inferred from what the partner has said.’ (emphasis
own – note the conflation of ‘checking’ and ‘confirming’ in the original definition)
Carletta et al. include a wide range of constructions in their conceptualisation of
a ‘check’ move, and give a few examples, repeated here. In example (227), the relevant
46Note that I use ‘check’ to refer to existing mentions of ‘checking’ in the literature; check refers to
specifically the analysis I posit for the Scots data.
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information to be ‘confirmed’ has just been uttered by the original speaker, G, and F
repeats a section of it for confirmation. In (228), [*] is a true query, while [**] is a ‘check’
that F has been able to infer from the directions given by G. Carletta et al. raise the
hypothetical example in (229) to show that ‘check’ moves could be targeting previous
dialogue events e.g. I told you.... However, it is interesting from the perspective of this
thesis as it is an example of a tag question; it is also interesting as it links the discourse
function of questions asked as responses to statements (227 and 228) and tag questions,
asked by the original speaker (229).
(227) G: ... you go up to the top left-hand corner of the stile, but you’re only, say about a
centimetre from the edge, so that’s your line.
F: OK, up to the top of the stile?
(228) F: Do you want it to go below the carpenter? [*]
G: No, I want you to go up the left hand side of it towards green bay and make it a
slightly diagonal line towards, em sloping to the right.
F: So you want me to go above the carpenter? [**]
(229) I told you about the landmine, didn’t I?
(examples from Carletta et al. 1996)
While there are a number of possible contexts for ‘check’ moves, the majority of
‘check’ moves in the map task corpus are about some information which the interlocutor
has already been told, and therefore some information that is either explicitly in their
partner’s discourse commitments (Farkas and Bruce 2010) and/or that is in their partner’s
interpretation of the CG/FACTS (Beyssade and Marandin 2006b, Ginzburg 2012).
Ginzburg (2012) presents a similar understanding of ‘check’ moves. However, he also
appears to extend the category of ‘check’ to include what Carletta et al. (1996) describe
as ‘align’ moves, as seen in examples (230) and (231).
(230) You should be skipping the edge of the page by about half an inch, OK?
(Carletta et al. 1996)
(231) So <pause> I’m allowed to record you. Okay? (Ginzburg 2012:219)
Carletta et al. (1996) describe these types of utterance with a following ok? as
instances where the speaker ‘checks the attention or agreement’ (again, note conflation of
terms in the original definition) of their conversation partner. They claim these are
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generally used in situations where the speaker wishes to check that the transfer of
information has been successful (i.e. that the addressee now believes p), in order to allow
them to downdate this from QUD and move on. Speakers can also use this ‘align’ move
directly after an instruction or assertion, perhaps to push for a more explicit response.
This conceptualisation of the ‘align’ move has clear links to Asher and Lascarides’
(2003) ‘Acknowledgment’: an utterance β is an acknowledgment question (Ackq) iff a
relationship holds between segments α and β just in case an answer i to β entails that the
goal of α has been achieved. For example, then, in a case like (230), there is a relationship
between the main assertion and the ok? such that an affirmative answer (‘yes’) to the ok?
indicates that the goal of the main assertion (to instruct the hearer that they should be
skipping the edge of the page by about half an inch) has been achieved – the hearer knows
that they should skip the edge of the page47.
Returning to Ginzburg’s (2012) definition of the ‘check’ move, he includes tag
questions (both same and reverse polarity), ‘align’ moves, confirmational particles like
right, as well as direct questions where the addressee questions the speaker’s directly
previous statement. Ginzburg’s definition is thus wider; however, it is the only formal
definition that takes into account all of these different types of move. I therefore start
with his account in developing the check that I posit for the Scots data, with the aim of
narrowing down his broad-brush approach to be able to account for the specific contexts
of use of –int and –n as well as developing a more specific move for canonical tag
questions in standard English.
Ginzburg’s ‘check’ moves
Ginzburg’s (2012) model of interaction in dialogue has a number of core concepts that
will be useful in understanding the various conversational moves developed here.
Dialogues are modelled around participants’ Information States, each of which includes a
public and a private component. The public component is referred to as the ‘Dialogue
Gameboard’ (DGB) and consists of three parts: FACTS, LatestMove and QUD
(Question Under Discussion).
LatestMove is the topmost element of a list called MOVES which tracks the
locutionary nature of the last proposition (e.g. whether it was a question, an assertion...)
as well as its semantic content. QUD contains propositions and questions which have
been introduced to the conversation but have not yet been answered or accepted by all
47Reese and Asher (2006) use this concept of Acknowledgment to interpret nuclear tag questions with
falling intonation in standard English. I will discuss this in detail in the next section.
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conversation participants; they are still ‘under discussion’. The QUD is assumed to be a
stack, with MaxQUD acting as the discourse topic. MaxQUD is the primary topic or
question which conversation participants are working towards downdating from QUD.
Other information can be added to QUD at any time, but any other questions or
assertions must contribute information towards resolving the MaxQUD until such time
that the conversation participants deem it able to be downdated.
FACTS is in effect a set of propositions that is assumed to be shared among
conversation participants, information that can be embedded under presuppositional
operators like Given that... . Propositions are added to FACTS once they have been
proposed and then downdated (through acceptance) by all conversation participants.
One of the key points of Ginzburg’s theory is that there is no generalised public
domain (e.g. the standard formal semantics interpretation of the Common Ground, or
Lewis’s scoreboard, where there is a shared public domain (QUD/Table and CG) as well
as private individual domains (see e.g. Farkas and Bruce (2010), Malamud and Stephenson
(2014) for recent, relevant instances of a dialogue model in the Lewis scoreboard style)).
In Ginzburg’s model, everything that is ‘public’ is interpreted through the perspective
of the individual. While generally, conversation participants’ set of FACTS will be the
same, each speaker is committed to knowing the meaning of their own utterances, but
other participants are not committed in the same way to others’ utterances. This permits
misunderstandings and slight difference in belief. For example, in the Friends episode ‘The
One Where Ross Meets Elizabeth’s Dad’, Monica and Chandler have a misunderstanding
about the time at which they were meant to meet at Central Perk. During their previous
dialogue, Monica’s version of the public domain was updated based on the assumption of
a shared belief that the couple were meeting at 6pm. However, in Chandler’s version of
the public domain, the assumed ‘shared belief’ was that the couple were meeting at 7pm.
Examples like these challenge the notion of a singular public ‘Common Ground’, and are
better dealt with in an entirely agent-relative framework like Ginzburg’s dialogue model.
Ginzburg’s definition of the ‘check’ move does not require the private domain, so
I will set it aside for the moment; however, the definition of the check move that I will
propose will require interfacing with the private component, and thus it will be discussed
in more detail below.
Ginzburg defines conversational moves in terms of the preconditions that license
them and the effects that they have, both on participants’ DGBs, and their private
information states. The ‘check’ move has a clear set of conditions for use, but these are
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very broad, given the range of constructions that Ginzburg labels as ‘check’ moves.
Firstly, LatestMove must be that p was Asserted, and thus p? is in QUD. p? is
such that p is not held as a fact, but discussion is open on whether p?. This will continue
until all conversation participants decide to downdate p, accepted or not.
There are no preconditions on FACTS in the ‘check’ move, or on the private
component. At this point, the conversational turn is underspecified and therefore either
the speaker or addressee can take up the turn and ‘check’. The effect of the ‘check’ move
once carried out is that the LatestMove is updated to Check(s, a, p? ). p? is thus still in
QUD following the Check move, with the only difference being that LatestMove has been
updated.
To consider some examples, take the following:
(232) S: (i) G is in town, (ii) isn’t he?
(233) S: (i) G is in town, (ii) is he?
(234) S: (i) G needs to leave at 5, (ii) ok?
(235) S: (i) G is in town.
A: (ii) Is he?
For Ginzburg, all of the examples marked (ii) carry out the same move. In each case,
a proposition has been asserted by S in (i). Following the (i) assertion, each participant’s
DGB looks as follows, with cg1 indicating the state of the FACTS is simply as it was prior
to the assertion:
LatestMove := Assert(s, a, p)
QUD := p?
FACTS := cg1
In all four contexts, then, there is no specification on who should take the next turn.
Either participant can pick up p for discussion. In the first three examples, the original
speaker takes up the turn, and produces a ‘check’ move. There is no new issue in the
QUD, but the context is changed so as to ‘force a response’ from the addressee. In the
final case, the original addressee takes up the turn, and thus a turn change move takes
place. However, there is still no new issue in the QUD; the context is simply shifted so as
to ‘force a response’ from the original speaker. The effects of all four utterances are thus:
TurnUnderspecified ∧merge [LatestMove := Check(s,a p? )]
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leading to a modified DGB such that:
LatestMove := Check(s, a, p? )
QUD := p?
FACTS := cg1
The key difference that Ginzburg posits between a DGB with an Assert LatestMove
and a DGB with a ‘check’ LatestMove is that while assertions can be accepted, ‘check’ moves
must be confirmed. While many responses can be used in both categories (e.g. ‘mhm’,
nodding), Accept moves include ‘I see’ and ‘Aha.’, which are not acceptable responses to
‘check’ moves.
(236) S: G is in town, isn’t he?
A: #I see.
(237) S: G is in town.
A: Is he?
S: #I see.
(238) S: G is in town.
A: I see.
However, this cannot hold for all of Ginzburg’s ‘check’ moves. For example, an ok?
tag can be responded to with ‘I see’ by the addressee; furthermore, a speaker can follow-up
on their own same polarity tag with ‘I see’ (whether or not the addressee can may depend
on a number of factors).
(239) S: G is going to be in town, ok?
A: I see.
(240) S: G is in town, is he? I see.
Ginzburg also distinguishes ‘check’ moves from Ask moves in their answering
possibilities: Ask moves can be followed up by an assertion of p, while ‘check’ moves, it is
claimed, cannot. However, again, this seems to vary across constructions. While it is true
that falling tag questions cannot be followed up by a fresh assertion of p, rising tag
questions can be. Furthermore, ok? tags can also be followed by p; as can same polarity
tags. In both the rising tag and same polarity tag cases, A repeating p seems to indicate
some uncertainty as to why S is using the ‘check’ move; nevertheless, it is an acceptable
response.
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(241) S: Is G in town?
A: G is in town (, yes).
(242) S: G is in town, isn’t ↘he?
A: #G is in town (, yes).
(243) S: G is in town, isn’t ↗he?
A: G is in town (, yes).
(244) S: G is going to be in town, ok?
A: G is going to be in town. Ok, got it.
(245) S: G is in town, is he?
A: G is in town (, yes).
Given the evidence presented here, in the previous chapter, and evidence from other
work in the literature (e.g. Malamud and Stephenson 2014 on same and reverse polarity
tags), it is clear that the various utterance types which are considered by Ginzburg under
this umbrella of the ‘check’ move have different preconditions and also potentially different
effects on the continuation of the discourse or response possibilities. I will thus borrow
elements of Ginzburg’s structure and extend it to develop a definition of the check move
in Glasgow Scots and Shetland dialect, before considering the moves that standard English
canonical tag questions carry out. I will not provide a full semantic definition but rather
highlight existing tools that I believe are necessary to explain the data, as well as areas
where new tools are needed.
4.3.4 Towards a semantics of the check move
Recall that –int and –n were available in tag questions (with a preference for neutral
evidential contexts), exclamatives and polar rhetorical questions. In each of these cases,
the speaker believes p and believes that the addressee shares a belief of p – as shown
by the cases of commitment revision, predicates of personal taste, the evidential context
preference in tag questions, and the loss of availability in matrix biased questions (preferred
in challenging evidential contexts, see chapter 5). I adopt the label check move as I posit
that given the pragmatic distribution of the –int and –n markers seen in Glasgow Scots and
Shetland dialect, the role of these markers is to check the speaker’s assumption that the
addressee shares their belief of p. Although I have shown that these cases are cases where
the evidential context surrounding the interaction is neutral to positive, I will assume that
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this evidential context is external to the participants’ Information States; I treat it as a
pragmatic factor that affects the choice a speaker makes to use one of these constructions,
but is not built into its semantic meaning (see chapter 5 for an experiment on speaker
choice of construction in varying evidential contexts). This diverges from the proposals of
Trinh (2014), Northrup (2014) and Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) who propose evidentiality
accounts for the biases found in interrogative constructions.
I will firstly give an overview of the preconditions I argue must hold in order to
produce a check move, arguing that the extended unpublished Information State found
in Beyssade and Marandin (2006a,b) is necessary for the definition of this move, as well
as partial ordering of FACTS to give RecentFACTS, similar to LatestMove. I will then
discuss the check move in itself as an instance of a goal which asks the addressee to
commit that p is part of their beliefs. Finally, I will discuss the downdating procedure for
this move, and the addition to FACTS.
As discussed above, Ginzburg’s ‘check’ move does not require use of the private
domain of the speaker’s Information State. However, he does posit such a domain. For
the private component, Ginzburg builds on Larsson (2002) and posits a three part system.
Firstly, BEL, a set of beliefs that the speaker holds, effectively corresponding to a private
version of FACTS. While FACTS is a set that has been discussed in QUD and downdated
as agreed, BEL includes the beliefs a speaker holds that have not been discussed with
the addressee. GENRE identifies the conversational genre and allows speakers to develop
plans, and AGENDA is a stack of actions that corresponds in some way to MOVES in the
public domain. For the purposes of this thesis, the complexity of AGENDA/GENRE and
its relationship to another component, PLAN, is not required and so I set aside Ginzburg’s
formulation of the private domain and instead use the formulation of the Unpublished
Information State (UIS) put forward by Beyssade and Marandin (2006a,b).
Beyssade and Marandin build on Ginzburg’s earlier work in order to deal with
intonation patterns in French and their role in attitude attribution. The UIS contains two
major subsections: GOAL and BACKGROUND. GOAL contains the intent of the speaker
when they produce their utterance – for example, the GOAL of an assertion is to have
p updated to FACTS for all conversation participants. GOAL is, in effect, a simplified
version of Ginzburg’s AGENDA/GENRE components.
Beyssade and Marandin’s BACKGROUND corresponds to Ginzburg’s BEL: a set
of propositions that the participant (privately) believes to be true. However, as well as
positing that speakers store their own set of beliefs (which they label SP), Beyssade and
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Marandin argue that there is a second subset of BACKGROUND in which the speaker
stores assumptions about what the addressee knows or believes (labelled ADD). The
intonation indicates the attitude that the speaker believes the addressee will have
towards p, and thus how they expect the addressee to respond.
The French intonation patterns, then, are accounted for by the relationship between
these two background contexts in Beyssade and Marandin (2006a). When a falling contour
is used, this signals that the speaker believes the content of their utterance is non-defective
(Stalnaker 1978) – the subsets of SP and ADD that include content about the issue under
discussion are assumed to be compatible. Non-falling contours (rising; rising-falling; rising
from a penultimate peak) are used in defective contexts, where the speaker believes that
the relevant subsets of content in SP and ADD are at least possibly not compatible.
It is well-established that speakers adapt what they say to suit the needs of their
addressees (an ‘audience design’ model of communication (Bell 1984)). Work in
psycholinguistics and cognitive processing has investigated the idea of partner-specific
adaptions in speech by looking at, for example, convergence and attenuation in narrative
tasks, showing that speakers move from full NPs to pronominals, shorten descriptions
and even speak faster when information is no longer new to the discourse (Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbes 1986, Clark and Schaefer 1989, Gundel et al. 1993, Brennan and Clark
1996, Bard et al. 2000, Horton and Gerrig 2002). However, there has been some debate
about the point at which this sort of ‘audience design’ takes place in dialogue. On one
hand, it has been argued that speakers are egocentric and do not take account of their
addressee’s knowledge in the early stages of speech production. Speakers may appear to
adapt to their addressees, but this is more coincidence than active modification. Instead,
addressee adaptation happens later, as something more like ‘repair’ (Brown and Dell
1987, Keysar et al. 1998a,b, Bard et al. 2000, Ferreira and Dell 2000, Pickering and
Garrod 2004, Kronmüller and Barr 2007). Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue this is
because it would be cognitively costly to keep track of a ‘full common ground’ – e.g.
which conversation participants are committed to what – at all times. This would mean
that a model like Beyssade and Marandin’s would be too expensive, as it relies on the
speaker keeping track of the addressee’s knowledge state at all times.
However, work from e.g. Metzing and Brennan (2003), Hanna et al. (2004), Hanna
and Tannenhaus (2004), Brennan and Hanna (2009), Matthews et al. (2010), Galati and
Brennan (2010) has argued that in fact, adaption to addressee beliefs is not ‘repair’ but
happens as early as speaker beliefs, challenging the egocentric model of dialogue. Brennan
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(see Brennan and Hanna 2009, Galati and Brennan 2010) argues for a ‘one-bit’ model of
speaker interpretation of addressee beliefs, in which only minimal information is stored
about the addressee’s beliefs – only to the extent that there are A/B possibilities, such as
I have told this person this story before or not; This person is currently looking at the same
scene as me or not. These ‘one-bit’ examples can be categorised in three ways: whether
there is ‘linguistic co-presence’ (where some information is part of the shared discourse
record with the addressee), ‘physical co-presence’ (where both participants have access to
the same evidence within their shared perceptual environment) and ‘shared sociocultural
background’. Within these subsets of shared information, if the relevant belief about the
addressee’s knowledge can be deduced from an inference that has already been made, or
can be rapidly established due to context, it can be taken into account at the earliest
stages of utterance production. I believe that these are exactly the types of information
that need to be taken into to account in the specific pragmatic distribution of –int and
–n: as we saw, there is no reason why the relevant p can’t be in FACTS already through
the previous discourse record, though there does appear to be a recency effect in the
acceptability. Similarly, the exclamative contexts where –int and –n are allowed in their
respective varieties rely, if not on the previous discourse record, then on the physical co-
presence of information, such as a beautiful sunset. It is also the case that assumed shared
sociocultural background can lead to checking of p. For example, two ex-pupils of the
same school may, twenty years later, have a conversation in which one says ‘Mr P was
awful, wint he?’ and the other agrees without them ever having had a dialogue about this;
the tag can be produced purely on the basis of the assumed shared sociocultural knowledge
of the school they both went to.
I thus follow Beyssade and Marandin (2006a, 2006b) in dividing the
BACKGROUND component of the speaker’s Information State into SP and ADD
sections. The SP component consists of the set of utterances that the speaker believes.
The ADD component contains information about what the speaker believes the addressee
believes. This may be a general characterisation of the addressee; their sociocultural
status in relation to the speaker, their physical location, as well as information about
previously discussed topics.
In what I refer to as check moves, I propose that the speaker must be able to be
a source for the relevant proposition (Gunlogson 2003). Generally, I take it that the
speaker will be an independent source for the proposition: a conversation participant will
be an independent source for p if they are committed to p and if their commitment to p
203
in the particular discourse context is not dependent on another conversation participant’s
‘testimony’ that p holds. For check moves, then, this means that the speaker is willing
to take responsibility for addition of p to the shared ground between the conversation
participants, and that the speaker would be able to do this independently of the
beliefs/opinions of any of their interlocutors. Therefore, p ∈ SP. I take SP to include all
propositions that the speaker has independent reason to believe; propositions that are
dependent on the addressee’s testimony of p (and therefore in which the speaker is only a
dependent source) can only become part of SP if they first become part of the shared
ground between the participants48.
Furthermore, and what I consider to be the most important precondition for –int
and –n, p ∈ ADD. The speaker assumes that the addressee also shares their belief of p. Of
course, it is not the case that the addressee does necessarily believe p: p ∈ ADD(s) 6→ p ∈
SP(a). However, through the speaker-mediated perspective of ADD, it is assumed by the
speaker that p ∈ SP(a). This combination of BACKGROUND preconditions immediately
narrows the scope of the check move as compared to Ginzburg’s definition, which had no
restrictions based on belief states. For example, under Ginzburg’s model, both canonical
tag questions with rising intonation and particles like right are labelled as ‘check’ moves.
However, both constructions are permitted in contexts where the speaker can no longer
attribute the belief to the addressee (see (189), above).
The other important part of the UIS is the GOAL of the utterance. However, in
order to fully understand the GOAL of the check move, it is first pertinent to consider
the preconditions that must hold in the public component of the dialogue, the DGB. Recall
that for Ginzburg’s ‘check’ move, it was simply the case that the LatestMove had to be
an assertion of p, which a ‘check’ move could then address. It is worth considering firstly
whether a simple restriction on LatestMove where LatestMove = Assert(s, a, p) would
be adequate to deal with the check move. Certainly, this works for the tag contexts:
the speaker has asserted the proposition in p, and then continues the turn with a check.
However, this cannot be the case for exclamatives. For example, take a context where two
friends meet each other on the street in Glasgow in July. It’s a lovely, warm day, and both
people are looking happy. One can easily say to the other ‘Int it a lovely day!’ with no
LatestMove (or perhaps following only Greet/CounterGreet moves – however, there could
be situations where there was no LatestMove: for example, two friends who have just come
off a rollercoaster; one says to the other ‘Wint that awful!’.). We can therefore conclude
48It is not necessarily the case that dependent propositions will become part of SP, but it is possible
that they can. Independent propositions must be part of SP.
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that there is no restriction of LatestMove to assertion with the Scots check move.
Another important point of Ginzburg’s ‘check’ move was that the following turn was
underspecified: e.g. either speaker could produce a ‘check’ move following the assertion.
It is not the case that the turn is underspecified following the assertion in the tag question
contexts; for example, it is not licit for a speaker to produce the assertion He can come.
and the addressee to produce can’n he?. It would, however, be possible for a speaker to
produce an assertion like It is a beautiful day! and the addressee to produce something
like is’n it? in response. However, this is only possible in contexts where it is possible to
get the sort of scalarity interpretations that license exclamatives (Zanuttini and Portner
2003, Wood 2014, Taniguchi 2017), so that the addressee is adding further information to
the original assertion (e.g. checking that the original speaker believes p to the same (high)
extent that they do). It is not acceptable for an addressee to do this in a situation where
there is no possible scalar interpretation, as seen with the can’n example. The check
cannot be taken up by an addressee when the speaker has just asserted their belief of
p. The speaker has thus made it clear that p ∈ SP(s) and so it would be redundant for
the addressee to check this. I thus assume that the response exclamative exemplifies an
addressee taking up a turn following a speaker’s assertion that the speaker did not believe
required checking.
It is thus not that there is an underspecified turn following an assertion, but that
any conversation participant can produce a check move, as long as their interlocutor’s
belief of p is not currently explicit in the dialogue.
Although there is no specification on turn-taking, I believe that there is specification
on QUD, or at least on topicality. check moves cannot be used in ‘Free Speech’ contexts,
where QUD is empty and any conversation participant is able to put any proposition or
question forward for discussion. For example, in (246), the participants meet and greet
each other, and then there is a Free Speech context. S cannot produce the check move
out of the blue. This contrasts with the Int it a lovely day! example as there, there is
the physical co-presence of the weather and otherwise pleasant day that the speaker can
comfortably assume is shared between themselves and the addressee.
(246) S and A meet on the street. They were at the same concert a couple of weeks ago,
but haven’t seen each other since.
S: Hi.
A: Hi.
S: # Wis’n that concert great!
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There is a contrast with the example in (247). There, S has implicitly introduced
the concert into QUD in the assertion (i); it is then felicitous for either participant to
produce the check move about the concert’s quality – here, the speaker does it in (ii).
(247) S and A meet on the street. They were at the same concert a couple of weeks ago,
but haven’t seen each other since.
S: Hi.
A: Hi.
S: (i)I haven’t seen you since that concert. (ii)Wis’n it great!
Rather than arguing that there needs to be a LatestMove of an assertion in order
to license the check move, then, I argue that there must be an available topic in QUD.
This topic can come about in a number of ways. The most obvious way for the topic to be
added to QUD is via an assertion, in which the speaker takes responsibility for p in QUD
with the aim of adding p to the shared ground for all conversation participants. When the
speaker asserts p, p? is added to QUD; discussion on the topic of p? is, if not expected,
certainly possible. However, the topic can be added to QUD in other ways, such as in
(247) above, where the topic is added by an assertion related to that concert. Furthermore,
the topic can be added through the physical co-presence (Galati and Brennan 2010). If
both participants have access to the same contextual evidence that strongly suggests p,
a check move can be uttered. To extend the concert example even further, in example
(248), S and A bump into each other right outside the concert they’ve just been to. In
this case, it is acceptable for S to use a check move straight away, based on the physical
co-presence of evidence; note that it would also be felicitous for A to use a check move
in this context too.
(248) S and A are leaving a concert venue when they bump into each other. Neither knew
the other was attending.
S: Hi!
A: Hi!
S: Wis’n that great!
The final relevant part of the DGB preconditions for the check move is
preconditions that hold on FACTS, the component of the DGB which stores the
speaker’s interpretation of the shared commitments that hold between the conversation
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participants. The relationship between QUD and FACTS is clearly of importance to the
dialogue model as a whole: in order to understand interactions, we need to understand
how something which is in QUD is added to FACTS and whether/how information is
shared between them. Ginzburg (2012:89) formulates a ‘Question Introduction
Appropriateness Condition’: A question q can be introduced into QUD by A only if there
does not exist a fact f such that f ∈ FACTS and f resolves q. Certainly, this holds for
canonical questions, whereby the speaker cannot ask a question if it has already been
resolved by some part of the previous discourse. However, this is not entirely accurate for
cases where the check move can be used. Ginzburg (2012:306) himself suggests that
rhetorical questions are simply restatements of assertions that answer the question.
Furthermore, Biezma and Rawlins (2017) argue that the proposition at the core of a
rhetorical question is already in CG, but there is no explicit commitment to it in the
discourse from any conversation participant – use of the rhetorical question is about
making the commitment to p explicit. I note that it is also possible for tag questions to
be used in a context where p has previously been added to FACTS and downdated from
QUD: in an example like (249), it would not be possible for S to ask the polar question Is
Ross coming? – however, it is ok for them to ask the tag question49.
(249) S: So who’s coming to the party tonight?
A: Err Ross, Khalid, Lori...
(conversation about party preparation continues for some minutes)
A: What should we buy?
S: Ross is coming, int he?
A: Beer, then.
I closely follow Biezma and Rawlins in my understanding of the check move and
its relationship to FACTS: it is ok if p ∈ FACTS (though it is certainly not a
precondition that it has to be; importantly, there is no precondition against it), but there
cannot be any recent public commitment by any conversation participant to p. In order
to model this appropriately, there must be some form of ordering that holds within
FACTS whereby updates which are downdated from QUD into FACTS are also held as
live public commitments within FACTS for a period of time following their downdating:
they are no longer under discussion, but they are also not accessible for further
re-commitment at that time. This is similar to the idea of LatestMove as the top of a
stack of conversational moves: I do not argue that conversation participants keep track of
49A rhetorical polar interrogative would also be acceptable in this context.
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who committed to every single proposition, or what is part of each individual
participant’s commitment set (Farkas and Bruce 2010, Farkas and Roelofsen 2017) or
that the ordering information is necessarily retained in the longer term. However, I
believe this level of ordering in the FACTS domain is necessary in order to account for
the distribution and required preconditions on check. This does require redefining
FACTS as a partially ordered set of propositions, similar to QUD but without the
relationship of a dependence to MaxQUD; simply, there are propositions at the top of
FACTS which are the most recently downdated; after a certain point, these propositions
are pushed down the stack and out of the top section. They are thus available for
re-commitment. I label the top of the FACTS stack RecentFACTS.
I suggest that it is also less likely that something the speaker is an independent
source for will be re-committed using a check move. If the speaker is an independent
source for p (and thus p has always been part of SP), and the addressee has already
signalled their agreement with or belief of p by allowing it to be downdated into FACTS,
there is very little reason for the speaker to then check that the addressee believes p – this
would appear to indicate distrust in the addressee, as the speaker appears to be assuming
that the addressee has not updated their beliefs accordingly. On the other hand, if the
speaker is only a dependent source for p (as in (249)), it is possible for the speaker to use a
check for re-commitment as they are then deferring to the addressee. This therefore does
not require keeping track of who committed to what, but simply that the speaker knows
whether or not p is part of SP.





GOAL := (to be discussed)
DGB
LatestMove := ¬(Ask(s, a, q) ∨ Command(s, a, i))
QUD := p?
FACTS := p /∈ RecentFACTS
Once again, it is important to note that it is not the case that these conditions
are conditions which cannot license tag questions, exclamatives or rhetorical questions in
other varieties, including standard English. However, the argument I am making is that
the check move has specialised in Glasgow Scots and Shetland dialect to require this
very specific set of preconditions, which are a subset of the broader conditions that permit
non-canonical questions in English.
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Given these preconditions, we can now consider what the GOAL of the check move
is. Recall the cases of commitment revision we saw in the previous chapter. The speaker
who produces the check move does not feel unable to commit to p without addressee
backing; they are at that moment, an independent source with a belief of p, which has
been modelled in the preconditions above. However, the GOAL of the move cannot simply
be to add p to FACTS; this could be achieved by a simple assertion and thus there would
be no reason to use a check move. I therefore posit that the GOAL of the check move
is to have the addressee make explicit their belief of p, and to add that the addressee is
also a source for p to FACTS (as well as to add p itself – whether that is in the anchor of
the tag, or the body of the exclamative/rhetorical question construction (see section 5.4
for a syntactic analysis)).
Note that this does not force an addressee to respond: it is not like a question which
must be resolved in order to be downdated. Clearly, a response is encouraged – the speaker
is making a claim about the addressee’s beliefs which can only be a hypothesis, and the
addressee should have final say on their own belief state – but it is not required.
The effects of a check move, then, are as follows.




The final piece of the puzzle is how downdating takes place. Downdating is agent-
relative, and takes places when participants decide that there is no further discussion that
needs to take place regarding any q or p? in QUD. Acceptance leads to downdating
of assertions: if both conversation participants have Accepted p, p can be added to the
shared ground (or each of their FACTS sets). As we saw in the Friends example above,
it can be the case that conversation participants’ interpretations of what p is differ; this
is accounted for by the individual, relative FACTS sets. Acceptance moves encapsulate a
range of different possible ways to accept p, including ‘mhm’, nodding, ‘yeah’ and also ‘I
see’ or ‘Aha.’.
For Ginzburg, a ‘check’ move cannot be accepted, only confirmed. However, the only
actual difference that he posits between accepting and confirming is that acceptances are
preceded by assertions, while confirmations are preceded by checks.
However, as we saw above, this isn’t the case for all of Ginzburg’s ‘check’ moves.
While many acceptance moves are also ‘confirmation’ moves, the two that are not ‘I see’
and ‘Aha’. However, from the ‘check’ moves that require them, it seems that the crucial
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link in those constructions that do permit these ‘accept’ move is that they are used when
the conversation participant does not already have a belief of p – as seen in (250-252).
(250) S: G is going to be in town.
A: I see.
(251) S: G is going to be in town, ok?
A: I see.
(252) S: G is in town, is he? I see.
When the participant producing the ‘confirmation’ move does already have a belief
of p, ‘I see’ is not a possible move50. Rather than saying that these are distinct moves, then,
it seems to me that it is more appropriate to consider that there is simply one category of
‘acceptance’ moves, which, like questions and tags, can be specified for speaker/addressee
beliefs.
The acceptances that require a lack of participant belief, then, are not acceptable
following check moves because the speaker has already indicated that they believe p is
already part of the addressee’s beliefs. However, I will set this aside here, and focus on
what happens to check moves following acceptance.
Ginzburg (2012:86) formulates the effects of a FACTS update / QUD downdate as
follows, given an existing discourse state where the LatestMove was either an ‘accept’ or
‘confirm’ move and the QUD is p?:
FACTS := pre.FACTS ∪ p
QUD := NonResolve(pre.QUD, FACTS)
The addition of p to FACTS is a simple union. In order to downdate from QUD,
Ginzburg posits the function NonResolve, which maps the new set of propositions in
FACTS to the partially ordered set of questions in QUD and returns a new partially
ordered set of questions which is the same, except with the questions that have been
resolved by information in FACTS removed.
I propose that the update following the acceptance of a check move is very similar;
p is added into FACTS, and downdated from QUD. Furthermore, I propose that p ∈ SP(a)
is also added into FACTS for the speaker only.
50Except in a case of pretence. The same can be said of ‘confirmation’ moves like sure and ok, which
seem to indicate active acceptance and acknowledge a new understanding on behalf of the conversation
participant which was not previously available.
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FACTS := pre.FACTS ∪ p ∧ p ∈ SP(a)
QUD := NonResolve(pre.QUD, FACTS)
For the addressee, they are already aware that p is part of their BEL set; the
purposes of the addressee adding p to FACTS is to register that p is part of the shared
ground and not just part of their individual beliefs.
FACTS := pre.FACTS ∪ p
QUD := NonResolve(pre.QUD, FACTS)
The idea of non-conventional content being added into FACTS is established in
Ginzburg (2012:297) for cases where the addressee makes it clear that they do not want to
discuss the topic at hand, e.g. by changing the subject, or saying ‘no comment’. Ginzburg
proposes that although the explicit content of the utterance is not ‘I do not wish to discuss
this’, ¬WishDiscuss(a, MaxQUD) is added to FACTS through an irrelevance inference.
In this case, LatestMove only consists of the conventional content of the utterance. For
example, if the addressee avoids a question by talking about the weather, the LatestMove
is only the conventional content of the utterance about the weather; the fact that the
addressee does not want to discuss the issue is an inference. I posit that other not-at-issue
content can be dealt with in a similar way.
In the check move case, then, the accept utterance that follows the check targets
specifically the conventional, at-issue content of the utterance. If not denied, the fact that
p ∈ SP(a) can simply be added to FACTS. However, this can be denied in multiple ways:
firstly, if the addressee denies p, then the whole update will not proceed. It may continue to
be MaxQUD if the speaker chooses to push the point for further discussion, but it may also
be dismissed entirely. Secondly, if the addressee denies existing belief of p but accepts that
it holds (e.g. the commitment revision cases), the move must be remade as an assertion
where the speaker takes full responsibility for p. This is further evidence that p ∈ SP(a) is
not-at-issue; it cannot be an explicit antecedent; however, it can be directly updated into
FACTS as adjacent to the proposition.
4.3.5 Canonical tag questions in English
As the pragmatic contexts discussed in section 4.2 above also hold for tag questions with
falling intonation in standard English, it is important to compare the analysis I have posited
for check moves in Scots varieties with the equivalent constructions in standard English
(and also the standard tag question constructions in Scots). I will focus on the case of
canonical tag questions here; I discuss polar rhetorical questions in chapter 6.
211
Although check moves can be used in the same contexts as falling intonation tag
questions in standard English, I argue that English tag questions are not check moves. In
general, my analysis for standard English canonical tags sits closely with Reese and Asher
(2006): here I will outline their analysis, and point out where my analysis differs.
To begin with, Reese and Asher (2006) argue that in nuclear tag questions, the
anchor and the tag are separate clauses which make separate speech act contributions.
The meaning of the clause is then derived from the paratactic relationship between them,
rather than originating as a singular complex unit. I believe that this is the correct
approach, unlike the complex speech act posited by e.g. Krifka (2014) or Farkas and
Roelofsen (2017)51, as prosodically, the anchor and the tag are contained in separate
intonation phrases (Ladd 1981, Asher and Reese 2007, Dehé and Braun 2013).
Syntactically, too, there is evidence in favour of the tag question being a straightforward
case of VP-ellipsis of a question rather than any sort of complex copy/movement analysis
(Sailor 2011).
As basic definitions, Reese and Asher state that the anchor has the default speech
act of communicating that the speaker believes p, with the goal that the addressee comes to
believe p too. The tag has the default meaning of a question q, which is that the speaker
believes an answer to the question. In the nuclear tag question with falling intonation,
then, because the speaker asserts p in the anchor, the addressee infers that the speaker
believes p, and therefore that p is the Known Answer to q in the tag. The addressee then
accepts the belief of p, following the default goal of the anchor, and thus the tag is an
Acknowledgment move (Asher and Lascarides 2003). As detailed in section 4.3.3, being an
Acknowledgment move means that an answer to the tag entails that the goal of the anchor
has been achieved – namely, the transfer of the belief from speaker to addressee.
Interestingly, Reese and Asher take this to be the default interpretation, despite the
fact that falling intonation is generally marked in polar questions (Banuazizi and Creswell
1999, Bartels 1999, Dehé 2017). They do not assign any meaning to the falling intonation,
but present it in contrast to the meaning of rising intonation tag questions, which they
describe as Confirm moves. Again, the speaker asserts a belief of p with their assertion
in the anchor. However, the final rise on the question is taken to mean that the speaker
believes that the proposition at the core of the question in the tag, is possible. Therefore,
51Like Reese and Asher (2006), I believe post-nuclear tags, on the other hand, are complex speech act
types; unlike nuclear tags, they do not have separate intonation phrases and they license both after all
– only permitted in declaratives – and by any chance, which is only permitted in unbiased questions,
suggesting that the anchor is not properly asserted in these cases, nor is the question fully asked. I do not
propose a semantic analysis for post-nuclear tags in this thesis.
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between the assertion of the anchor (S believes p) and the final rise on the tag (S believes
¬p), there is inconsistency and therefore the assertion is only weakly asserted. It is not
possible for A to accept a belief of both p and ¬p simultaneously: this thus blocks the
Acknowledgment inference, because it is not possible for the goal of the anchor to follow
from the conflicting information presented in the tag.
Certainly, there are many positive aspects to Reese and Asher’s analysis: firstly, the
fact that different meanings are assigned to rising and falling nuclear tag questions, and that
the anchor and tag are treated as contributing separate pieces of the meaning. However,
I believe that their general approach to the meaning of intonation is not quite accurate
when looking at matrix biased questions, thus bringing its meaning of weak possibility
into question. Domaneschi et al. (2017) find clear patterns of usage where low negation is
used in cases where the speaker believes ¬p, and high negation is used where the speaker
believes p but may be being challenged by some evidence. In both cases under Reese and
Asher’s account, the speaker would believe ¬p to be possible. In both low negation and
high negation cases, it is true to say that the speaker believes ¬p to be possible, but this
generalisation does not capture the actual differences in belief of the speaker that leads to
difference in usage patterns.
If intonation has such a strong semantic input to a construction, it would also not be
possible to explain the lack of impact of intonation on the interpretation of tag questions
in the Scots data gathered in this thesis, nor in fact to reconcile the acceptability of rising
intonation with the meaning of the check move given above.
Finally, this understanding of canonical tag questions as Acknowledgement moves
is unable to capture the differences in behaviour and in licensing conditions between these
constructions on the one hand and a tag like ok? on the other, which does appear to have
some sort of ‘acknowledgment’ meaning in the sense that Asher and Lascarides (2003)
define.
Rather than arguing that rising and falling tag questions produce different
conversational moves, I wish to argue that in both contexts, the meaning of the tag is the
same – a simple question, as Reese and Asher posit. The difference in meaning comes
entirely from the intonation. I follow Gunlogson (2008) in arguing that the contribution
of rising intonation is contingency52. The move toward understanding rising intonation as
contingency rather than as putting a proposition ‘up for question’ (Truckenbrodt 2015),
or as marking a proposition as possible (Reese and Asher 2006), re-frames it as a
pragmatic meaning, rather than semantically triggering some sort of question or
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confirmation speech act. This is a positive move, in light of the results in chapter 3 in
which intonation did not affect speakers’ comprehension of the speech act taking place –
the meaning for them was clearly more flexible, and able to be influenced by context.
Regarding contingency, I repeat Gunlogson’s definition here (see also section 1.1.5):
‘A discourse move µ by an agent α is contingent on a discourse condition δ if:
(a) δ does not obtain at the time of µ; and
(b) It is inferrable from the discourse context that the update effected by µ is to be
retained only if δ obtains after the discourse move immediately succeeding µ.’
(Gunlogson 2008:129)
In falling intonation nuclear tag questions, then, the anchor proposition is a Known
Answer to the question in the tag, as Reese and Asher propose. The speaker has already
put p forward, indicating that it is part of their beliefs, and that they wish for it to be
added to the shared ground. However one wishes to formulate the semantics of a question,
the speaker’s belief of the answer is already given in the tag; the lack of rising intonation
indicates that the discourse move (the tag question) is not contingent on the addressee’s
next move e.g. whether or not the addressee confirms p. This accounts for the corpus
examples we saw in section 4.2.3 where the proposition could be accepted without explicit
response from the addressee, as well as the commitment revision cases: acceptance of p is
not contingent on the addressee’s ability to answer the question. Furthermore, the question
is answered by the speaker’s assertion, and so can be downdated without requiring a full
answer, explaining the unacceptability of restating the assertion after the tag question.
In the rising intonation case, the proposition in the anchor is still put forward as a
Known Answer to the question in the tag; the speaker has presented their willingness to
take responsibility for p and to add p to the shared ground. However, the rising intonation
adds contingency. The speaker is presenting a question, and though they have indicated
that they believe there is a Known Answer that they wish to take responsibility for, the
acceptance of the proposition is contingent on the addressee’s answer to the question.
I believe that this analysis can account for the fact that rising intonation tag
questions are not especially common (Dehé and Braun 2013). Rising intonation tags are
used in situations with challenging evidence (Ladd 1981), but in order to present a
‘Known’ Answer in a situation with challenging evidence, a speaker must have an
52I do not take a position on whether it is one particular part of the intonation contour that contributes
the specific meaning of contingency, or whether it is the whole contour. Further research would be required
to establish potential contributions of different individual tones and the relationship between them, as
Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990) and Truckenbrodt (2015) do.
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exceptionally high degree of belief in the proposition – or a strong bouletic desire for p to
be true. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 5 where I present the results of an
experiment looking at the preferred usage of tag questions and matrix biased questions
based on evidential context53.
This analysis can also be couched in Ginzburg’s framework, used to discuss check
moves, above. Note that there is a turn-taking constraint, in which the turn must be
continued by the original speaker; furthermore, a similar constraint on RecentFACTS
must hold – speakers can reassert things from earlier in the discourse using a canonical tag
question.
UNPUB
BACKGROUND SP := p




FACTS := p /∈ RecentFACTS
There are clear links to check moves here, but with a number of differences: the
turn must be held by the original speaker, and importantly there is no requirement that
the speaker believes that the addressee believes p – they may, but that is not central to
the meaning of the tag question.
The effect of the tag is thus as follows:




FACTS update and QUD downdating take place as expected in Ginzburg (2012:87).
Accepting p with e.g. ‘yeah’ accepts it into FACTS; p is the MaxQUD, and in this case
resolving the MaxQUD means that its related sub-questions can also be resolved. The
question is therefore not ‘answered’ in the same way as a true question, or a tag question
with rising intonation, which does not automatically resolve on acceptance but requires an
answer (and permits a fresh assertion of p).
53This analysis (and Reese and Asher’s) is unable to explain the requirement for tag questions to be of
reverse polarity to their anchors. I note that same polarity tags tend to be used when the speaker has no
existing prior belief of p but believe that the addressee does believe p; furthermore, same polarity tags are
produced with rising intonation as default.
(i) Kamasi is coming, is he?
I believe there can still be a Known Answer aspect here, but the question remains as to why the polarity
switch is used in cases where the speaker knows the answer based on their own beliefs, but same polarity
tags in cases where the Known Answer comes from the addressee’s beliefs.
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Having established an analysis for standard English tag questions, it is worth
comparing with a couple of recent works which have also considered the semantics of tag
questions: Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) and Malamud and Stephenson (2014). I will
discuss Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) first, as they provide a compositional semantics for
tag questions that is comparable to Reese and Asher (2006) – however, I believe there are
a number of issues with their analysis.
Secondly, I will compare Malamud and Stephenson (2014) to the Ginzburg discourse
model. Malamud and Stephenson adopt and extend Farkas and Bruce’s (2010) Table model
for dialogue; their approach has been popular and I will assess whether the check move
(and falling canonical tag question in standard English) could also be accounted for in this
framework.
Farkas and Roelofsen 2017
Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) posit an analysis for declaratives, interrogatives and tag
questions, tying their various syntactic forms to their intonation. Here, the word order of
a question gives a construction INT force; the word order of a declarative gives a
construction DEC force. Rising intonation creates OPEN discourse; falling intonation
creates CLOSED discourse.
DEC force simply provides a non-inquisitive proposition, which is informative and
does not present possible alternatives: λP.!P, while INT force gives an inquisitive
proposition: λP.?P. With an inquisitive proposition, some information is still to be
resolved in something to be added to the participants’ commitment sets, with a
commitment set defined as the set of worlds compatible with everything that a
participant is publicly committed to54. CLOSED has no semantic meaning in Farkas and
Roelofsen’s framework, but OPEN gives an inquisitive proposition in the same way as
INT force: λP.?P.
The authors then argue for a compositional semantics for the four relevant parts.
Given that DEC gives a non-inquisitive proposition and CLOSED has no semantic
output, a declarative with falling intonation always has non-inquisitive semantics. For
rising declaratives, DEC gives a non-inquisitive proposition, but OPEN, added through
the rising intonation, means that the clause becomes inquisitive. The idea that rising
intonation makes a clause an interrogative has been common elsewhere in the literature
54For Farkas and Roelofsen, the Common Ground is simply a union of all conversation participants’
commitment sets: cg = ∪{cs(x) | x ∈ participants}. There is therefore no CG/FACTS component in their
model, although it can be derived from the extant commitment sets.
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(Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg 1990, Truckenbrodt 2015, Wiltschko and Heim 2016),
giving full semantic meaning to intonation, unlike the pragmatic meaning that Gunlogson
(2003, 2008) puts forward (and that I support in this thesis).
Finally, given that INT provides an inquisitive proposition which is inherently
open, any subsequent addition of OPEN or CLOSED through intonation is vacuous.
Regardless of intonation, then, a question is inquisitive. The relevant diagrams for the













Figure 4.1: Falling declaratives, rising declaratives and questions in Farkas and Roelofsen
(2017).
Farkas and Roelofsen then go on to apply these same compositional principles to
tag questions. They argue for a structure in which a declarative (DEC with CLOSED
intonation, as seen in the anchor clause) is embedded under an inquisitive operator (INT,










Figure 4.2: Tag questions in Farkas and Roelofsen (2017).
The first issue that I see with this analysis is that this QUESTION•ASSERTION
type construction is unnecessarily complex for a nuclear tag question: given that there are
separate intonation phrases and possibilities for commitment revision, there is no reason
to fully embed the anchor under the interrogative operator. Secondly, this does not give
an accurate syntactic representation of the tag, requiring some sort of movement analysis
(Culicover 1992, den Dikken 1995) to get the correct interpretation where the interrogative
scopes over the declarative, rather than the preferable VP-ellipsis analysis detailed in the
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next section (Sailor 2011).
Primarily, however, the main issue in the Farkas and Roelofson story is that the
inquisitive construction in the tag can then either be OPEN or CLOSED depending on
the intonation associated with the tag. Firstly, although speakers can show sensitivity to
differences in prosody (see chapter 4.4.4 for discussion), in constructions like tag
questions, variation in prosody does not seem to contribute significant differences in
interpretation. Therefore, it cannot be that inquisitive semantics are fully contributed by
prosody. Secondly, although the intonation does not appear to contribute strongly to
semantic meaning when it comes to interpretation, there are still nevertheless contexts in
which speakers prefer to produce rising or falling intonation on tag questions (Ladd 1981,
Dehé and Braun 2013) as well as some indication that there is different intonation used in
different contexts for matrix biased questions (Domaneschi et al. 2017) and in rhetorical
questions (Dehé 2017). To argue that there is a full semantic meaning to the intonation
but then to say that it is ‘vacuous’ for production in interrogatives seems unintuitive
given these usage preferences: rather, some form of pragmatic account of the influence of
prosody, along the lines of Gunlogson (2008) seems like a better approach to take.
Farkas and Roelofsen also discuss the conventions of use, or tabling, model that they
propose for these constructions. A basic discourse context is a triple of participants, the
set of discourse participants; Table, corresponding to Ginzburg’s QUD, and commitments,
a function from every participant x to the set of possibilities that x is publicly committed
to. This is enough, they argue, to deal with canonical declaratives and questions, but
that to deal with ‘marked’ form (e.g. rising declaratives and tag questions) they add an
additional component evidencex. Evidence includes a list of pairs <p, i> that x claims to
have evidence for, where p is a possibility and i is a ‘credence level’ indicating the level of
belief that the speaker has in p based on the evidence.
Rising declaratives (with rising intonation), then, indicate [zero, low] credence;
rising intonation tags indicate [moderate, high] credence and falling tags indicate [high]
credence. The credence levels are argued to arise purely from the intonation.
Farkas and Roelofsen present a large number of examples that they believe support
their analysis; I believe, however, that their analysis is too broad and suffers from not
taking account of the relationship with the addressee (e.g. through contingency). Their
primary reason for ruling out a contingency-based analysis is rising declarative examples
like their example (55) (shown here as (253)):
(253) Student: The answer to this problem is 5 because the square root of 9 is 2
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and 2+3 is 5.
Teacher: The square root of 9 is 2?
Farkas and Roelofsen argue that a contingency analysis cannot hold here because
the teacher’s belief of p is not conditional on the student’s response: the teacher knows that
the square root of 9 is not 2. They rule out a situation of pretence for two reasons: firstly,
they question why tag questions are unable to be coerced into this context, if pretence is
available with rising declaratives in this context. However, I think this is easily accounted
for by the analysis I have presented above: in a tag question, the speaker has a belief of
p that they are willing to take responsibility for (and which they do take responsibility
for in the anchor of the tag). Whether or not the acceptance of that belief is contingent
on the addressee relies on the intonation of the tag, but the speaker does make their
own assertion and suggests that this assertion is the Known Answer to the tag question.
In a rising declarative on the other hand, the speaker does not take any responsibility
for p upfront. While they claim through the rising intonation that their commitment is
contingent on the addressee, the addressee (here, the student) has already committed to p
– the fact that the teacher is thus questioning that commitment leads the student towards
the conclusion that the square root of 9 must not be 2. This accounts for the usage of the
rising declarative in example (253) and rules out the use of the tag question.
The authors’ other point is the use of rising declaratives in contexts like examples
(254) and (255) – in each case, the parent is reported to have low credence in the proposition
despite the evidence in favour of p:
(254) Context: Mother sees child putting on football boots.
Mother: What? You are going to play soccer? No way! You are staying home
and doing your homework.
(255) Context: Father asks his child to set the table. The child does a particularly
bad job of it but appears to consider the job finished.
Father: This table is set? Where are the wine glasses? Where are the
napkins?
(Farkas and Roelofsen 2017:276)
However, I believe these can be accounted for in a similar way to the teacher
example: in each case, the child has committed (through putting on their boots, or
presumably leaving the table), indicating that they believe they are going to play
football, or that they have finished setting the table. The parent does not take
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responsibility for p in either case, but leaves it contingent on the child – given that the
child in each case has already committed, this again leads to the conclusion that their
behaviour needs to be questioned, especially by someone in authority like a teacher or
parent.
In terms of the difference between rising and falling tag questions, Farkas and
Roelofsen discuss a couple of examples that it is worth considering. Firstly, the examples
presented in (256) and (257). The authors argue that both rising and falling tags are
possible, given that the speaker has high credence of belief in the evidence for p:
(256) Belinda and Chris are looking at a sunset. Belinda says to Chris:
This is a beautiful sunset, ↗isn’t it? / ↘isn’t it?
(257) Amalia and Bert have a colleague, Carla, who is admired by everyone for her
problem solving skills. One day at a department meeting, the chair raises an issue,
and Carla immediately finds a solution that makes everyone happy. Amalia says to
Bert:
She always finds a solution that makes everyone happy, ↗doesn’t she? / ↘doesn’t
she?
(Farkas and Roelofsen 2017:273-274)
While both are interpretable and acceptable, this does not account for the fact
that tags with falling intonation are preferred in these situations where the speaker has a
strong belief of p (Ladd 1981, Reese and Asher 2006). In Farkas and Roelofsen’s evidential
model either tag question should be able to be used with equal probability in these positive
contexts because both are available in [high] credence contexts. The correct distribution
can be established through the analysis I posit above along with a pragmatic understanding
of contexts of use: if the speaker is not challenged by some contextual evidence, there is
no need for them to make their commitment contingent, and so falling intonation will be
preferred in production.
There are some positives to Farkas and Roelofsen’s analysis: namely, the idea of
credence levels, which I will return to in chapter 5, and the fact that the varying intonation
on the tag question does not appear to truly rule out any uses. However, I don’t believe
that their reasons for ruling out a more pragmatic analysis of the intonation like that of
Gunlogson (2008) are justified; furthermore, the analysis is entirely egocentric and does not
involve any acknowledgment of the relationship between the speaker and addressee. I don’t
believe that Farkas and Roelofsen’s table model for non-canonical questions is necessarily
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incorrect, but it is too broad.
Malamud and Stephenson 2014
Malamud and Stephenson (2014) extend Farkas and Bruce’s (2010) model of dialogue to
account for three types of constructions: rising declaratives, same polarity tags and reverse
polarity tags with rising intonation in four contexts. The contexts are labelled ‘unsure of
move’ (258), ‘seeking agreement’ (259), ‘blushing/innuendo’ (260) and ‘borderline paint’
(261). I will only discuss the distribution and analysis that they present for rising reverse
polarity tags and rising declaratives55.
(258) B hasn’t met A’s neighbour and asks ‘What do you think of your new neighbour?’
A isn’t sure if B wants to know about neighbourliness or suitability for dating. A
replies:
# He’s attractive, ↗isn’t he?
He’s attractive?
(259) A and B are discussing various traits of their mutual acquaintances. B says ‘I
think Bill, more than anything else, is just a really nice guy’. A replies:
He’s attractive too, ↗isn’t he?
# He’s attractive too?
(260) A and B are gossiping. A doesn’t know anything about B’s new neighbour. B says
blushing, ‘You’ve got to see this picture of my new neighbour!’. Without looking, A
replies:
# He’s attractive, ↗isn’t he?
He’s attractive?
(261) A and B are sorting paint cans in a store into a ‘red’ bin and an ‘orange’ bin. B
points to orangish-red paint and says ‘What colour would you say this is?’. A
replies:
It’s red, ↗isn’t it?
It’s red?
(all from Malamud and Stephenson 2014)
55In all of the contexts where ‘rising declaratives’ are available, it could be argued that these are in fact
closer to cases of uptalk or uncertainty rather than being questioning declaratives. Farkas and Roelofsen
(2017), for example, acknowledge these uptalk/uncertain of move contexts but argue that they should be
handled separately. I agree with Farkas and Roelofsen’s position: none of these contexts have the same
belief conditions as the true rising declarative questions discussed by Gunlogson (2003, 2008) and Farkas
and Roelofsen (2017).
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Malamud and Stephenson’s work extends Farkas and Bruce (2010), who develop a
framework for dialogue whereby each conversation participant has their own set of discourse
commitments (DCx) as well as the Table (equivalent to Ginzburg’s QUD), CG, and the
projected CG. When a speaker produces an assertion, the assertion is added to their
DC as well as to the Table and to the projected CG. When the addressee accepts the
assertion, it is also added to their DC and can be ‘popped’ from the stack on the Table (i.e.
downdated from QUD) and becomes part of CG. A proposition that is in each conversation
participant’s DC will automatically be added to CG.
In order to account for the distributions of rising declaratives, same polarity tags
and reverse polarity tags with rising intonation in across the four contexts, Malamud and
Stephenson posit that as well as participants’ discourse commitments DCx, each participant
also has a set of projected discourse commitments which they are not yet committed to.
For a reverse polarity tag in a case like example (261) Malamud and Stephenson
(2014) argue that p is added to the Table. Furthermore, it is added to the projected
CG as well as to the speaker’s projected DC. It is not added to the addressee’s projected
commitments, nor to any DCs or the CG.
It is possible that the check move could be accounted for Malamud and
Stephenson’s (2014) framework: p would be added to the speaker’s DC and to the
addressee’s projected DC set. However, this does not account for the prior beliefs that
precondition the use of the check move; furthermore, the idea of projected discourse
commitments can be accounted for with a simple QUD/Table model (as discussed above).
More generally I believe there are issues with Malamud and Stephenson’s account.
Firstly, they argue against a compositional account of the contribution of the different
parts of the construction to the meaning, rather treating each one as an individual unit.
As I have shown above, there is reason not to treat e.g. reverse polarity tag questions and
their anchors as complex speech acts.
Secondly, from a dialogue perspective, I am not convinced of the necessity of
projected DCs. By virtue of putting a proposition p on the Table (or in the QUD), the
speaker is projecting that p is something they would like to commit to; similarly, that it
should be entered into the shared ground between the conversation participants. Further,
Malamud and Stephenson’s analysis of rising declaratives suggests that the speaker is
projecting a commitment on behalf of the addressee without considering their own
engagement with or belief in the proposition, even at the Table level. While I do not
agree that conversation is entirely egocentric, I certainly believe that the speaker takes
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their own beliefs and perspective into account. So, while Malamud and Stephenson’s
analysis has some benefits over Farkas and Roelofsen’s account in terms of taking the
speaker-addressee relationship into account, I believe that a Ginzburg style dialogue
model combined with a pragmatic understanding of intonation following Gunlogson is
able to deal with the data in the most adequate way.
4.3.6 Summary
In this section I took the evidence from the pragmatic distribution of the –n and –int
particles seen in section 4.2 in order to establish a meaning for the particles. I argued
that although these particles appear to be related to the negation seen in biased questions,
it is more relevant to relate the meaning to particles that have been variously labelled
‘checks’, ‘confirmationals’, ‘acknowledgments’ and ‘align moves’ in the literature. I thus
argued that –int and –n are check moves, which I defined using the framework for the
semantics of interaction developed by Ginzburg (2012), while also arguing that Ginzburg’s
definition of ‘check’ moves, while the most inclusive of all the available definitions, was not
specific enough to encapsulate the nuanced relationships of speaker and addressee beliefs
and biases that these sorts of moves must take into account.
I posited that in order to use the check move, speakers must believe that p is part
of the addressee’s existing beliefs; that p ∈ SP(a) is also added to the QUD as not-at-issue
content. When the addressee accepts the proposition, they also accept the not-at-issue
content (i.e. that they already believed p); this is added to the speaker’s FACTS set,
providing further evidence for the need for conversation participants to have individual
interpretations of the shared ground rather than an abstract Common Ground that all
shared information is added to.
I also posited a domain within FACTS, RecentFACTS. This redefines the FACTS
domain as a partially ordered set, and allowed me to account for the fact that check moves
can be used to highlight and re-establish information that is already assumed to be in the
shared ground from earlier in the same conversation, without requiring that conversation
participants keep track of who is committed to what at all times.
I compared this analysis of the Scots check moves with an analysis of standard
English tag questions, which I argue are not check moves, but rather defective questions.
Building on the analysis given in Reese and Asher (2006) by separating the contributions
of the syntax and intonation, I argued that the Known Answer analysis of tag questions is
the right way to account for all instances of nuclear tag questions, with the contribution
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of rising intonation as introducing contingency (Gunlogson 2008). Finally, I compared
this to the accounts of tag questions put forward by Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) and
Malamud and Stephenson (2014). While both accounts have their positives, I argued that
neither approach was able to fully account for the belief and bias combinations required to
get an accurate distribution of tag questions, and that the compositional approach I have
established here is better in that respect.
I will now move on to the final piece of the analysis for –int and –n: the syntactic
distribution of the particles.
4.4 The syntax of –n and –int
4.4.1 Introduction
The final part of the puzzle that needs to be addressed is the syntax of the –int and –n
particles. As we have seen, superficially, these particles look like negative markers, and
appear in places where standard English has negative markers. In the previous section
I argued that semantically, these markers were not negation, but instead what I termed
check moves. This does not necessarily mean they are not syntactically negation. For
example, Romero’s (2015) analysis of biased question negation argues that the negation is
not true negation, but a falsum marker – nevertheless, syntactically, this is taken to be
in NegP. I will therefore firstly consider whether a NegP account is a plausible analysis for
the –int and –n markers, looking at both Thoms et al. (2013) and Cormack and Smith
(2012). However, I will instead argue in favour of positioning –int and –n in a conversation
domain in the left periphery, based on the idea that speaker and addressee roles can be
encoded in the syntax when relevant (Wiltschko 2014). This more accurately accounts for
the syntactic distribution, and is in particular able to deal with tag questions on negative
anchors well, utilising Sailor’s (2011) VP-ellipsis analysis of tag questions.
4.4.2 Not in NegP
A brief overview of NegP
Following Pollock (1989), in the framework of generative syntax, negation is generally taken
to be located in some sort of NegP position (Ouhalla 1991, Haegeman 1995, Zanuttini
1997, Rowlett 1998, Brown 1999, Zeijlstra 2004, Poletto 2015), or in a Pol(arity)P which
has a [+neg] feature (Laka 1990, Holmberg 2013)56. Negative elements cross-linguistically
are taken to be base generated here. Analyses vary as to whether negative elements are
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generated in one NegP location and then moved, constrained by independently motivated
syntactic/semantic reasons (Zeijlstra 2004, Poletto 2015), or whether there is a (possibly
extensive) series of fixed NegP projections (Ouhalla 1991, Cinque 1999, Zanuttini 1997).
These cartographic approaches to negation have been more popular for Romance languages,
particularly Italian, where there are a range of negative markers, each seemingly in a
different location syntactically.
In English, there is only not and its reduced form, –n’t. However, there has still been
considerable discussion about where these negative markers are generated. Pollock (1989)
argues that English –n’t and not are both in SpecNegP. Potsdam (1997) gives evidence
from ellipsis and the Head Movement Constraint to show that –n’t and not are in the head
of NegP. Zeijlstra (2004) splits up the two elements and argues that –n’t is a preverbal
negative element that sits in the head of NegP, with not as an adverb in specifier position,
raised from a vP adjunct. In the following discussion, whichever approach one wishes to
take to the distribution within NegP of negation markers in English (and Scots) does not
affect the analysis, and so I will not take any position here.
It is important firstly to consider whether the analysis that –n and –int are
syntactically in NegP is a suitable one. They are, after all, phonologically similar to true
negative markers, and they appear in locations where standard English has negative
markers. I argued in section 4.3 that these particles are not semantically negation
markers: but although e.g. biased question negation may behave differently in the syntax
(e.g. by combining with the auxiliary and raising in standard English (compare (265) to
(264)) (Domaneschi et al. 2017), or by not combining with indefinites in German (Büring
and Gunlogson 2000, Domaneschi et al. 2017)), it is still taken to be generated in NegP.
Indeed, for Romero and Han (2004) this is one of the peculiarities of biased questions –
cross-linguistically, why is it so often negation that carries out this role of indicating bias
in questions?
We know that the distribution of –int and –n is limited to non-canonical questions,
and not to any construction which actually involves an expression of negation – so, not
available in negative declarative or imperatives, or in truly negative questions (see chapter
3 for a full distribution). Syntactically, we also saw that –int and –n do not license negative
polarity items, a general feature of syntactic negation, while they do not anti-license PPIs.
(262) Can’n Jenny come too/*either? (Shetland)
(263) Dint they have bread too/*either? (Glasgow)
56I will refer to NegP throughout, but what I discuss would also be applicable to a PolP analysis.
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However, this fact is not enough to claim that the markers are not, syntactically,
negation. Negation in biased questions famously does not anti-license PPIs (Ladd 1981).
In (264) we have an example of true negative question, which licenses NPIs, and in (265)
we have a biased question which does not.
(264) Is Jane not coming either/*too?
(265) Isn’t Jane coming too/*either? (standard English)
So it is very much possible that these particles could still be in NegP, despite not
having traditional negative properties.
There have been two relevant theoretical analyses of Scots negation, both of which
consider particles like the two examined in this thesis to be negation. Firstly, Thoms et al.
(2013) look to analyse Scots negation patterns (including Glasgow Scots particle –int) in
a framework of extended projections (Grimshaw 2005). I will firstly argue against this
position, focusing on evidence from biased questions and tag questions, as well as further
evidence from subject wh-questions. I will then turn to consider Cormack and Smith’s
(2012) proposal for Scots negation that takes a more cartographic approach, using the
question data presented in Millar and Brown (1979), presented in chapter 2 and repeated
here.
(266) *Isnae he coming?
(267) Isn’t he coming? (Edinburgh, Millar and Brown 1979:29)
While I will argue that Cormack and Smith’s proposal is a step in the right direction,
I will conclude that it is not the best analysis for the data, again focusing on the distinctions
we see between biased questions and tag questions.
Thoms et al. 2013
Thoms et al. (2013) explore negation in Scots more broadly, presenting a rich set of data
from primarily Glasgow and Fife varieties of Scots. They argue that the richness of the
data merits a model of the data that follows the extended projections framework developed
by Grimshaw (2005), and ‘spans’ (Svenonius 2012).
In this framework, a clause is modelled as an extended projection of the lexical verb.
Positions are not related through head movement, as is standard in generative syntax, but
by being part of the same extended projection. An extended projection consists of a lexical
head, like N or V, and the functional projections that associate with it (Grimshaw 2005) –
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for example, D is the functional projection that associates with N – and a span is a sequence
of heads within an extended projection. Spellout rules are determined by a ‘diacritic’ which
associates with a particular head within a span. This ‘diacritic’ acts in some ways like an
EPP feature, but rather than forcing movement, the diacritic purely states that the head
that hosts it is the point of lexical realisation for the information contained in the span.
This framework requires an extensive range of C heads which are specified for
particular speech acts.
For example, Thoms et al. claim that an interrogative C in standard English has a
specific Cinterr head which has C+T+Neg in its span, and then spells out aux + –n’t in C.
In Scots, Thoms et al. argue that this does not happen: there is no rule for C+T+Neg to
spell out together in C with a Cinterr head in the variety. This blocks –nae from appearing
in C, and thus rules out examples like (266), above.
(268) EP for Cinterr: Cinterr+T+Neg −→ aux+–n’t in C [English]
(269) EP for Cinterr: Cinterr+T+Neg −→ aux in C [Scots]
I believe this analysis has problems, however.
The first issue, which is most pertinent for this research, is that Thoms et al.
(2013) posit a separate Ctag for tag questions. Theoretically, there does not seem to be
any reason to suggest that tag questions (in standard English) require a different syntactic
structure to other types of interrogatives. Sailor (2011) presents a comprehensive analysis
of canonical tag questions cross-linguistically, arguing that canonical tag questions are
VP-ellided versions of matrix interrogatives.
Sailor uses Lobeck’s (1995) licensing conditions for VP-ellipsis to show that English
canonical tag questions exhibit the same properties as regular VP-ellipsis with regard to
the availability of auxiliary stranding – for example, not permitting stranding of progressive
be, as in (270-273).
(270) Our hot dog vendor is being arrested, but our gyro guy isn’t [being arrestesd].
(271) *Our hot dog vendor is being arrested, but our gyro guy isn’t being [arrested].
(272) Our hot dog vendor is being arrested, isn’t he [being arrested]?
(273) *Our hot dog vendor is being arrested, isn’t he being [arrested]? (Sailor 2011:30)
Further, tag questions do not challenge Lobeck’s proposal that VP-ellipsis must be
locally c-commanded by a T or Neg head.
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(274) Mary didn’t leave, although others *(did) [leave].
(275) Mary didn’t leave, *(did) she [leave]?
(276) Joy washes her hands before dinner, but George does not [wash his hands before
dinner].
(277) George washes his hands before dinner, does he not [wash his hands before dinner]?
(Sailor 2011:31)
Using evidence from a typological study, Sailor goes on to show that there is a
one-way implicational relationship between VP-ellipsis and canonical tags: if a language
has canonical tag questions, it also has VP-ellipsis57. The way in which tag questions are
formed in the language furthermore depends on the properties of stranding that the
language in question permits with regard to its VP-ellipsis. For example, while English,
Danish and Taiwanese have auxiliary stranding preceding VP-ellipsis and thus auxiliary
stranding in tag questions, some languages such as Persian, Samoan and Scottish Gaelic
have V stranding in VP-ellipsis contexts (see (278) from Persian). These languages




































‘Naysan didn’t read the book, did he?’ (Persian, Sailor 2011:65)
Sailor thus provides an analysis of canonical tag questions which formalises the long-
held intuition that canonical tags are elided versions of matrix questions, which has been
previously discussed in this thesis. Specifically, he suggests that these are elided forms of
matrix biased questions, highlighting Romero and Han (2004) for discussion, and stating
that ‘any progress toward answering these more general questions [of how bias is derived
from negation and interrogation] will therefore have direct implications for the theory of
tag questions’ (Sailor 2011:17).
57A language can have VP-ellipsis without having canonical tag questions. Sailor (2011:81) cites Hebrew,
Swahili, Vietnamese and Malagasy.
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Back to Thoms et al.’s framework, then, to posit a separate C head for tag questions
does not allow us to maintain this syntactic relationship between tags and matrix biased
questions, instead requiring that tag questions are their own type of speech act requiring a
specific C head. While some authors (Krifka 2015, Farkas and Roelofsen 2017) have argued
that biased questions and tag questions are different speech acts from ordinary questions
(e.g. that they are something like a REQUEST•ASSERT), they have still maintained the
relationship between matrix biased questions and canonical tags. So, although there may
be tricky data to deal with in Scots regarding the presence of e.g. –int in Glasgow Scots
tags, this is not justification for arguing that tags in general are different speech acts with
different rules. If Thoms et al. did not posit a separate Force head for tag questions, they
would not be able to deal with the distribution of the data, as –int is unavailable in matrix
biased questions. Furthermore, this separate speech act proposal is redundant for standard
English, where the rule would be identical for matrix (biased) interrogatives and tags.
(281) EP for Cinterr: Cinterr+T+Neg −→ aux+–n’t in C
(282) EP for Ctag: Cinterr+T+Neg −→ aux+–n’t in C
Note also that Thoms et al.’s framework cannot deal with the variation in negation
patterns established by Domaneschi et al. (2017), where –n’t negation is preferred with
biased questions, and low not negation is preferred with true negative questions (again
without adding a separate biased interrogative C head).
Similarly, while the relationship between polar rhetorical questions and interrogative
exclamatives has not been extensively formalised, to posit a head for exclamatives separate
from rhetorical questions – as Thoms et al. do – ignores work which makes the claim that
one is a sort of the other (Zanuttini and Portner 2003, Delfitto and Fiorin 2014). This
particular issue is admittedly less important for the Scots data because, as we saw in
chapter 3, there was acceptability of –int and –n in both polar rhetorical questions and
exclamatives, and thus the notion that they are the same construction could be maintained
through one head. However, throughout the results presented in this paper, it seems as
though – as has been posited for biased questions and tag questions, or for rhetorical
questions and exclamatives – there are connections between all of these non-canonical
question constructions which should be explored, rather than attempting to cleave them
apart. Indeed, Thoms et al. hint at that themselves when they present the questions ‘why do
exclamatives and tags have the same form in C [in Scots]?’ and ‘why does standard English
realise negation in C in the same way in almost all cases?’ (2013:22). The interrelatedness
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of the data and the subsequent proliferation of ‘different’ contexts that the spanning model
gives rise to in respect of that (for example, in standard English) should be cause for
concern.
Furthermore, there is evidence that –n and –int are not base generated in a
middlefield, negative polarity position, due to their possibility of co-occurring with lower
negation.
(283) People widnae understand that, wint they no? (attested, Glasgow)
(284) Do’n they no have a bakery in Waas? (attested, Shetland)
In an example like (283), again following the VP-ellipsis analysis of tag questions,
the no in the wint they no tag must be the head of NegP given Lobeck’s licensing conditions
for VP-ellipsis – this lower no cannot be a constituent negation within VP. Similarly, in
(284), the particle –n acts together with the lower no to give one biased question meaning
– it is not the case that there is simply one negative position in the span that can give you
all the required flexibility for non-canonical questions with negation in Scots.
Outwith the realm of non-canonical questions, there are other problems with
Thoms et al.’s analysis. Firstly, their generalisation that –nae cannot be realised in C in
interrogatives due to the fact that the Cinterr head does not spell out C+T+Neg in Scots
as aux+–nae in C. While this seems to be generally true for polar interrogatives and
object wh-questions, the lack of spell out of negation in C in questions in Scots arguably











‘Who didn’t love your mother?’
(Shetland, from Aert-fast by Jacqueline Clark, 2012)
(286) Andy: You hearing of any spares for Pittodrie? Could do with one.
J: Nothing as yet mate. Asking the usuals. Who didny58get? We got 2
kids tickets off celtic. (Glasgow, jsstarryplough, 2017)
(285) is an example of a rhetorical subject wh-question in response to the question
‘but did you love my mother too?’, while (286) is clearly a true information-seeking
wh-question, asking which of Andy’s acquaintances did not get tickets for the game at
Pittodrie. Andy subsequently answers that it was his dad who did not get a ticket.
58Although the literature generally transcribes Central Scots [ne] negation as –nae, as I have done
throughout this thesis, Scottish Twitter users generally transcribe the sound as –ny.
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Thoms et al. (2013), following Brown and Millar (1980), suggest that aux+–nae in C
might be a feature of rural Scots dialects. It is therefore worth noting that although
(285) comes from a play written in Shetland dialect and so is certainly rural and could be
seen as more ‘archaic’ Scots, (286) comes from a (young) male Twitter user in Glasgow in
2017 – neither rural nor archaic.
Participants in this research also rated examples of subject wh-questions with –
na(e) highly59. For example, in Shetland, 81.25% (N=65) of information-seeking subject
wh-questions with incorporated –na negation were rated 5, with the other 18.25% (N=15)
were rated 4. 77.5% (N=62) of equivalent –nae constructions in Glasgow were also rated
5, with only two 1 or 2 ratings. Clearly, (285) and (286) are not exceptions to a rule.
Subject/non-subject asymmetries of this sort are not uncommon: there is of course
a noted (den Besten 1983, Koopman 1983) subject/non-subject asymmetry in wh-questions
in English (and Scots), whereby positive object wh-questions obligatorily have auxiliary
verbs which move to C, and positive subject wh-questions do not require auxiliaries and
thus do not trigger do-support like object wh-questions.
(287) Whoi did he give the present to ti?
(288) Who bought a present?
(289) *Who did buy a present?60
There have been subsequent arguments made that the aux(+neg) in wh-subject
questions is not spelled out in C, but rather in T. This could save Thoms et al.’s
generalisation. Pesetsky and Torrego (2001), for example, argue that nominative case is a
uT feature on the determiner D. C has both a uT and a uWh feature in a question. In
object wh-questions, the subject in T has the uT feature, but no uWh. The object does
have a uWh feature. Two separate movement operations must therefore take place in
order to check the two uninterpretable features on C, as in (290). Note that do-support is
also triggered to check uT.
(290) What did Mary buy?
[CP CuT, uWh [TP [MaryuT] T [VP bought whatuWh ]] −→
59Object wh-questions were not tested with –na(e) but rather with verb-subject-no constructions; 78.75%
(N=63) of those examples were rated 5 by participants in Shetland, and 80.52% (N=62) by participants
in Glasgow, indicating that –na(e) is the standard construction for subject wh-questions in comparison to
verb-subject-no in object wh-questions.
60This example is fine if did has focus stress. Pesetsky and Torrego (2001) point out that the addition
of focus do-support is independent of wh-movement, appearing in assertions, for example, and thus it is
not relevant for the overall picture of subject/object wh-asymmetry.
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[CP [whatuWh] diduT [TP [MaryuT] did [VP buy what ]]
In subject wh-questions, however, the subject in T carries both uT and uWh
features. Movement of the subject to C is enough to check both features and thus there is
no need for an auxiliary verb in T to move to C, or for do-support to be generated.
(291) Who bought the book?
[CP CuT uWh [TP [whouT, uWh] T [VP bought the book ]] −→
[CP [whouWh uT] [TP [who] T [VP bought the book ]]
So, Thoms et al. could argue that the evidence from subject wh-questions does not
provide a counter argument to the generalisation that negation cannot be realised in C in
Scots – it may well be that in subject wh-questions, negation is realised on T.
However, it would not be possible to implement this in Thoms et al’s ‘spanning’
approach without stating that there must be a separate C head specifically for subject
wh-questions, which stipulated that when there was a Csubjwhq head, the spell out rule for
the extended projection would be:
(292) Csubjwhq+T+Neg −→ aux+neg in T.
This is not impossible, but there is one obvious issue. While there could perhaps
be arguments made for separate C heads for polar interrogatives and wh-interrogatives,
or perhaps for rhetorical questions and information-seeking questions, it is difficult to see
a justification for treating subject and object wh-questions as different at the speech act
level, even taking account of the subject/non-subject asymmetries in their behaviour.
Both subject and object wh-questions semantically denote the set of possible
answers, and request that the addressee makes public which of these answers holds and
therefore how the set of possible worlds in the Common Ground should be restricted
(Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). While syntactically, their form might vary, the
constructions are not fundamentally different at a speech act level. Therefore, an analysis
like Pesetsky and Torrego’s (2001) approach, which retains the notion that these are the
same type of construction but with different positioning of features seems preferable –
retaining the singular speech act idea. This can deal with the asymmetry in auxiliary
generation in standard English – as well as the difference in availability of –na(e) in Scots
object vs subject wh-questions: –nae does not appear in C in interrogatives in Scots
varieties, but verbs in subject wh-questions are not in C, and therefore are not subject to
this constraint.
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In summary, then, Thoms et al.’s (2013) analysis for the Scots negation data is
extremely flexible. They argue that the variation in the data warrants this level of
flexibility. However, their analysis requires drawing arbitrary lines as to what speech acts
are deserving of syntactic heads, as we saw for biased questions and tag questions,
rhetorical questions and exclamatives, and object and subject wh-questions. The analysis
does not have strong predictive power, and leads to the potential for serious redundancy
as we saw in the biased question/tag question case in standard English. I believe there
are better analyses for the problematic Scots data than the extended projection analysis
suggested by Thoms et al., which do not run into these problems. Before I move on to
my proposed analysis, I will first consider the alternative analysis for Scots negation put
forward by Cormack and Smith (2012).
Cormack and Smith 2012
Cormack and Smith (2012) propose a cartographic style analysis for English negation.
The authors start by looking at standard English negation, and posit not just one but
three negation positions in English: AdvNEG, which scopes over only vP and is effectively
constituent negation; PolNEG, which acts like Laka’s (1990) polarity phrase and functions
as clausal negation; and EchoNEG, which is in C and performs ‘metalinguistic negation’.
They state that only not can be AdvNEG, only –n’t can be EchoNEG, and either –n’t or
not can be in PolNEG (see Figure 4.3).
Cormack and Smith (2012) subsequently extend this cartography to Scots negation.
Similarly to standard English, they argue no is in AdvNEG for constituent negation, while
–nae or no can be in PolNEG to contribute clausal negation. Most interestingly, they
suggest that –n’t is in EchoNEG in Scots. This is based on the work of Brown and Millar
(1980) and Millar and Brown (1979) who note that while –nae cannot be used in questions,
–n’t can (see (266-267)). The tree for this distribution can be seen in Figure 4.4.
Cormack and Smith’s analysis seems at first promising in that it recognises a
distinction between the role of something like –n’t in Scots (or –n, or –int), which is
available in some interrogatives, in that it is not situated in a main, polarising NegP.
However, this analysis has some major weaknesses.
The first is the conceptualisation of EchoNEG as a position for metalinguistic
negation in general. Metalinguistic negation is a ‘formally negative utterance’, so, one
which contains a negation marker and appears on the surface to be a negative





































Figure 4.4: Cartography of Scots negation posited by Cormack and Smith (2012).
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(Horn 1989:374). Metalinguistic negation could, for example, be used to correct a
pronunciation, as in (293). Alternatively, it could be used to correct the focus of a
proposition, as in (294), or to provide some contradiction and ‘a more exact indication of
the focus of negation’ (Horn 1989:371), as in (295).
(293) It’s not your pro[noUn]ciation you need to work on – it’s your pro[n2n]ciation.
(294) I’m not his brother – he’s my brother!
(295) Some men aren’t chauvinists – all men are chauvinists!
(examples from Horn 1989)
These instances of metalinguistic negation in Scots all accept –na(e); for example
(296).
(296) Mozart’s sonatas wirna for violin and piano, they were for piano and violin.
To argue that this EchoNEG is a position for ‘metalinguistic negation’ more broadly
does not seem to be a good direction. However, could it be re-conceptualised as a position
for ‘high negation’ that is specific to questions?
We could consider whether EchoNEG could be a high position for negation that
was exclusively for some sort of biased question negation, like falsum markers (Romero
2015). At a base level, this is problematic as Cormack and Smith do not consider the more
specific distribution of –n’t in non-canonical questions (rhetorical only (Tagliamonte and
Smith 2002)); furthermore, –int and –n are also not available in these contexts.
Some have argued that the type of negation found in biased questions is not falsum
but a type of true negation that denegates a speech act. For example, as mentioned
in section 1.1.1, Krifka (2015) argues that the negation found in biased questions is a
particular speech act operator. It embeds a ForceP that hosts assertion, and is scoped
over by a second ForceP which hosts request. It is this request operator that licenses
the interrogative word order; speech act level NegP is not accessible without the inclusion
of this request operator. The high negation subsequently acts to ‘denegate’ the lower
assertion force, asking the addressee if it is not this assertion that should be added to
CG.
(297) S believes that there is a vegetarian restaurant nearby, but hasn’t seen it, and
wants to ask A whether their belief is correct.
[ForceP request [NegP isin’t [ForceP assertion [TP there ti a vegetarian restaurant
here]]]]
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Krifka claims that this accounts for negation being syntactically high in biased
questions, which does appear to be common cross-linguistically. However, in chapter 1 I
discussed the fact that this is not the case in all languages, e.g. Japanese. Scots is like
Japanese in that negation remains in low position in matrix biased questions. This is
especially noticeable in Glasgow Scots, where high ‘negation’ –int is not at all available in
biased questions but verb-subject-no is – clearly, negation is not syntactically high in the
verb-subject-no construction.
Furthermore, Krifka’s analysis is designed for matrix biased questions, with
canonical tag questions a subset of matrix biased questions. If biased questions are
formed by a standard negation operator in a high NegP, denegating the assertion, the
same should be true of tag questions. But as we saw in chapter 3, biased questions and
tag questions have different forms in Glasgow Scots, and appear to be moving in that
direction in Shetland dialect. Krifka’s analysis clearly cannot work, therefore, just for tag
questions, exclamatives and rhetorical questions.
Furthermore, in section 4.2 I presented evidence that the contexts that permit tag
questions (and exclamatives and rhetorical questions) are contexts in which the speaker is
able to revise their commitment and add p to CG without any response or commitment
from the addressee – the speaker is able to be an independent source for the commitment,
in Gunlogson’s terms. I subsequently argued that there was no request force at play
in –n or –int constructions (although standard English tags do retain this). Therefore,
following a high NegP analysis of –n and –int in the style of Krifka would conflict with
the semantic role of the check move which does not require a request force.
The major problem, then, with positing any sort of high negation position
syntactically for the Scots data is that these analyses are designed to deal with matrix
biased questions. Tag questions have the same analysis; the problem posed by the Scots
data is that matrix biased questions and tag questions diverge in their form, with –int
available in tag questions but not biased questions, and –n the same for younger speakers
in Shetland.
Summary
In summary, neither Thoms et al. (2013) or Cormack and Smith (2012) are able to fully
account for the distribution of Scots particles like –n and –int in certain non-canonical
questions only, as seen in chapter 3. Thoms et al.’s account creates problems regarding
how many individual speech acts and Force heads are required, while Cormack and
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Smith’s analysis relies too heavily on the Scots particles being available in all
non-canonical question contexts, and particularly on the relationship between biased
questions and tag questions, to posit some sort of general ‘high negation’ position. As we
saw in the distribution in chapter 3, it is not the case that –int and –n are generally
available in non-canonical questions, and I thus posited that they were not specific
non-canonical negation, but a check markers.
In the next section, I thus argue that these particles, as well as –n’t in other Scots
varieties (Brown and Millar 1980, Millar and Brown 1979, Tagliamonte and Smith 2002),
should be given a syntactic analysis that is closer to something like innit – an invariant
particle which developed from a canonical tag, but now has a range of distinct meanings
(Anderson 2002). I will thus draw on the relationship between tag questions and
confirmational particles, as I did in the semantic analysis in section 4.2, rather than the
relationship between biased questions and tag questions. Specifically, I will situate these
particles in GroundP in the left periphery, following the neo-performative syntactic
framework of Wiltschko and Heim (2016).
4.4.3 A neo-performative analysis: –n and –int in GroundP
Motivating a discourse domain
The idea of having speech act type material in the left periphery goes back to Ross (1970)
and the ‘performative hypothesis’, in which a sentence’s illocutionary force is encoded
in a performative verb at deep structure. Strong arguments were made against the idea
of a ‘performative’ speech act layer in the syntax (Anderson 1971, Fraser 1974, Gazdar
1979), and the idea of encoding speech acts in syntax beyond a ForceP was not pursued
frequently. However, based on evidence from discourse particles and vocatives, there have
been some recent attempts to establish some sort of syntactic layer above CP that encodes
the speaker/addressee relationship – for example, Speas and Tenny (2003) and Haegeman
and Hill (2013) – based on evidence that syntactic phenomena can be seen occurring in
this domain.
For example, Romanian is one of a number of languages (e.g. Bulgarian, Czech,
Polish, Ukranian, Georgian (Daniel and Spencer 2012)) which has a specific vocative case,
indicating that case marking can take place in this extra-clausal domain.
(298) bare noun singular vocative plural vocative
fată ‘girl’ fato fetelor
băiat ‘boy’ băiate băiat,ilor
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(Romanian, Hill 2013:82)
There is evidence that particles – also outside of the main clause – can agree with
vocatives in number or person (shown in (299-300) for Romanian), indicating that
agreement can take place in this domain. In (299), fetelor is the vocative form for ‘girls’
which has the features [+feminine] and [+plural]. Given the [+plural] feature, the
particle lăsa which simply calls for the addressees’ attention, must therefore take the
second person plural ending t,i. As seen in (300), lăsa itself would not be grammatical in
this context. This agreement is interesting firstly because it is with the interlocutor(s),


















(Romanian, Haegeman and Hill 2013:375)
Moreover, there are confirmational particles in Austrian German that inflect
depending on the relationship between the speaker and the addressee, and whether the
speaker would refer to the addressee with the formal second person pronoun Sie or with
the informal second person pronoun du. Notably, this agreement is with the addressee
and not with any individual mentioned in the anchor clause, as can be seen in (301) and
(302) below – there is therefore no obvious connection to the proposition, but there is


























‘He has a new dog, right?’
(Austrian German, Wiltschko and Heim 2016:14)
Allocutive agreement, for example in Basque, also involves particles agreeing with















‘Peter worked’ (said to a female friend) (Basque, Oyharçabal 1993:92 )
There is also evidence of ordering constraints in this domain, indicating that there
is some syntactic structure (Haegeman and Hill 2013). In West Flemish, for example,











I’ve finished, y’know? (West Flemish, Haegeman and Hill 2013:375)
This evidence suggests that these particles and vocatives, which have often been
considered pragmatic and outside of the syntactic domain, should be formalised in syntax.
They have ordering restrictions, and can interact with things like case and agreement –
syntactic phenomena. The question is how they should be formalised.
Wiltschko and Heim: an overview
Wiltschko’s (2014) ‘Universal Spine Hypothesis’ centers on the premise that ‘language-
specific categories are constructed out of language-specific Units of Language and a limited
set of universal categories’ (2014:24). Units of Language include categories such as words
and morphemes, as well as more abstract concepts such as features and clause types.
Universal categories are projected on a universal spine which consists of four domains (a
similar classification is found in Travis (2006) and further attributed to Ken Hale’s lectures
at MIT, and a similar type of proposal with strong semantic connections for functional
projections is made in Ramchand and Svenonius (2014)):
• classification, corresponding to the vP, where an event is classified;
• point-of-view, corresponding to AspP, where the reference time is introduced;
• anchoring, corresponding to IP, where the event is ‘anchored’ to the utterance;









Figure 4.5: The conversation domain, as conceptualised by Wiltschko and Heim (2016).
Only as much of the syntactic spine as needs to be projected at any one time should
be projected.
For example, an embedded small clause such as ‘Britney Spears perform in Las
Vegas’ in ‘I saw Britney Spears perform in Las Vegas’ is a VP which does not require tense
or aspect. It thus only projects VP (306). In regular tensed matrix clauses in English, IP
must be projected (307); embedded complementiser clauses project CP (308).
(306) I saw [VP Britney Spearsi [ V’ perform in Las Vegas ]]]
(307) [IP Britney Spearsi [ I [VP ti [V’ performs in Las Vegas]]]]
(308) I know [CP [C’ that [IP Britney Spearsi [ I [VP ti [V’ performs in Las Vegas]]]]]
Given this evidence that clauses ‘grow’ as necessitated by their linguistic context,
Wiltschko and Heim (2016) argue that the clause can be extended further to include a
‘conversation domain’ above CP, which can be projected if/when a speaker wants to
incorporate some specific speaker/addressee relationship or action syntactically, for
example with a confirmational. This does not require a fully performative syntax like
Ross’s (1970), but a domain that is invoked when required.
I will model the conversation domain in the same way as Wiltschko and Heim (2016),
as seen in Figure 4.5 and detailed here.
There are two layers to the conversation domain. The lower layer, GroundP, encodes
the speaker’s attitude towards the proposition, with the intention of ‘grounding’ it in the
discourse (Clark and Brennan 1991), with ‘grounding’ equivalent to ‘adding to the Common
Ground’.
The GroundP layer is separated into two projections: GroundS, which encodes the
speaker’s own attitude towards the proposition, and GroundA, which encodes the
speaker’s belief about the addressee’s attitude to the proposition. Wiltschko and Heim
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justify separating these two perspectives syntactically based on evidence from e.g.
Cantonese, where different particles encode specific meanings depending on the beliefs of
the speaker or addressee. Lam (2014) argues that Cantonese me1 particle is used when
the speaker believes ¬p and wants to find out what the addressee thinks, while ho2 is
used when the speaker thinks the addressee believes p and wants to confirm this belief is
true. The me1 particle, therefore, is in the GroundS projection, while ho2 is in
GroundA. They claim that the fact that the particles sit in different projections comes
from evidence that there are ordering restrictions when the particles co-occur, with ho2
always occurring after me1 61.
(309) Jimmy is the first of a long taxi queue. A taxi is coming, but someone not from the
queue opens the door of the taxi saying loudly that he is in a hurry. Everyone in the























‘What can one get by just by being loud?! I assume you’d agree it’s a valid
question, right?’
(Cantonese, Lam 2014:64)
The authors argue that there is also evidence from English varieties that some
particles can be situated either in GroundS and GroundA, depending on which
perspective the speaker wants to encode. Canadian eh, for example, can be used to
confirm the speaker’s belief of p (in GroundS), and also to confirm the speaker’s belief
that the addressee knows p (in GroundA) – the latter case an instance where
confirmational right or huh cannot be used.
(310) Mary is walking her new dog when she runs into John. She is expecting that he
would congratulate her on the new dog, but he’s not mentioning it. So she isn’t
sure anymore whether he actually realizes that she got a new dog. So she utters:
I have a new dog, eh/*right/*huh?
(example from Wiltschko and Heim 2016:27)
The highest projection is ResponseP. Based on the idea of call on addressee
(Beyssade and Marandin 2006b), this projection encodes what the speaker wants the
61Further discussion with native Cantonese speakers, however, suggests that ho2 and me1 do not co-
occur. There may be dialectal variation.
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addressee to do with the proposition in order to complete the ‘grounding’ process. The
evidence the authors present for separating ResponseP from GroundP comes from
languages like Medumba, a Bantu language, which combines two particles in order to get
the same meaning as e.g. Canadian eh. While k0la marks the speaker’s propositional
attitude, and is situated in the grounding layer, particle a signals that the proposition is
up for question and the speaker wishes for the addressee to confirm p. This a particle













‘You have a new dog, eh?’ (Medumba, Wiltschko and Heim 2016:26)
In English, Wiltschko and Heim argue that the meaning of confirmation particles
can be decomposed into the meaning of the particle itself, and the meaning of the intonation
contour associated with the utterance. While the particles themselves (such as right, eh
and huh) are in the ground projections, intonation sits in ResponseP.
It is worth at this point considering Wiltschko’s (2017) extension to Wiltschko and
Heim (2016). Building on the Universal Spine Hypothesis, Wiltschko (2017) argues that
the projections in the conversation domain are also ergative constructions, modelled as in
Figure 4.6.
Within this framework, Wiltschko argues that standard declarative assertions
project both Grounding and Response domains, indicating that the proposition is in the
speaker’s set of beliefs (through the use of Ground-S as the external argument which has
no lexical content) but requiring no further information to be given by any lexical item in
any area of the conversation domain62.
Instead of positing that confirmational particles are in this grounding domain,
Wiltschko instead argues that the particles are incorporated into ResponseP. The
addressee is merged as an external argument with no lexical content in the Respsubj
position. Rising intonation, marked with /, is encoded in the resp head. The particle
itself, such as huh or eh, is in Respobj and ‘marks the utterance as the object of the
requested response’. This can be seen in Figure 4.7.
Polar questions are argued to have the same structure as is presented in Figure
4.7 except without any Respobj position; Austrian German particle jo is taken to be an
instance where the Respobj position is filled with no information in respP – jo marks out
an utterance as a response without requesting any subsequent response.


























































Figure 4.8: Location of –n and –int in the left periphery.
Wiltschko does not discuss how Cantonese particles me1 and ho2 fit into this
framework; given Lam’s categorisation, one might assume that ho2, as a particle which
requests confirmation, would be in RespP, while me1, as additional information about the
speaker’s stance, would be in Ground-S. However, this is purely an assumption.
I will use and adapt the conversation domain framework from Wiltschko and Heim
(2016) and Wiltschko (2017) in order to position Scots particles –n and –int syntactically
in a way that builds on their relationship with invariant confirmational particles. In
particular, I will suggest that while particles like right or huh, which request further
confirmation, may be in RespP, –int and –n are in Ground-A, and offer further
information about the speaker’s belief that p is in SP(a) (see section 4.3.3 for more
details).
–n and –int in GroundP
Recall the semantic analysis I gave for the Scots particles –n and –int in section 4.3. The
particles are check moves, which are defined as indicating that the speaker believes that
the addressee believes p. They do not explicitly request a response. Syntactically, therefore,
I argue that these particles head ground in Wiltschko’s (2017) Ground-A domain.
I believe this is the best way to model the distribution of the particles. I will discuss
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this for tag questions on positive anchors, exclamatives and rhetorical questions, with key
justification coming from tag questions on negative anchors.
Following the VP-ellipsis analysis of tag questions given above Sailor (2011), and
the observation of Ladd (1981) that falling tag questions (the most frequently occurring
type of tag question (Dehé and Braun 2013)) have their own nuclear contours, I assume
that the anchor clause of the tag question and the tag itself are in separate clauses, rather
than involving any sort of movement of the clause above the tag, or duplication, as in
analyses presented by Culicover (1992) or den Dikken (1995).
In a tag question with a positive anchor, the main clause is a straightforward
declarative assertion in which the speaker is happy to take responsibility for p in CG (see
section 4.3 for more details). Following Wiltschko (2017), nothing is required to be in
Ground-S with a standard assertion, where the speaker is taking responsibility for p. The
additional semantic quality of the tag question is based around the relationship between
the speaker and the addressee, and specifically states that the speaker believes the
addressee believes p. While I argued that this encourages a response from the addressee
as the speaker has made a claim about what the addressee believes (see section 4.3 for
more details on the semantic and pragmatic distribution of the form), it is not directly
requesting a response; it is instead checking the speaker is able to explicitly add that p
is believed by the addressee into their understanding of the Common Ground, providing
this is not explicitly denied.
I thus posit that the positive anchor clause in the tag is a regular assertion; the
VP-elided clause that follows it contains the –n or –int particle in GroundP, selecting for
p to be checked. Both semantically and syntactically, this is a separate clause. I thus
do not believe a tag question and its anchor are a singular complex speech act, but rather
consecutive speech acts (see section 4.3 for further discussion).
Exclamatives and rhetorical questions are straightforwardly accounted for in this
framework as the same constructions syntactically63, but without VP-ellipsis – the –n and
–int particles again are used specifically to target the relationship between the speaker and
the addressee.
This analysis deals especially well with tag questions on negative anchors. As we
saw in chapter 3, participants did not accept –n or –int on tag questions with negative
anchors.
63The scalarity aspect of exclamatives that I discussed in section 4.3 could be dealt with by a silent pos
operator situated in the VP (Kennedy and McNally 2005), as compared to the rhetorical question which



















Figure 4.9: Tag question on positive anchor in Glasgow Scots: She’ll come, wint she?.


















Figure 4.10: Exclamative in Glasgow Scots: Dint they sound great!. Movement will be
discussed in section 4.4.3.
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(312) *She canna come, can’n she? (Shetland)
(313) *She cannae come, kint she? (Glasgow)
At first glance, this is one point that would perhaps be in favour of the NegP
analysis, otherwise ruled out above. Generally, tag questions are of the opposite polarity
to their anchor. While there are some contexts where positive tags on positive anchors are
acceptable, negative tag questions on negative anchors in English are extremely uncommon
(Tottie and Hoffman 2006). If –n and –int are not in NegP, as I am arguing, why are these
particles not available to check a negative proposition?
Tag questions with –int and a lower negative marker no were acceptable in neutral
evidential contexts for Glasgow speakers, and tag questions with –n and a lower no were
to some extent acceptable in neutral contexts for older Shetland speakers.
(314) She canna come, can’n she no? (Shetland)
(315) She cannae comme, kint she no? (Glasgow)
While these constructions have not previously been analysed in the literature, there
has been some discussion suggesting that these are instances of two negation markers
which are ‘cancelling each other out’ (Millar and Brown 1979, Beal 1993) in the sense of
double negation (Horn 1989:22), leading to an interpretation of the tag as positive, and
therefore able to occur on a negative anchor. This would be surprising if it were the
case: double negation is extremely marked in languages that allow it, including English
(Svenonius 2002, Blanchette 2015), and is only licensed either when the two negations are
syntactically too far apart to enter into concord, or when contradicting a previous negative
assumption (Blanchette 2015:17). Neither of these things are the case in examples like
(314) or (315), especially given that these tags are not acceptable in the context where
there is a contradiction.
However, the check analysis accounts for this data nicely, ruling out examples like
(312) and (313) syntactically. It is also able to account for the difference in acceptablity
by evidential context.
Recall that VP-ellipsis must be licensed either by an IP or a NegP, whichever is
the head most immediately governing the VP that is to be elided. In a negative clause,
VP-ellipsis is ‘grammatical when empty VP is preceded by contracted or uncontracted
negation’ [in NegP] (Lobeck 1995:154).
(316) Mary will leave but John will not [VPleave].
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(317) *Mary will leave but John will [NegPnot [VPleave]
Furthermore, recall that the semantic analysis for the check marker is that it is
checking that the proposition in the CP below is in the addressee’s beliefs. When there is a
negative anchor to the tag question, the check marker must select the negative proposition
to check, otherwise there would be a polarity mismatch between the anchor and the tag,
with the speaker taking responsibility for a negative proposition in the anchor clause, but
attempting to check that the opposite, positive proposition is in the addressee’s belief set
in the tag.
(318) She can come [groundP kjint [IP shei [I tj [VP ti come]]]
(319) She cannae come [groundP kjint [IP shei [I tj [NegP no [VP ti come]]]]
(320) * She cannae come [groundP kjint [IP shei [I tj [VP ti come]]]
This analysis better accounts for the data than an analysis which argues that
somehow this is an instance of two negative markers cancelling each other out. Firstly, in
order to be licensing VP-ellipsis, the no negation in examples like (319) must be in the
clausal, polarity instantiating NegP position and not in some sort of adverbial negation
position where it would be elided. So, without adding some special ‘high negation’
position, there is no obvious way to account for both of these particles as in NegP
projections – and as we saw above, there is no reason to suggest that –int or –n is in a
special ‘high negation’ position.
Finally, the check analysis in which the marker checks the proposition in CP is in
the addressee’s belief set accounts for the variation in acceptability of these –int + no and –
n + no type tags depending on the evidential context, as seen in section 3.3.11. Examples
of these tags on negative anchors in neutral evidential contexts, such as (321), scored
significantly higher than they did on negative anchors in negative evidential contexts, such
as (322), for speakers in Glasgow and for older speakers in Shetland.
(321) For some months, there was a cat that would sit outside my door. You would
always say hi to it. However, you realise you haven’t see it for a while. You come in
and you say:
That cat isna/hasnae been here for a while, is’n it no / hint it no?
(322) I have been trying to win a holiday by collecting the codes on the backs of crisp
packets. You thought this was ridiculous all along. When the closing date passes, I
tell you I am really disappointed not to win. You say:
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You didna(e) really think you’d win, did’n you no / dint you no?
If these tags were simply a case of two negative markers cancelling each other out and
thus giving a positive tag, there would be no reason why the tag would be more acceptable
in neutral evidential contexts over negative evidential contexts. As is also shown in section
3.3.3, there was no contextual difference in acceptability for standard reverse polarity tags
on negative anchors, so it is not the case that in general, tags were dispreferred in negative
evidential contexts.
Finally, as is mentioned above, double negation is used exclusively in contradictory
environments (Blanchette 2015). It would therefore be very surprising if these tags were
double negatives, but were preferred specifically in contexts where there was no
contradiction between the speaker’s existing belief and their surrounding evidential
context. I thus conclude that a neo-performative analysis for –int and –n, specifically
with the particles in Ground-A, is the best analysis for the data.
Movement to GroundP
Following this analysis where –int or –n associates with Ground-A in groundP, there is then
a question of how and why the auxiliary moves to combine with these particles in the left
periphery. I have argued that constructions with these particles are not interrogatives, not
introducing any sort of interrogative speech act or {p, ¬p} to the semantics. Syntactically,
this means there is no [Q] feature on C triggering interrogative inversion. How does the
auxiliary get to CP?
[Q] is of course not the only feature that can trigger movement in the syntax – in
fact, head movement is often ‘seen as a way to fulfil some kind of morphological licensing,
driven by the status of some head as a bound affix or not ’ (Koopman 2000:264) – clearly,
the particles discussed in thesis are bound affixes. For considerable discussion on what
triggers head movement, e.g. c-selection, EPP, wh-, and how head movement should be
analysed see e.g. Koopman (1983), Travis (1984), Baker (1988), Chomsky (1995), Pesetsky
and Torrego (2001), Matushansky (2006), Roberts (2010). I follow these accounts, which
support the syntactic nature of head movement, rather than Chomsky (2001), Mahajan
(2003), Müller (2004) who propose rethinking the existence of head movement altogether.
In particular, I follow Roberts (2010), who proposes a system of head movement
based on ‘defective goals’. In this system, a goal can move to a probe iff it is ‘defective’ as
defined in (i)).
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i) A goal G is defective iff G’s formal features are a proper subset of those of G’s probe
P.
In order to account for differences between French and English with respect to V-to-
T, for example, Roberts proposes that there is a parametric difference between the feature
specifications on T64. In French, T has [iT, uV, uφ]. T’s [uφ] feature will be dealt with by
the φ-features on the subject that intervenes between T and v; v hosts [uT, iV] features,
which constitute a proper subset of T’s features, and thus movement is triggered.
In English, on the other hand, T hosts [iT, uφ]. There is no [uV] feature on T,
and so the [iV] feature on v leads its features not to be a proper subset of those on T.
Head movement is therefore not triggered. In order to have subject-auxiliary inversion
in questions, there is T-to-C movement, with T[iT, uφ] being probed by C[uT, iC, iQ] as a
defective goal. As the main verb has not moved to v from V, it is not available to move
to C – vP is a phase head (Citko 2014) and the main verb has not moved to the edge of
the phase by the time it is spelled out (Roberts 2010). do is thus inserted as a last resort
in an unfilled T, and moves to C, or an auxiliary which has been base generated in T will
also move.
In the Scots data, I propose that the auxiliary in T moves to combine with the –int
or –n particle in groundP following this same ‘defective goal’ theory.
I assume in order to trigger movement, –int and –n have a [uT] feature which must
check with [iT] on T. In order to be a defective goal, i.e. in a proper subset relationship to
groundP, T’s [uφ] feature must be checked before –int or –n is merged in; this will happen
locally with the subject. Movement could thus be accounted for by the defectiveness of T
in relation to the –int and –n heads, as seen in Figure 4.11.
Although this is not standard interrogative inversion, do-support is still triggered
in these contexts. This is unsurprising given the assumption that the main verb has not
moved to the edge of the vP phase by the time it is spelled out (Roberts 2010). In order
to combine with the affix in cases where there isn’t an auxiliary in T, do-support occurs
to ensure that the affix isn’t left stranded. This would mean that the conversation domain
is in a singular phase with CP. I also follow Roberts (2010) and Biberauer and Roberts
(2010) in proposing that head movement is not cyclic and but rather follows the idea of
phases and Spellout; this means that it is not necessary for the auxiliary to move through
64Biberauer and Roberts (2010) propose a more complex mechanism for V-to-T movement which derives
from the richness of tense morphology (see also e.g. Holmberg and Platzack (1995), Rohrbacher (1999),
Koeneman and Zeijlstra (2014) on the Rich Agreement Hypothesis). For the purposes of this thesis, the
level of detail presented by Biberauer and Roberts (2010) is not relevant; I simply present Roberts’ theory
here as an example of how features can cause movement of verbal heads.
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C to get to groundP.
In section 4.4.3 I discussed the reasons that have been used in the literature in
order to justify incorporating a discourse domain – primarily, that syntactic phenomena
such as agreement and ordering effects can be seen. My proposal for head movement to
the discourse domain based on features and defective goals is further evidence that there
is a need to syntacticize this sort of ‘conversation domain’. There can be affixes in this
domain which must to be attached to material that comes from within the proposition.
The reanalysis which has gone on in Scots has caused this to be the case.
I note that while I argue in favour of head movement within the syntax here, it is
also possible that movement of the auxiliary to groundP could be purely for PF reasons,
as an instantiation of Lasnik’s ‘Stray Affix Hypothesis’ (1981). The Stray Affix Hypothesis
is a morphological restriction that states that a bound affix cannot be realised at PF
if it is not syntactically dependent e.g. if it has not been affixed to something. This
would therefore trigger head movement of the auxiliary to the left periphery and would
still account for the data in an analysis which wished to reject pure syntactic movement
(though see Matushansky (2006) and Roberts (2010) for arguments in favour of syntactic
movement due to e.g. LF effects).
A note on other varieties
It is not only the two varieties of Scots investigated in this thesis that accept tags on
negative anchors like the –int + no and –n + no tags described above. As discussed in
chapter 2, these tags are found in a number of British English varieties. Importantly, these
constructions are not available in standard English, or generally in southern/non-British
non-standard varieties.
(323) Your name’s no Willie, isn’t it no? (Edinburgh, Millar and Brown 1979)
(324) She can’t come, can’t she not? (Newcastle, Beal 1993)
(325) She won’t come, won’tn she not? (Tyrone, Warren Maguire p.c.)
In the Edinburgh and Newcastle examples, –n’t negation is found in these
constructions, while in Tyrone an additional –n can be added to any monosyllabic
negative auxiliary, with a similar distribution to Shetland –n and Glasgow –int, above65.
65Warren Maguire (p.c.) states that this additional –n is available in tag questions on positive anchors
in Tyrone English, especially in neutral evidential contexts, as well as these examples with a lower not on
a negative anchor. He attests some acceptability of –n in interrogative exclamatives and polar rhetorical








































Figure 4.11: Movement of can to groundP, where it takes –n as an affix, due to its status
as a defective goal in a construction like ‘You can run, can’n you?’ (note also VP-ellipsis).
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Given these Edinburgh and Newcastle examples, it is easier to see how a double negation
analysis arose – these tags do not have any markers which are clearly different from
negation markers that are available in negative declaratives or imperatives in standard
English. However, note that in Edinburgh Scots, main propositional negation is –nae66,
not –n’t. Having –n’t is therefore unusual when compared with the general realisations of
negation in the variety. (This is noted by Cormack and Smith (2012), whose analysis for
Edinburgh Scots –n’t more generally is discussed above.)
The Newcastle example is perhaps the most puzzling: however, we know from
Tagliamonte and Smith (2002) that availability of –n’t in negative questions in English
appears to operate on a continuum from north to south of the UK, with –n’t only
available in ‘rhetorical questions’ in Scotland, the north of England (e.g. Newcastle) and
Northern Ireland. In fact, it appears that in these varieties –n’t acts like Glasgow Scots
–int or Shetland dialect –n, with the same syntactic and pragmatic distribution.
I thus hypothesise that in varieties where –n’t is only available in Tagliamonte
and Smith’s ‘rhetorical questions’ (including tags, as is shown for Edinburgh by Millar
and Brown (1979) and for Newcastle by Beal (1993)) but not in biased questions or true
negative questions, –n’t is a check marker, not negation, and is situated in groundP,
just like –n and –int. A full investigation of the distribution of –n’t in Edinburgh Scots
and Newcastle English is outwith the scope of this thesis – however, from the existing
descriptions, this seems to be the case.
4.4.4 The role of prosody
Above, I argued in favour of analysing Scots check moves –n and –int as being situated
in the left periphery, following the neo-performative framework of Wiltschko and Heim
(2016) and Wiltschko (2017). The particles are situated in groundP, encoding the
speaker’s perception of the addressee’s beliefs. This analysis appropriately captures the
relationship of these particles to things like confirmationals, and to the speech act
domain, while providing further evidence that there is a need to have some sort of
speaker/addressee relationship syntactically encoded at the periphery.
A core part of the proposal put forward in Wiltschko and Heim (2016) and
expanded by Wiltschko (2017) is that in English varieties, intonation is situated in
ResponseP, following a Truckenbrodt (2015) style analysis in which rising intonation
66Of course, –nae would not be available in question contexts; however, the point is that –n’t is not the
standard propositional negation in Edinburgh Scots; therefore, –n’t stands out in comparison, unlike in
the Newcastle examples, where –n’t is also the main propositional negation.
253
encodes the meaning of a questioning speech act and thus provides a ‘call on addressee’.
They argue using the example of Canadian eh that while the particle eh itself grounds
the proposition (or, in Wiltschko’s extended analysis, marks out the proposition as the
object for responding to), it is rising intonation that provides the call on the addressee to
confirm the speaker’s belief of p. They contrast this example of ‘confirmational’ eh with a
particle they describe as ‘narrative’ eh. Narrative eh is reportedly used to mark discourse
continuation and does not have strongly rising intonation. This can be seen in Figure 4.7.
The incorporation of intonation into the syntactic structure as Wiltschko and Heim
(2016) and Wiltschko (2017) do predicts that intonation contours exhibit grammaticality
and that there should be a strong association between certain particles and intonation
structures. For example, right and huh only associate with rising intonation which sits
above it in the structure; rising intonation in ResponseP alone is taken to signal polar
questions.
I varied rising vs falling intonation in the judgment tasks that participants carried
out, with the hypothesis that falling intonation would be preferred: as standard assertion
intonation, falling intonation encodes no explicit call on addressee and is thus the ‘default’
intonation if none is syntactically encoded in the Wiltschko and Heim framework. This also
follows from the contingency analysis for rising intonation (Gunlogson 2008) supported in
section 4.3.
However, there was no effect of prosodic contour on the acceptability of –n or –int
at any point, and so intonation was excluded from the final models. It is also worth noting
that intonation was also varied in the standard verb-subject-no form of the interrogative
constructions tested, and again no effect of intonation was found.
It does not seem to be the case that participants could not hear differences in
prosody. For example, as filler examples, participants were asked to judge examples of
negative imperatives. Negative imperative subjects are argued to be available either above
(high) or below (low) don’t, with true imperative subjects above don’t distinguished from
vocatives by the lack of an intonational boundary between the subject and don’t (Jensen
2003, Zanuttini 2008, Potsdam 1996). However, results showed that participants in both
Shetland and Glasgow dispreferred examples of negative imperatives with high subjects
(with no intonation break), which had a significantly lower mean acceptability rating than
imperatives with low subjects. This is not predicted if both are available. This shows that
participants are paying attention to the intonation, in that the only thing blocking the
(grammatical) vocative interpretation of the ‘high subjects’ is the lack of intonation break.
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Additional comments provided by the participants on the imperative examples
also expressed the opinion that in the high cases, the subject wasn’t ‘stressed’ enough, or
that there needed to be more of a separation between the subject and don’t – i.e., to be
acceptable, the ‘subject’ actually needed to be a vocative. This has two consequences:
firstly, for negative imperatives, it suggests that true high subjects are not actually
available, against the opinions and judgments given in the literature. Further research
here is required, but is outwith the scope of this research. Secondly, however, and more
pertinently for the argument presented here, this result shows that there are contexts
where the judgments given by the participants in this research were affected by
intonation. This adds weight to the argument that whether the intonation was rising or
falling was not important for the overall acceptability of the –n or –int construction and
should not be encoded in the syntactic structure.
Furthermore, direct comments from participants on the –n or –int examples
themselves indicate that varying intonation was not crucial for acceptability. For
example, when asked directly about the acceptability of rising intonation, participant
GY01, a young Glaswegian man, said that it was acceptable, although he offered an
example with falling intonation as perhaps a more usual way of hearing it.
GY01: I would expect to hear that all the time
E: yeah?
GY01 aye five
E: ok ... even–
GY01: the the ‘hint’
E: even– yeah
GY01 ‘hint’ is like really really common I think
E: mhm ... would you–
GY01 more so than like ‘dint’
E: ok ok ‘hint’ more common ok ... emm would you
expect to hear it in
that way like that really sort of surprise like
‘hint ↗they’
kind of way
GY01: aye or like ‘hint ↘ye’
E: ‘hint ↘ye’ yeah
GY01: yeah
E: ok
Moreover, GY09, another young Glaswegian man, commented that he wanted more
falling intonation on –int tags on three occasions. However, two of those three occasions
already had falling intonation. This suggests that this particular participant was aware of
the intonation and was paying attention to it, but that the meaning or acceptability of the
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construction was not affected by the intonation contour.
All of these comments indicate that intonation does not encode a specific semantic
meaning to the –n or –int constructions that requires syntacticization, but rather some
more loosely pragmatic meaning, the acceptability of which is more able to be affected by
context (as has been found in other work on the role of intonation contours in
establishing speaker/addressee beliefs or speech acts (Liberman and Sag 1974, Ladd 1978,
1980, Ward and Hirschberg 1985)). Wiltschko and Heim’s (2016) framework, which
formalises intonation in the syntax in the same way as particles, cannot accurately
capture this difference in semantic vs pragmatic meaning.
Evidence from other non-canonical questions also lends support to this.
Classically, polar rhetorical questions have been assumed to have falling intonation (Han
2002), or perhaps a mixture of rising and falling intonation (Banuazizi and Creswell
1999). However, Dehé (2017) shows that different combinations of boundary tones,
nuclear accent placements and overall nuclear contour patterns contribute to speakers’
interpretation of an interrogative as a rhetorical question. Clearly, many complex facets
of intonation can contribute to the meaning of a construction and it is not clear how all
of these could be syntacticized in the way that Wiltschko and Heim try to do.
I follow Gunlogson (2008) in arguing that rising intonation signals contingency
(see section 4.3.5 for more details). When there is no rising intonation, the validity of the
speaker’s move no longer depends on the subsequent moves of the addressee. This
accounts for the lack of variation in acceptability of constructions based on their
intonation – regardless of which is the preferred intonation in production, participants
were able to be flexible about the pressure that the example was putting on the
addressee.
This result points in favour of an analysis where intonation does contribute meaning,
but from a separate modular domain (Selkirk 1981, 1984, Nespor and Vogel 1986, Zec and
Inkelas 1990, Jackendoff 2002, Büring 2013) such as through an intonation phrase, or a
pairing mechanism between syntactic structures and prosodic structures, giving ordered
<s,p> pairs for interpretation at the semantic/pragmatic level. I do not take any position
on which of these models is most appropriate for the data. While this thesis cannot
shed much light on the exact interfaces, it certainly suggests that when conceptualising
production, we must take into account the fact that in perception studies, participants do
not consider intonation integral to the acceptability of non-canonical question utterances,
despite preferences in production.
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4.4.5 Implications for confirmationals
Wiltschko and Heim (2016) argue that the difference between ‘confirmational’ and
‘narrative’ eh, as discussed above, is purely the addressee response requirements. Rising
intonation in the confirmational case puts the proposition ‘up for question’ and requires
an addressee response, while narrative eh, with its falling intonation, does not. However,
they provide only one example paragraph to demonstrate the two intonations, which
comes from a radio monologue. Although the ehs in the monologue vary in their
intonation, at no point is there an addressee that directly responds or confirms what the
speaker is saying – not even following the examples which have strongly rising intonation.
Of course, there are arguments to be made about the rhetorical nature of this kind of
monologue, acting as conversation without a direct addressee. However, this weakens the
strong argument made by Wiltschko and Heim that the intonation is key to the meaning
of the particle; key enough to be represented in the syntax. Clearly, it is not essential
that an addressee responds, though there may be a stronger pull on one to do so in a
conversation when there is rising intonation.
I suggest, then, that similar to the situation with Scots –n and –int particles,
there may be prosodic preferences for these confirmational particles that come out in
production studies. However, these intonation contours are not essential for the meaning
of the particle, and do not need to be syntacticized in such a way as to make them part
of the core meaning: the acceptability of the construction is not affected by the intonation
contour.
Instead, I suggest that while Wiltschko and Heim are right to say that the meaning
of a confirmational should be broken down into the contribution of the particle and the
contribution of the intonation, intonation is part of a separate domain. The contingency
(or lack thereof) invoked by the rising intonation contributes pragmatic meaning, but does
not have to be syntactically encoded.
The weaker meaning of contingency compared to ‘up for question’ (i.e. contributing
the meaning of the speech act) implies that there needs to be more semantic content to
the contribution of the particle. In Wiltschko and Heim’s analysis, they posit that a tag
like right ‘marks the proposition as the object up for question’. Rather, I suggest that a
particle like right must semantically encode some sort of confirmational meaning. right
















Figure 4.12: Confirmational right heading ResponseP instead of the rising intonation
posited by Wiltschko and Heim (2016) or Wiltschko (2017).
4.4.6 Implications for English canonical tags
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that although particles like Shetland dialect –n,
Glasgow Scots –int and even –n’t in some Scots and northern English varieties may look
superficially like negation, they are not. However, as stated above, I believe there is good
reason to maintain the relationship between biased questions like (326) and tag questions
like (327) established in the literature (van Rooij and Šafářová 2003, Sailor 2011, Krifka
2015). Tag questions are thus VP-elided biased questions, and the –n’t in examples like
(327) is not a check move. In fact, I argue that the other tag questions in Scots, the
verb-subject-no tags, are also instances of these VP-elided biased questions.
(326) Can’t she come too?
(327) She can come, can’t she? (standard English)
(328) Can she no come too?
(329) She can come, can she no? (Scots varieties)
Syntactically, there is no reason to invoke the conversational domain in these tags
– they are interrogatives, with T-to-C movement due to the [Q] feature on C. Intonation
is contributed from a separate domain, and either contributes contingency or not.
One final phenomenon worth noting: Reese and Asher (2006) point out that tag
questions with their own nuclear contours can have rising intonation; however, there are
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also instances of tags which do not have an independent nucleus separate from their anchor
clause (also discussed by Ladd (1981)). These tags always have rising intonation (Ladd
1981, Reese and Asher 2006, Dehé and Braun 2013). I have not discussed post-nuclear
tags in this thesis. However, it may be interesting to investigate whether these tags are
syntactically different from canonical tags with a separate nucleus. For example, these
tags appear to behave differently with regards to polarity item licensing, as shown by Ladd
(1981), and permit by any chance, which only appears in neutral (non-biased) questions
(Reese and Asher 2006). (In the following examples, I use Ladd’s notation in which ‘=’
(e.g. (330)) signals that the tag is post-nuclear, while ‘/’ (e.g. (331)) indicates that the tag
has a separate nucleus.
(330) J can’t come too=can she?
(331) *J can’t come too / can she? (Ladd 1981:169)
(332) M can’t come, by any chance=can she?
(333) *M can’t come, by any chance / can she?
(334) *M can come, by any chance=can’t she?
This suggests that post-nuclear tags are complex interrogatives. (330) is acceptable
because the negation in the main clause is biased question negation and thus does not
anti-license PPIs, while in (331) the negation is regular clausal negation. (332) must be a
neutral (non-biased) question to license by any chance. This is based on the form of the
tag, which is positive. The same construction is not licensed in the nuclear tag form (333)
as there it would be part of a declarative clause, with the nuclear tag (‘neutral’ question)
entirely separate. (334) is ruled out because the negation in the tag makes it a biased, and
therefore not neutral, question (Reese and Asher 2006).
There may also be differences in the possibility for mismatches between the anchor
and the tag. Sailor (2011) argues that evidence from mismatched tags and anchors (for
example, in terms of their auxiliary verb or their subject) works in favour of ruling out a
movement/duplication analysis. This is indeed true of nuclear tag questions, but dubious
for post-nuclear tag questions, as in these examples:
(335) *John is drinking scotch and Mary is drinking whisky=aren’t they?
(336) *We ought to leave now=shouldn’t we? (examples adapted from Sailor 2011)




In this section, I have built on the semantic and pragmatic analyses I established for the
particles –n in Shetland dialect and –int in Glasgow Scots. Although they may look on the
surface like negation markers, and appear in contexts where negation markers appear in
standard English, I argued that their limited pragmatic distribution meant that they were
better analysed as discourse particles, specifically check moves. In this section, then, I
presented a syntactic analysis for the particles which aligned with this semantic analysis,
drawing on the relationship between canonical tag questions and confirmational particles.
Firstly, I briefly considered the two existing syntactic analyses of negative markers
in Scots – Thoms et al. (2013) and Cormack and Smith (2012) – and whether the data
presented in this thesis could be accounted for in either of these frameworks. However, I
showed that both of these accounts are problematic for the data presented here, due to
the established relationship between biased questions and tag questions, assumptions that
would have to be made about speech acts, and the possibility of having more than one
‘negation’ marker in one clause.
Instead, I made use of the neo-performative syntactic framework established by
Wiltschko and Heim (2016) and Wiltschko (2017). The –int and –n particles are situated
in groundP, a projection for additional grounding information. Rather than being
syntactically interrogatives, triggering movement through a [Q] feature on C, I motivate
head movement to this discourse domain using Roberts’ (2010) theory of defective goals,
with –int and –n probing for an [iT] feature. Movement is licensed due to T’s features
not equalling a proper subset of ground ’s features. I therefore provide evidence of another
syntactic phenomenon (head movement) operating in the discourse domain, building on
the evidence presented in the literature from e.g. Haegeman and Hill (2013) and Hill
(2013) regarding agreement and ordering restrictions.
The analysis I presented here is also able to explain the otherwise puzzling tags
on negative anchors where the particle –n or –int appears with a lower negation marker
no, making use of Sailor’s (2011) VP-ellipsis analysis of tag questions. Furthermore, the
analysis means that in these varieties, there is a clear parallel between the syntax of tag
questions, rhetorical questions and exclamatives.
The analysis has implications for the syntactization of intonation as posited by
Wiltschko and Heim (2016). I briefly discussed this, suggesting that the results presented
in this thesis suggest that rather than placing intonation in a projection in the syntactic
structure, the relationship requires that the intonation contour is contributed separately,
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but interfaces with the syntax before being passed on to the semantic/pragmatic domain.
This had consequences for the authors’ interpretation of confirmational particles, which I
briefly discussed.
I also briefly discussed tags in other varieties of (northern British) English, arguing
that varieties which permit tags on negative anchors which look like ‘double negation’ also
have this type of check construction in groundP. However, I noted that this analysis does
not have an impact on the analysis of standard English canonical tags, which I still take
to be VP-elided biased questions.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I provided a pragmatic, semantic and syntactic account of the –int and
–n particles in Glasgow Scots and Shetland dialect. Based on the across-construction
distribution from the results of the data collection that I presented in chapter 3, in section
4.2 I firstly established the specific pragmatic factors that license the particles, making use
of the bias/belief distinctions set up in Sudo (2013) and showing that the key connection
between the three constructions that permit –n and –int is the relationship between the
speaker and the addressee. I did this through the use of three pieces of evidence: the ability
of the speaker to attribute the belief of p to the addressee (and how this works for predicates
of personal taste); the ability for the speaker to revise and take full responsibility for p
in the event that the addressee is not also an independent source, and discourse closure,
using the possibility of a following so continuation.
In section 4.3 I built on this pragmatic evidence to propose a semantic definition
for the particles, using Ginzburg’s (2012) interactive dialogue model. I labelled –int and
–n check moves, defining a check move as expressing that the speaker believes the
addressee believes p. This is not-at-issue content. The overall goal of producing a check
move is that the speaker adds both p and that p ∈ SP(a) (the addressee’s belief set) to
their interpretation of the Common Ground. I compared this move to the moves carried
out by canonical tag questions in standard English, which are true interrogatives but with
pragmatically Known Answers given by the declarative assertion in the anchor of the
tag. This built on Reese and Asher (2006) and Gunlogson (2008), and I argued handles
the specifics of the data better than recent accounts of standard English canonical tag
questions proposed by Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) and Malamud and Stephenson (2014).
Finally, in section 4.4 I rounded off the analysis by proposing that rather than being
situated in NegP as might have first been imagined, the syntactic analysis of –int and –n
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in fact reflects their semantic analysis as discourse particles. Specifically, I proposed that
–int and –n were situated in a groundP projection in the conversation domain of the left
periphery (Wiltschko and Heim 2016, Wiltschko 2017). I argued that this was evidence
of head movement to the discourse domain, thus adding movement to the list of syntactic
phenomena seen in this peripheral domain. The syntactic analysis I proposed was able
to deal with particularly problematic data from negative tags, as well the three relevant
positive constructions (tag questions on positive anchors, polar rhetorical questions and
interrogative exclamatives); I also briefly discussed and argued against the syntacticization
of intonation proposed by Wiltschko and Heim (2016) and Wiltschko (2017), and the
impact this would have to for analysing the syntax of confirmational particles like right
and eh.
The analysis I have presented in this chapter is therefore a coherent analysis of the
two Scots particles –int and –n, which addresses their pragmatic licensing, their meaning
and relationship to intonation, and how they should be modelled in the syntax.
Throughout, I have shown how the particles are similar to, and where they diverge from,
their parallel constructions in standard English.
In this section, I have sought to address the major questions presented at the
beginning of the thesis, looking at interrogative licensing, discourse in semantics and
discourse in syntax. Furthermore, we have now seen based on the Scots data that there is
a clear link between the four non-canonical question constructions. Glasgow Scots –int is
limited to polar rhetorical questions, interrogative exclamatives and tags, while the
Shetland dialect particle –n is available in all four constructions and no other contexts for
older speakers, but moving towards the same pattern of use as Glasgow Scots –int for
younger speakers. I have thus demonstrated that there are particles which are limited to
the relevant non-canonical questions, and this suggests a number of things about the
relationship between the constructions:
i) There is a closer relationship between the four constructions than has generally been
proposed in the literature, supporting the recent claims of Gaertner and Gyuris (2017)
and Biezma and Rawlins (2017) that all interrogatives are in some way biased, as
well as the framing of Sudo (2013) that (polar) interrogative formation occurs as a
result of a combination of speaker beliefs and evidential biases. From the Scots data it
seems that the bias expressed in the four constructions investigated in this research is
expressed in the same way (separate from other interrogative constructions), as seen
in the older speakers in Shetland. In the Scots varieties, there has been reanalysis and
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specialisation of two particles to incorporate a third factor (the speaker’s belief about
the addressee’s belief), as seen in Glasgow and the younger speakers in Shetland.
However, I propose that the non-specialised variants (so verb-subject-no in Scots
and high –n’t negation in standard English) are contributing the same semantics to
all four constructions, rather than requiring separate analyses.
ii) In particular, the analysis I give for the Scots data predicts that polar rhetorical
questions should not receive the same analysis as rhetorical wh-questions
cross-linguistically. I discuss this in detail in chapter 6.
iii) The evidence of reanalysis of the particles from biased questions to tag questions
(with a preference for neutral evidential contexts) suggests that speakers will have a
preference for tag questions in neutral contexts in English, despite the fact that biased
questions are also available according to the literature (Ladd 1981, Domaneschi et al.
2017). I discuss this next, in chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Biased questions and tag questions:
contextual preferences?
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 3 we saw that there appears to be change ongoing from use of particle –n
in Shetland dialect as an acceptable marker in non-canonical questions quite generally, to
something which is only acceptable in polar rhetorical questions, interrogative exclamatives
and tag questions, and which is preferred in neutral evidential contexts over negative ones.
There is a loss of acceptability of –n in matrix biased questions. This is generally interesting
as biased questions and canonical tag questions are often taken to be the same construction
syntactically (Sailor 2011, Malamud and Stephenson 2014, Krifka 2015) and semantically
(van Rooij and Šafářová 2003, Sailor 2011, Krifka 2015), and are argued to be available in
the same contexts.
In this section, I test the hypothesis that the availability of matrix biased questions
and tag questions is affected by the evidential context for non-Scottish English speakers. I
present the results of a forced choice task run through Qualtrics, where participants were
presented with a situation that involved a belief p and established an evidential context
(whether neutral or ¬p) surrounding the interaction. Participants were then asked to
choose whether they would prefer to produce a matrix biased question or a tag question
in these contexts.
I also present the results of a second version of the experiment carried out with
native German speakers, presenting a forced choice between matrix biased questions and
invariant oder tags. While invariant tags are perhaps more clearly ‘different’ from matrix
biased questions (certainly, they are not VP-elided versions of the construction), oder tags
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are also attested as preferred in the same contexts as matrix biased questions in German
(Scheffler 2015), and so there is still clear potential for comparison. There is thus also
the potential to shed light on the broader question of evidential bias and how it relates
to question production cross-linguistically, relating back to the initial big questions of the
thesis.
In the discussion, I show how the English results fall out from the analysis I presented
in chapter 4. I then compare the English and German data to think more broadly about
question bias and how we model beliefs and evidential bias, along the lines of Sudo (2013),
Yang and Wiltschko (2016), Domaneschi et al. (2017) and Gaertner and Gyuris (2017).
5.2 Experiment 1 – English
5.2.1 Motivation
In chapters 1 and 4, I summarised the literature on the distribution of biased questions
and tag questions in English. Throughout this thesis, I have taken the position that it is a
combination of the epistemic belief of the speaker and the evidential bias of the discourse
context that licenses these constructions (see section 4.3). In brief, the literature showed
that both constructions exhibit bias in favour of p on the part of the speaker, and both
constructions are available in both neutral evidential contexts (where there is no evidence
for or against p) and negative evidential contexts (where there is evidence challenging p)
(Ladd 1981, Büring and Gunlogson 2000, Romero and Han 2004, Sudo 2013, Domaneschi
et al. 2017, Gaertner and Gyuris 2017).
(337) S believes there is a vegetarian restaurant in the town that he is visiting A in.
A: You want to go get something to eat?
S: Yeah. Isn’t there a vegetarian restaurant around here?
There’s a vegetarian restaurant around here, isn’t there?
(338) S believes there is a vegetarian restaurant in the town that he is visiting A in.
A: We should get something to eat, but I don’t think there will be much
for you around here.
S: Isn’t there a vegetarian restaurant around here?
There’s a vegetarian restaurant around here, isn’t there?
(adapted from Ladd 1981:164)
Experimentally, work from Domaneschi et al. (2017) and Sailor (2013) has shown
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epistemic belief evidential bias
Isn’t Paul a vegetarian? positive –positive
Is Paul not a vegetarian? none +negative
Table 5.1: Negation forms in English biased questions by epistemic belief and evidential
bias, following the results in Domaneschi et al. (2017).
epistemic belief evidential bias
falling tag question positive –negative
rising tag question positive +negative
Table 5.2: English reverse polarity tag questions by epistemic belief and evidential bias,
extending Sudo (2013) based on Ladd (1981) and Reese and Asher (2006).
that different forms of matrix questions are preferred based on the epistemic bias/evidential
belief relationship (see Table 5.1 for an overview). Ladd (1981) and Reese and Asher (2006)
claim that the different intonation patterns on canonical tag questions in standard English
also align with different evidence and belief patterns, as seen in Table 5.2. The division of
labour in tag question forms is different to the division in the form of negation between
biased questions and true negative questions. However, it is notable that tag questions
and biased questions are both available in evidential contexts that are [+negative] and
evidential contexts that are [-negative, –positive] (neutral). Given the direction of the
reanalysis we see taking place in the Shetland dialect –n data, and given that there are
within-context preferences for different interrogative forms depending on the evidential
context and epistemic biases in standard English, we might expect there to be preferences
in when biased questions and tag questions are available in standard English, despite the
fact that they overlap in possible contexts.
The null hypothesis, therefore, is that there would be no difference in speakers’
production of biased questions and canonical tag questions depending on evidential
context. The alternative hypothesis is that there will be some preference regarding which
construction is used in either evidential context. Following the Scots data, I hypothesise
that tag questions are preferred in neutral evidential contexts, and that matrix biased
questions are preferred in negative evidential contexts.
5.2.2 Methodology
I set up a short forced choice experiment using Qualtrics. In the test cases, participants
were presented with a short, 1-2 line context that established a) a situation; b) a belief
p for the participant; c) whether the evidential context was negative or neutral. After
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reading that short context, participants were asked to choose between a biased question
or a tag question that they would produce following the given context. Of course, there
may be other possibilities that speakers employ in any given situation – however, for the
purposes of this experiment, a forced choice task was most appropriate.
All the tag questions were canonical constructions consisting of an auxiliary verb
combined with –n’t negation and a subject, e.g. isn’t it. Intonation was not indicated,
meaning that the tag should be possible in either context. All matrix biased questions used
high –n’t negation, following the results of Domaneschi et al. (2017). Again, intonation
was not indicated. All stimuli can be seen in Appendix B.
(339) Neutral evidential context:
You want to go and see the new Harry Potter film. A group of our friends went last
week, and you’re pretty sure I went with them. You want to find out what I
thought of it, so you say:
• Haven’t you seen it?
• You’ve seen it, haven’t you?
(340) Negative evidential context:
You think I won the marathon at the weekend. However, I start telling you that I
am disappointed with my performance. You say:
• Didn’t you win the race?
• You won the race, didn’t you?
Participants were presented with 10 examples where a belief, p, was presented
followed by a neutral evidential context, and 10 examples where a belief p was followed
by a negative evidential context. There were therefore 20 test cases, plus 30 filler
examples in which participants made forced choices between e.g. a true negative question
and a biased question, or a tag question with a negative anchor and a true negative
question. The order of the contexts was randomised, and within each context the two
potential responses were randomised, so no participant saw the contexts or responses in
the same order.
The experiment took between 10 and 15 minutes to complete.
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Figure 5.1: The instructions presented to the participants in Qualtrics, as well as examples
of a neutral evidential context and a negative evidential context that participants judged.
5.2.3 Participants
Participants were recruited through official channels at the University of Edinburgh, as well
as through shared posts on Facebook and Twitter. The only requirements were that the
participant was over 18 years old and was a native speaker of English not from Scotland.
As discussed in detail in chapter 2, Scottish English speakers use –na(e) as reduced form
negation rather than –n’t. –na(e) is not able to be used in interrogatives (Millar and
Brown 1979, Thoms et al. 2013). Instead, speakers of Scottish English use low no negation
in both true negative questions and biased questions, rather than following the –n’t/not
divide exhibited by standard English speakers in Domaneschi et al.’s (2017) work. The
materials were thus not suitable for Scottish participants, and they were not invited to
take part in the study.
138 participants filled out the survey. 25 of those were incomplete; excluding the
incomplete surveys left 113 complete responses.
Participants were asked to provide three pieces of demographic information: their
age, their gender and where they grew up. All three pieces of information are relevant to
potential variation in the results. Tottie and Hoffman (2006) find in their corpus study that
older speakers use more canonical tag questions than younger speakers67. Lakoff (1973)
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claims that women use more tag questions than men (though this claim was subsequently
disputed in Cameron et al. (1988), who present evidence suggesting that if anything, men
use more tag questions than women). Finally, Tottie and Hoffman (2006) also find that
British English has more canonical tag questions than American English, and thus location
may be relevant.
The mean age of participants in the English experiment was 29.73. The age, gender
and location distribution of participants can be seen in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5.
Age
18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 Total
3 69 30 6 2 3 113
Table 5.3: Age distribution of participants in the English experiment.
Gender
Female Male Other Not given Total
72 34 6 1 113
Table 5.4: Gender distribution of participants in the English experiment. Other genders
given were agender, genderqueer and non-binary.
Location
Australia UK & Ireland USA & Canada Other Total
10 61 38 4 113
Table 5.5: Countries of origin of participants in the English experiment. Other locations
given were Cyprus, Singapore and South Africa.
5.2.4 Results
The raw data was downloaded from Qualtrics and stored in .csv format. All analyses were
carried out in RStudio (RStudio Team 2015).
In order to test the three sociolinguistic factors, I ran a binominal multiple logistic
regression with fixed effects for evidential context as well as potential sociolinguistic effects:
gender and location. Age was input as a random effect due to the uneven spread of ages
across the participant pool. The model, shown in Figure 5.2, showed that evidential
context was a significant predictor for whether a participant chose a biased question or a
tag question. None of the sociolinguistic factors were significant predictors of participants’
behaviour.
I used chi-square tests to investigate the results for each evidential context.
67Tottie and Hoffman point out that it is unlikely that younger speakers are losing tag questions, but
that invariant examples are perhaps becoming more popular (e.g. innit in Multicultural London English
(Andersen 2001)).
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Figure 5.2: Multiple logistic regression model for choice between biased question and tag
question in English. There was a significant effect of evidence (either negative or neutral),
but no further effects.
TQ BQ
Neutral 882 (78.05%) 248 (21.95%)
Negative 344 (30.44%) 786 (69.56%)
Table 5.6: Raw numbers of tag questions vs biased questions across evidential contexts in
English
Neutral evidential contexts
My hypothesis predicted that in English examples like (339), where there is no negative
evidence challenging the speaker’s prior belief p, participants would choose to produce a
tag question over a matrix biased question. This hypothesis was strongly supported (see
Figure 5.3). A chi-square test gives χ2 = 355.71, df = 1, p < .001.
Negative evidential contexts
My hypothesis predicted that in English examples like (340), where there is negative
counterevidence challenging the speaker’s prior belief p, participants would choose to
produce a matrix biased question over a tag question. This hypothesis was strongly
supported (see Figure 5.3). A chi-square test gives χ2 = 172.89, df = 1, p < .001.
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Figure 5.3: Choice of biased question or tag question by evidential context in the English
experiment – TQ represented in dark blue, BQ represented in orange.
Individual variation
It was not the case that certain participants consistently chose one variant over the other
across contexts: though some participants were consistent within one of the contexts, no
participant was consistent across both contexts. Even within contexts, consistency was
rare: around 14% of participants selected only tag questions in neutral contexts, and
around 7% of participants only selected biased questions in negative contexts.
All tag questions All biased questions
Neutral evidential contexts 16
Negative evidential contexts 8
Table 5.7: Numbers of participants in the English experiment who consistently selected
one of the variants in each context.
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5.3 Experiment 2 – German
5.3.1 Motivation
I gave an overview of the literature for biased questions and tag questions in English in
chapters 1 and 4. There has also been some discussion of German biased questions and tag
questions that shows the same sort of patterning based on epistemic belief and evidential
bias. I will briefly overview that literature here.
Matrix biased questions
Büring and Gunlogson (2000) give the first discussion of biased questions in German,
arguing that there is a morphological distinction between negative questions and biased
questions. Generally, a sentence with a negative + indefinite combination in German would
require use of the negative indefinite marker, kein(e). Büring and Gunlogson show that
this is the case in negative questions where the speaker is not biased by any prior belief (in
other words, a true negative question) (e.g. (341), reproduced from their article). On the
other hand, in contexts where a speaker has a prior epistemic belief, p, about the indefinite
and wants to produce a biased question regarding this belief, speakers use the combination




































‘Isn’t there a vegetarian restaurant around here?’
(German, Büring and Gunlogson 2000:4)
Domaneschi et al. (2017) tested this in the lab with 42 native German speakers.
They found a clear preference for nicht ein(e) questions in situations where the speaker
had a prior epistemic belief p, and there was either a neutral or negative evidential context.
On the other hand, kein(e) questions were preferred in situations where the speaker had
no prior epistemic belief, and was presented with a negative evidential context68.
68As in the English data, positive interrogatives were used when speakers had no prior epistemic belief,
and were presented with either neutral or positive evidence.
69There was a higher proportion of kein(e) questions in negative evidential contexts than low negation
not in English negative evidential contexts. Domaneschi et al. (2017) take this as evidence that kein(e) can
be used when the speaker has an epistemic belief p and a negative evidential context. They suggest that
this distinction in use lines up with the different intonation patterns found in English biased questions.
However, nicht ein(e) was clearly preferred overall, and they do not discuss the within-context distribution
of kein(e). I thus set this possibility aside.
272
epistemic belief evidential bias
nicht ein(e) positive –positive
kein(e) none69 +negative
Table 5.8: Negation forms in German biased questions by epistemic belief and evidential
bias, following the results in Domaneschi et al. (2017)
Tag questions
Unlike English, German does not have canonical tag questions. As is common cross-
linguistically, tag questions in German are expressed through a variety of invariant tag
particles.
Early accounts of German tag questions cited dialect variation as the main point
of variation in the distribution of different tag question forms (e.g. Mills (1981)).
However, Scheffler (2015) carried out a corpus study of German speakers’ tag question
use on Twitter. Though she did not account for dialect variation, she did find clear
results based on evidential context, which were sharpened by looking at co-occurring
discourse particles in the anchor of the tag.
Invariant tag oder most commonly co-occurs with discourse particle doch. Doch
serves the function of reopening a previous Question Under Discussion (QUD) (Rojas-
Esponda 2013, Grosz 2014) and can be stressed or unstressed. In positive tag question
anchors it is generally unstressed. The precise role of unstressed doch in tag questions is
not clearly stated in the literature. However in standard assertions, unstressed doch signals
that p, indicated by the proposition, is common knowledge i.e. should be in CG. As shown
by Rojas-Esponda (2013), there are two contexts in which unstressed doch can be used in
assertions: firstly, examples with direct propositional contrast where the speaker wants to
tell the addressee that what they have just said is incompatible with the information that
previously resolved this issue (response (i)), and secondly, examples where the sentence is
used to contradict something by suggesting that it is superfluous, because it is given by










































‘Sabine doch goes jogging every morning.’
(German, Rojas-Esponda 2013:372)
Though doch in tag questions does not require this same contradictory context, it
does share some features with the plain assertive doch. It retains the flavour of indicating
that p is something that the speaker believes should be a shared belief between themself
and the addressee, and thus should already be part of CG. It is also relevant to a salient
QUD70. I take it that this indicates that the speaker’s degree of belief in p is relatively high,
and that the speaker believes the addressee’s degree of belief should be, firstly, towards p,
and secondly, also relatively high.
Returning to oder, then, Scheffler’s results showed that oder was the most common
tag overall (86.9% of all tags), and was generally preferred when some sort of contextual
evidence has ‘made the speaker unsure’ of their belief of p. Scheffler does not distinguish
between neutral and negative evidential contexts, and oder seems to be able to be used in





































‘That’s pointless, isn’t it?’ (German, Scheffler 2015)
Oder is not the only invariant tag in German. According to Scheffler’s data, other
invariant tags are also specified for particular bias/belief contexts. In contexts in which
there was no counterevidence for the speaker’s belief of p and evidence leaning in favour of
p, speakers preferred to use the invariant tag particle nä, which co-occurs with discourse













‘So, there are genuine people, aren’t there?’
(German, Scheffler 2015)
70Thanks to Felicitas Enders for discussion on the role of doch in tag questions.
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epistemic belief evidential bias discourse particle
nä positive +positive ja
oder positive -positive doch


































‘Mama thinks I am pregnant because I have mood swings. They’re totally
uncommon during puberty, aren’t they?!
(German, Scheffler 2015)
So, while oder seems to be able to be used in situations that both rising and falling
tags can in English, nä is reserved for a situation where English could only use a nuclear
tag.
These are not the only particles available for German speakers to use as tags;
however, Scheffler’s corpus data suggests that other tag forms are used in small numbers.
I will leave this matter aside, simply noting that certain tags are preferred in certain
evidential bias contexts in German, and return to focus on oder.
We have seen that biased questions and invariant tag particle oder are available
in the same contexts: [-positive] (so, both [-positive, -negative] and [+negative]). The
null hypothesis is that there should be no difference in the acceptability of matrix biased
questions and oder in neutral and negative evidential contexts in German, given that
matrix biased questions with nicht ein(e) and oder tags are both licensed in [-positive]
evidential contexts. Following the English results, the alternative hypothesis is that tag
questions will be preferred in neutral contexts, and biased questions in negative contexts.
5.3.2 Methodology
As with the English experiment detailed in section 5.2.2, I set up a short forced choice
experiment using Qualtrics. Participants were presented with a short, 1-2 line context
that established a) a situation; b) a belief p for the participant; c) whether the evidential
context was negative or neutral. After reading that short context, participants were asked
to make a choice between a biased question or a tag question that they would produce
following the given context. Of course, there may be other possibilities that speakers
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employ in any given situation – however, for the purposes of this experiment, a forced
choice task was most appropriate.
In order to be as comparable as possible, the German version of the experiment
was translated from the original English materials by a native speaker, and checked by a
second native speaker71. Some minor changes were made in order to make the materials
more suitable; however, as far as possible, the materials were direct translations.
All tags were given as oder, given that this is the most common tag across German
varieties, and is preferred in situations with neutral and/or negative evidential contexts.
The discourse particle doch was also included in all the examples on recommendation from
native speakers regarding the frequency with which oder co-occurs with doch.
All biased questions were presented with nicht. There were a mixture of examples
with indefinites and without. Those without indefinites simply displayed nicht ; those
with presented nicht ein(e) and not kein(e), again following the results of Domaneschi
et al. (2017) – and setting aside the potential availability of kein(e) in biased questions.
Unstressed doch is not permitted in matrix questions (including matrix biased questions),
and so was not included in the biased question examples. All stimuli can be seen in
Appendix B.
(348) Neutral evidential context:
Wir gehen in ein Konzert. Du hast noch kein Ticket, aber du bist dir ziemlich
sicher, dass du an der Abendkasse noch eins bekommen wirst. Du sagst:
‘We are going to a concert. You haven’t got a ticket yet, but you are pretty sure you












































‘You can buy a ticket at the box office, can’t you?’
(349) Negative evidential context:
Du glaubst, dass unsere Freundin nur eine Katze als Haustier hat. Ich erwähne,
dass ich sie mit ihrem Hund Gassi gehen sah. Du sagst:
’You believe that our friend only has a cat for a pet. However, I tell you that I saw
her out walking her dog. You say:’

























‘She’s got a cat, hasn’t she?’
As with the English experiment, participants were presented with 10 examples in
which the participant was given a belief, p, followed by a neutral evidential context, and
10 examples in which the participant was given a belief p, followed by a negative evidential
context. There were therefore 20 test cases, plus 30 filler examples in which participants
made forced choices between e.g. a true negative question and a biased question, or a tag
question with a negative anchor and a true negative question. The order of the contexts
was randomised, and within each context the two potential responses were randomised, so
no participant saw the contexts or responses in the same order.
The experiment took between 10 and 15 minutes to complete.
5.3.3 Participants
Participants were recruited through official channels at the University of Edinburgh and
Universität Konstanz, as well as through shared posts on Facebook and Twitter. The only
requirements for participation were that the participant was over 18 years old and was a
native speaker of German.
61 participants filled out the survey. 7 of those were incomplete; excluding the
incomplete surveys left 54 complete responses.
For comparison with the English data, participants were asked to provide the same
demographic information: age, gender and location where they grew up. Tables of the
demographic information are available below (Tables 5.10, 5.11, 5.12).
Age
18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 Total
1 33 14 4 2 0 54
Table 5.10: Age distribution of participants in the German experiment; mean age was 30.
Gender
Female Male Other Not given Total
36 18 0 0 54
Table 5.11: Gender distribution of participants in the German experiment.
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Location
Austria Germany Switzerland Total
12 40 2 54
Table 5.12: Countries of origin of participants in the German experiment.
Figure 5.4: Multiple logistic regression model for choice between biased question and tag
question in German. There was a significant effect of evidence (either negative or neutral),
but no further effects.
5.3.4 Results
The raw data was downloaded from Qualtrics and stored in .csv format. All analyses were
carried out in RStudio (RStudio Team 2015).
In order to test the three sociolinguistic factors, I ran a binominal multiple logistic
regression with fixed effects for evidential context as well as potential sociolinguistic effects:
gender and location. Age was input as a random effect due to the uneven spread of ages
across the participant pool. The model (see Figure 5.4) showed that evidential context was
a significant predictor for whether a participant chose a biased question or a tag question.
None of the sociolinguistic factors were significant predictors of participants’ behaviour.
I used chi-square tests to investigate the results for each evidential context.
Neutral evidential contexts
My hypothesis predicted that in German examples like (348), where there is no negative
counterevidence challenging the speaker’s prior belief, p, participants would choose to
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TQ BQ
Neutral 416 (77.04%) 124 (22.96%)
Negative 192 (35.56%) 348 (64.544%)
Table 5.13: Raw numbers of tag questions vs biased questions across evidential contexts
in German
Figure 5.5: Choice of biased question or tag question by evidential context in the German
experiment – TQ represented in dark blue, BQ represented in orange.
produce a matrix biased question over a tag question. This hypothesis was strongly
supported (see Figure 5.5). A chi-square test for goodness of fit gives χ2 = 157.9, df = 1,
p < .001.
Negative evidential contexts
My hypothesis predicted that in German examples like (349), where there is negative
counterevidence challenging the speaker’s prior belief p, participants would choose to
produce a matrix biased question over a tag question. This hypothesis was strongly
supported (see Figure 5.5). A chi-square test for goodness of fit gives χ2 = 45.067, df =
1, p < .001.
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Individual variation
As with the English data, individuals in the German experiment made varied choices
across contexts: it is not the case that certain participants were strongly in favour of one
variant over the other. No one selected one type of construction across the board. 11%
of participants selected tag questions in all of the neutral examples: however, across the
negative evidential context, every participant had a mix of biased question and tag question
responses.
All tag questions All biased questions
Neutral evidential contexts 6
Negative evidential contexts
Table 5.14: Numbers of participants in the German experiment who consistently selected
one of the variants in each context
5.4 Crosslinguistic results summary
In both experiments detailed above, speakers strongly preferred to produce biased questions
in negative evidential contexts, and tag questions in neutral evidential contexts. However,
as noted in sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.4, very few participants were consistent in their preference
for one form (even within a context). Also worth noting, as shown in Figure 5.6, is that
there is variation in choice to some extent between individual examples. In neutral contexts,
English and German seem to follow a very similar pattern across examples, though there
is a little more variation in the negative contexts72. Looking at the individual examples
(see Figure 5.6), I take this as evidence for the idea of bias as a scalar phenomenon,
with participants exhibiting preferences rather than either form being mandatory in either
context – thus supporting a bias model like that of Gaertner and Gyuris (2017) rather
than that of Northrup (2014), in which the choice between biased question or tag question
is decided by the evidential context. This will be discussed in more detail in the following
section.
5.5 Discussion
In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I presented the results of two experiments which showed that,
despite both matrix biased questions and tag questions being available in both neutral and
72Though the examples were translated by native speakers, I accept that the effect of translation may
have had an effect on the German responses. Similarly, it is possible that some indefinites in the negative
evidential contexts may have preferred kein(e). Further research is required on the full distribution of
kein(e) in negative evidential contexts.
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Figure 5.6: Results by individual context in English and German, with each bar
representing one example. Orange indicates proportion of biased questions chosen; blue
indicates proportion of tag questions chosen.
negative evidential contexts, speakers have preferences about which construction should
be used in which evidential context. Specifically, speakers of both English and German
preferred matrix biased questions in negative evidential contexts, challenging the speaker’s
belief of p. They also preferred tag questions (whether canonical or invariant) in neutral
evidential contexts, where nothing was challenging p.
There are three important parts of the results presented in sections 5.3 and 5.4 that
need to be accounted for. Firstly, the overall preferences that can be seen in Figures 5.3
and 5.5; biased questions were preferred in negative evidential contexts and tag questions
were preferred in neutral evidential contexts. Secondly, however, it is not the case that
this is unanimous in any way; depending on the exact example there was variation in
the proportions of biased questions and tag questions chosen. It therefore cannot be the
case that the construction is determined exclusively by the evidential context. Finally, the
choice of biased question or tag question in the German data patterns very closely to the
English data73. Although I generally argue against Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) and their
analysis of the semantics of tag questions, I believe that this evidence from English and
German supports their idea that in biased and tag question production, there is an aspect
of credence of belief involved, and that the ability of the speaker to have strong credence in
their belief of p will affect what construction the speaker chooses to produce. I will discuss
this further below.
I will focus firstly on the English results and show how they fall out from the analysis
73The clear exception to this generalisation is the example in PNZ9, where German participants opted
for a tag question over a biased question. This goes against the general pattern found in German, and
opposes the results found in the English data for the same context. In this particular context, there may
have been a strong effect of translation.
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I proposed in chapter 4. I will not discuss the German results in detail74 but I will return
to them for a broader discussion of beliefs and biases in section 5.5.3.
5.5.1 Overall preferences
The overall results just presented fall out from the analysis of tag questions I presented
in chapter 4.3. Recall that I began from the starting point of Reese and Asher (2006), in
which tag questions are not singular complex speech acts but rather their interpretation
is derived from the interaction between the anchor and the tag. The tag’s anchor is an
assertion in which the speaker puts forward that they are willing to take responsibility for
p with the underlying goal that the addressee will also accept p as a belief – and thus that
p will be added to the Common Ground. From the assertion, then, the addressee can infer
that the speaker has a belief of p. I treat the canonical English tag question semantically
as a question which has undergone VP-elision. For Reese and Asher (2006), a question q
means that the speaker believes an answer to the question; however, the important point
which holds regardless of which question semantics one subscribes to, is that by pushing
p on to the QUD stack in the tag’s anchor, the speaker has already indicated what the
Known Answer to the question is. For example, in (350), the speaker indicates that ‘he is
going to be late’ is the answer to the question presented in the tag.
(350) He’s going to be late, isn’t he?
By combining with falling intonation then, which indicates a lack of contingency
(Gunlogson 2008), the speaker is able to in effect take responsibility for p, using the
tag to signal that the addressee’s opinion is desirable, but without making the discourse
continuation reliant on it. This accounts for the various pragmatic phenomena discussed
in chapter 4.2. Recall also that I argued that biased questions do not present the same
sort of Known Answer as tag questions, arguing against accounts which present them as
the same sort of complex speech act (Krifka 2015), and rather suggesting that these are
74For what it is worth, in terms of oder, I believe it has similar syntactic and semantic behaviour to a
confirmational marker like right and huh. For example, it appears that oder behaves like confirmational
marker right with regards to discourse closure. German also behaves like English so with regards to marking
an inference between propositions in ‘recipient-orientated’ contexts (see section 4.2.3 for discussion on the
English data).
i) Es ist doch ein schöner Tag, oder? Also sollten wir zum Strand gehen.
It is prt a nice day, tag? So we should go to the beach.
ii) David trinkt doch Weißwein, oder? Also werde ich Weißwein für die Party kaufen.
David drinks prt white wine, tag? So I’ll buy white wine for the party.
In both cases, it is acceptable to have also at the beginning of the second proposition in order to create a
link and continue the need for confirmation into the second proposition. Special thanks to Mirjam Eiswirth
for discussion of this point and judgments; I leave the details for future research.
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true questions (regardless of the bias that they present) which require a true answer or
confirmation from the addressee, rather than simple acknowledgment.
This straightforwardly explains the results seen in the above section. In neutral
evidential contexts where the speaker has a belief of p, it is more relevant (Sperber and
Wilson 1995) for them to take responsibility for the proposition by asserting it. The tag
question is a question, but the speaker, firstly, has made their impression of the answer
known in the anchor, and secondly has not made the utterance contingent on the addressee
– therefore, the addressee is included and the speaker may in fact want them to back up
their utterance, but it is not necessary for the continuation of the discourse.
Alternatively, when there is some counterevidence challenging the speaker’s belief of
p, the matrix biased question is a more relevant move. In that case, although the speaker
has a bias towards p and a belief that this is the correct answer, they do not have to take
responsibility for p as an assertion on the QUD stack. The discourse cannot proceed until
the addressee has cleared up whether p or ¬p holds and should be added to the Common
Ground. This therefore allows the speaker to take account of the negative counterevidence
while still indicating their belief of p – however one believes that should be modelled in
biased questions.
This analysis correctly predicts the facts; furthermore, by focusing on the
relevance of the discourse moves, it also does not require claiming that only one
construction is available per context, as Northrup (2014) does (see chapter 4.2 for full
discussion of Northrup’s model).
5.5.2 Variation in selection
If it is simply the case that particular discourse moves are more relevant, we can then ask
why biased questions are available at all in neutral contexts? Why are tag questions (with
rising intonation) available in negative contexts? Why did certain contexts receive more
choices for the ‘most relevant’ construction than others, even within the overall umbrella
of ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’ contexts?
The first relevant point, discussed in chapter 1, is that interpretation of evidence is
always relative to the speaker and their own background and perspective. In this
experiment, then, and in general, it may be that in certain contexts, speakers interpreted
the evidence (or lack thereof) in different ways. For example, in neutral evidential
context PNX1 (presented in (351)) participants were given a context in which they were
discussing a friend who had recently moved. Participants were told they thought the
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friend had moved to Berlin, and then were asked to choose between ‘She moved to Berlin,
didn’t she?’ and ‘Didn’t she move to Berlin?’.
(351) We are talking about a friend of ours who recently moved away. You are pretty
sure she went to Berlin [bel: p]. [ev: Ø ] You say:
◦ Didn’t she move to Berlin?
◦ She moved to Berlin, didn’t she?
This context, which was particularly underspecified in terms of whether there was
any evidence challenging or supporting the proposition, was one of the neutral contexts
which gathered a higher number of matrix biased question responses (see Figure 5.6).
Adding further information to the context can strengthen the preference for one of the
constructions over the other; for example, specifying exactly what we were discussing about
our friend. If the addressee had said something like ‘She should have learned some German
before she left’, this may have indicated that she was at least in Germany; however, if the
addressee had made the same statement about French, this would have perhaps challenged
the speaker’s assumption to a higher degree. However, even that latter statement would
have challenged the speaker less if they believed that the friend’s job required her to speak
French. Therefore, the information that the speaker brings to the context will vary and
their choice of construction may vary to match that.
Regarding biased questions in neutral contexts specifically, it may be that the choice
relates to politeness. Deferring to the interlocutor is a cooperative move and in particular
contexts, it may be most polite for the speaker to request more input from the addressee in
order to bring them into the conversation. For example, in (183) (repeated here as (352)),
the biased question ‘Wasn’t it Ash?’ is the best move for S to make: while the speaker is
in a position to take responsibility for p, the addressee has put themself in a vulnerable
position by admitting that they cannot remember the name; the speaker can bring them
back into the fold by asking a biased question.
(352) S and A are at a party. They spot someone arriving. S recalls that both they
and A had met this person the previous weekend. S believes he is called Ash.
A: There’s Rob’s friend. I can’t remember his name!
S: Wasn’t it Ash?
While this is a case where the addressee has made it clear that they cannot commit
to p (‘I can’t remember’), the principles are more broadly applicable; it may be more polite
for the speaker to defer to the addressee.
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Finally, regarding tag questions with rising intonation. In the literature, these
constructions are described as more ‘confirmational’ questions which are posited to occur
in contexts where there is counterevidence challenging the speaker’s belief of p by e.g. Ladd
(1981) and Reese and Asher (2006). However, we saw that in general, tag questions are
dispreferred in contexts with counterevidence. Furthermore, the analysis of tag questions
I posited in chapter 4 suggests that the speaker is presenting a Known Answer in the
anchor to the tag. It would be unusual to claim a Known Answer in a situation where
the speaker is no longer able to have confidence in the fact of p. I tentatively suggest that
rising intonation tag questions have particular import, specifically relating to the speaker’s
bouletic bias. Tag questions with rising intonation would therefore be more likely to be
used when the speaker has an existing belief of p and is met by some counterevidence. The
speaker’s desire for p to be true is high, and therefore they are likely to take responsibility
for the assertion of p anyway. The negative counterevidence, however, means that they
need to defer to the addressee to some extent in order to clarify whether or not their belief
is true. This is where the contingency added by the rising intonation on the tag comes in:
given the evidential context, the speaker is aware that they cannot take responsibility for
p without further support and/or elaboration from the addressee, but they wish to make
their current position (i.e. belief of p) clear.
For example, negative context PNZ9 (presented in (353)), a context in which the
participant has made dinner, but the addressee looks unhappy and is reluctant to try
it, received a relatively high concentration of tag questions responses, despite an overall
preference for matrix biased questions in negative contexts.
(353) You think I would like a really spicy dinner you have made [bel: p]. However, I’m
pushing it around my plate and looking unhappy [ev: ¬p]. You say:
◦ Won’t you try it?
◦ You’ll try it, won’t you?
In this situation, the speaker has put effort into making dinner and hopes the
addressee enjoys it. Their bouletic desire for the addressee to try the food is high and thus
using a tag question in which presents the Known Answer as ‘you will try it’ is a relevant
and even persuasive move.
Similarly in negative evidential context PNZ6 (presented in (354)), the speaker’s
desire for p to be true is important as this move could be construed as trying to reassure
the addressee75. They are indeed relying on the addressee’s confirmation, but there is
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reason to choose the tag question over the biased question.
(354) I am giving an important presentation this year. You think it is a long time away.
However, I tell you that I am feeling extremely nervous about it. You say:
◦ Isn’t it a few months away?
◦ It’s a few months away, isn’t it?
This interpretation of rising tag questions in negative evidential contexts can of
course only be tentative at this stage. However, it seems that rather than being purely
‘confirmational’, as the literature might suggest, rising intonation tag questions may have
more specific purposes. This also develops the idea of a role for non-epistemic biases in
biased question production, briefly mentioned but set aside by Sudo (2013) and Domaneschi
et al. (2017). I believe more research looking at the role of bouletic/teleological/deontic
biases in non-canonical question formation would be extremely beneficial. Of course, there
may still be a role for something like a straightforward confirmation interpretation – I
discuss this to some extent in the next subsection.
5.5.3 Scalarity of belief
The final interesting piece of the puzzle of results is the fact that the distribution of the
variation in the English and German results across contexts patterns very closely, as seen in
Figure 5.6. For each individual example, the division of biased questions and tag questions
is very similar in the two languages.
I suggest that this supports the idea that biased question production is in some way
influenced by the strength of belief or contextual evidence. Although both constructions
are technically available in either a neutral or negative evidential context (though the
intonation may vary in tag questions), it appears that the probability of selecting one or
the other construction is at similar rates between the two languages.
Similar ideas about the scalarity or strength of the required belief have been put
forward in the literature recently. The idea of credence of belief affecting the availability of
particular constructions has been put forward by Farkas and Roelofsen (2017), who argue
that rising tag questions can be used when a speaker has [medium] or [high] credence in
the evidence for p, while falling tags are only used when the speaker has [high] credence
75It is possible that this example could be viewed as teleological (von Fintel 2006) – rather than p being
true being part of the speaker’s personal desires, it is part of the speaker’s wider goals in reassuring the
addressee. However, the lines between bouletic/teleological/deontic modality can be fine, with all evaluated
against circumstantial modal bases (Hacquard 2011) rather than the speaker’s current epistemic state, and
so either way it is still distinct from a standard epistemic belief.
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for p. While I argue against Farkas and Roelofsen (2017) in chapter 4.3.5, this particular
facet of their argument is especially relevant.
Furthermore, in their paper on Northern Mandarin ha tags, Yang and Wiltschko
(2016) posit a ‘credibility scale’ which they link to Han’s (2002) idea of ‘informativeness’,
stating that ‘the difference between believing p and not believing p is often a matter of
degree and not a binary distinction’ (Yang and Wiltschko 2016:78). To produce a standard
assertion, a speaker must have high credibility in the proposition, i.e. they must believe p –
the speaker’s chance of producing a standard assertion drops as their credibility for p drops.
Yang and Wiltschko (2016) refer to this as the ‘affirmativeness function’. The authors also
posit a ‘confirmativeness function’ which is a bell-shaped curve. Confirmativeness increases
as affirmativeness decreases until the mid-point of the credibility scale, at which point it
reduces as the speaker’s credibility and reason to believe p decreases. The ‘confirmativeness
function’ can be seen in Figure 5.7, with the three relevant tags (ba, dui bu dui and ha1)
partitioned.
Figure 5.7: The ‘confirmativeness function’ from Yang and Wiltschko (2016:79),
demonstrating the space in which the authors posit that confirmationals are permitted
and the particular distribution of the three Northern Mandarin tags.
In Northern Mandarin, then, ba is used when the speaker has relatively high
credibility in their belief of p (but is not certain). dui bu dui, an A-not-A question, is
used when the speaker’s credibility is neither high nor low, while ha1, the focus of Yang
and Wiltschko’s paper, is used when the speaker has low credibility for p.
It is not entirely clear what the y-axis in the confirmativeness function figure is
meant to represent – I interpret it as strength of belief, given that high credibility refers to
a belief of p over ¬p; however, it is therefore unclear what the scalarity of the credibility
scale refers to. Furthermore, it is not the case that low credibility for p would necessarily
imply high credibility for ¬p. I am therefore not convinced by this exact graphing of the
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scalarity; however, the underlying point is relevant.
While Yang and Wiltschko separate their curve into sections representing each
confirmational particle, it seems to me that it would be perfectly plausible that two
confirmationals (or biased question types) would overlap somewhat in the sections of
belief and evidential bias that they represented – but the probability of choosing one or
the other would depend on the strength of the speaker’s belief and the interpreted
strength of the evidence, rather than a feature-based system (e.g. Sudo (2013) or
Gaertner and Gyuris (2017)) where beliefs and evidence are categorised as either [+] or
[–], [negative] or [positive].
In the English and German data, then, the belief and evidential bias contexts for
biased questions and canonical tag questions or oder overlap. However, the constructions
are different discourse moves despite their matching pragmatic contexts. Various factors
(e.g. background, politeness or bouletic desire) may affect the speaker’s choice of
construction, but at some level, the exact strengths of belief or evidential bias would have
an effect. This may account for the similarity in the distribution of participants’ choices
cross-linguistically when specific evidential contexts are given. I believe this would be a
productive avenue for future research and for modelling the overall relationship between
question bias and confirmation.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I aimed to address the question of whether matrix biased questions and
canonical tag questions are equally available in the evidential contexts in which they can be
used. I presented the results of an experiment which showed that speakers of English and
German prefer to produce biased questions in contexts where there is some counterevidence
challenging the speaker’s belief of some proposition p; on the other hand, they prefer to
produce tag questions in contexts where there is no counterevidence against p. These
results build on the experimental work of Domaneschi et al. (2017) who showed that
speakers of English and German prefer to produce different forms of matrix interrogatives
in different belief and bias contexts, and the results of Ladd (1981) and Scheffler (2015)
who showed that speakers use different tag question forms depending on the belief and bias
combination. I showed that although biased questions and tag questions are both available
in these contexts, it is not the case that speakers choose to produce them equally across
contexts. I also noted from the results that there was variation by specific context within
the overall umbrellas of ‘neutral’ or ‘negative’ evidential context.
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I explored these results in section 5.5, showing that they follow from the semantics
of tag questions (and biased questions) that I posited in chapter 4. With regard to the
variation seen across individual contexts, I suggested that this, to some extent, follows
from the fact that evidence and belief are always relative to the speaker’s own perspectives.
However, I also discussed the possibility that biased questions in neutral evidential contexts
and tag questions in negative evidential contexts may have specific pragmatic import,
specifically relating to politeness or to biases that are assessed relative to circumstantial
rather than epistemic modal bases. Finally, I discussed what these results imply for an
overall conceptualisation of biased question distribution. I suggested that the fact that
the variation in biased question or tag question across individual examples by and large
patterns across English and German suggests that a scalar model of belief and bias like
that of Yang and Wiltschko (2016) is preferable to a model which simply uses a binary p
or ¬p system. Both of these latter points would be good avenues for future research.
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Chapter 6
Extending the theory: Rhetorical
questions
6.1 Introduction
In chapter 3 we saw that the particle –int in Glasgow Scots and the particle –n in
Shetland dialect are available to some extent in polar rhetorical questions, but not in
rhetorical wh-questions. In chapter 4 I presented an analysis of these particles which
argued that they were check markers, checking that the addressee shared the speaker’s
belief of p. On the basis of the results and of this analysis, I posited a close relationship
between biased questions and polar rhetorical questions, under the umbrella of
‘non-canonical questions’. However, rhetorical wh-questions are also ‘non-canonical
questions’, in that they do something more than purely seek information. It is therefore
worth considering what exactly the relationship between polar rhetorical questions and
rhetorical wh-questions is, and why Scots check moves are not permitted in rhetorical
wh-questions.
I will first argue that English polar rhetorical questions can be accounted for in the
same way as biased questions in the framework of Domaneschi et al. (2017), with rhetorical
questions in effect ‘filling in the blanks’ in their table of question types (see Table 6.1).
This means that they are still questions, albeit with specific pragmatic purpose. This
follows from the analysis I presented in chapter 4. I then turn to wh-questions. I will
firstly explain why wh-rhetorical questions cannot express bias in the same way as polar
questions. I will then present evidence to argue that we must consider at least two types
of rhetorical wh-questions: those with polarity flip, and those without. The fact that both
can occur is observed by Rohde (2006) and Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) – however, what
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the authors do not observe is that there are particular generic interpretations associated
with polarity-flipped rhetorical wh-questions. I argue that when there is no polarity flip,
rhetorical wh-questions are true questions with specific pragmatic purpose (Caponigro and
Sprouse 2007, Biezma and Rawlins 2017).
On the other hand, polarity-flipped rhetorical wh-questions have a particular generic
interpretation and cannot refer to (a) specific known individual(s). To my knowledge, this
difference in polarity and interpretation has not been observed in the literature. To support
this discussion, I present the results of an online experiment that suggests that in generic
cases, rhetorical wh-questions are propositions as they can be selected by because clauses.
This is exemplified by variation in acceptability between examples like (355) and (356).
(355) I’m going, because who doesn’t want to meet Beyoncé?!
(356) *I’m going, because don’t I want to meet Beyoncé?!
This suggests that generic rhetorical wh-questions require a more strongly semantic
analysis, separate from the pragmatic analysis given for the non-flipped wh-question cases
and the polar question cases. In order to account for both types of rhetorical wh-question,
I extend the semantics for wh-questions presented in Kotek (2016).
Of course, there are many more types of rhetorical questions that I do not discuss in
this chapter – for example, idiomatic examples like the famous ‘Is the Pope Catholic?’, or
the examples of rhetorical alternative questions presented by Biezma and Rawlins (2017).
I do not mean this chapter to be a full exploration of rhetorical question types, but rather
to argue firstly for a closer relationship between polar rhetorical questions and matrix
biased questions and secondly that one singular mechanism cannot be posited to deal with
‘rhetorical questions’ as a broad category.
6.2 Motivation
6.2.1 Recapping the Scots data
In chapter 3, I presented the results of data collection from two Scots varieties, from
Glasgow and from Shetland, establishing the distribution of the particles –int and –n.
One particularly interesting result was that these particles were available for participants in
polar rhetorical questions, but not in rhetorical wh-questions (see section 3.3.5, in particular
Figures 3.52 and 3.54 when compared to Figures 3.60 and 3.62). These distinctions are
significant. In Shetland, the overall mean rating for –n in polar rhetorical questions was
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4.25 while for rhetorical wh-questions it was 3.04 – t(229.37) = 9.858, p < .00176. In
Glasgow for the 55+ group, the mean rating for –int in polar rhetorical questions was
4.27 while in rhetorical wh-questions it was 2.99 – t(154.33) = -6.669, p < .001. For the
18-30 group, recall that their judgments on both standard verb-subject-no questions and
–int polar rhetorical questions were lower than the older group: however, their judgments
for –int in polar rhetorical questions (mean = 3.52) were still significantly higher than in
rhetorical wh-questions (mean = 2.45): t(156.2) = -4.845, p < .001.
It is therefore not the case that –int or –n can be seen as general markers of non-
canonical question negation: if that were the case, one would expect that –int and –n would
be available in rhetorical wh-questions too. Further, if it were the case that –int and –n
were markers of syntactically raised negation (in non-canonical contexts), we might expect
there to be a distinction between subject and object rhetorical wh-questions – however
that is not what the results show. In neither variety was there a significant difference in
acceptability for rhetorical wh-questions that depended on the type of wh-question.
In chapter 4, I argued that despite looking like negation markers, –n and –int were
instances of check markers. Further, although the constructions that they appear in look
like questions on the surface, I argued that they were not: instead, these particles have
specialised in the left periphery to indicate that the speaker assumes the addressee shares
their belief of p. This explained their distribution across constructions; I showed that the
contexts in which these particles are permitted are contexts where the speaker is able to
take full responsibility for the proposition p, but also believes that the addressee shares
their belief, and thus wants to check that this is true.
However, I also argued that polar rhetorical questions in standard English (and
instances of verb-subject-no rhetorical questions in Scots) were not check moves; instead,
I suggested that there should be a closer link between polar rhetorical questions and matrix
biased questions. I will explore this in more detail here. Note that this relationship between
different types of attitude-expressing questions (such as biased questions and tag questions,
as well as rhetorical questions) is observed by Biezma and Rawlins (2017:303), who suggest
that they are from the ‘same family’. However, Biezma and Rawlins (2017) posit that this
holds for all rhetorical questions; I will argue this is not the case.
76This holds across clearly local instances of –n and the potentially confounded cases, where –n could
be confounded with standard English –n’t.
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6.2.2 Polar rhetorical questions: filling in the blanks
Recall the table of interrogative preferences from Domaneschi et al. (2017), presented once




p PPQ / really?! PPQ really?! PPQ
neutral ONPQ PPQ
¬p ONPQ INPQ
Table 6.1: Relationship between epistemic and evidential biases established in Domaneschi
et al. (2017) for choice of matrix question produced in English and German.
Recall that ONPQs, or ‘outer negation polar questions’ are matrix biased questions,
while INPQs, or ‘inner negation polar questions’, are true negative questions; recall also
the different negation positions seen in each construction, as seen in (357) and (358)77.
(357) Doesn’t John have to go to the meeting (too)? biased question
(358) Does John not have to go to the meeting (either)? true negative question
The other questions in this table are PPQs, or positive polar questions, and really?!
PPQs, which are positive polar questions with a preceding really?!, as seen in (359) and
(360).
(359) Does John have to go to the meeting? positive polar question
(360) Really?! Does John have to go to the meeting? surprisal polar question
Domaneschi et al. (2017) tested these four constructions in constructed scenarios in
which the participant’s existing belief state was set up so as to believe p, believe ¬p, or to
have no existing belief regarding p or ¬p (neutral). The participant was then presented with
a context in which the contextual evidence either pointed in favour of p, in favour of ¬p, or
had no particular impact on whether p or ¬p should hold (neutral). The participant was
then asked to produce the one of the four questions they would be most likely to produce
in the given situation. The results are summarised in the table above.
77I follow the results of Domaneschi et al. (2017) and Sailor (2013) in setting aside Ladd’s (1981) reported
ambiguity, where high –n’t negation can also have true negative question meaning. However, note again
that Domaneschi et al. (2017) find that there is variation in the intonation used in biased questions in the
case where the speaker has a belief of p but the evidential context suggests that ¬p is true, and suggest
that this may correlate with some sort of true negative meaning. They leave the details for future research;
as do I.
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For this section, the most relevant cells are those which are filled with grey.
Domaneschi et al. (2017) did not test any questions in these contexts as they argued that
questions would not be produced in those contexts. The most interesting cells for our
purposes are the top left cell (p/p) and the bottom right cell (¬p/¬p)78. The authors
argue that ‘a speaker with an original bias for p that receives contextual evidence for p
will most naturally assume that p is true and will not feel prompted to inquire about the
truth of p’ (Domaneschi et al. 2017:8). The same reasoning applies to the bottom right
cell: a speaker with a belief of ¬p, presented with evidence for ¬p, will assume that ¬p is
true and will not feel prompted to inquire about status of ¬p. These claims are
supported by evidence from Roelofsen et al. (2012), whose experimental work suggests
that participants negatively evaluate interrogatives in these contexts.
Domaneschi et al.’s (2017) reasoning for excluding the two corners of the grid is
sensible: in general, if a speaker has a belief and it is supported by the evidential context,
there is no reason for them to question it. However, these are of course the exact contexts in
which polar rhetorical questions are used: instances in which the speaker assumes that their
‘attitude [towards the answer of the question] is (or should be) accepted by all participants’
(Biezma and Rawlins 2017:303)79. The proposition which is the answer to the question is
already in the shared ground between participants, whether through previous discussion
or through the evidential context to the interaction.
I argue that these questions can be analysed in the same way as biased questions.
Both sets of constructions require that the speaker presents both {p, ¬p} and some common
ground management content as part of the question for a situation in which the speaker
believes p. In having a falsum or verum operator as part of the question, the speaker
is asking whether or not the addressee agrees that the answer to the question should be
added to the Common Ground, just as in a biased question (for more details, see section
4.3) (Romero 2015). Unlike a biased question, however, the intonation on a polar rhetorical
question does not rise as frequently (Dehé 2017); I take it that this falling intonation signals
a lack of contingency as defined by Gunlogson (2008) and discussed in depth in section
4.3.
78Domaneschi et al. (2017) exclude the middle right cell as they predict it licenses a complex question
form using both high and low negation, such as (i)).
i) A: I’d like to send this paper to a senior reviewer, but I’d prefer somebody new.
B: Hasn’t Frege not reviewed for us yet? (Romero and Han 2004:28)
They decide to set aside complex interrogatives like this for future study.
79The evidential context need not be p for a rhetorical question, but it should be at least [–negative],
e.g. neutral or in support of p. I take this as further evidence for overlapping between biased questions
and polar rhetorical questions.
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This accounts for the fact that regular questions with bias and polar rhetorical
questions share the same forms – for example, high negation (taken to be falsum in the
literature) or particular focus/really in positive forms, both argued to be verum markers
in the literature. The only things that differ are firstly, their intonation, and secondly the
pragmatic context in which they are used.
It is of course possible that languages may specialise forms to use for the particular
pragmatic function of a rhetorical questions (Gaertner and Gyuris 2017); however, that
does not appear to have happened in English.
6.2.3 Rhetorical wh-questions
Above, I argued that polar rhetorical questions should be considered in the same
framework as matrix biased questions, expressing that the speaker strongly believes
either p, or believes ¬p. This effectively has the same import as a matrix biased question;
however, the contextual factors are different, with no challenging evidence against the
proposition and the condition that p is already assumed to be known to both
conversation participants. While in English I argue that this role isn’t syntactically or
semantically specialised, I believe that it has been in the Scots data I presented in
chapter 3.
One of the key points that motivated this extension of the analysis of polar
rhetorical questions given by e.g. Biezma and Rawlins (2017) was the evidence from the
Scots data, summarised above. While –int and –n, analysed as check moves, can be
used in polar rhetorical questions, they are not acceptable in rhetorical wh-questions.
Above, I argued that polar rhetorical questions express the bias that the speaker believes
p; p is assumed to be in the shared ground, or FACTS, and pragmatically there is no
evidence challenging this belief of p. I argued that in standard English, this was
expressed by means of biased questions with falsum or verum, depending on the
polarity of the proposition to be expressed; the optionality of response was once again
presented through contingency (Gunlogson 2008), based on the fact that polar rhetorical
questions have considerably less rising intonation than information-seeking questions
(Dehé 2017)80. I argued that the Scots check particles developed from these type of
questions. The question is therefore why wh-questions do not express these same biases,
despite seemingly having the same rhetorical type properties as polar rhetorical questions
– for example, they do not expect an answer though can optionally be answered; the
answer is obvious to both the speaker and the addressee; they ‘feel’ somewhat like an
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assertion (Rohde 2006, Caponigro and Sprouse 2007, Biezma and Rawlins 2017).
I argue that this is quite simply to do with the semantics of wh-words. The
pragmatic work required to answer a question based on information in the Common
Ground in a polar question is very different to a wh-question; I argue this means that
although their interpretations are both dependent on speaker and addressee shared
beliefs, these conclusions are reached in different ways. This accounts for two important
points: firstly, the development of the distinction seen in the Scots data, and secondly,
evidence from polarity flip, discussed below. I will then argue that this evidence from
polarity flip suggests that there there are two types of rhetorical wh-questions: those in
which specific values are pragmatically filled into the wh-variables, and those in which
there is a generic, polarity flipped implication. I will argue that this latter type of
question requires a more formalised semantic meaning.
The semantics of wh-words
The semantics of wh-words makes it very clear why rhetorical wh-questions do not express
bias in the same way as polar questions. There are various definitions of wh-words in
the literature. Ginzburg and Sag (2001) define wh-words as variables; for Hintikka (1962)
or Karttunen (1977) wh-words are quantified expressions, while Hamblin (1973) defines a
wh-word as a set of all the possible answers. I will settle for the Hamblin definition in this
section of the thesis, as it is the most common.
If we consider the semantics of polar rhetorical questions posited above, a polar
rhetorical question without negation is a question with verum, or FOR-SURE-IN-CG(p);
a polar rhetorical question with negation is a question with falsum, or FOR-SURE-NOT-
IN-CG(p). These not-at-issue operators scope over the proposition (and can be scoped
over by the question operator). However, with a wh-word, there is an unknown in the
proposition. It is therefore impossible to express verum or falsum in the same way with
a wh-question – there is no full proposition that can be FOR-SURE-IN-CG or FOR-SURE-
NOT-IN-CG. While it may be possible for a speaker to indicate some sort of inclination
towards a proposition that they do not have the full details of, with regards to a rhetorical
question the speaker is required to express some sort of attitude towards each part of the
underlying proposition: semantically, while it would be possible for them to claim that
they were certain that part of the proposition should be in the Common Ground, if one
80Note that Dehé (2017) discusses information-seeking questions, not biased questions. While I have
argued that these are information-seeking, though biased, it would be worth carrying out separate
experimental investigation into the prosodic patterns of matrix biased questions.
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part of the construction is in fact a set of all possible answers, it is not possible for a
speaker to claim that this whole set should be in the Common Ground. The speaker can
not express an attitude about this part of the proposition, and thus a verum or falsum
operator cannot scope over a wh-word.
Therefore, wh-questions cannot express bias in the same way that polar rhetorical
questions do, despite sharing their pragmatic contexts – of having an answer that is
either already in the Common Ground for all conversation participants or is obvious to
all conversation participants through the evidential context.
This accounts for the Scots data seen in chapter 3; if negation in biased questions
and polar rhetorical questions is expressed through falsum questions, and this is what
the Scots check marker developed from, falsum would not have been in the rhetorical
wh-questions to begin with. Once it had been reanalysed as a check marker, its purpose
could not be extended to rhetorical wh-questions because, again, a wh-variable cannot be
subject to a check move as there is not a full proposition there to be checked.
I believe this also provides support for the syntactic analysis presented in section
4.4 – the check marker has been reanalysed in the left periphery, and is thus higher than
the negation we see in wh-questions.
I now turn to consider an alternative analysis for rhetorical wh-questions, firstly
summarising key points from the literature on the potential for polarity flip (section 6.2.4),
as well as the answer possibilities for rhetorical questions (section 6.2.5).
6.2.4 Polarity flip
Traditional accounts of rhetorical questions in the literature make the claim that despite
being superficially interrogatives, rhetorical questions are equivalent to assertions of the
opposite polarity (Sadock 1971, 1974, Krifka 1995, Han 2002, van Rooij 2003). In effect,
then, positive rhetorical questions are equivalent to negative assertions; rhetorical questions
with negation are equivalent to positive assertions. This was taken to hold for both polar
rhetorical questions and rhetorical wh-questions.
(361) Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy?! (= ‘I didn’t tell you that
writing a dissertation was easy.’)
(362) Didn’t I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy?! (= ‘I told you that writing
a dissertation was easy.’)
(363) What has John ever done for Sam?! (= ‘John has done nothing for Sam.’)
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(364) What hasn’t John done for Sam?! (=‘John has done everything for Sam.’)
(examples from Han 2002:202)
This idea of ‘polarity flip’ was integral to early analyses of rhetorical questions,
but more recent work identifies that there is a broader range of rhetorical questions than
first considered (Rohde 2006, Caponigro and Sprouse 2007, Biezma and Rawlins 2017).
For example, Biezma and Rawlins (2017) note that alternative questions can be rhetorical
(365).
(365) Are you doing a PhD or vacationing in Konstanz?! (Biezma and Rawlins 2017:303)
More relevant for the current discussion is the observation by Rohde (2006) and
Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) that rhetorical questions, as well as having interpretations
of ‘assertions of the opposite polarity’, can also denote specific propositions. For example,
in (366), the answer to the rhetorical question is the individual ‘your mother’ rather than
‘no one’; similarly in (367) it is not the case that ‘everyone’ helped Luca when he was in
trouble; rather, it is the specific individual ‘Mina’ who helped him.
(366) Who fed you and gave you a proper education?
(= ‘Your mother fed you and gave you a proper education’)
(Han 1998:9)
(367) It’s understandable that Luca adores Mina. After all, who helped him when he was
in trouble?
(=‘Mina helped Luca when he was in trouble’)
(Caponigro and Sprouse 2007:124)
The first point to note is that these non-null set interpretations of rhetorical
questions do not exhibit the same sort of polarity flip as the examples in (361-364): the
rhetorical question in (367) does not imply that Mina did not help Luca, for example.
The second point is that both of the examples presented here without polarity flip are
rhetorical wh-questions. Is it the case that only wh-questions can have rhetorical
interpretations without polarity flip?
Rohde (2006) does give a single example of a polar rhetorical question without
polarity flip: the classic example Is the Pope Catholic?. This example is clearly idiomatic
and should not, to my mind, be considered as part of a productive paradigm of rhetorical
question strategies. Biezma and Rawlins (2017:312) consider a couple of other potential
examples:
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(368) John thinks that it would be fun to pour water over Tim’s head; he goes ahead and
does it.
Tim: Are you an idiot?!
(369) John is about to jump from the top of a tree.
Tim: Is that guy crazy?!
These questions are only licensed in situations where the speaker has made an
assumption about p e.g. that John is acting like an idiot. However, if John is a stuntman
training for his next film by jumping from trees, Tim’s utterance is no longer licit (Biezma
and Rawlins 2017). Therefore, it may seem at first as though the rhetorical question is
implying that ‘that guy is crazy’. However, relevantly for us here, it is difficult to tease
apart exactly what the implied meaning of the question is. On one hand, clearly the
question is licensed by some evidence which indicates that p is true (e.g. ‘that guy is
crazy’) and so one might expect that the implied answer is ‘yes’. On the other, if the
speaker did not believe that ¬p was true (e.g. ‘that guy is not crazy’), they would not be
posing any question. The expectation is presumably, therefore, that the ‘answer’ is no,
he’s not crazy, and that this is known to all conversation participants, but some additional
explanation is required for his current behaviour. It does not, therefore, seem to correct
to consider these as polar questions which have answers without polarity flip.
There are also ‘monologue’ rhetorical questions, mentioned by Biezma and Rawlins
(2017:303) in a footnote.
(370) Presenter: So we have seen all the machinery we have at our disposal. Can we find
an answer to our initial problem? Well, let’s see...
Examples like these also do not require polarity flip; however, they appear more
like self-addressed questions. Certainly, monologue is not an ideal context to work out the
interactional properties of rhetorical questions; I will thus set examples like these aside.
So, for the most part, rhetorical polar questions seem to require polarity flip, and
the cases that don’t require it are the exceptions, rather than the rule. This is also the
conclusion that Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) reach. The same cannot be said of rhetorical
wh-questions, where polarity flipped answers and specific proposition answers are both
common. Although seemingly a key point, this has not been accounted for in research on
rhetorical questions to date.
Indeed, existing accounts of rhetorical questions in the literature have given a
uniform analysis for all types of rhetorical questions, regardless of whether that analysis
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is semantic (Han 2002) or pragmatic (Rohde 2006, Caponigro and Sprouse 2007, Biezma
and Rawlins 2017). I will overview the more recent pragmatic accounts, highlighting data
that these accounts do not discuss as well as their merits.
Rohde (2006) argues for an account of rhetorical questions which is based around
entropy, following van Rooij (2003). She thus follows Shannon’s (1948) formula for the
uncertainty of a system in order to calculate how ‘surprised’ a conversation participant
will be to discover the value of an undefined variable. For example, in the instance of a
regular, information-seeking wh-question like Who went to the party?, the entropy levels
for the speaker posing the question will be high, as from the set of possible attendees, there
is an equal probability of any of the possibilities being the correct answer. For example,
with a question ‘Who went to the party?’ in a set of three people, Josie, Leon and Monika,
the possibility that Josie attended is as high as the possibility that Leon attended, or that
Josie and Leon attended, etc. for all eight possibilities – therefore, whatever the answer is,
the speaker will be to some extent surprised by the answer.
On the other hand, in a rhetorical question, Rohde (2006) argues that the entropy is
reduced because the probability of selecting one particular cell of the possibilities is higher.
The probability is skewed and the answer is predictable because the answer is known to
both the speaker and the addressee. For example, if the speaker and the addressee both
know that Leon is the only one of Josie, Leon and Monika who ever attends parties,
the rhetorical question ‘Who went to the party?’ will have lower entropy, with a higher
probability that Leon is the correct answer based on the fact that the speaker and addressee
share this belief about Leon’s proclivity for partying.
In order to account for the fact that the speaker and the addressee do not have one
shared set of beliefs or one shared Common Ground, Rohde (2006) posits a condition of
‘sufficient similarity’, by which conversation participants’ beliefs are compared on a relevant
scale. Scales can be introduced by a number of different things, and do not even have to
mean identity between the participants’ answers, but could relate to general similarity.
The scale can be introduced by a negative polarity item e.g. lift a finger, which will then
‘highlight the bottom element’ (Rohde 2006:155); scales are similarly introduce by quantity
wh-words, e.g. how many or how soon. Rohde then uses the idea of an explicit scale to
analyse rhetorical questions with no negative polarity items, which she argues invoke scales
based on the probability values associated with each possible answer, introduced by the
lexical items in the question.
(371) Who would steal a newspaper?! Rohde (2006:157)
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In (371), she argues that each conversation participant has an ordered set of
worlds based on the likelihood that any individual would steal a newspaper; the
probability distribution is skewed towards one end, with high probability that no one
would steal a newspaper, followed by the high likelihood that ‘a lunatic’ would. At the
other end of the scale are individuals with extremely low probability of stealing a
newspaper and who are therefore unlikely to be selected from the sets encoded in who. It
doesn’t matter exactly what is at the end of each participant’s scale, as long as the
participants’ respective answers are equally extreme on the scale. In this way, Rohde
(2006) attempts to account for the possibility of the answer being ‘no one’ as well as a
possible exact reference (with high probability).
While the idea of having scalar probabilities for answers is appealing, this account
is unable to deal with the aforementioned polarity flip (or lack thereof): why do rhetorical
wh-questions without negation imply the negative, and why do the same constructions
with negation imply the positive? Rohde (2006) does not discuss this. Secondly, I believe
there that the null set interpretations have an element of generic meaning that is not
captured by this analysis. For example, regarding (371), the idea that no one would steal
a newspaper is not logically true; however, if the speaker and addressee both know that Oli
is a thief, there is no generic aspect. The rhetorical question does not imply that someone
like Oli would steal a newspaper, it implies that Oli specifically would steal a newspaper.
It is not the case that the speaker means none of the set would steal a newspaper, but
rather that for some approximation of ‘everyone’, it is the case that they would not steal
a newspaper.
While Rohde (2006) improves on the earlier literature in taking into account multiple
types of rhetorical questions, she cannot capture the differences in accounting for polarity
flipped rhetorical wh-questions and non-flipped ones.
Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) take a very similar position to Rohde (2006),
arguing that rhetorical questions are simply questions which pragmatically do not have to
be answered because the answer is known to all conversation participants, and all
conversation participants know that this is the case. The authors do not invoke entropy
in order to deal with the probabilities of possible answers but simply argue that the
interpretations of rhetorical questions arise due to the mutual beliefs of the conversation
participants which are public and shared. The analysis provided in Rohde (2006) is more
complex and deals explicitly with a wider variety of rhetorical question data; however,
Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) also present some interesting data on rhetorical questions
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which I will summarise here; some of which will be particularly relevant to the discussion
in section 6.4.1 regarding multiple wh-questions.
Firstly, Caponigro and Sprouse (2007), like Rohde (2006), acknowledge that
rhetorical questions can have both negative and positive answers, or implications.
However, they do not acknowledge the generic nature that the polarity flipped answers
bring.
(372) All faculty members voted for the current chair months ago, and now everyone is
complaining about him to the students.
S: They should stop complaining about the chair to us. After all, who voted for
him?
A: (All of) them / #Nobody. (Caponigro and Sprouse 2007:4)
This example would, at first, seem to go against the generalisation that I have made
above, in which only polarity flipped quantifier answers are permitted. However, note that
in this example, the speaker and addressee are both aware that all of the faculty voted
for the current chair i.e. it is an instance of a specific reading which happens to be plural.
This is therefore an instance where it truly is an example of the specific cell in which the
specific cell is also all of the relevant members of the set, rather than an instance where
there is a quantifier indicating some element of ‘genericness’.
Secondly, as Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) state, if rhetorical questions are simply
questions, one would expect that it would be possible to have multiple wh-word questions
with rhetorical readings. The authors claim that only single-pair readings are available
for multiple wh-questions with rhetorical readings. Single-pair readings are those in which
there is a specific pair of answers that are the true and informative answer to the question;
on the other hand pair-list readings are those where for every member of the set of one
of the wh-words, there is an answer from the set of the other wh-word (single-pair vs.
pair-list readings will be discussed more in section 6.4.1). Caponigro and Sprouse (2007)
then present the results of a pilot judgment study in which they show that participants do
accept rhetorical questions with multiple wh-words provided there is an acceptable context
and an ordering word (like first) to trigger the single-pair readings such as (373).
(373) Murray danced with Brent’s girlfriend at the dance while Brent got some punch.
So, while Murray went to the bathroom, Brent danced with Murray’s girlfriend. As
Murray got angry, Brent said:
You can’t be angry; after all, who danced with who first?!
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(Caponigro and Sprouse 2007:5)
Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) show that their participants accept rhetorical
readings for examples like (373). However, note that it does not seem to be possible to
have a case in which one wh-element indicates a specific cell (e.g. ‘Murray’, ‘Brent’s
girlfriend’) and another indicates the generic null set81.
I take this as further evidence that the ‘negative answers’ that can be offered for
rhetorical wh-questions are not the same as the possible null set answer to true
wh-questions, in the way that the analyses of both Rohde (2006) and Caponigro and
Sprouse (2007) predict. If they were, we would expect that it would be possible to have
multiple wh-questions in which one or both of the wh-elements were interpreted as
elements of the full or empty set.
Further evidence that may build on this point is the lack of availability of the
polarity flipped or ‘generic’ interpretation in rhetorical wh-in-situ questions. These echo
questions can again, only refer to specific variables and not to a generic value.
(374) A believes they have been nothing but nice to B.
S: B told me you were rude to him.
A: He said what?!
(375) M is known for being very unfashionable.
S: M bought that shirt you really wanted.
A: Who bought it?!
The final part of Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) that it is worth discussing are the
two examples that they consider ‘problematic’; it is, they argue, easier to get the reading
in (377) than it is to get the truth-conditionally equivalent reading in (376).
(376) After all, who likes ice cream?
#Everybody.
(377) After all, who doesn’t like ice cream?
Nobody. ( = Everybody likes ice cream.)
Their claim is probably true. However, I believe that they are simply asking the
wrong question: although the readings are truth-conditionally equivalent, the generic
rhetorical question in (376) would trigger a negative answer, implying that ‘There is no
81It is possible that there could be a single-pair answer where one of the wh-words equated to a plural
group that is the null set. However, that is not the same interpretation as ‘generic’ ‘nobody’.
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one who likes ice cream’ – just like the example Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) give
involving castor oil, shown here in (378).
(378) After all, who likes castor oil?
Nobody.
It is possible to get a felicitous interpretation of (376) if the interpretation is specific
– i.e. if the wh-variable is filled with the partition of the set that includes all the members
of the set). In order to get this reading, both conversation participants would need to be
sure that every member of the set did indeed like ice cream. Of course, this cannot be
said to be for everyone in the world; however, it might be able to be said for e.g. all the
attendees of a child’s birthday party (379).
(379) A is organising a birthday party for S’s child and their friends. A is baking a cake,
but the cake isn’t ready, and A is worried that there won’t be enough food. There
is already ice cream, and both A and S know that the children all like ice cream.
S: Don’t worry! After all, who likes ice cream?
S or A: Everyone. / All the children.
In the castor oil example (378), on the other hand, it is the case that there probably
are people who like castor oil, but for the majority, the speaker (and addressee) believe it
is safe to assume that they don’t.
Caponigro and Sprouse (2007), therefore, discuss a number of interesting examples
that support the idea that something else is going on with null/full set rhetorical wh-
questions. In particular, I will return to the multiple wh-questions in section 6.4.1.
The most recent relevant account of rhetorical questions in the literature comes from
Biezma and Rawlins (2017), who update the semantics of Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) to
a dynamic Stalnakarian semantics based on Farkas and Bruce (2010), in which rhetorical
interpretations of questions arise due to their being ‘non-inquisitive’ on the QUD stack.
The answer to the question is incorporated as a presupposition, which is automatically
updated into the context set (if not already there) before the construction reaches the
QUD; the rhetorical question is thus non-inquisitive as the update has already been forced
to the context set. In order to reject the presupposition of a rhetorical question, Biezma and
Rawlins (2017:318) suggest that ‘rhetorical disagreements are often marked as targeting
not-at-issue content, e.g. by actually ’, lending support to their argument that the answer
is incorporate by presupposition. The overall effect is therefore similar to an assertion (a
proposal to update the common ground, which is then accepted); however, the effect of
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the rhetorical question is that it is a non-inquisitive question which can then simply be
accepted because the answer has already been forced by presupposition.
This analysis is acceptable for the rhetorical wh-questions in which there are specific
answers shared in the common ground by participants; however, it also does not account
for the issues of polarity flip or genericness that I discussed above.
Here, I have shown that there is reason to treat cases of rhetorical wh-questions
which imply answers that are assertions of the opposite polarity as separate from cases of
rhetorical wh-questions in which a specific partition of the set is known to be the true and
informative answer to the question. I will firstly rule out the possibility of investigating
this through answering possibilities, before I present the results of an experiment aimed at
further testing the properties of the ‘generic’ opposite polarity cases, showing that speakers
accept these as the complements of because clauses, indicating that they are interpreted as
propositions. I will then given an analysis for these constructions in section 6.4.
6.2.5 Answering possibilities
As highlighted above, the literature argues that all rhetorical questions should be able to
accounted for by one analysis. However, the data presented above suggests that
wh-questions with answers of the opposite polarity are different to those which imply that
there is a specific known value in the common ground that fills the wh-variable. Firstly,
the first type of question always implies an answer which is of the opposite polarity to
the question; secondly, there is an element of genericness to their interpretation, rather
than the true empty or full set interpretation; finally, while multiple wh-questions can
have rhetorical readings, they can only have specific single-pair interpretations – the
opposite polarity/generic examples readings are infelicitous in those contexts. Rather
than having a purely pragmatic interpretation, then, in which the wh-variable is filled by
shared knowledge in the common ground, I suggest that the meaning of these polarity
flipped rhetorical questions may be derived in the semantics, leading to these
wh-questions behaving more like assertions. How can we test this?
One of the key distinctions between rhetorical questions and assertions posited by
Biezma and Rawlins (2017) is the fact that rhetorical questions can be responded to with
‘That’s right.’ but not ‘That’s true.’, implying that these are not propositions and do not
have truth values.
(380) S: Are you doing your PhD or vacationing in Konstanz?!
A: You’re right / #That’s not true!
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(381) S: Are you an idiot?!
A: You’re right, I shouldn’t have done that. / #That’s true, I shouldn’t have done
that.
Biezma and Rawlins (2017:304)
Using possible answers would therefore be an obvious way to test whether the
‘generic’ rhetorical wh-questions are semantically not questions. However, as with some
of the answering properties discussed in section 4.3, it appears that the required
preconditions for the different answering moves varies more than has been discussed in
the literature. If we look first at the ‘generic’ rhetorical questions, it seems that ‘that’s
true’ can be an acceptable response.
(382) A is fretting about the fact that they have over-catered for a party and are going to
be left with too much food at the end.
S: Oh, don’t worry about the fact you bought too much ice cream. It will get eaten.
Who doesn’t love ice cream?!
A: That’s true.
However, with marginally altered contexts in which A has not previously committed
to ¬p in some way, those responses are no longer acceptable.
(383) S: I found out yesterday that your girlfriend doesn’t like ice cream. What?! Who
doesn’t like ice cream?!
A: I know! / #That’s true.
It may be the case that ‘that’s true’ is only acceptable when the addressee needs
to accept the truth of the proposition in a case where they have not done so previously,
rather than generally being available as a marker of agreement. Looking at rhetorical wh-
questions with specific values as well as polar rhetorical questions, it becomes apparent
that this is a more general phenomenon. In cases where the addressee has hinted at a ¬p
commitment, ‘that’s true’ is acceptable (384-385); where they haven’t (386-387) it is not.
(384) A is telling S that they are worried they are going to be late to Y’s birthday.
S: Don’t worry about being late to Y’s birthday party. Who was late to your
birthday party?
A: That’s true.
(385) S and A are waiting for Y at her birthday party; she is nowhere to be seen.
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S: Ugh, Y is late again. It’s always her. Who was late to my birthday party? Who
was late to your birthday party?
A: I know / #That’s true.
(386) S is helping A look for a flat; they have looked at all the flats available on the south
side, as that is where A’s work is. S thinks they’ve found a great opportunity in the
west end, but A looks dubious.
S: You’re not going to find anywhere closer to work that this. Didn’t you already
look at all the flats on the south side?!
A: That’s true. / # I know.
(387) S and A are looking for a flat for A. They have already looked at all the available
flats in the south side, because that is where A wants to live. S assumes A has made
a decision, but A asks them to go to a viewing on Saturday.
S: Ugh, but flat hunting is so boring. Didn’t you already look at all the flats on the
south side?!
A: I know (but I want to double check). / #That’s true.
Just as we saw regarding the potential responses to ‘check’ moves in section 4.3,
then, answering moves in themselves appear to have specific preconditions and effects
regarding conversation participants’ existing beliefs and the commitments they wish to
make. Looking at the responses in themselves can’t, therefore, make a distinction between
‘assertions’ and ‘questions’.
Instead, I test the acceptability of these generic type rhetorical wh-questions as
the complements of because clauses. Because clauses only take complements denoting
propositions (Johnston 1994), and if rhetorical wh-questions were behaving as propositions,
it would suggest that they would be acceptable in this context82. I compare this with the
acceptability of polar rhetorical questions as well as declaratives in the same context, and
show that these generic rhetorical wh-questions are rated as ‘OK/fine’ by participants –
better than polar rhetorical questions though not as acceptable as declaratives. These
results add further support to the analysis I will put forward for wh-questions with the
generic rhetorical interpretation in section 6.4.1.
82Thank you to Rebecca Woods (p.c.) for providing the original data from because clauses, and for
further discussion on this point.
307
6.3 Experiment
In order to test the prediction made by the Scots data as to the lack of similarity between
polar and wh- rhetorical questions, as well as the behaviour of ‘generic’ rhetorical wh-
questions, I ran an experiment for non-Scottish native English speakers using Qualtrics. I
tested the acceptability of polar rhetorical questions and ‘generic’ rhetorical wh-questions
as the complement of a because clause. Participants were presented with a short context
that established a scenario, and a point of discussion between the participant and some
other (imagined) addressee. At the end of the context, there were the words ‘you say’.
Participants were then presented with an example in bold, which consisted of a matrix
clause with a reason clause introduced by because.
(388) I am passing around some fermented fish I bought in Iceland. I offer it to you and
you say:
I’m not having any, because who wants to eat rotten fish?!
I’m not having any, because do I want to eat rotten fish?!
I’m not having any, because I don’t want to eat rotten fish.
For each context, the matrix clause was kept consistent, and the contents of the
subordinate because clause varied. In an example like (388), participants would only have
seen one of the three potential reason clauses at a time; however, over the course of the
experiment, they judged all three examples. For each context, there were either one or two
polar rhetorical questions, a ‘generic’ rhetorical wh-question, and two declarative fillers,
which participants judged in random order throughout the session. Participants judged
examples both with and without negation markers. In wh-RQs, participants judged both
subject questions (with who) and object questions (with what). Polar rhetorical questions
were primarily with pronominal subjects; a separate group with quantifier phrase (QP)
subjects were also included. See Table 6.2 for distribution. All stimuli can be seen in
Appendix C.
whRQ polar RQ
subject object pronominal QP
without negation 2 2 4 2
with negation 2 2 4 2
8 8 4
+ 16 declarative fillers
Table 6.2: Distribution of forms in the because clause experiment.
Participants were asked to rate the acceptability of the bolded sentence on a scale
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Figure 6.1: Examples of the screens that participants were presented with, including the
first introduction screen, and the scales on which the participants were asked to judge the
examples.
309
from 1 to 5. The points on the scale were explicitly labelled: 1 = ‘terrible’; 2 = ‘poor’; 3 =
‘OK’; 4 = ‘fine’; 5 = ‘good’, to ensure that participants had a reasonably consistent method
of scoring throughout. The scale was presented directly beneath the example sentence,
below the context, so participants could flick back to the context and the example when
deciding their rating in order to ensure consistency as far as possible. Participants were
explicitly told not to worry about politeness when judging a particular example, but of
course it is not possible to tell what any individual participant’s judging process entailed.
My hypothesis predicts that the ‘generic’ rhetorical wh-questions should be
acceptable in these contexts, while polar rhetorical questions, which are true questions,
should not be acceptable.
6.3.1 Participants
Participants were gathered through Facebook, Twitter and a postgraduate mailing list at
the University of Edinburgh. It was stipulated that participants must be over 18, and must
be non-Scottish native English speakers. Scots varieties do not exhibit the same –n’t/not
distinction as other English varieties (Brown and Millar 1980, Thoms et al. 2013) and so
were excluded from the data collection. Altogether, 147 completed data sets were collected;
one was removed as the participant gave a Scottish location when asked where they grew
up, giving 146 participants overall, with a mean age of 30.
Unlike the experiment presented in chapter 5, the literature does not suggest that
any particular social group should behave differently from another with regard to rhetorical
question production, and so I do not include any intra-participant information in the
following model – simply random effects for participant, as well as example.
6.3.2 Results
The raw data was downloaded from Qualtrics and stored in .csv format. I first present
descriptive statistics; following the descriptive analysis, as in chapter 4, I used the ordinal
package (Christensen 2018) in RStudio (RStudio Team 2015) to fit a cumulative link mixed
model. Cumulative link mixed models are a type of logistic regression specifically designed
for ordered data with more than two response categories without the risks associated with
using linear mixed – such as the Likert scale judgments that participants gave to the
examples presented in this experiment. As such, it is an appropriate method of analysis
for the data gathered in this experiment.
Recall that the scale participants were presented with labelled each point: 1 =
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1 2 3 4 5
whRQ 62 (5.3%) 223 (19.1%) 253 (21.7%) 354 (30.3%) 276 (23.6%)
ynRQ 302 (25.9%) 471 (40.3%) 222 (19.0%) 131 (11.2%) 42 (3.6%)
declaratives 35 (1.5%) 140 (6.0%) 234 (10.0%) 554 (23.7%) 1373 (58.8%)
Table 6.3: Raw scores for generic rhetorical wh-questions, polar rhetorical questions and
declaratives as complements of because clauses, in which 1 is ‘terrible’ and 5 is ‘good’.
‘terrible’; 2 = ‘poor’; 3 = ‘OK’; 4 = ‘fine’; 5 = ‘good’. Rhetorical wh-questions achieved
a mean rating of 3.48, with a median rating of 4 and a standard deviation of 1.19. A
clear majority (75.6% (N=883)) of the generic rhetorical wh-questions were rated in the
3-5 range (OK-Good), with 23.6% (N=276) of those achieving ratings of 5. On the other
hand, rhetorical polar questions achieved a mean rating of 2.26, with a median rating of
2 and a standard deviation of 1.07. 33.8% (N=395) of polar rhetorical question examples
were in the 3-5 range, with only 3.6% (N=42) achieving ratings of 5.
Declarative fillers were included to provide a comparison point. These fillers received
a mean rating of 4.32, with a median rating of 5 and a standard deviation of 0.98. Almost
all (92.5% (N=2161)) of the declarative fillers were scored in the 3-5 range, with 58.7%
(N=1373) achieving ratings of 5. It thus seems as though, like declaratives, ‘generic’
rhetorical wh-questions are acceptable, while polar rhetorical questions are not. This can
be seen in Figure 6.2.
The statistical model supports the descriptive results. Fitting a cumulative link
mixed model with a fixed effect of construction type and random effects for participant
and example shows main effects of construction type: whether wh- or polar. Paired t-tests
(Bonferroni correction applied, significance level = .025) confirm that declaratives were
rated significantly higher than rhetorical wh-questions (t(1973.4) = 20.914, p < .001), but
that rhetorical wh-questions were rated significantly higher than polar rhetorical questions
(t(1167) = 29.378, p < .001).
It seems as though this is another case, then, where there is difference between
polar rhetorical questions and wh-rhetorical questions; more importantly, however, it also
indicates that ‘generic’ rhetorical wh-questions do behave more like assertions than
questions83. I will move on to present an analysis for this in the next section.
83It does not seem that specific rhetorical wh-questions are available as the complement to a because
clause.
i) # You should be nice to your mother because who raised you?
These examples are somewhat improved by a) inclusion of after all before the wh-question, or b) rising
intonation on the question, which the speaker themself then answers. I set aside both of these issues.
311
Figure 6.2: Proportions of judgments for generic rhetorical wh-questions, polar rhetorical
questions and declaratives as the complements to because clauses.
Figure 6.3: Cumulative link mixed model for rhetorical questions as complements of because
clauses, with fixed effects of clause type and random effects for participant and example.
There is significant effect of clause type.
312
6.4 Towards an analysis for ‘generic’ rhetorical wh-questions
Above, I set out arguments from the literature that there should be one analysis for all
types of rhetorical questions (Sadock 1974, Han 2002, Rohde 2006, Caponigro and Sprouse
2007, Biezma and Rawlins 2017). However, based on the data from Scots seen in the
earlier chapters of this thesis as well as evidence from polarity flip. I argued that although
polar rhetorical questions and rhetorical wh-questions were used in the same pragmatic
contexts (i.e. contexts where the speaker and addressee are assumed to agree on the same
answer, which may be in the Common Ground already), polar rhetorical questions were
better analysed with a framework of polar question bias, defined by e.g. Romero (2015)
as falsum and verum questions. Looking more closely at wh-questions with rhetorical
questions, I then argued that there were in fact two separate accounts of rhetorical wh-
questions required. The pragmatic accounts posited in the literature by Rohde (2006),
Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) and Biezma and Rawlins (2017) I argue are appropriate for
cases where the correct partition of the wh-word in the rhetorical question is available for
both conversation participants either in the common ground or in the evidential context
surrounding the interaction.
However, I presented evidence not previously considered in the literature to
suggest that the traditional cases of polarity flipped rhetorical wh-questions in fact
behave differently, and require a separate analysis. For one, these interpretations always
imply an answer of the opposite polarity, which is not the case when simply filling in a
known variable. Secondly, these polarity flipped interpretations have a ‘generic’ aspect in
which some approximation of all or some approximation of none of the set is implied as
the answer. Furthermore, multiple wh-questions and wh-in-situ questions can have
rhetorical interpretations, but not in cases where one or more of the wh-words is meant to
indicate the ‘generic’ polarity flipped wh. Finally, I carried out an experiment, the results
of which I presented in section 6.3. I showed that the ‘generic’ polarity flipped rhetorical
wh-questions were relatively acceptable as the complements of because clauses, indicating
that they are behaving more like something denoting a proposition than a regular
question. They were not as acceptable as regular declaratives, but more so than polar
rhetorical questions.
In this section, then, I take the evidence presented above to develop an analysis for
rhetorical wh-questions. This will account for both the standard specific cases which have
a pragmatic analysis, and these ‘generic’ interpretations.
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6.4.1 Kotek (2016)
I take Kotek (2016) as my starting point for the analysis of rhetorical wh-questions
presented here. Kotek (2016) develops a straightforward three-part syntax and semantics
for wh-questions which she argues accounts for a wider range of wh-question phenomena
than other previous accounts: superiority effects, presuppositions of question meaning,
the possibilities of both single-pair and pair-list readings for multiple wh-questions and
intervention effects. While Kotek therefore deals with a number of important phenomena,
and includes special cases of quiz questions and nested wh-questions, she does not discuss
rhetorical wh-questions. I will show how her framework can be adopted to both account
for the standard pragmatic rhetorical wh-questions as well as the ‘generic’ cases that I set
out above. Important in this analysis will be the observation of Caponigro and Sprouse
(2007) that rhetorical wh-questions in English only have single-pair readings and not
pair-list readings.
The three components of a wh- interrogative
In order to derive all of the possible wh-questions, Kotek proposes a question semantics
based on the idea of Rooth-Hamblin alternatives (Hamblin 1973, Rooth 1992). With
Rooth-Hamblin alternatives, as well as the ordinary domain of interpretation associated
with each node in a structure, there is also a focus semantic value. The availability of these
focus alternatives in a separate domain has been posited to account for focus semantics as
well as the role of the wh-variable in echo questions, for example.
(389) [Sally]F doesn’t like chocolate.
(390) Piotr likes [who]F?
Firstly, Kotek (2016) argues that wh-words are elements that introduce alternatives
at this focus semantic level. In the ordinary domain, the variable has no value – it is
undefined (Ramchand 1997, Beck 2006). At the focus semantic level, however, alternatives
will be introduced as in (391), where o signals the ordinary semantic value, and f signals
the focus semantic value.
(391) JwhoKo = undefined
JwhoKf = {x : x ∈ human} (Kotek 2016)
The second element of Kotek’s account is the interrogative complementizer in C,
which simply triggers interrogative movement. For wh-questions, this means that a wh-
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word must move to the specifier of C in the syntax; furthermore, a singular wh-word must
be pronounced at PF in this high position. Other movements to CP can take place covertly
at LF, but these will be realised at PF in their original position. This is a straightforward
syntax for wh-words. The interrogative complementizer does not contribute anything to
the semantics under Kotek’s account – it simply passes up whatever denotation it receives
from its sister.
(392) JCK = λP . P
The interrogative complementizer passes the denotation up to the final piece in
Kotek’s puzzle: the altshift operator, situated in CP.
(393) Jaltshift ασKo = JασKf
Jaltshift ασKf = {Jaltshift ασKo}
The proposition α that is passed up to the altshift operator has an ordinary
value; however, this is undefined due the undefined nature of the wh-word. altshift then
takes the alternatives from the focus domain of the proposition α, and shifts them into the
ordinary domain, so as the ordinary meaning of the proposition and specifically of the wh-
word becomes the meaning of the alternatives posited in the particular world, as opposed
to the undefined variable. For example, if α is a question like Who won the race?, the
ordinary value of this is undefined. The focus value of α in this case would be something
like the set of propositions {Jake won the race, Yuji won the race, Sadie won the race}.
After the altshift operator is applied, as the output, the ordinary value of the question
would then be the set of propositions.
For an ordinary wh-question then, the derivation at LF proceeds bottom up as
shown in Figure 6.4.
At the point of C’1 in Figure 6.4, the denotation is straightforward and purely in
the ordinary domain, as shown in (394).
(394) JC’1Ko = λw. Sally order x in w
Once this variable x is abstracted over, it composes with the set of pizzas available
in the world, i.e. which pizza. However, as which pizza at this point only has meaning in
the focus domain, the ordinary meaning is undefined here, in C’2. There is only a meaning
in the focus domain, as shown in (395).
(395) JC’2Ko = undefined



















Figure 6.4: The LF realisation for a straightforward wh-question, as posited by Kotek
(2016).
Finally, the altshift operator is situated above the wh-word in the CP. It takes the
focus alternatives shown in (395) and shifts them so as they become the ordinary meaning
of the question, as shown in (396). The focus value of CP is the same as the ordinary
meaning.
(396) JCPKo = { λw. Sally order x in w : x ∈ pizza }
The set of possible answers therefore might look something like:
{ λw. Sally order margherita in w, λw. Sally order funghi in w, λw. Sally order pineapple
in w }
One of these will be the true and maximally informative answer in a regular wh-
question and it is up to the addressee to provide that answer.
While this is straightforward for simplex wh-questions, Kotek’s main concern is
dealing with multiple wh-questions. Kotek (2016) demonstrates that the semantics laid
out above can be used to deal with both single-pair and pair-list readings of multiple wh-
questions, both superiority obeying – in which the higher base-generated wh-element is
raised to C, as in (397) – and superiority violating – in which the lower base-generated
wh-element is raised to C, as in (398).
(397) Which person which person ordered which pizza? superiority obeying
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(398) Which pizza did which person order which pizza? superiority violating
The availability of pair-list readings for superiority violating wh-questions is
debatable. While Kotek (2016) and Pesetsky (2000) clearly support the idea that these
readings are available, Boškovič (2001) and Elliott (2015) posit accounts for multiple
wh-questions in which the pair-list reading is blocked in superiority violating contexts.
Nicolae et al. (2017) present the results of experimental work suggesting that in general,
there is acceptablity of these constructions, but less so than pair-list readings for
superiority obeying wh-questions. Furthermore, they show that the availability of
superiority violating wh-questions may be subject to intra-speaker variation. I therefore
note the possible variation in acceptability, and set this issue aside in my adoption of
Kotek (2016). I will not discuss her analysis for superiority violating wh-questions in any
detail here.
Single-pair readings, as briefly discussed above, are cases of multiple wh-questions
in which there is a single-pair of individuals that equate to the true and informative answer
to the wh-question. For example, with regard to (397), where there was a world with three
individuals in the domain of ‘people’ {Olivia, Sally, Eden} and three individuals in the
domain of ‘pizza’ {margherita, funghi, pineapple}, there would be nine possible single-pair
answers. The question is therefore a set of propositions:
{ λw. Olivia order margherita in w, λw. Olivia order funghi in w, λw. Olivia order
pineapple in w λw. Sally order margherita in w, λw. Sally order funghi in w, λw. Sally
order pineapple in w, λw. Eden order margherita in w, λw. Eden order funghi in w, λw.
Eden order pineapple in w }
The addressee chooses the true and informative answer from this set of propositions,
which Kotek describes as ‘flat’ as they are unordered.
As seen in Figure 6.5, with a single-pair reading in a superiority obeying multiple
wh-question, both wh-words are in the CP at LF, with the upper DPx moved overtly in the
syntax and pronounced in CP, while the lower DPy is moved covertly at LF and pronounced
in its base-generated position.
Importantly, there is still one altshift operator that scopes over the whole
question. This means that the two variables combine with each other in the bottom up
composition before their alternatives are shifted into the ordinary domain, as shown in
examples (399-401).





















Figure 6.5: The LF realisation of a superiority obeying multiple wh-question with a single-
pair reading, as posited by Kotek (2016).
(400) JC’2Ko = undefined
JC’2Kf = { λw. x order y in w : y ∈ pizza }
(401) JC’3Ko = undefined
JC’3Kf = { λw. x order y in w : y ∈ pizza, x ∈ person }
Finally, the altshift operator takes the focus meaning from the C’3 and shifts the
values into the ordinary meaning, giving the overall meaning of the question.
(402) JCPKo = { λw. x order y in w : y ∈ pizza, x ∈ person }
The question thus composes in the same way as the simple question with a single
wh-variable, with all alternatives composed together before altshift applies, giving a list
of propositions and thus the single-pair reading.
Pair-list readings of multiple wh-questions are ones in which the addressee must
provide a list of pairs that satisfy the presuppositions for multiple wh-questions posited by
Dayal (2002):
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i) Domain exhaustivity: every member of the set quantified by the higher wh-word84
must be paired with a member of the set quantified over by the lower wh-word.
ii) Point-wise uniqueness: with regard to domain exhausitivity, every member of the
higher set must be paired with no more than one member of the lower set.
With the multiple wh-question given in (397), with the same world posited above,
with a domain of person individuals { Olivia, Sally, Eden } and a domain of pizza
individuals { margherita, funghi, pineapple }, there are a ‘family’ of questions, to which
the addressee must chose a possible answer for each one – thus providing the pair-list
interpretation.
(403) The ‘family’ of questions in the pair-list: {{ λw. Olivia order margherita in
w, λw. Olivia order funghi in w, λw. Olivia order pineapple in w }, { λw. Sally
order margherita in w, λw. Sally order funghi in w, λw. Sally order pineapple in w
}, { λw. Eden order margherita in w, λw. Eden order funghi in w, λw. Eden order
pineapple in w}}
To account for pair-list readings, Kotek (2016) posits multiple altshift operators
in CP; one of which sits above the higher wh-word, and the other which sits between the
higher and lower wh-words.
Unlike in single-pair readings, where the wh-words compose together before the
alternatives are shifted into the ordinary domain, in the pair-list reading, the alternatives
for the lower wh-word are shifted into the ordinary domain before being passed up to
compose with the higher wh-word. The higher wh-word thus ‘sorts’ the question presented
by the lower wh-word, giving the ‘family’ of questions interpretation given in (403) – the
pizza individuals are sorted by the person individuals, so as each pizza is an answer option
for each person.
(404) JC’1Ko = λw. x order y in w
(405) JC’2Ko = undefined
JC’2Kf = { λw. x order y in w : y ∈ pizza }
(406) JC’3Ko = { λw. x order y in w : y ∈ pizza }
JC’3Kf = { λw. x order y in w : y ∈ pizza }
84In superiority obeying wh-questions, this will be the subject; in superiority violating wh-questions this






















Figure 6.6: The LF realisation of a superiority obeying multiple wh-question with a pair-list
reading, as posited by Kotek (2016).
(407) JC’4Ko = undefined
JC’4Kf = {{ λw. x order y in w : y ∈ pizza } : x ∈ person }
The composition above gives the overall meaning of the question as shown in (408).
x ordered a pizza y in w, and there is a true answer for all x in in the set of people in w.
(408) JCPKo = {{ λw. x order y in w : y ∈ pizza } : x ∈ person }
Having outlined Kotek’s (2016) semantics for wh-questions, I will now take this
framework and show how both the pragmatic and ‘generic’ rhetorical wh-questions can be
accounted for, as well as the restriction to single-pair multiple rhetorical wh-questions.
6.4.2 Rhetorical wh-questions in Kotek’s framework
The framework presented in Kotek (2016) is particularly relevant for the discussion of
rhetorical wh-questions85 because she posits different mechanisms for single-pair and pair-
list readings. Recall that Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) suggest that while multiple wh-
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questions can have rhetorical meanings, this is only the case when the readings are single-
pair. These different mechanisms are thus relevant. I will first discuss the pragmatic
rhetorical questions before positing an analysis for the ‘generic’ instances.
Pragmatic rhetorical wh-questions
Within the semantics provided by Kotek (2016), it is relatively straightforward to deal
with rhetorical wh-questions that imply there is a specific answer to the question already
known to both speaker and addressee. I believe that in these cases, the question composes
as usual as shown in Figure 6.4 and as laid out in the steps underneath.
From the question then given (e.g. Which pizza did Sally order?! ), there is a set of
possible answers { margherita, funghi, pineapple }. However, the correct answer is believed
to be known to both conversation participants. This can be seen in the context given in
(409)
(409) Olivia and Eden are making dinner for their flatmate, Sally. Eden is not sure
whether Sally would be happy if she put mushrooms in the food. The three of them
had had pizza together the night before; Sally had ordered a funghi pizza. Olivia
says:
O: Come on! Which pizza did she order last night?!
The other alternatives are still shifted into the ordinary meaning of the question;
however, the correct answer is known to both participants and so does not need to be
responded to – the analysis can then simply proceed following a pragmatic account such
as Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) or Biezma and Rawlins (2017).
With multiple wh-questions, the same principle applies: if only single-pair readings
are available, there must only be a single altshift operator which applies after both
wh-variables have composed together, as in Figure 6.5. The question therefore has the
semantics of a regular multiple wh-question but the answer is known to both conversation
participants.
Pair-list readings can be ruled out by stipulating that for rhetorical wh-questions,
only one altshift operator ever applies – it is not possible for a second altshift operator
to be between the two wh-variables and therefore to compose the question as in Figure 6.6.
The idea that there are some constructions which only permit single-pair readings is also
85Mitrović (to appear) briefly mentions this possibility in his paper on Serbo-Croatian wh-questions;
however, he does not work out any details of this analysis and opts for an analysis based on a silent even
operator instead.
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discussed in Kotek (2016), who argues that this must be the case for quiz questions like
(410) and nested wh-questions like (411). In both cases, these are multiple wh-questions
which can only have single-pair readings.
(410) Germany were knocked out of which major football tournament when they
lost to which team in 2018?
(411) Which striker of which team scored the winning goal last night?
Kotek (2016) accounts for these by arguing that altshift operators are only
permitted in CP; quiz questions like (410) are TPs, with no wh-word moving to the
specifier of C, and so the wh-words must compose together before the altshift operator
applies. Nested wh-questions are singular DPs; so, although the wh-words move to the
specifier of C, the altshift operator cannot intervene between them. There are
therefore clear syntactic reasons as to why neither of these constructions can have
pair-list readings. This is, however, not the case for rhetorical multiple wh-questions. The
lack of pair-list reading cannot be so easily explained – with one wh-word moving overtly
to the specifier of C and the other moving covertly at LF, the intervention of a second
altshift operator (as in Figure 6.5) must be blocked. I do not motivate this block here,
but simply acknowledge that it must be the case.
In the same way as the single wh-variable questions, then, the altshift operator
applies, shifts the relevant alternatives for both wh-variables into the ordinary domain in
order to give the meaning of the question. The true, informative values of the variables
are known to both conversation participants, and thus the rhetorical question reading is
accessible for the participants.
(412) Olivia and Eden are making dinner for their flatmate, Sally. Eden is not sure
whether Sally would be happy if she put mushrooms in the food. The three of them
had shared pizzas together the night before: Sally had almost all of the funghi.
Olivia says:
O: Come on! Who polished off which pizza last night?!
It is therefore reasonably straightforward to deal with simple pragmatic instances of
rhetorical wh-questions in the semantics of Kotek (2016). However, this is to be expected:
they are, after all, instance of regular wh-questions, simply with known answers. I will
now move to consider how Kotek’s (2016) account can deal with the instances of rhetorical
wh-questions that I have labelled ‘generic’, and that exhibit polarity flip.
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6.4.3 ‘Generic’ rhetorical wh-questions
Recall that I posited there were two types of rhetorical wh-questions: the pragmatic ones
accounted for above, and those which I described as having a ‘generic’ meaning. These
are cases like the examples in (363) and (364), repeated here, in which the implied answer
to the question is a) of the opposite polarity to the question itself and b) implies an
approximation of the null set of possible answers, or an approximation of the full set of
possible answers.
(413) What has John ever done for Sam?! (= ‘John has done nothing for Sam.’)
(414) What hasn’t John done for Sam?! (=‘John has done everything for Sam.’)
It is worth noting once again at this point that these concepts of sets are wider than
the actual members of the set. If, in the { Olivia, Sally, Eden } domain, one of the members
says Who doesn’t like pizza?!, they do not necessarily know that all of the members of the
specific group like pizza: however, they are implying that for most people, it is the case
that they like pizza.
In order to account for examples like these, I posit that the altshift operator that
is the key part of Kotek’s (2016) analysis for wh-question meaning does not apply. This
means that no alternatives are shifted into the ordinary domain, and so it is not the case
that all conversation participants simply know the answer that is to be selected to fill the
variable.
However, according to Kotek (2016), this would then mean that the question was
undefined in its ordinary meaning. This is obviously not the case; these ‘generic’
rhetorical questions have meaning. I therefore posit that rather than being undefined
(Ramchand 1997), wh-words are defined in their ordinary values as a null metavariable ε.
The metavariable is specifically not a member of the set of things which can be denoted
by the wh-word: such as humans for who, things for what etc.
When the alternatives are not shifted into the ordinary domain, the question still
composes syntactically, with the EPP feature on C requiring a wh-phrase to move to and be
pronounced in the specifier of C. However, the altshift operator does not apply, leaving
the ordinary meaning of the question as it is without shifting any alternatives out of the
focus domain. The construction therefore never achieves the full semantics of a question
i.e. is not denoted as a set of propositions; rather, it is one singular proposition. Note
that in order to get the correct interpretations, the meanings of the metavariables must
be defined further for each wh-word, as in e.g. (415-417). Beside this ordinary meaning,
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there will be a set of individuals in the focus domain, but these are not put forward for
interpretation.
(415) JwhoKo = λw . ε /∈ human in w
JwhoKf = {Olivia, Sally, Eden}
(416) JwhatKo = λw . ε /∈ thing in w
JwhatKf = {margherita, funghi, pineapple}
(417) JwhereKo = λw . ε /∈ location in w
JwhereKf = {Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee}
The ordinary meaning supplied by the metavariable is downward entailing, without
having to posit a collapse to a full negative operator ¬ as Han (2002) does. This permits the
‘generic’ wh-word to license negative polarity items while this is not possible in rhetorical
wh-question cases where the answer is known to all participants in the Common Ground
(418).
(418) Who gives a damn if you lose?! [no one gives a damn, *Nikesh gives a damn]
The fact that this is an emphatic context also permits for the double negation
reading that licenses generic rhetorical wh-questions with negation in the main body of
the question. The fact that there is double negation, and therefore cancellation of the
negative operators, in this question means that negative polarity items are not licensed in
these interrogatives (419). Note there is an acceptable reading in which the wh-word is not
generic, and thus the negation is not cancelled.
(419) Who doesn’t give a damn if you lose?!
[Nikesh doesn’t give a damn, *no one gives a damn]
An alternative analysis for this type of construction posited in the literature is the
idea of a silent even operator which targets the lowest point of some sort of relevant scale
(Guerzoni 2004, Mitrović (in press)). While this can capture the generic interpretation
and the NPI licensing, it cannot account for the polarity flip, nor the issues with multiple
wh-words.
On the other hand, the lack of altshift operator explains why it is not possible to
have these ‘generic’ wh-words in multiple wh-questions. Either the operator applies, and
the alternatives are shifted into the ordinary domain, or it does not, and they cannot (see
the tree in Figure 6.7). It is therefore not possible to have one ‘generic’ wh-word and one
clear focused alternative in a multiple wh-questions.
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(420) Who danced with who first?!


























Figure 6.7: The LF representation of the rhetorical question posed in 420, showing the
optionality of the altshift operator. If the operator applies, both DPs will be shifted. If
it does not, neither DP can be shifted; it is not possible for one to shift without the other.
If the altshift operator does not apply in a multiple wh-question, the question has
no clear interpretation. In a similar way to the fact that a conversation participant must
hold an attitude towards each part of a proposition, there must be something concrete for
the generic metavariable to be understood in relation to.
Throughout this analysis, I have posited that rhetorical wh-questions denote
propositions, in part based on the results of the because clause experiment presented in
section 6.3. One possible issue with this analysis is the fact that, although pragmatically
marked, it is possible to give specific, single-word answers to ‘generic’ rhetorical
wh-questions (421).
(421) S: Who doesn’t like pizza?!
A: Amir.
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This answer appears to function like a denial, in that by giving the single word
answer ‘Amir’, A is rejecting the fact that there is no one in the world who doesn’t like
pizza. Denials of assertions are also pragmatically marked, but of course possible. However,
assertions cannot under any circumstances have single-word ‘answers’ (422). This clearly
sets these rhetorical interrogative constructions apart from assertions. In this respect,
then, rhetorical wh-questions appear to operate more like interrogatives, which challenges
the idea that they are of the same type as assertions.
(422) S: Everyone likes pizza!
A: Amir doesn’t. / *Amir.
However, I believe that the model of conversation participants’ discourse states
supported in chapter 4, in which each participant has their own version of the current
conversation, and of the moves that have been pushed to the QUD stack. The speaker
of the rhetorical wh-question has chosen not to shift the alternatives into the ordinary
meaning and thus push a version of the ‘question’ which is of type <s, t> to their own
stack. This may be signalled to the addressee by intonation (Dehé (2017) shows that there
are specific intonation triggers for generic rhetorical wh-questions, but does not compare
these to the intonation on specific pragmatic rhetorical wh-questions). However, given
that the addressee has their own version of the QUD stack, it is possible for the addressee
either to misinterpret the signals given by the speaker or intentionally reject these signals
and push a version of the interrogative in which the focus alternatives have been shifted
into the ordinary domain by the altshift operator to the stack. This allows for the
addressee to then give a specific answer from the domain of focus alternatives, which
is highly pragmatically marked as there has been a mismatch of meaning between the
speaker and the addressee – to the speaker, it is therefore a denial of the proposition they
put forward; to the addressee, it is simply the answer to a regular wh-interrogative (for
whatever pragmatic purpose). This thus accounts for the differing answering possibilities
between rhetorical wh-questions and their assertive counterparts, despite the fact that both
denote assertions.
A final note: it appears that, cross-linguistically, there is further evidence that
these types of wh-rhetorical question are fundamentally different from the general working
pragmatic definition where p (or the value of the wh-variable) is already contained within
the Common Ground – for example, see Oguro (2014) on mono ka questions in Japanese,
or Mitrović (to appear) on biased wh-questions in Serbo-Croatian. Exploring the strategies
that languages employ to do this further could be a productive avenue for future research.
326
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I explored some questions around rhetorical questions that arose from
earlier claims made in this thesis. Firstly, I extended my prior claim that polar rhetorical
questions can be accounted for in the same framework as biased questions, showing how
rhetorical questions fill the gaps in the table presented in Domaneschi et al. (2017), and
following Biezma and Rawlins (2017) in claiming that these questions are all from the
‘same family’. I also showed why wh-questions cannot have the same analysis for their
rhetorical interpretations – speakers must be able to express an attitude towards each part
of a proposition in order to be biased towards its inclusion in the Common Ground, but
this cannot be the case in wh-questions, where the wh-word itself is a set of propositions.
This explains why Scots check moves developed in polar rhetorical questions but not in
wh-questions, and nor could they be extended to them once established.
Having argued that polar rhetorical questions were different, I then moved on to
discuss rhetorical wh-questions in more detail. The analyses posited in the literature
suggest that all rhetorical wh-questions can have the same pragmatic analysis – however,
I presented data that was problematic for this position, showing that polarity flipped
rhetorical wh-questions behave differently. I then presented the results of an experiment
showing that these rhetorical questions behaved more like assertions in being acceptable
as the complement of a because clause.
I developed an analysis for these ‘generic’ rhetorical wh-questions using Kotek’s
(2016) semantics for wh-questions. Here, an altshift operator normally applies in wh-
questions to move the set of focus alternatives from the focus domain into the ordinary
domain, but fails in the cases of these ‘generic’ questions. Instead, the downward entailing
null metavariable ε is the underlying ordinary meaning of the wh-word and thus remains
the ordinary meaning as no alternatives are shifted. This was able to account for the
‘generic’ quality of these rhetorical questions, their acceptability as the complement of
because clauses, their polarity flip, and the fact that they cannot occur as one of the




I began this thesis with the aim of addressing a number of overarching questions at the
syntax/pragmatics interface: how are non-canonical questions licensed? What sort of
information is encoded semantically in these constructions? How much of this discourse
information can be built into the syntax, and how does this happen? I proposed to look at
this by focusing on non-canonical questions with negation, a set of constructions that show
interesting relationships to polarity and to conversational goals: matrix biased questions,
reverse polarity tag questions, polar rhetorical questions and interrogative exclamatives.
The relevant constructions had been separated into two groups in the literature, with
tag questions analysed as variants of biased questions (van Rooij and Šafářová 2003, Sailor
2011, Malamud and Stephenson 2014, Krifka 2015), and interrogative exclamatives variants
of polar rhetorical questions (Zanuttini and Portner 2003, Delfitto and Fiorin 2014). I also
proposed to look more closely at the relationship between the four constructions.
In order to address these overarching questions, I focused firstly on data from two
Scots varieties: Glasgow Scots and Shetland dialect. Each variety has a particle (–int in
Glasgow Scots and –n in Shetland dialect) that the literature suggests appears in certain
types of interrogative constructions only (Robertson and Graham 1952, Thoms et al. 2013)
– however, this had not been documented in any detail for either variety. My first task was
therefore to establish the distribution of each particle, linking to the recent literature on
non-canonical questions and speaker beliefs and evidential biases, and therefore providing a
considerably more detailed understanding of these particles than in the previous literature.
In chapter 2, I presented the methodology for this research, which extended
existing dialect syntax methods (e.g. Barbiers and Bennis (2007)) to take account of
pragmatic and prosodic phenomena. I also considered the sociolinguistic knowledge
required to accurately interpret the results of the data gathering process, positing what I
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termed ‘perceptual hyperdialectalism’ by showing evidence of young Shetland dialect
speakers’ hyperdialectalism through their use of rating scales to assert their identity in
the face of linguistic insecurity. This gave further insight into the linguistic situation in
Shetland, as well as how speakers behave in situations of dialect obsolescence.
In chapter 3 I presented the results of extensive acceptability judgment tasks that
I carried out with speakers of the relevant varieties. From these results, I was able to
establish the distribution of the particles: –int in Glasgow Scots was acceptable in tag
questions with preference in neutral evidential contexts, interrogative exclamatives and
polar rhetorical questions, while –n in Shetland dialect was acceptable in tag questions,
interrogative exclamatives, polar rhetorical questions, and to some extent in matrix biased
questions for older speakers.
In chapter 4, I moved on to propose an analysis of the Scots particles that engaged
with the major questions from the first chapter. I firstly looked at the pragmatic
distribution of the particles and showed how this agreed with and diverged from standard
English. In particular, I used three tests (the ability of the speaker to attribute the belief
of p to the addressee (and how this works for predicates of personal taste); the ability for
the speaker to revise and take full responsibility for p in the event that the addressee is
not also an independent source, and discourse closure, using the possibility of a following
so continuation) that showed the relationship between the speaker and the addressee is
crucial to the distribution of the –int and –n particles.
I then moved on to a semantic analysis, based on the interactional framework of
Ginzburg (2012), and analysed the Scots particles as check moves, in which the speaker
has the goal of adding both p and p ∈ SP(a) to their representation of the Common
Ground. I compared this analysis with the standard English canonical tag construction,
which I proposed was an instance of there being a Known Answer to the proposed question,
building on Reese and Asher (2006) and Gunlogson (2008). The semantic analysis for –int
and –n also required refining the meaning of phenomena like ‘check’, ‘confirmation’ and
‘acknowledgment’ to show the subtle distinctions between different types of move.
Finally, I presented a syntactic analysis for the –int and –n particles. I utilised
and refined the neo-performative syntax for confirmationals proposed by Wiltschko and
Heim (2016) and Wiltschko (2017), and added evidence for head movement into this
speech act syntax domain, thus extending work that claims that particles outwith with
the traditional conceptualisation of a clause should also be treated as a regular part of
the syntax (Haegeman and Hill 2013, Hill 2013, Wiltschko and Heim 2016). The
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syntactic analysis I proposed accounted for the limited distribution of the –int and –n
particles, particularly the data from negative anchor tag questions which was problematic
for alternative approaches which took –int and –n to be negation.
Across chapters 3 and 4, then, I established the distribution of some previously
understudied particles in two Scots varieties. I provided a cohesive pragmatic, semantic
and syntactic analysis for the particles that showed how and where they differ from the
same constructions in standard English. This data addressed my overarching questions in
a number of ways: by taking into account the role of the speaker/addressee relationship in
question licensing; by establishing specific semantics for check moves, and by proposing
that –int and –n are situated in the discourse domain in CP. I also provided evidence that
specific particles could be employed in subsets of the non-canonical questions discussed
that did not align with the divides presented in the literature. I thus argued that the
relationship between the constructions is different, and more closely linked, than what has
previously been proposed in the literature.
Following the Scots data, I addressed two more questions using data from standard
English which also contributed to the overall question about the relationship between
all four constructions. Firstly, in chapter 5, I presented the results of an experiment to
test speakers’ preferences for matrix biased questions or tag questions depending on the
evidential context surrounding the interaction. This built on prior work that tested types of
matrix question construction depending on evidential context (Domaneschi et al. 2017) as
well as claims that had been made about the distribution of different types of tag question
(Ladd 1981). I established that although both constructions are available in neutral and
negative evidential contexts, speakers in both English and German have preferences as
to which construction to use in which context. I showed that in standard English, this
followed from the analysis of tag questions that I proposed in chapter 4. I also hypothesised
about the role that the strength of belief and/or evidential context plays in the licensing of
question constructions cross-linguistically through comparison of the English and German
data.
Finally, in chapter 6, I turned to consider rhetorical questions. Previous work on
rhetorical questions has taken polar rhetorical questions and rhetorical wh-questions to
be amenable to the same analysis. However, the data from Scots suggested that the bias
in these two constructions is not expressed in the same way. I firstly argued that polar
rhetorical questions can be accounted for by a falsum / verum approach, and why this
is not suitable for rhetorical wh-questions. I then presented an analysis for rhetorical
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wh-questions which extended Kotek’s (2016) semantics for wh-questions to include
rhetorical questions. In this way, I was able to accommodate the standard pragmatic
account of rhetorical wh-questions (Caponigro and Sprouse 2007, Biezma and Rawlins
2017), as well as the lack of availability of pair-list readings in rhetorical wh-questions
pointed out by Caponigro and Sprouse (2007). Most interestingly, though, this accounted
for the group of rhetorical wh-questions that I label ‘generic’. These interrogatives were
distinguished from standard rhetorical wh-questions by their polarity flip, their ‘generic’
quality and their ability to act as the complement of because-clauses. I proposed that
these interpretations arise from the failure of Kotek’s altshift operator to apply, as
opposed to standard instances of rhetorical wh-questions in which the answer is simply
known to both participants.
I have therefore addressed a number of gaps in the literature in a timely fashion.
On the theoretical side, there has been considerable interest in non-canonical questions
with negation in recent years (on English alone see e.g. Sailor (2011), Repp (2013), Sudo
(2013), Malamud and Stephenson (2014), Northrup (2014), Trinh (2014), Krifka (2015),
Romero (2015), Biezma and Rawlins (2017), Domaneschi et al. (2017), Farkas and
Roelofsen (2017), Gaertner and Gyuris (2017)). This thesis builds on this literature by
considering the relationships between the non-canonical question constructions and
arguing that, for polar cases, the same analysis is applicable to all four of the
constructions in standard English. The syntax/pragmatics interface has been of
considerable interest recently (e.g. Speas and Tenny (2003), Coniglio and Zegrean (2012),
Haegeman and Hill (2013), Hill (2013), Haegeman (2014), Wiltschko (2017)), and I have
added to those discussions by proposing head movement to the the discourse domain of
the left periphery. There has also been considerable recent interest in discourse particles
and their syntactic and semantic encoding (e.g. Ginzburg (2012), Rojas-Esponda (2013),
Grosz (2014), Wiltschko and Heim (2016), Woods (2016), Yang and Wiltschko (2016)),
and I have added to this through discussion of the Scots particles and their analysis as
check markers, making more specific and subtle distinctions between different types of
particles used for confirming/checking/acknowledging moves. The work in this thesis also
builds on the current work of the Scots Syntax Atlas project by providing in-depth
syntactic judgments on two constructions and extending the dialect syntax methodology
to consider specific pragmatic and prosodic variables.
Of course, there are many aspects which I have not addressed in this thesis, merely
hinted at, which I believe would be fruitful lines for future study. In particular, the
331
relationship between polar rhetorical questions and exclamatives deserves further study: is
it the case that exclamatives are like polar rhetorical questions and biased questions, simply
with a pos marker (Kennedy and McNally 2005) invoked due to the scalar predicate?
More investigation is required. Similarly, the roles of other non-epistemic biases (such as
deontic or bouletic biases) in interrogative production should be investigated: how does a
circumstantial desire for p to be true affect a speaker’s choice of interrogative construction?
There are further questions to be answered too with respect to rhetorical questions: what
is the effect of something like after all with regards to the semantics of the proposition
it is attached to? In the Scots varieties investigated here there are also further questions
as to the development of the –int and –n particles, and also in general to do with the
development of the negation patterns we see in Scots – why does Scots use verb-subject-no
for biased questions and true negative questions, while there is a high/low negation split
in standard English? These questions could be addressed with larger historical corpora. I
believe that this could tie into a wider investigation in to the cross-linguistic development
of negation in biased questions when a language’s progress through the Jespersen Cycle is
taken into account.
Overall, I hope that this research helps push towards a broader research
programme that builds on and extends the work by Sudo (2013), Domaneschi et al.
(2017) and Gaertner and Gyuris (2017), who all take the position that at least all
information-seeking polar interrogatives can be accounted for in terms of speaker beliefs
and evidential biases. The contributions that I have made here indicate that considering
these phenomena in a gradient manner (rather than in a binary positive / negative
fashion) will incorporate a wider range of non-canonical questions (e.g. polar rhetorical
questions), as well as showing the potential for links between the constructions. The
Scots data in particular indicate that different varieties can develop different particles to
express different points and combinations of points of the scale; furthermore, the
discussion of check and ‘confirmational’ moves etc. demonstrates that there can be very
subtle distinctions in what particles within a variety express. I thus believe that this
would be a positive programme for future cross-linguistic study on the topic.
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This appendix includes all of the materials used in the Scots data collection from chapters
2 and 3. It also includes the forms that participants in both Glasgow and Shetland were
given prior to and following data collection.
i) Key to codes in materials
ii) Materials for data collection
iii) Pre-task information sheet
iv) Consent form























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Information sheet for participants 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study! 
This research is part of the work I am carrying out for my PhD in Linguistics and English Language at 
the University of Edinburgh, where I am researching Scots dialects. 
There are two sessions in this research. Both sessions involve the same task, and should each take 
about the same amount of time. 
In the first session, I will read to you a short context, which will end with the words “you say” or “you 
say to me”. After this, you will press a button a laptop, which will play a sentence. You will listen to 
the sentence, and then you will give a judgment on a scale of 1 to 5 about how acceptable the 
sentence is to you in your local dialect. We might discuss the examples; all the discussion will be 
recorded. 
 
          
1            2            3            4    5 
unusual 
sounds weird 
no one says that 
   totally natural 
I say that 
people around me say that 
 
There is no right or wrong answer. Don’t worry about what you were taught at school, or what seems 
“proper” – I’m just interested in what you might expect to hear or say in a relaxed, conversational 
environment between speakers in your community. 
When the first session is finished, there will be a short break. When you are ready, we will start the 
second session. The second session will be exactly like the first, but with different sentences for you 
to give judgments on. 
All recordings and information disclosed will be treated as strictly confidential. You will be assigned 
a participant number and all recordings will be stored securely and referred to by that number alone.  
You may withdraw from the study at any point. 
Before we start the interview, make sure you have filled out: 
1) A consent form; 
2) The background information questionnaire. 
If you have any questions or would like any more information at any point, please contact me at 
e.jamieson@sms.ed.ac.uk.  




Linguistics & English Language 
University of Edinburgh 
Consent for Participation in Experiments, Data Use, and Data Storage 
Study title: PhD research 
Principal Investigator: Professor Caroline Heycock 
Researcher collecting current data: E Jamieson 
What is this document?  This document explains what kind of study we’re doing, what your rights are, and 
what will be done with your data. If there are any special benefits or risks, they will be explained here. By filling 
in, signing and dating this document, you will be agreeing to participate and to let us use your data in specific 
ways.  Please read the information below, then turn to the next page, tick all boxes that apply, and, if you are 
happy to proceed, sign and date where indicated at the end of the form. 
Nature of the study.  You are about to participate in a study which involves giving judgments on a series of 
sentences. The researcher named above will first introduce a small context, and then you will press a button on 
a laptop to hear an example. You will then give a rating to the example you have heard, and may discuss it with 
the researcher. This discussion will be recorded. There will be two sessions with a short break in the middle; in 
total, the study should take up to 2 ½ hours. You will be given full instructions shortly and will be able to ask 
any questions you may have.   
You will be given a £15 Amazon voucher as a thank you for your participation in this research. 
Risks and benefits.  There are no known risks to participation in this study. The only benefits to you personally 
are those you draw from making a contribution to our knowledge about language and its use.  
Confidentiality.  The data we collect will not be associated with your name or with any other personal details 
that might identify you. 
Voluntary participation and right to withdraw. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from 
the study at any time and for any reason. If you withdraw from the study during or after data gathering, you can 
also request that your data is deleted. There is no penalty for withdrawal. 
Contact information. This research is being conducted by the above-listed researchers at the University of 
Edinburgh. The researchers can be contacted at e.jamieson@sms.ed.ac.uk or caroline.heycock@ed.ac.uk for 
questions or to report a research-related problem. Contact the Linguistics & English Language Ethics 
committee at 0131 651 5510 or lel.ethics@ed.ac.uk if you have concerns regarding your rights as a participant 
in the research. 
If you have any questions about what you’ve just read, please feel free to ask them now. 
Thank you for your help! 
Now please complete the consent form on the next page.
	 2 
No 
Linguistics & English Language 
University of Edinburgh 
Consent for Participation, Use of Data, and Data Storage 
Study title: PhD research 
Principal Investigator: Professor Caroline Heycock 
Researcher collecting current data: E Jamieson 
PLEASE	MARK	EITHER	‘YES’	OR	‘NO’	FOR	EVERY	STATEMENT	BELOW:	
Consent for participation: Yes No 
I consent to having my responses and speech recorded for the specific research project identified 
above. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions. 
  
I understand that I have the right to terminate this session at any point, and to request that my data 
is deleted. 
  
   
Anonymity/identification: Yes No 
I agree that my name and personal details will not be made public under any circumstances. 
  
    
Researcher use of judgment data: Yes No 
I agree that the anonymized data I produce may be kept permanently in Edinburgh 
University archives and used for the specific research project which made them. 
  
I agree that the anonymized data I produce may be used by the above-named researchers, as 
well as by other qualified researchers, for teaching or research purposes, an d  in 
professional presentations and publications.  
	 	
   
Researcher use of voice recordings: Yes No 
I agree that the recordings m a d e  may be kept permanently in Edinburgh University 
archives and used for the specific research project which made them. 
  
I agree that the recordings m a d e  may be used by the above-named researchers, as well as 
by other qualified researchers, for teaching or research purposes, an d  in professional 
presentations and publications. In the case of voice recordings, I understand that my voice 
might be recognizable to those who know me. 
	 	
   
General public use of judgment data: Yes No 
I agree that the anonymized data I produce may be made publicly available for general use, 
e.g. used in radio or television broadcasts, or put on the world-wide web.  
  
 	 	
General public use of voice recordings: Yes 	 No 	
I agree that these recordings may be made publicly available for general use, e.g. used in radio 
or television broadcasts, or put on the world-wide web.  In the case of voice recordings, I 




Name:                                                                                                           Email:                
 





Name:   ____________________________________________________________________ 
Age:  __________   D.O.B.:  ______ /______ /_______ 
Gender:   ______________________ 
 
We may want to contact you at a future date to ask if you would be interested in participating in a 
follow-up. If you are willing to be contacted in this way, please provide your email address. We will 
use it for no other purpose and it will not be shared with any other person or organisation. 








Have you ever lived anywhere outside of [Shetland/Glasgow]?   Y / N 





Parents’ places of birth:   ________________________   and   _________________________ 
 
What is your occupation?   _______________________________________________________ 
Post-Interview 
 
Thank you for taking part in this research! 
My project is entitled “Questions, biases and ‘negation’: Evidence from Scots varieties” and looks at 
the different ways that people use types of questions in different Scottish dialects – specifically, in 
Shetland and in Glasgow. 
I am looking at questions that seem to have some sort of negative marker in them (like the n’t in 
don’t), but that don’t actually mean anything negative. This includes  
• tag questions (where you know Sarah, don’t you? implies that you do know Sarah) 
• biased questions (where don’t you know Sarah too? again implies that you do know Sarah) 
• rhetorical questions (things like didn’t I tell you it would be easy?!, which implies both that I 
told you it would be easy, and that it was easy) 
• exclamatives (things like isn’t it a lovely day!, which implies that it is a lovely day) 
In Shetland and Glasgow, I am interested to find out what sorts of negative markers people use in 
these types of sentences, and how they are different to the negative markers they use when they 
actually want to say something negative. I am also interested in the ways that intonation, particularly 
getting higher at the end of a sentence, works in these types of sentences. 
I hope that this research will also be able to contribute to wider discussion about these types of 
questions across languages. 
If you would like to know more, please email me (E Jamieson): e.jamieson@sms.ed.ac.uk.  
I am supervised by Professor Caroline Heycock, who can be contacted at caroline.heycock@ed.ac.uk.  
Thanks again! 
Appendix B
This appendix includes the materials and consent forms for the experiments on biased
questions and tag questions presented in chapter 5.
i) English experiment consent form
ii) English materials




Linguistics & English Language 
University of Edinburgh 




Researcher collecting current data: E	Jamieson	
Nature of the study. You are about to participate in a study which involves reading a set of short (1-2 line) 
contexts, and then choosing one of two possible sentences in response to each context. Your responses will be 
recorded. Your session should last for around 15 minutes. You will be given full instructions shortly. 
Risks and benefits.  There are no known risks to participation in this study. The only benefits to you personally 
are those you draw from making a contribution to our knowledge about language and its use.  
Confidentiality.  The data we collect will not be associated with your name or with any other personal details 
that might identify you. 
Voluntary participation and right to withdraw. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from 
the study at any time and for any reason. If you choose to withdraw afterwards, please use the contact 
information below, we will delete your data and there will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. 
Contact information. This research is being conducted by the above-listed researchers at the University of 
Edinburgh. The researchers can be contacted at e.jamieson@sms.ed.ac.uk or caroline.heycock@ed.ac.uk for 
questions or to report a research-related problem. Contact the Linguistics & English Language Ethics 
committee at 0131 651 5510 or lel.ethics@ed.ac.uk if you have concerns regarding your rights as a participant 
in the research. 
If you have any questions about what you’ve just read, please contact the researchers before continuing. 
Thank you for your help! 
By clicking accept, you consent to the following:  
 
1. I agree that the anonymized data I produce may be kept permanently in Edinburgh University 
archives and used for the specific research project which made them. 
2. I agree that the anonymized data I produce may be used by the above-named researchers, as well 
as by other qualified researchers, for teaching or research purposes, an d  in professional 
presentations and publications. 
3. I agree that that the anonymized data I produce may be made publicly available for general use, e.g. 
used in radio or television broadcasts, or put on the world-wide web. 
4. I understand that I have the right to terminate this session at any point. If I choose to withdraw after 






























































































































































































































































































































Linguistics & English Language 
University of Edinburgh 
Einverständniserklärung zur Teilnahme am Experiment, Nutzung und Speicherung der 
Daten 
 
Name der Studie: PhD	Umfrage	
Doktormutter/Hauptuntersuchungsleiterin: Professor	Caroline	Heycock	
Die Daten erhebende Doktorandin: E	Jamieson	
Art der Studie. Die folgende Umfrage besteht aus einer Folge kurzer Kontexte und zwei alternativer 
Antwortmöglichkeiten, von denen Sie geben werden eine auszuwählen. Ihre Auswahl wird gespeichert. Die 
Umfrage dauert etwa 15 Minuten. Der genaue Ablauf wird vor dem Start erklärt. 
Risiken und Nutzen. Es sind keine Risiken oder Gefahren der Studie bekannt. Der einzige Nutzen, den Sie 
persönlich an der Teilnahme haben, ist der Wissenschaft und unserem Wissen über Sprache und ihre 
Anwendung zu helfen. 
Vertraulichkeit.  Die gesammelten Daten warden nicht mit Ihrem Namen oder persönlichen Details durch die 
Sie identifiziert werden könnten in Verbindung gebracht.  
Freiwilligkeit der Teilnahme und möglichkeit zum Abbruch. Die Teilnahme an dieser Studie ist freiwillig 
und kann jederzeit unterbrochen oder beendet werden. Sollten Sie Ihre Teilnahme zurückziehen wollen, nutzen 
Sie bitte die unten stehende Kontaktadresse – wir werden Ihre Daten löschen. 
Kontakt. Diese Umfrage wird von den oben genannten Forscherinnen an der University of Edinburgh 
durchgeführt. Sie sind unter e.jamieson@sms.ed.ac.uk oder caroline.heycock@ed.ac.uk erreichbar, falls Sie 
Fragen haben oder ein Problem mit der Umfrage melden möchten. Sollten Sie Fragen oder Bedenken zum 
Thema Datenschutz haben, kontaktieren Sie bitte den Linguistics & English Language Ethikrat unter +44 
0131 651 5510 oder lel.ethics@ed.ac.uk . 
Wenn Sie Fragen zu den oben stehenden Informationen über die Studie haben, kontaktieren Sie bitte eines der 
Mitgleider des Forschungsteams bevor sie an der Studie teilnehmen.  
Danke für Ihre Hilfe! 
Wenn Sie auf “annehmen” klicken, stimmen Sie dem Folgenden zu:  
 
1. Meine anonymisierten Daten dürfen permanent im Archiv der University of Edinburgh aufbewahrt 
und für dieses Forschungsprojekt genutzt werden. 
2. Meine anonymisierten Daten dürfen von den oben genannten Forscherinnen und anderen qualifizierten 
Forschern für Forschung Lehre und in Fachvorträgen und Publikationen verwendet werden.  
3. Meine anonymisierten Daten dürfen für die allgemeine Nutzung öffentlich zur Verfügung gestellt 
werden, das bedeutet sie können in Radioß oder Fernsehsendungen genutzt oder online verfügbar 
gemacht werden.  
4. Ich bin mir bewusst, dass ich die Teilnahme an der Studie jederzeit unterbrechen oder beenden 













































































































































































































































































































































This appendix includes the materials and consent form for the experiment on rhetorical





Linguistics & English Language 
University of Edinburgh 




Researcher collecting current data: E	Jamieson	
Nature of the study. You are about to participate in a study which has two short parts. In one section, you will 
rate sentences on a scale from 1-5. In the other section, you will be asked to choose the most acceptable response 
to a statement from two possible answers. Your responses will be recorded. Your session should last for around 
20 minutes. You will be given full instructions shortly. 
Risks and benefits.  There are no known risks to participation in this study. The only benefits to you personally 
are those you draw from making a contribution to our knowledge about language and its use.  
Confidentiality.  The data we collect will not be associated with your name or with any other personal details 
that might identify you. 
Voluntary participation and right to withdraw. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from 
the study at any time and for any reason. If you choose to withdraw afterwards, please use the contact 
information below, we will delete your data and there will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. 
Contact information. This research is being conducted by the above-listed researchers at the University of 
Edinburgh. The researchers can be contacted at e.jamieson@sms.ed.ac.uk or caroline.heycock@ed.ac.uk for 
questions or to report a research-related problem. Contact the Linguistics & English Language Ethics 
committee at 0131 651 5510 or lel.ethics@ed.ac.uk if you have concerns regarding your rights as a participant 
in the research. 
If you have any questions about what you’ve just read, please contact the researchers before continuing. 
Thank you for your help! 
By clicking accept, you consent to the following:  
 
1. I agree that the anonymized data I produce may be kept permanently in Edinburgh University 
archives and used for the specific research project which made them. 
2. I agree that the anonymized data I produce may be used by the above-named researchers, as well 
as by other qualified researchers, for teaching or research purposes, an d  in professional 
presentations and publications. 
3. I agree that that the anonymized data I produce may be made publicly available for general use, e.g. 
used in radio or television broadcasts, or put on the world-wide web. 
4. I understand that I have the right to terminate this session at any point. If I choose to withdraw after 
completing the study, my data will be deleted at that time. 
There's	a	new	job	coming	up	at	your	
company.	It's	two	grades	above	the	one	
you've	already	got.	I'm	always	very	
supportive	of	your	work,	and	I	suggest	you	
should	apply.	You	say:	
I'm	not	going	
to	apply	
because…	
	
what	could	I	bring	to	the	table?!	 WH	
could	I	bring	anything	to	the	table?!	 YN	
I'm	not	ready	for	that.	 DECL	
I	don't	bring	anything	to	the	table.	 DECL	
	
Our	basketball	club	is	having	an	AGM.	
Neither	of	us	are	on	the	committee	and	so	
neither	of	us	have	to	be	there.	We're	
discussing	it,	and	you	say:	
I	won't	be	
there	
because…	
	
who	can	be	bothered	with	that?!	
	
WH	
can	anyone	be	bothered	with	that?!	 YNQP	
can	I	be	bothered	with	that?!	 YN	
I	can't	be	bothered	with	that.	 DECL	
I	have	better	things	to	do.	 DECL	
	
I	am	passing	around	some	fermented	fish	I	
bought	in	Iceland.	I	offer	it	to	you	and	you	
say:	
I'm	not	
having	any	
because…	
	
who	wants	to	eat	rotting	fish?!	
	
WH	
does	anyone	want	to	eat	rotting	fish?!	 YNQP	
do	I	want	to	eat	rotting	fish?!	 YN	
I	don’t	want	to	eat	rotting	fish.	 DECL	
I	think	it	sounds	gross.	 DECL	
	
I'm	getting	an	Amazon	Alexa.	You	think	
they're	a	bit	pointless.	I	tell	you	about	the	
one	I'm	getting	and	you	say:	
I	wouldn't	
get	one	
because…	
	
what	would	I	do	with	it?!	
	
WH	
would	I	do	anything	with	it?!	 YN	
I	would	never	use	it.	 DECL	
I	think	they	are	pointless.	 DECL	
	
We	have	been	offered	two	meet	and	greet	
tickets	for	a	Beyoncé	concert.	We	both	really	
like	her,	but	it's	at	a	time	when	we're	both	
really	busy.	You	say:	
I'm	going	
anyway,	
because…	
	
who	doesn't	want	to	meet	Beyonce?!	 WH	
doesn't	everyone	want	to	meet	
Beyonce?	
YNQP	
don't	I	want	to	meet	Beyonce?!	 YN	
it	would	be	ridiculous	not	to.	 DECL	
I	really	want	to	meet	her.	 DECL	
	
You	love	trying	new	foods.	I	have	just	bought	
a	selection	of	really	hot	chillis	and	I	say	I'm	
going	to	put	one	in	a	curry	I'm	making.	I'm	
worried	no	one	will	want	to	eat	it	but	you	
say:	
I	will,	
because…	
	
what	wouldn't	I	eat?!	 WH	
wouldn't	I	eat	anything?!	 YN	
I	would	try	anything.	 DECL	
it	sounds	great.	 DECL	
	
You	have	won	a	raffle	and	you	get	to	choose	
between	the	two	remaining	prizes.	There	are	
some	Amazon	vouchers,	and	a	bottle	of	
champagne.	You	say:			
I'll	take	the	
vouchers	
because…	
	
what	couldn't	I	get	with	them?!	
	
WH	
couldn't	I	get	anything	with	them?!	 YN	
I	could	get	anything	with	them.	 DECL	
that	way	there's	loads	I	can	get.	 DECL	
	
You've	made	a	big	cake.	Lots	of	people	at	
your	work	are	on	a	diet	but	you	know	they	
love	treats.	So	you	say:	
	
I'll	take	the	
cake	into	
work	anyway	
because…	
	
who	won't	have	just	a	small	slice?!	
	
WH	
won't	everyone	have	just	a	small	
slice?!	
YNQP	
won't	they	have	just	a	small	slice?!	 YN	
everyone	will	have	a	small	slice.	 DECL	
they	will	all	appreciate	it.	 DECL	
	
